COMMENTS
What is the so-called ‘hard problem’? Vlastimil thinks it is the problem of specifying which natural (physical) item a given mental item is identical to. But this is a misuse of the term ‘hard problem.’ As used in contemporary literature, its meaning is rather more specific. Although the problem so-labelled has been around for a long time, the label ‘hard problem’ as used in contemporary discussions was first introduced by David Chalmers in a 1995 article and then fully explained in his 1996 book The Conscious Mind. It is to be understood by contrast with (supposedly) ‘easy problems’ in the philosophy of mind. So what is the hard problem? And what is an example of a (supposedly) easy problem?
The Hard Problem
Suppose I inadvertently touch a hot stove top, experience a pain sensation, and withdraw my hand. My behavior (stove-touching, hand-withdrawal) is third-person accessible: I see it and others around me see it. And if no one around me is present? They could see it if they were present. But surely there is more to pain than pain-behavior. There is the sensation itself. But what is the sensation itself? There are two ways of considering it. In one way it too is third-person accessible or outwardly observable. In the other way it is not.
The first way is by taking the pain sensation to be a state or event or process literally internal to (spatially inside of) the organism. In the present example, the organism is the animal that wears my clothes. So the sensation is a physical process occurring in BV’s brain-body composite. This physical process is then plausibly taken to be the salient cause of the aversive behavior whether physical or verbal (the hand-withdrawal and/or various spoken obscenities.)
The second way I’ll call phenomenological. The subject of the painful experience simply attends by introspection to the felt pain precisely as it is felt while bracketing (in roughly Husserl’s sense) all such considerations as the causation of the experience and its location in the organism. In so doing, the subject does not deny that the felt pain has a cause or that the pain has neural correlates located in the brain. He does not even doubt their existence. He simply leaves those factors out of consideration, and makes no use of them, the better to focus on the undeniable (pace Dennett the Denier) phen0menological datum, the felt pain precisely as it is felt. The subject focuses his attention exclusively on the phenomenal or qualitative features of the experience he is enduring.
The so-called ‘hard problem’ can now be stated. It is the problem of giving an account, consistent with (metaphysical) naturalism, of these qualitative features or properties of sensations, the so-called qualia (singular: quale), when the sensations are taken, not behavioristically, nor neuro-scientifically, but precisely as they themselves appear from the first-person point of view (POV) of the subjects who consciously experience them. There is something it is like to experience the phenomenal pain consequent on touching a hot stove. This Nagelian ‘what it is like’ is undeniably real — is there anything more real than pain? — but it cannot be slotted into a wholly third-personal naturalistic ontology. The felt pain is ineluctably subjective: there is simply no place for it in a naturalist world-scheme.
Now suppose you are, for whatever reasons, committed to that naturalist scheme. Then you face a very hard problem indeed, so hard, I would say, as to count as insoluble. The problem is well-formulated in the inconsistent triad Vlastimil cites at the top of the page. Scroll up and take another look at it. The third proposition cannot be denied on pain of the naturalist’s ceasing to be a naturalist. The first cannot be denied unless our naturalist is an eliminativist about consciousness, a position with absolute nothing to recommend it. The naturalist’s only hope is somehow to hold onto the second proposition — consciousness is not physical. But how? By going mysterian. But first a word about easy problems, one of which is intentionality.
A (Supposedly) Easy Problem
Not every episode of consciousness is object-directed. The felt pain I have been using as an example is not object-directed, or an instance of intentionality. It has a cause outside the body, the hot stove, and a neural correlate inside the brain, Delta-A fiber excitation let us suppose, but the felt pain does not reveal or display or make manifest anything in the way my seeing of a glorious Arizona sunset reveals said sunset to me. The pain is not of or about anything; the seeing is. We have to distinguish between consciousness and consciousness-of. Of course, an episode of consciousness-of may have some associated qualia, if I am, say, watching a glorious sunset or moonrise, but there are qualia free object-directed mental states. But this is a complicated special topic we cannot now discuss. I will just refer you to an earlier entry, Intentionality not a ‘Hard Problem’ for Physicalists?
Mysterianism
What our friend Vlastimil is calling mysterianism about consciousness I take to be the thesis that, while humans either do or can — unclear which he means — know that, in general, every mental item (whether intentional or non-intentional) is identical to some natural item or other, what they cannot know, and what must remain a mystery to them, is whether any given mental item such as a phenomenal pain felt on a given occasion by a particular subject is both natural and mental. They cannot know it as both mental and physical. While experiencing headache pain, for example, I can and do know it self-evidently to be a mental datum, but I cannot also know it to be wholly natural, even if in reality it is! Thus our friend is advocating the mysterianism of Colin McGinn.
Vlastimil distinguishes this mysterian form of naturalism about the mind from an old-school anti-naturalist mysterianism according to which we cannot recognize mental items to be natural items because there are no natural items to which they could be identical.
But here I must raise a question about the tenability of this distinction. If a particular felt pain cannot be identified with, and thus reduced to, a particular instance of Delta-A fiber stimulation because the former has properties the latter cannot have, and vice versa, why call this mysterianism? Where is the mystery? What we would have here is a straight-forward argument which, if sound, shows that some or all mental items cannot be reduced to natural items. What we would have is an argument for dualism, whether property dualism or substance dualism.
To have a mystery in the strict sense you need propositions that appear and cannot fail to appear to intellects of our constitution as logically inconsistent, but in reality, and beyond our ken, are somehow consistent. Trinity and Incarnation are mysteries in this sense.
Similarly for McGinn: We cannot understand how qualia, which are undeniably real, are identical to natural items, and yet they are! It is imply beyond our ken. Our cognitive architecture is so structured as to disallow any insight on our part as to how this pain I am feeling is nothing more than a physical occurrence!
Many thanks for this, Bill.
– Readers may find my paper at http://www.academia.edu/8610367/Mysterianism_about_Consciousness_and_the_Trinity
– “the hand-withdrawal and/or various spoken obscenities”
I love that.
– “This Nagelian ‘what it is like’ is undeniably real — is there anything more real than pain?”
Beware esp. Kammerer. He tries hard, better than Dennett, to prove you wrong. I don’t buy his attempts, but he’s interesting:
http://www.facebook.com/vlastimil.vohanka/posts/pfbid0pY7oZzHFKd8ndmcBULX6DphuDFScyzWCdKbeZUsg7v1VwAShx3jF7YUQryRkVR18l (sorry to reader who don’t have facebook, but they might be able to see this post of mine anyway)
– “The so-called ‘hard problem’ … is the problem of giving an account, consistent with (metaphysical) naturalism, of these qualitative features or properties of sensations, the so-called qualia”
Okay, but that’s vague (“giving an account”), hence my more specific definition of the problem. Maybe it does not cover all facets of the problem, but it is a good working definition for the purpose of realizing why or how exactly one major facet of the problem is hard — why it persists. But I agree that my formulation at the beginning of that page of mine (that you insert above in this post) wrongly suggests that that facet exhausts the whole problem.
– I am not sure some qualia really are about nothing. Can you give me a clearer example? Plus a definition of what it means to be about something?
– “humans either do or can — unclear which he means — know that, in general, every mental item (whether intentional or non-intentional) is identical to some natural item”
In the paper, I stay agnostic about both positions. I just argue they are defensible/reasonable.
– “every mental item (whether intentional or non-intentional) is identical to some natural item or other”, but “what must remain a mystery … is whether any given mental item such as a phenomenal pain felt on a given occasion by a particular subject is both natural and mental”
No. I argue it is defensible/reasonable that: any mental item is natural, yet it cannot be known by us which _specific_ natural item it is identical with.
-“If a particular felt pain cannot be identified with, and thus reduced to, a particular instance of Delta-A fiber stimulation because the former has properties the latter cannot have, and vice versa, why call this mysterianism?”
Because the brain may well have more exotic natural properties we can’t know — or know as identical with mental properties. As I explain in the paper.
One kind would be spatial extradimensional properties. Fancy string theories talk about extra dimensions. But a great objection I found recently is that of Michael Huemer, in his book Approaching Infinity. He argues that spatial extra dimensions are metaphysically impossible. Hence, too, there are also no parallel worlds, pace David Lewis, Hud Hudson, and many others. I recommend taking a look at that book of Huemer. (I am fascinated by parallel worlds, as my own website admits.)
Thanks for the responses, Vlastimil.
1. Can you explain how guys like Kammerer could possibly deny the obvious datum that felt pain is real? That denial is silly and not worth discussing, as Galen Strawson says. One of the podcasts you cited runs for two hours! I don’t have that kind of time to waste.
2. I don’t get the impression that you have understood my point. Maybe it is because you do not admit distinction between intentional and non-intentional experiences.
I explain the distinction here: https://maverickphilosopher.blog/index.php/2009/02/27/four-uses-of-of-and-nonintentional-conscious-states/
More comments later.
haha
I dont get the impression you understand my point either
as for Kammerer, he argues physicalism is antecedently probable (setting qualia aside), qualia do not fit into it, and the seeming that they exist is just a recurring disposition to believe/say (externally or “internally”) that they exist, built for some evolutionary reason into your brain, while the seeming/disposition is defined in a way thar does not imply qualia of course
sorry, replying from phone
if you cant read or listen to lengthy content, use AI
I recommend NotebookLM
V,
If that is Kammerer’s argument, it is breathtakingly awful. It induces in me a disgust quale.
First, you can’t set qualia aside, to support the antecedent probability of physicalism, since that assumes that qualia are illusory — which is what needs to be shown.
Second, while it is of course true that there is no place for qualia in the physicalist’s world, saying that does not show that there are no qualia.
Third, “the seeming that they exist is just a recurring disposition to believe/say (externally or “internally”) that they exist” is plainly false. For one thing, qualia are not dispositional but occurrent. If I feel nauseous that is an occurrent, actual, conscious state I am in, and I know indubitably that I am in it. Now I may be disposed to issue a verbal report about it by uttering some such words as ‘Wifey dear, I feel nauseous,’ but that disposition to issue a verbal report, whether or not exercised, is not the conscious state itself.
The main point, of course, is that qualia are directly and indubitably known to exist. The fact that they are disallowed by some highly speculative theory cuts no ice whatsoever.
The only reason I can think of as to why you misunderstand the phrase ‘hard problem’ is because you do not admit a distinction between intentional and non-intentional conscious experiences. Do you or do you not? You need to answer that question directly, and argue for your answer.
Bill,
First, Kammerer’s argument may be recast as Bayesian. In Bayes Theorem, you can set aside almost any piece of information (updated upon) that you can. Such as the existence of qualia.
I like the contrastivist Bayesian approach: compare a claim’s probability, apart from the given piece of evidence, with the probability of the claim’s opposite (negation). Compare the probability of the same evidence given the said claim with the probality of that evidence given the opposite. Try to guess both of these ratios. Combine (multiply) them to update your probability for the claim.
P(C|E & K)/P(~C|E & K) = P(C|K)/P(~C|K) × P(E|C & K)/P(E|~C & K).
Here, C may be physicalism, E the seeming that qualia exist, K all the relevant background knowledge, including all the evidence for physicalism.
Second, of course.
Third, Kammerer does not say qualia are dispositional. He argues they do not exist, probably. Else, you’re right. That’s why I don’t buy his argument. Seemings cannot be reduced to dispositions to beliefs or utterances. See https://fakenous.substack.com/p/the-prime-fallacy-misunderstanding-appearance
Also, _I am in pain_ (in the robust, phenomenal sense) is more plausible than the abstract, highly theoretical premise that everything in the universe must be reducible to physical matter; even abductive and Bayesian reasoning must respect this. Philosophers often dismiss things like qualia, the soul, objective values, or libertarian free will because they seem “weird” or “spooky” compared to physical science; but space, time, and quantum fields are also weird; there is no reason to assume that non-physical phenomenal states cannot exist just because they are poorly understood by current science.
As for the rest, please read again what I commented above:
“The so-called ‘hard problem’ … is the problem of giving an account, consistent with (metaphysical) naturalism, of these qualitative features or properties of sensations, the so-called qualia” — you said.
To which I said: Okay, but that’s vague (“giving an account”), hence my more specific definition of the problem. Maybe it does not cover all facets of the problem, but it is a good working definition for the purpose of realizing why or how exactly one major facet of the problem is hard — why it persists. But I agree that my formulation at the beginning of that page of mine (that you insert above in this post) wrongly suggests that that facet exhausts the whole problem.
“every mental item (whether intentional or non-intentional) is identical to some natural item or other”, but “what must remain a mystery … is whether any given mental item such as a phenomenal pain felt on a given occasion by a particular subject is both natural and mental” — you said.
To which I said: No. I argue it is defensible/reasonable that: any mental item is natural, yet it cannot be known by us which _specific_ natural item it is identical with.
Now, suppose some kinds of consciousness are non-intentional. So what? How’s that relevant to what I said? I’ve already admitted that the hard problem of consciousness is not just a problem of qualia, and maybe intentional mental states create another problem that I ignore in the paper. But focusing just on the specific hard problem of qualia that I focus on in the paper, where’s exactly is my mistake?
Typo: In Bayes Theorem, you can set aside almost any piece of information (updated upon). Including the existence of qualia, or the seeming that qualia exist.
Not much time now, but we need to discuss how probability could come into this discussion.
God, for example, necessarily exists if he exists, and if he doesn’t, then he is impossible. So the probability of God’s existence is either 1 or 0. So, to say the the prob of God’s existence relative to the evidence is .729 — or whatever — is senseless.
Similarly with qualia. It is certain that they exist. There is no distinction between seeming and being here. This is why is it senseless to say that a felt pain is illusory. The prob of the existence of the felt pain of my headache = 1.
Of course, I am not suggesting that a given quale is a necessary being. I am saying that, for qualia, esse est percipi ,and that the percipi is indubitable to the subject of the quale as long as he experiences it.
Bill, it depends what kind of probability you talk about: logical vs epistemic etc. Take a look at my book that I sent you years ago: Modality, Logical Probability, and the Trinity. (Btw, Dale Tuggy cites it in his SEP entry on the Trinity.)
Qualia are certain, but you still can update probability given their certain existence (update Bayes-wise). Likewise, even if it is certain that you exist (as an organism), and so that the universe is fine-tuned for (organic) life, you can still update on that information, as is done in proper fine-tuning theistic arguments. I recommend Mike Huemer’s book Paradox Lost, he nicely explains several involved intricacies.
V, you didn’t send me that book. Are you confusing me with someone else? In what format did you send it? If you sent it to me, I would have acknowledged receipt. Do you have an acknowledgment of receipt from me?
I did, physically, by mail. Years ago. I don’t have the receipt, no. A secretary sent it.
But I emailed it to you, as well. I will resend the email.
V.
Btw, I cite you in that book a lot!
V,
>>Qualia are certain, but you still can update probability given their certain existence . . .<< Can you explain why that is not pure nonsense? I say it is pure nonsense. The existence of the felt pain of my current headache is known with certainty by me as long as the felt pain endures. Since it is epistemically certain that this quale exists, it is epistemically impossible that it not exist. Therefore the epistemic probability of its existence is 1 and cannot have any other value. It cannot be 'updated' by the addition of any other evidence since no other evidence is either needed or relevant. My example is different from the one you give. >>even if it is certain that you exist (as an organism), and so that the universe is fine-tuned for (organic) life, you can still update on that information, as is done in proper fine-tuning theistic arguments.<< You have shifted from the first-person POV to a third-person POV. It is NOT epistemically certain that I exist as an organism in nature, and this for the reason that it is epistemically possible that I exist without a body. Here I have no objection to updating the evidence.
Bill, I will. But can you please reply to my email with my opening Qs to our interview?
So, Bill,
Correct that the existence of a felt pain is known with certainty, pace Kammerer. So the epistemic probability of its existence is 1.
Not suggesting we update the probability of qualia existence. One might use their certain existence as evidence to update the probability of physicalism. Then, by the contrastivist Bayesian approach, one can compare the probability of physicalism given the evidence against the probability of its negation. One can perfectly well take a piece of information that is 100% certain and update one’s credence in a completely different theoretical claim based upon it.
This was the point of my fine-tuning analogy. In proper fine-tuning theistic arguments, we take something that is (almost) certain to us — the baseline fact that we exist as organisms — and we update on that information to evaluate the probability of a cosmic designer. You object that our existence as an organisms is not epistemically certain (we might be disembodied minds). But even if we grant that this specific evidence is uncertain, the probability calculus handles this: we can update our beliefs based on uncertain evidence by the Bayesian theorem for total probability. (Google it.) We simply calculate a weighted average, so the lack of 100% certainty is no barrier to updating our hypotheses.
Also, I should distinguish between updating on the information “qualia exist” versus “qualia strongly seem to exist.” From the first-person perspective, both of these propositions are absolutely certain, pace Kammerer. Because both are certain, we can and should use both to update the probabilities of physicalism. I repeat, I maintain this pace Kammerer, who argues that phenomenal consciousness does not actually exist and is merely an introspective illusion, which recursively creates itself in you as you retort, “all illusion implies qualia (or intentional states)”. Kammerer grants the “seeming” of qualia, which he attempts to explain away via redefinition of seemings as dispositions, so he denies their actual existence.
You and I agree that the existence of a felt pain is indubitable to the subject experiencing it, so we can and should update on both its seeming and its actual existence.
Finally, I agree, if something is logically necessary, its logical probability on any evidence is 100%. It’s epistemic probability may be less, though. See my book on the Trinity.