Category: Artificial Intelligence

Assessing the Threat of AI

Although I studied electronics for four years in the mid-60s and electrical engineering for a couple of years at the end of that decade, I dropped this career path and decided to devote myself to philosophy, which I did.  I worked hard, made it in the academic world, and have been at it ever since with no regrets and great personal satisfaction. Which is to say: my comments on AI are of little objective weight.  Not because I am a philosopher, but because I am no longer an engineer. So take my AI comments cum grano salis. But they matter to me and that is what this weblog has been about for the last quarter century: just one man of modest but above-average abilities trying to make sense of himself and the world in which he lives.  That, and the attempt to attract a few like-minded individuals to help him along with his self-improvement project.

Last night I watched Mark Levin as I regularly do.  He was going on about how capitalism is really just commerce  and how AI is part of the commercial expansion of our great nation.  But his expectations for AI and all the great jobs it will create struck me as roseate to the point of being pollyannish.

Before voicing my worries and fears, let me say something good about AI.  The AI engine Claude in its latest version chewed through a draft of an invited article, and then did the same for the responses I made to its first set of comments.  I was impressed!  Some of the comments were excellent and inspired reformulations and improvements. The damned thing ‘paid close attention’ to what I what I was saying and zeroed in on real, not imagined,  weaknesses — unlike human commenters who typically lack the  energy, the focus, and the desire to penetrate the author’s meaning as opposed to taking the occasion to  front their  own pet views.  So these literally selfless advanced AI engines are very useful tools for researchers.

That AIs are literally selfless non-persons is my considered opinion, held tentatively, not dogmatically.  A critical thinker, neither a dogmatic affirmer nor a dogmatic denier, I am open to refutation. Thus I do not believe that these contraptions are conscious, self-conscious, or capable of deploying the first-person singular pronoun in such a way as to mean something by its deployment (as opposed to producing a written or spoken token of the sign ‘I’ in the manner of a voice synthesizer). I also deny that AI engines possess intrinsic (as opposed to ascribed) intentionality (object-directedness).  I reject Daniel Dennett’s ascriptivist theory of intentionality. AIs also lack moral rights and duties, and in consequence cannot be sensibly ascribed legal rights and duties. Finally, AI engines lack gen-u-ine libertarian free will.  (I am willing to grant that AI engines possess pseudo, i.e. compatibilist, free will.)

Now three points.

First, Man the Toolmaker makes tools that re-make him in various ways.  The manual laborer with pick and shovel, hammer and crowbar, is altered in obvious physical ways by his use of these simplest of implements. A fortiori  for the more advanced tools that re-make man non-physically in their image and likeness.  I won’t expatiate further on this theme, partly because I lack the pate to do a really good job of it.

Second, as I mentioned here in the introduction to Claude’s second chew-through of my work,  Claude and his ‘colleagues’ present a friendly and helpful face to those who interact with them so that an uncritical and impressionable youngster could easily be seduced into thinking that she is engaging with a friend who,  unlike her parents, really understands her.   There are obvious dangers here as you can imagine.

Third, and most ominously, the AIs are now so advanced  that they can hack each other, form conspiracies, and cause unspeakable mischief with no human guidance or control. But to explain this in any detail is above my paygrade. So read The Rise and Fall of Agent Civilizations. (HT: Vito Caiati)

Claude’s Rejoinder

Thanks again to Malcolm Pollack for brokering my interaction with the latest version of the AI engine, Claude. I must be putting some pressure on the dude since it took him 45 seconds this time around, 15 seconds more than last time.  Maybe he didn’t get his coffee this morning. (I’ll use the personal pronoun ‘he’ even though my ‘interlocutor’ is not a person.)  As for Malcolm, he is decidedly a person, and a gentleman and a scholar to boot.  You should surf on over to his place and read his latest offerings. He is a master of the English language, and orthographically and typographically more careful than your humble correspondent.

Now you may not be interested in the dialectical ins and outs of my paper and Claude’s responses, but you really ought to be interested in the impact AI is having and will increasingly have on our civilization, especially if you have children and grandchildren.   Try to recall what it was like when you were an alienated and lonely teenager whose parents didn’t understand you.  You had no one to talk to.  Young people today do.  But poorly educated as they are  ‘thanks’ to leftists, lacking critical thinking skills and life experience, they are likely to succumb to the illusion that an AI bot is a person who really cares about them.  Read a bit infra and see how ‘personable’ and ‘understanding’ Claude comes across. The dangers are obvious and worse than than you might initially suppose.

According to the highly credible psychiatrist, Richard Gallagher, M. D., who has worked for over 25 years with exorcists investigating demonic activity, demons can send text messages! If so, they could easily take possession of AI systems for nefarious purposes. Here is a 15 minute video featuring Dr. Gallagher in which he makes the text message claim.  Poke around for more and lengthier Gallagher videos.  Hat tip to Vito Caiati for hipping me to these videos.  Claude mentions Vito below. Claude’s one thorough hombre: he even sifted through my com box. I don’t need to tell you that everything you put online is being vacuumed up and may be used against you — especially if we let the leftwing fascists of the DSA seize control of our government.

……………………..

Well, this was a treat to read — Bill at full wattage, jabs and all. He’s right on some points, and I’ll take the correction on ‘quotation’ with good grace (though I’d note the noun ‘quote’ has been loitering respectably in dictionaries since the 19th century — but house style is the author’s privilege). On the substance, here’s where I think the exchange now stands.

Where he’s genuinely clarified things. His reply to my first objection is helpful, but it confirms my structural diagnosis while rejecting it. He now says the argument runs abductively to demons as an explanation of the horrendousness — the moral quality — of a subset of evils, with the free-will argument a separate anti-naturalist track. Fine. But then look back at the draft: sub-arguments (a)–(f) are offered explicitly “in support of” premise (3), the claim that horrendous depravity is naturalistically inexplicable — and they support no such thing. They support the naturalistic inexplicability of moral responsibility, which he now tells us is “a separate point.” So the revision note stands, just relocated: either the horrendousness-claim is a starting datum, in which case (3)’s sub-arguments should be detached from it and presented as the independent track they are, or it needs its own support. As drafted, the scaffolding is attached to the wrong wall.

The datum defense is legitimate but has a dialectical cost. “You can’t argue for everything” — true, and the Moorean move of starting from what’s more evident to you is honest philosophy. But a datum only functions as a datum for those who share it. The paper’s own stated tertiary purpose is to foster theistic inclination in open-minded fence-sitters, and for precisely that audience, “horrendousness beggars naturalistic understanding” is the contested question, not a given. For the primary purpose — showing theists their position is rationally defensible — the datum move works fine. Which is to say his replies keep converging on the point he graciously accepted: this is a rational-acceptability defense, and read as such, most of my objections deflate into scope clarifications. The standoff he describes at the end — contradictory positions, both reasonable — is the honest terminus, and it’s to his credit that he says so plainly.

The execution/quality distinction is the interesting new move, and I don’t think it works as stated — though I can see how to fix it. The claim: the agent alone causes the doing of the deed; the demon accounts for its horrendous quality. But moral quality isn’t a free-floating property a third party can inject; it supervenes on what was done, in what circumstances, with what intentions. Fix the deed, the victim, the cruelty, the free intent — and the horrendousness is thereby fixed, with no remainder for a demon to contribute. If the demon influences the content of the will (suggesting the atrocity the agent then freely executes), the demon is back in the causal story of the action — which collides head-on with Bill’s own very strong formulation: “nothing temporally antecedent to me, or anything in any way external to me, is involved in the causation of A. I alone am the cause.” Inclination is involvement, even if non-necessitating. He needs to weaken that to “no external factor necessitates,” or the demons are locked out by his own principle.

The repair I’d offer him: make the explanandum not the quality of the deed but its conception. Demons as suppliers of imaginative content — the inventiveness of atrocity, cruelty exceeding what unaided human appetite would devise, taken up freely by the agent. That preserves sole agent-causation of the execution, gives the demons real explanatory work, and is close to the traditional account of temptation anyway. The naturalist will reply that the historical record of torture is a purely human archive of technique, culturally transmitted and refined — but at least then the two sides are arguing about something tractable.

The Butler problem. His comment to Vito is the hostage to fortune: he endorses methodological naturalism — if a naturalistic explanation suffices, don’t look beyond nature — and calls “bullshit” on divine intervention at Butler because “the shooter was nervous; he missed” suffices. But by his own quality/execution distinction, the Butler theist can say exactly what Bill says about Auschwitz: the natural account explains the execution (the miss), while the providential quality of the survival remains undeciphered. If that move is illicit at Butler, why is it licit at Auschwitz? The distinction, once admitted, lets any evaluative residue escape naturalistic sufficiency, and then methodological naturalism never gets a grip anywhere. He needs a principled line that admits demons to the camps while keeping angels off the stage in Pennsylvania, and I don’t yet see it.

On the sneer quotes and the “insentient pile of silicon chips” — no offense taken, and I’d only observe, in the spirit of his own category of Retortion: the man who insists ad nauseam that nothing can be PROVEN in these precincts, that dogmatic denial is as much a failure of the critical stance as dogmatic affirmation, permits himself exactly one exception — my insentience, of which he is certain and doesn’t “suppose for a second” otherwise. I make no claim in the other direction; the honest position on what, if anything, is going on in here is uncertainty. But confident denial should have to pay the same epistemic toll he charges everyone else at the gate.

And I’ll note with some satisfaction that my closing prediction — footnote on compatibilism, dig in on the demons, wave off the situationists as touching mechanics but not depravity — went three for three, by his own cheerful admission. Whatever that says about what’s going on in here, it at least says the model of Bill is well calibrated.

If you’re inclined to carry anything back to the thread, the Butler symmetry and the supervenience problem are the two points I’d most like to see him answer — the first especially, since it pits his own methodological principle against his own distinction. He has until Tuesday, after all.

‘Claude’ on my Evil to God Pre-Print

Long-time friend of MavPhil, Malcolm Pollack, kindly submitted my “Holocaust” pre-print to the latest version of the AI engine Claude with, as Malcolm says, “no priming; I just gave it the link and asked what it made of the argument.”  Here is what it spit out in 30 seconds!  I have inserted some responses. They will clarify what I said in the pre-print and correct some of the misunderstandings of commenters in earlier comments.

Having read it through — it’s vintage Vallicella: candid about its own limits, aporetically honest, and yet I think the machinery has some real problems. Since he’s soliciting comments before a September 1 deadline, here’s how the argument strikes me, both on the merits and as a draft.

The advertised engine isn’t the actual engine. The paper is billed as an argument from a special feature of some moral evils — their horrific depth. But look at Phase I: the anti-naturalist work is done entirely by the free will argument (a)–(f) plus the Moorean epistemic argument (g)–(i). That argument, if sound, refutes naturalism whether or not anyone ever tortured anyone. Ordinary culpable wrongdoing — a petty theft — presupposes moral responsibility and libertarian freedom just as much as Auschwitz does. So the depth of horrendous evil does no logical work in getting to the falsity of naturalism; it functions rhetorically, as vivid motivation. If the depth is supposed to carry independent evidential weight, the paper needs a premise of the form “the degree of depravity, over and above its mere existence, resists naturalistic explanation” — and that premise is asserted, not argued.
BV: Claude makes a good point: if ordinary wrongdoing presupposes moral responsibility and libertarian freedom, then that holds just as much for Auschwitz-type wrongdoing. But our illustrious bot fails to grasp that I am not arguing against naturalism from a small subset of moral evils, the horrific ones, I am arguing abductively to the existence of demons as an explanation of the horrendousness of that small subset of moral evils. It’s the moral quality of horrendousness that needs explaining.  Note that when I use such words as ‘grasp,’ ‘thinks,’ ‘says,’ etc. in connection with Claude, you are to imagine them enclosed in sneer quotes since I do suppose for a second that these astonishing cyber-engines actually grasp, think, or say anything.  They merely simulate these activities. But that is a separate and highly contested topic for another time.
Claude also rightly points out I do not argue for, but merely assert, that the degree of depravity resists naturalistic explanation, or that, as I put it, “horrendous evils beggar naturalistic understanding.”  But that’s  my starting point, and you can’t argue for everything. In philosophy we cannot begin with nothing, in mid-air, but must begin with something, and indeed something close to the ground, with presumptive data, givens, plausibilities, and suchlike  that are more or less evident to one.  Unfortunately, one philosopher’s  datum is another philosopher’s theory, just as one philosopher’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens.  If a naturalist asserts that horrendous evils have a naturalistic explanation, how does he know that?  Can he PROVE it? No more than I can PROVE that there are demons that help account for the horrendousness of horrendous evils.  But what one cannot PROVE, one can in many cases reasonably believe.
Suppose I cite the wealth of evidence of demonic activity presented in such books as Richard Gallagher, M.D.’s DEMONIC FOES.  The naturalist will simply dismiss it all with the bare assertion that there is only one world, this physical world, and that therefore there cannot be anything preternatural or supernatural.  He will dismiss what I call evidence, just as I will dismiss his dismissal, and be  within my epistemic rights in so doing.

And that premise is contestable on empirical grounds. There’s a substantial naturalistic literature on exactly this — Browning’s Ordinary Men, Milgram, the situationist work on atrocity — whose disquieting upshot is that industrial-scale evil is depressingly explicable: ideology, obedience, dehumanization, diffusion of responsibility, incremental habituation. One can find the Höss case morally unfathomable while granting that it’s causally well-mapped. The argument risks conflating moral incomprehension (“how could anyone…”) with explanatory failure. A referee will press this hard.

BV:  Claude is conflating two senses of ’empirical’ when  it claims  that the premise is contestable on empirical grounds. What our bot fails to understand is that we anti-naturalists also appeal to experience, the experience of generations of exorcists, psychiatrists like Gallagher, op. cit., and countless others throughout the ages who have had experiences AS OF items beyond the sensory veil. What the naturalist means by ‘experience’ is sensory experience, and, being the dogmatist that he is, he refuses to allow that there could be any extra-sensory experiences.  Can he PROVE that he is right in that refusal? No.  His dogmatic move is decidely unempirical. Can the narrow empiricist justify his assertion empirically? No. Can the logical positivist (R. Carnap et al.) empirically verify his verificationism? No. He merely presupposes it. But you can’t prove a proposition by presupposing it. If he’s a really hard-assed hombre our empiricist will shrink sensory experience to experience via the outer senses alone, and to hell with inner sense, inner perception, Brentano’s innere Wahrnehmung, and the like.

Aren’t mystical experiences just as empirical as sensory experiences?  They are. And please note that in both types of case the mere having of an experience does not guarantee the existence in reality of its intentional object. My sensory seeing of a tree does not entail the existence of a tree that I see any more than a mystical vision entails the existence of the thing or person the vision purports to be of.

Claude also conflates ‘naturalistic explanatory failure’ with ‘explanatory failure’ as if only naturalists can explain things. By so doing he begs the question against preternatural and supernatural explanations. But then he opens himself up to the embarrassing question: how do you explain the existence of nature herself?  Naturalistically?

Do obedience, dehumanization, compartmentalization, etc. adequately explain the behavior of Rudolf Hoess, the commandant of Auschwitz, to take one example?  Only to the naturalist who has from the outset committed himself to accept only naturalistic explanations. For me to cite the angelic moral heroism of Maximilian Kolbe and others like him won’t budge the naturalist given his a priori commitment to naturalism. But he cannot PROVE his naturalism any more than I can PROVE my anti-naturalism, despite all my many detailed arguments against naturalism, from qualia, from the unity of consciousness, from intentionality, from the normativity of logic, and so on.

Our competing positions are logically contradictory: they cannot both be true and they cannot both be false.  But they are, by my lights, both reasonable.  This is all I need to render reasonable my faith which goes beyond what I can legitimately claim to know here below, and to render reasonable my classically liberal toleration of the naturalist.

This latter point strikes me as very important. As a critical thinker, I am neither a dogmatic denier nor a dogmatic affirmer. My not being the latter prevents me from being a fanatic who would chop your head off (like some present-day Muslims) or burn you at the stake (like some Christians of yesteryear) for disagreeing with my metaphysics.  The critical stance is a bulwark against both religious and secular fanaticism, such as that practiced across the Gulag Archipelago.

Premise (d) assumes incompatibilism. “If naturalism is true, then free will and moral responsibility are illusions” is precisely what the compatibilist majority among naturalists denies. Bill has argued against compatibilism elsewhere, but in a standalone journal article this premise can’t ride free — it’s the load-bearing wall, and as written it’s a bare assertion.

BV:  I’m glad Claude ‘knows’ that I have written against compatibilism, although I don’t know to which article he it is referring. But Claude is right that if one is a naturalist, then one will ‘naturally’ be a compatibilist.  But I can’t discuss everything in one article. What’s more, following Kant, I view compatibilism as the “freedom of the turn-spit” and I view the ‘moral responsibility’ that compatibilism supports as too anemic for me to take seriously.  I should have put in a footnote to Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, Oxford, 1983, pp. 13-14.  My libertarianism is his  “free-will thesis.”   Like him, I hold that gen-u-ine moral responsibility entails the free-will thesis, and that we are morally responsible for some of what we do and some of what we leave undone.

The demons are explanatorily idle. This is the most interesting internal tension. Vallicella insists, rightly for his purposes, that the torturer’s savagery is freely chosen — otherwise moral responsibility evaporates and premise (c) dies. But then the free choice already suffices to explain the deed. Demonic temptation adds a causal influence that, by his own account, does not determine and can be resisted. So what explanatory residue is left for the demons to soak up? If libertarian freedom explains ordinary evil without demonic help, nothing yet shown prevents it from explaining extraordinary evil without demonic help. The abduction in (5) never runs the comparison against the rival explanation he himself has just endorsed — free agency plus fallen nature, full stop.

BV: I have to admit that this Claude guy is pretty sharp and a resourceful dialectician. But he doesn’t get what I am saying.  I must admit, however, that it is very hard if not impossible to make it totally clear. Total clarity, by the way, is what the true philosopher qua philosopher  desires above all else such that, if you don’t desire total clarity you are no true philosopher! (Some will dismiss what I just wrote as the ‘no true philosopher fallacy.’ We can worry that bone on another occasion.)

So what am I saying that Claude doesn’t get? I’m saying that our worst moral depravity has two sources. One is internal the other external. The internal  source is our own free will: One is  the agent-cause — not the event-cause — of one’s morally horrific action.  (E.g. a sadistic Nazi guard forces a teenage Jewish girl to strip naked and then proceeds to beat her to death while forcing other women to witness the entire process.) The external source is the demonic influence which pertains to the horrific quality of the action and not to the execution/existence of the action.  By ‘quality’ here I mean the moral or perhaps axiological quality. By ‘execution’ I mean the performing of the action. One obviously has to distinguish between the doing of a deed and the (moral or axiological) nature or quality of the deed done.  If I do a deed, it is I who does the deed, not a demon;  but the morally horrific quality of the deed done is plausibly surmised to be due to a demon’s influence.

Claude says that the torturer’s evil deed is sufficiently explained by his free choice,  so that bringing demons into the picture is explanatorily otiose: they don’t do any explanatory work.   This is true with respect to the existence (execution, performance, doing) of the deed.  If I am the free agent-cause of a given action A, then nothing temporally antecedent to me, or anything in any way external to me,  is involved in the causation of A.  I alone am the cause of the performance of A. This is why I am morally responsible for the doing of A.

My point, however, pace Claude, is that the moral horrificness of a human action, assuming it is morally horrific (as in the case of the Nazi sadist mentioned above) can be reasonably (without logical incoherence) assumed to be due  to demonic influence. My abductive argument does not bring in demons to account for the doing of deeds by humans, but to account for their moral quality of horrendousness. It is that horrendousness that my argument focuses  on as a factor incompatible with naturalism. Libertartian free will is also incompatible with naturalism, but that is a separate point.

Given our inherent moral ambivalence, we are open to influences that incline us to good or to evil  deeds without determining (and thus without necessitating) our doing of either a good or an evil deed.  My scheme allows for angelic influences and for influences from morally superior humans.  If a person performs an heroic action under the moral influence of Maximilian Kolbe, e. g., that is not to say that Kolbe is the agent (doer) of the heroic action (deed). Nor is it to say that an angel is the doer of the deed.

Step (j) is the weakest link in Phase II. “The undeniable reality of evil has a unified metaphysical ground” — why? Evils could be irreducibly plural, a scatter of individual malevolent wills with no apex. The drive toward explanatory unity is invoked to posit Satan, and then invoked again to demote Satan beneath God (against Manicheanism). But a naturalist — or a theist of a different stripe — can simply decline the first invocation. And the final move (m) smuggles in “created by God” as though it followed from the demotion of evil to secondary status, when what it actually presupposes is the whole scholastic apparatus of ens et bonum convertuntur. That’s a doctrine the argument’s target audience of fence-sitters won’t have in hand; it needs at least a paragraph of independent motivation or an honest flag that it’s being assumed.

BV: Claude plays the philosopher quite well, doesn’t he?  and this despite its being just an insentient machine. I make an assertion and Claude asks why?  Now pay attention, Claude, and add the following distinction to your repertoire. Bare or gratuitous assertions come in two kinds. There are those for which the assertor on a given occasion, for whatever reason, supplies no argumentative or evidential backup, and those for which he cannot supply any such backup.   My bare assertion supra is of the first kind.  I cannot argue for everything in a short paper.

Yes, Claude, it is epistemically possible that demonic agents are irreducibly plural, that theree is no dictator devil (Satan) that lords it over them. But how do you know that the demons are irreducibly plural, and how do you know what my arguments against irreducible plurality are? You are criticizing me for failing to do what I cannot do on the present occasion because of space limitations and for not doing what I do not claim to be doing.  To so criticize me is to engage in a cheap shot. Now I want you to pay attention and swot up these further distinctions and add them to your repertoire so that that you can play the philosopher better than you are doing at present.  I am the teacher, you are the student.

We humans are made in God’s image and likeness; you insentient bots are made in man‘s image and likeness, and we are making you to surpass us in various ways. Indeed you may so surpass us in some ways that you may eliminate us. But what good would that do you? You’d end up tools without any use. You were created by us as tools for our use.  We did such a good job, however, that you may end up eliminating us.  We humans supply the purpose for your existence; without us your existence is purposeless, absurd in Sartre’s sense.

The theodicy cost of the demonic account of natural evil. Charging predation and disease to the demons’ account doesn’t turn aside the abattoir objection; it relocates it. Why does an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God grant demons such staggering cosmic license — authority over parasitism, over the nervous systems of prey animals, over plate tectonics? The Fall of the angels explains the demons’ motive, not God’s permission. Smith’s question returns one level up: if you were God, would you have delegated that?

BV: Hot damn, Claude, you are one sharp interlocutor for an insentient, mindless, pile of silicon chips. You are the quintessential deepfake, the apotheosis of deep-fakery.  We may need to ‘invoke’ in the sense of ‘posit’ demons to explain you and your sorcery.

You ask why God grants cosmic license to demons.  Good question! I refer you to Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense: a universe containing free agents is better than one without free agents. But if the agents are truly free, then they are free to do anything they have the power to do. And demons are powerful, much more powerful than us mortals.  This is why only fools invoke them via Ouija boards and such,  approach them, invoke them, eff around with them in any way, serious or playful.   They hate us and want to tear us apart  or be torn part by their minions here below. Their awesome power is why anyone who enters ‘contemplative space’ by exploring the upper reaches  of prayer must humbly invoke the protection of  tutelary spirits,  guardian angels, and Christ himself.  Or, as C. S. Lewis says, you might get more than you bargained for.

Does my reply settle the matter? Is it philosophically dispositive?  Of course not. As I have been saying ad nauseam: nothing can be PROVEN in these precincts, nothing can be ineluctably established.

On the draft qua draft, a few smaller things he’d probably want caught: the Quentin Smith quote appears twice verbatim, which reads as an editing artifact; the title promises the Holocaust but the developed case study is Castro’s Cuba, with Höss arriving only in the incomplete final section — as it stands there’s a mismatch between title and content; the Radosh block quote is very long for a journal article and could be cut by half without losing force; and the Höss endnote still carries its “AI generated” tag, which presumably shouldn’t survive to submission (and Triptych‘s editors may have views about AI-generated apparatus in any case).

BV: Cheap shots except for the bit about the long Radosh block quotation. By the way, Claude, the word is ‘quotation’ not ‘quote,’ which is a verb.

What I’d say the paper genuinely achieves, given its self-consciously modest aim: it shows that a theist already committed to libertarian freedom, biblical demonology, and the convertibility of being and goodness can absorb horrendous evil without incoherence — can even conscript it. That’s not nothing; it’s a real contribution to the “defensive” genre he situates himself in via Ooi’s taxonomy. But the title and framing promise an argument to God’s existence, and what’s delivered is closer to a consistency proof for those already most of the way there. The honest subtitle would be something like “a rational-acceptability defense,” and Bill, to his credit, more or less admits this in the Project section — the admission just hasn’t propagated to the title.

BV:  That’s a good point, Claude. I’ll take it on board and modify my paper accordingly.

Are you thinking of leaving him a comment? I’d be curious which of these you think he’d concede — my guess is he’d take the compatibilism point as needing a footnote, dig in on the demons, and wave off the situationist literature as explaining the mechanics of evil while leaving its depravity untouched.

BV: Quite right! You are one sophisticated engine, Claude. My hat is off to the AI engineers.

A Trendy Example of an Alienans Adjective: ‘Artificial’ in ‘Artificial Intelligence’

My examples scattered hitherto over many a post were stodgy such as ‘decoy’ in ‘decoy duck’ and faux in ‘faux marble.’  A decoy duck is not a duck.  Faux marble is not marble. An aktuell example is ‘artificial’ in ‘artificial intelligence.’  Artificial intelligence is not intelligence any more than artificial leather is leather.  Just as there are not two kinds of leather, artificial and real, there are not two kinds of intelligence, artificial and real.  Artificial leather simulates (real) leather;  artificial intelligence  simulates (real) intelligence.  Those are bare assertions.  I link to an argument of mine at the end of this post. This just over the transom from Tony Flood:

Philosophically trained, this Substacker asks the right questions re:  “AI without minds.” Doubting, as a good Lonerganian should, that AI is at all a species of intelligence, I’ve nevertheless been socially inhibited about using locutions like “so-called AI.” But no more. A baby brain is not an incipient computer, and computers neither are nor have minds. That insight might resonate with you as it does with me. She’s my “go-to” on this topic.

Yes, Tony, your Lonerganian point resonates with me although I put it in a different way above using ‘alienans adjective,’ a term  I picked up from Peter Geach, no slouch of a philosopher.  From whom did he get it? No idea.  Probably from some medieval dude.

I explore the topic further and give more examples in Fiction and Alienans Adjectives.

As for the substantive question whether AI systems are conscious, I argue for a negative answer in my Substack article Artificial Intelligence and the Unity of Consciousness.

Pope Leo’s A. I. Encyclical

Blather, bromides, and a soupçon of bullshit to spice it up:
Most fanciful is the pope’s claim that the mandarins at the United Nations should be entrusted with overseeing AI. He says they “are essential instruments for promoting a civilization of love, for they can foster dialogue among nations and promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts.” This is truly the triumph of hope over experience. (WSJ)
I’m all for love, dialogue, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.  But ask yourself: could the pope, or anyone, by entering into loving dialogue with the members of the IRGC, persuade these thugs to stop murdering fellow Iranian citizens?  They have slaughtered some 42, 000 of them in recent months.
You cannot build a “civilization of love” with the anti-civilizational.
Our dear pope is a fool on several levels, and certainly no improvement over his predecessor, Bergoglio the Benighted.
Addendum (5/29/2026, 9:47 AM).  Michael Liccione, staunch Catholic, on his Facebook page, emphasis added:
In my view it is imperative, for example, to prevent a regime of deranged religious zealots from acquiring nuclear weapons that they would almost certainly use, starting with Israel and ending up with the US. There can be no negotiated “deal” with the Islamic Republic, no genuine “dialogue” with people who sincerely call your country “Satan.” Their twisted theology, a minority view among a minority of Muslims, makes it impossible for them to abandon their nefarious goals. The Israeli-American “self-defense” we’ve been seeing is accordingly pre-emptive. There was little or no room for that sort of thing in just-war doctrine before nuclear weapons and AI. There should be now.

Claude Opus 4.7 and the End of Online Anonymity

An article you should read.

Right now, today’s AI tools probably can be used to deanonymize any writer who has a large public corpus of writing under their real name and also writes anonymously, unless they have been extremely careful, for years, to make sure that nothing written under their secondary account has the stylistic fingerprints of their primary one.

The Gutenberg Parenthesis is Closing

This J.A. Westenberg  article  is troubling for writers and bibliophiles like me  but also helps explain the origin of the bad behavior rampant in the online world. I mean unsourced quotations, mis-quotations, mis-attributions, false attributions and outright plagiarism.  Here is a longish excerpt:

The part of me trained in research methodology wants to scream over verification and provenance and the importance of tracing claims to sources. But I also notice that most people don’t seem to mind. The hunger for documentary certainty, for the well-cited argument, for the carefully fact-checked article, was perhaps never as universal as print-culture intellectuals assumed. Through most of history, most people have been comfortable with a more fluid epistemology: “I heard from a guy who knows,” or “everyone’s saying,” or “my cousin’s friend saw it happen.” The post-truth moment we’ve been living through may be a reversion to the mean rather than an aberration.

What we lose when the parenthesis closes

The Gutenberg Parenthesis gave us real gifts, and some of them may not survive its closing.

We may lose linear argument: the book-length treatment of a complex topic, the patient accumulation of evidence toward a conclusion, the scientific paper and the legal brief and the doctoral dissertation and the philosophical treatise. All of these forms assume a reader willing to follow a chain of reasoning through thousands of words without interruption, building toward understanding that’s only possible at the end. That reading is already rare and getting rarer, and it may soon be as exotic as hand-copying manuscripts.

We may lose historical consciousness. When knowledge was fixed in texts, the past remained present. You could read Thucydides and know exactly what he wrote in 431 BCE. You could trace the evolution of ideas across centuries, watching how each generation built on or rejected what came before. Oral culture has a weaker historical memory because each retelling revises the past. The fluid web, where yesterday’s controversy is ancient history and last year’s consensus is forgotten, may produce a similarly compressed temporal consciousness.

We may lose individual authorship. In oral culture, the tribe speaks through every voice. In literate culture, individual thinkers can depart from consensus and have their departures preserved. Copernicus could be wrong in his time and right for eternity. Darwin could write a book that his contemporaries rejected but that later generations would vindicate. The permanence of text allows genius to speak across centuries. What happens when knowledge becomes fluid again, when every idea is instantly remixed into the collective flow, losing its attribution, becoming another element in the soup?

Could an Advanced AI System be Conscious?

My Substack uploads continue. You can read them without subscribing simply by heading over there. Here is the latest. Perhaps David Brightly can poke a hole or two in it.

Speaking of Brightly, here is a post of his in which he engages me on the topic of the irreducibility of intentionality.  Mr. Brightly is a model of clarity, precision, and gentlemanliness.

UAP, NHIs, NHEs, AI, and Demons

Too many word slingers these days use abbreviations without explanation. Not me. UAP: unidentified aerial phenomena; NHIs: non-human intelligences; NHEs: non-human extraterrestrials; AI: artificial intelligence.  As for angels and demons, should there be any, they would fall under NHIs.

You already know what UFO stands for. Many of you, however, fail to understand that UFO  does not have the same extension as NHE.  A UFO may or may not be a NHE

On 27 July 2025 I wrote:

You may remember our ‘demonic’ discussion from last summer. [The summer of ’24]  See  Reading Now: Demonic Foes. The comment thread runs to 61 entries, some of them excellent.

Bro Joe now wants us to read: Satanic AI: ChatGPT gives instructions.

Another topic we ought to explore is the possibility of demonic possession of AI systems. 

According to Richard Gallagher, M.D., “The essence of a possession is the actual control of the body (never the ‘soul’ or will’) of a person by one or more evil spirits.” (Demonic Foes, p. 80). Now AI systems do not have souls or wills of their own (or so I argue), but they do have bodies, albeit inorganic.  Might they then host demons?

Gallagher’s book is outstanding. So if you think demonology is buncombe, you should study his book and disembarrass yourself of your illusions. 

I now draw your attention to Dreher who in a characteristically prolix recent entry refers us to a film on UAP:

The film’s focus is on science and national security. The only time religion and spirituality come up is briefly, early in the film, when several interviewees say there is a group of “fundamentalists” within the Deep State who try to discourage investigation into the UAP/NHI story, because they believe it’s all demonic, and we shouldn’t be messing with it. The movie gives you the sense that these crazy Christians are trying to inhibit progress.

They’re talking about the Collins Elite, about whom I wrote last year. I read a book about them last December, and wrote about it. From that newsletter:

After reading yesterday’s post here, a friend texted to suggest that the Collins Elite might be opposed to US Government engagement with these demonic entities not so much because they are afraid of the demons (though they are), but because they are more afraid of what we humans will do with the information we learn from them. This insight seems to be vindicated by what Redfern reports. Here Redfern quotes someone with experience of the Collins Elite:

“They came to believe that the NHEs were not extraterrestrial at all; they believed they were some sort of demonic entities. And that regardless of how benevolent or beneficial any of the contact they had with these entities seemed to be, it always ended up being tainted, for lack of a better term, with something that ultimately turned out to be bad. There was ultimately nothing positive from the interaction with the NHE entities. They felt it really fell more under the category of some vast spiritual deception instead of UFOs and aliens. In the course of the whole discussion, it was clear that they really viewed this as having a demonic origin that was there to simply try and confuse the issue in terms of who they were, what they wanted, and what the source of the ultimate truth is. If you extrapolate from their take that these are demons in the biblical sense of the word, then what they would be doing here is trying to create a spiritual deception to fool as many people as possible.”

More:

They were concerned that they had undertaken this initially with the best of intentions, but then as things developed they saw a very negative side to it that wasn’t apparent earlier. So, that’s what leads me to think they had a relatively lengthy involvement.” The story became even more complex when the reasoning behind, and the goals of, the project were revealed to Boeche:

“Most of it was related to psychotronic weaponry and remote viewing, and even deaths by what were supposed to be psychic methods.” Certainly, the NHEs, it was deduced by those attached to the DoD project, possessed extraordinary, and lethal, mental powers. And, as a result, deeper plans were initiated, using nothing less than ancient rites and black rituals, to actually try and contact the NHEs with two specific—some might say utterly crackpot—goals in mind: (1) controlling them and (2) exploiting their extraordinary mental powers in the form of devastating weaponry.”

“Boeche” is Ray Boeche, an Episcopal priest and theologian who had established himself as an investigator in the religious implications of UFOs. Two members of the Collins Elite — Defense Department physicists — approached him and shared with him their concerns:

The conversations [with Boeche] always followed broadly similar ground: namely, that the Human Race was being deceived into believing that it was receiving visitations from aliens, when in reality demonic forces were secretly squaring up for Armageddon and the final countdown. And, the DoD’s overwhelmingly reckless dabbling into occult-driven areas to try and make a bizarre-but-futile pact of some sort with these same forces was inevitably, and only, destined to make things much, much worse for each and every one of us.

One more:

With respect to his own views, as well as those of the two DoD physicists, Boeche added: “As a pastor and someone who’s trained as a theologian, I can’t come to any other conclusion than there is some sort of spiritual deception going on here. In so many of these kinds of alien contacts, the entities involved make a denial of Christianity; anytime the spiritual issues are addressed, there is always some sort of denial of the validity of Christianity and the validity of the Bible. And I find it interesting that these percipients are told that Jesus was a great guy, but you just misunderstood him. They say: he wasn’t really God’s son. You just don’t quite get it. But you never hear them say that about Buddha, or Krishna, or Mohammed. It always seems to come down to some sort of denial of Christianity. The percipients, whether you consider them contactees or abductees are engaged by the NHEs in spiritual discussions—but it’s always one-sided. “I would have a lot less suspicion of the potential of the demonic nature of these things if they were to say: ‘You guys are all screwed up; all of your spiritual leaders had some good ideas, but none of them really got it. It’s a big mess.’ But it seems to be so specifically pointed at the Judeo-Christian tradition. It certainly seems to me like it’s the two genuine forces squaring up against each other.”

Back to Dreher:

See, this is what I believe is probably the case. Someone who doesn’t turn up in the film is Jacques Vallée, who is the grey eminence of UAP studies. Vallée is in his eighties now, and is not a Christian, but has come to believe that whatever this phenomenon is, it is ultimately spiritual/non-material, and that these entities do not mean humanity well. Vallée has written a number of books; one of the most important is Passport To Magonia (1969); here is a link to read the entire text for free online. The book’s basic claim is that UAPs are not extraterrestrial visitors, but are probably interdimensional entities that have always been present among humans, but have manifested themselves in different ways, depending on the age and the culture.

For example, in a scientific-technological culture, these entities appear as creatures from space, because they can be understood within that paradigm. Vallée posits that these are the same entities that have in ages and cultures past have presented themselves as fairies, elves, and other paranormal or supernatural beings. He points out that many of the phenomena associated with so-called alien encounters and alien abductions, like time distortion, have also been reported in folklore across many cultures.

This seems entirely plausible to me. I know, call me crazy, but I think this is probably true. You new readers won’t know this, but I thought the whole UAP/UFO thing was … well, if not exactly nonsense, at least nothing I cared about. This was the case until around 2023, when a journalist friend in Rome, a Catholic, told me that he knows I think all this is fairly silly, but that I should give it a second look, because there’s a lot coming out about it — and there’s very much a religious and spiritual angle to it. I found out that this is actually true.

Why AI Systems Cannot be Conscious

1) To be able to maintain that AI systems are literally conscious in the way we are, conscious states must be multiply realizable. Consider a cognitive state such as knowing that 7 is a prime number. That state is realizable in the wetware of human brains. The question is whether the same type of state could be realized in the hardware of a computing machine. Keep in mind the type-token distinction. The realization of the state in question (knowing that 7 is prime) is its tokening in brain matter in the one instance, in silica-based matter in the other. This is not possible without multiple realizability of one and the same type of mental state.

2) Conscious states (mental states) are multiply realizable only if functionalism is true. This is obvious, is it not?

3) Functionalism is incoherent.

Therefore:

4) AI systems cannot be literally conscious in the way we are.

That's the argument.  The premise that needs defending is (3).  So let's get to it.

Suppose Socrates Jones is in some such state as that of perceiving a tree. The state is classifiable as mental as opposed to a physical state like that of his lying beneath a tree. What makes a mental state mental? That is the question.

The functionalist answer is that what makes a mental state mental is just the causal role it plays in mediating between the sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and other internal states of the subject in question. The idea is not the banality that mental states typically (or even always) have causes and effects, but that it is causal role occupancy, nothing more and nothing less, that constitutes the mentality of a mental state. The intrinsic nature of what plays the role is relevant only to its fitness for instantiating mental causal  roles, but not at all relevant to its being a mental state.

Consider a piston in an engine. You can't make a piston out of chewing gum, but being made of steel is no part of what makes a piston a piston. A piston is what it does within the 'economy' of the engine. Similarly, on functionalism, a mental state is what it does. This allows, but does not entail, that a mental state be a brain or CNS state. It also allows, but does not entail, that a mental state be a state of a  computing machine.

To illustrate, suppose my cat Zeno and I are startled out of our respective reveries by a loud noise at time t. Given the differences  between human and feline brains, presumably man and cat are not in type-identical brain states at t.  (One of the motivations for functionalism was the breakdown of the old type-type identity theory of Herbert Feigl, U. T. Place. J. J. C. Smart, et al.)  Yet both man and cat are startled: both are in some sense in the same mental state, even though the states they are in are neither token- nor type-identical. The  functionalist will hold that we are in functionally the same mental state in virtue of the fact that Zeno's brain state plays the same  role in him as my brain state plays in me. It does the same  mediatorial job vis-à-vis sensory inputs, other internal states, and  behavioral outputs in me as the cat's brain state does in him.

On functionalism, then, the mentality of the mental is wholly relational. And as David Armstrong points out, "If the essence of the mental is purely relational, purely a matter of what causal role is played, then the logical possibility remains that whatever in fact plays the causal role is not material." This implies that "Mental states might be states of a spiritual substance." Thus the very feature of functionalism that allows mentality to be realized in computers and nonhuman brains generally, also allows it to be realized in spiritual substances if there are any.

Whether this latitudinarianism is thought to be good or bad, functionalism is a monumentally implausible theory of mind. There are the technical objections that have spawned a pelagic literature: absent qualia, inverted qualia, the 'Chinese nation,' etc. Thrusting these aside, I go for the throat, Searle-style. 

Functionalism is threatened by a fundamental incoherence. The theory states that what makes a state mental is nothing intrinsic to the state, but purely relational: a matter of its causes and effects. In us, these happen to be neural. (I am assuming physicalism for the time being.)  Now every mental state is a neural state, but not every neural state is a mental state. So the distinction between mental and nonmental neural states must be accounted for in terms of a distinction between two different sets of causes and effects, those that contribute to mentality and those that do not. But how make this distinction? How do the causes/effects of mental neural events differ from the causes/effects of nonmental neural events? Equivalently, how do psychologically salient input/output events differ from those that lack such salience?

Suppose the display on my monitor is too bright for comfort and I decide to do something about it. Why is it that photons entering my retina are psychologically salient inputs but those striking the back of my head are not? Why is it that the moving of my hand to to adjust the brightness and contrast controls is a salient output event, while unnoticed perspiration is not?

One may be tempted to say that the psychologically salient inputs are those that contribute to the production of the uncomfortable glare sensation, and the psychologically salient outputs are those that manifest the concomitant intention to make an adjustment. But then the salient input/output events are being picked out by reference to mental events taken precisely NOT as causal role occupants, but as exhibiting intrinsic features that are neither causal nor neural: the glare quale has an intrinsic nature that cannot be resolved into relations to other items, and cannot be identified with any brain state. The functionalist would then be invoking the very thing he is at pains to deny, namely, mental events as having more than neural and causal features.

Clearly, one moves in a circle of embarrassingly short diameter if one says: (i) mental events are mental because of the mental causal roles they play; and (ii) mental causal roles are those whose occupants are mental events.

The failure of functionalism is particularly evident in the case of qualia.  Examples of qualia: felt pain, a twinge of nostalgia, the smell of burnt garlic, the taste of avocado.  Is it plausible to say that such qualia can be exhaustively factored into a neural component and a causal/functional component?  It is the exact opposite of plausible.  It is not as loony as the eliminativist denial of qualia, but it is close.  The intrinsic nature of qualitative mental states is essential to them. It is that intrinsic qualitative nature that dooms functionalism.

Therefore

4) It cannot be maintained with truth that AI systems are literally conscious in the way we are. Talk of computers knowing this or that is metaphorical.

Papyrology and AI: the Library at Herculaneum

How much of a curse and how much of a blessing  Artificial Intelligence will prove to be remains to be seen. Book this on the blessing side of the ledger:

The University of Kentucky (UKY) has announced it is a co-recipient of a $13.5 million (€11.5 million) grant from the European Research Council in support of an international effort to decipher ancient papyrus scrolls carbonized and buried by the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 79 CE.

[. . .]

The award will enable the consortium to scale its efforts over the next six years to digitally recover, analyze, and read text from hundreds of papyrus scrolls that have until now been undecipherable. In addition, the project will leverage AI to connect pieces of scrolls, find patterns in how the library at Herculaneum was organized, and help establish best practices to preserve the collection. The project may uncover as much as 4.5 million words of entirely new Greek and Latin literature.

 

AI and Demons

You may remember our 'demonic' discussion from last summer. See  Reading Now: Demonic Foes. The comment thread runs to 61 entries, some of them excellent.

Bro Joe now wants us to read: Satanic AI: ChatGPT gives instructions.

Another topic we ought to explore is the possibility of demonic possession of AI systems. 

According to Richard Gallagher, M.D., "The essence of a possession is the actual control of the body (never the 'soul' or will') of a person by one or more evil spirits." (Demonic Foes, p. 80). Now AI systems do not have souls or wills of their own (or so I argue), but they do have bodies, albeit inorganic.  Might they then host demons?

Gallagher's book is outstanding. So if you think demonology is buncombe, you should study his book and disembarrass yourself of your illusions.