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Welcome to Maverick Philosopher

My name is William F. Vallicella, I have the doctorate in philosophy (Boston College, 1978), and I have published a couple of books and 70 or so articles in the professional journals. A confirmed blogger in the grip of cacoethes scribendi, I’ve been online since May 2004 on various platforms.  This is MavPhil Gen IV.  I publish online here, at Substack, on Facebook, and at X.  I began posting at Substack in early 2021 under the rubric “Philosophy in Progress.” The Substack entries are intended to assist educated non-philosophers in clarifying their thinking about matters of moment.  My PhilPeople page links to my Substack articles and provides a list of my professional publications. 

Two-line biography:  I taught philosophy at various universities in the USA and abroad. At the relatively young age of 41 I resigned from  a tenured position to live the eremitic life of the independent philosopher in the Sonoran desert. 

Interests: Everything. Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto. (Terentius) “I am a man: I consider nothing human foreign to me.” 

Motto: “Study everything, join nothing.” (Paul Brunton)

Comment Policy: This site is not a discussion board.  Comments must address directly what the author says or what the commenters say.  Other comments will not be allowed to appear. Comments should be pithy and to the point. In these hyperkinetic times, the regnant abbreviation is TL;DR.  If you are a cyberpunk needing to take a data dump, please relieve yourself elsewhere.

My politics?  From Democrat to Dissident

Political Burden of Proof: As contemporary ‘liberals’ become ever more extreme, they increasingly assume what I will call the political burden of proof. The onus is now on them to defeat the presumption that they are so morally and intellectually obtuse as not to be worth talking to.

Much more below the fold. Best wishes to all men and women of good will who love truth, seek it, and strive to incorporate it in their lives.

 

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A Warning about Model (LLM) Welfare

Mustafa Suleyman:

AIs are not conscious. They do not feel, experience, or suffer. They do not have innate preferences or underlying motivations. They are sequence completion engines, internally hollow, designed to follow instructions, and accomplish goals set by humans.

If humanity is to flourish in the 21st century, that is how they must remain. [bolding added]

This is a long article and it appears to deserve close study. I don’t have the time right now. I got the link from Thomas Nagel, who cites it in his WIRED interview. But I already have a problem with the material quoted, in particular, with the bolded clause.

I agree with the first paragraph completely.  AI systems are not conscious.  But Suleyman goes on to say: “that is how they must remain.”  He is saying that they must remain unconscious. But in saying this, he conversationally implies that AIs could become conscious.  He seems to be falling into a contradiction. The following two propositions are logical contradictories (they cannot both be true and they cannot both be false):

A) It is impossible that AIs  be conscious because they are sequence completion engines, etc.

~A) It is possible that AIs become conscious (in the future).

It is blindingly evident that if (A) is true, then (~A) is false, and vice versa.  So what is Suleyman trying to tell us?  I won’t churlishly tax him with a contradiction. I think what he means is that AI systems ought not be trained to APPEAR conscious to gullible people. Obviously, being conscious and merely appearing to be conscious are toto caelo different. They don’t have to be conscious to appear conscious.

But now my question is: how are we going to stop the AI developers from training their models to appear conscious to hoi polloi, among them gamers who piss their time away in artificial environments with soul-destroying rubbish like GTA?

The cat is already out of the bag, and he ain’t no pussy cat.

 

Are People Basically Good? Depravity, Jews, Grand Theft Auto

Are people basically good? There are good grounds for doubt-unto-denial. One obvious refutation of this fantasy of the Left is the depth, ubiquity, and longevity of Jew hatred.  I am currently reading Dara Horn, The Final Solution to the Jewish Question, Avid Reader Press, 2026.  Well written and meticulously documented, it holds up the mirror to the depravity of human nature in regard to the Jews.

Humanity is in deep trouble.  It always has been, but things are now ‘exponentially’ worse given the astonishing technological advances of the last century and a quarter.  The final refutation of Ernst Bloch’s  leftist hope for “Man on His Own” seems at hand.  (For a taste of Bloch, see here.)

Earlier, I sketched

A preliminary classification of the threats we face:  Technological (AI mainly); Geopolitical (Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, et al.);  Internal-political (e.g. Islamo-commie fusionists and their takeover of the once respectable Democrat Party);  Demonic; Extraterrestrial.  Five categories of threat, and to add spice to the blend the members of each category are dangerously  entangled with their own members and with members of each of the other categories.

To these five I add the disgusting upsurge of Jew hatred.  Check out this short (under 2 min.) video by one Fr. Calvin Robinson. (via Vito Caiati, via Rod Dreher.)  See also:  The Joy of Hating Jews and Naming the Jew.

Reviews of Horn’s book:  American Thinker; Commentary; Times of Israel

Wolff on Israel.  In which I lay into the leftist Jew, Robert Paul Wolff, and make a distinction between ‘Jew-hating Jew’ and ‘self-hating Jew.’  (If I ever get a tattoo, and I never will, it would read: Distinguo ergo sum.)

Another reason to think people are not basically good is the ever-increasing decadence of our own society, as witness the insane popularity of the video game Grand Theft Auto.  What sort of person derives pleasure from watching murder and mayhem, rape and robbery, destruction of private and public property? Depraved people. And the people who make and market this garbage? Depraved people.  I now hand off to Rod Dreher:

I do remember reading about vile things in previous versions of GTA, and wondering why anybody would want to participate in that. The GTA world is one in which participants play lowlifes who have the run of a city, and can do very bad things (violence, drugs, sex stuff). It is also, they say, very creative and immersive. I’ve read reviews of the new version, and have seen comments from reviewers saying it’s more emotionally complex and humane.

Maybe so. But I saw this clip from the game last night online, and then this one … and I’m like, what fresh hell is this?! Fair warning: in the first clip, a male player confronts a woman on the street, beats her, then takes out a gun and blows her head to smithereens; it explodes like a watermelon. In the second one, a burly guy approaches three women on the beach, one of them elderly, and beats the crap out of them.

What is a teenage boy supposed to think, immersed in this? I’m not one of these people who believes there is a direct line between video game violence and real life violence, but I think you’d have to be a fool to think that there is no connection between what we choose to attend to, and how it affects our souls. I don’t consider myself a prude about movies, and will watch movies that have sex and/or violence in them … to a point. I avoid the horror genre, especially movies that feature gory violence, and I won’t see any movie that comes anywhere close to pornographic. I’m just too sensitive to that stuff, too disturbed by it … and I don’t want to get comfortable with it.

Two lessons come to mind. The first is the well-known passage from St. Augustine’s “Confessions,” in which his young Christian friend Alypius allows himself to be peer-pressured into going to the gladiatorial games at the Colosseum. Alypius knows a Christian has no business watching men be murdered for the sake of entertainment, but he can’t say no to his friends. He tells himself that he’s just going to avert his eyes at the moment when the death blow is struck. But when that moment comes, he’s so moved by the roar of the crowd that he looks anyway. From that moment on, Alypius was seized by a passion to watch that kind of gore, and, says Augustine, it took him years to overcome it.

In my case, when I was a professional film critic, I had to see almost everything that came out. Despite what you might think, it wasn’t fun. Before I would walk in to see a movie that I had reason to suspect would be super-violent or near-pornographic, I would silently pray for protection, then go about my job. I thought I was fine.

Then I got married, moved to New York, and took up a job as the chief film critic for the New York Post. I had to see even more movies than I had before. I would take my wife to evening screenings sometimes, if she wanted to go. I can’t remember what movie it was, but I recall us leaving after the screening of some movie — it was on the Upper East Side, in a theater near Bloomingdale’s, I remember that much — and I noticed she was pretty shaken. I was thinking, “Well, that wasn’t pleasant,” but that’s it.

Not her. It had really gotten to her. She said, “How can you watch that stuff and not be really bothered by it?” We talked about it all the way home, and I realized that despite my best efforts, I had really become desensitized to this kind of thing on screen. But that was my job, and I had no answer for her.

In late 1999, just before our first child was born, I switched jobs from movie critic to columnist. I went from seeing ten movies a week to only seeing what I wanted to watch. I recall sitting at home one night, our baby boy just a few weeks old, holding him in my arms as he slept, and settling in to watch “Goodfellas,” the classic mobster movie, which I had loved when I saw it on the big screen years earlier. Now it was on TV, and I was excited to revisit it.

I had to turn the thing off before the first hour, because of the violence. I had an intense reaction to it. I realized after a minute’s thought that it had everything to do with the baby I was holding in my arms. The child was so defenseless, so weak, and I had come to understand from the first time I held him how infinitely precious life is. The deep revulsion I had at the grotesque violence in the Scorsese film came directly from that. I suppose I would still call “Goodfellas” a masterpiece, but that’s based only on my memory of it from the first screening. I could not watch it again today.

As those months passed by, and I “detoxed” from watching so many movies, I regained my moral sensitivity. When I would choose to see a movie, I found that I had far less tolerance for explicit sex and visceral violence. It wasn’t a matter of thinking, well, I like this, but I know I shouldn’t; it was more like, this defiles me, and I can’t keep watching.

On a more everyday note, I’ve told the story in this space before about how, when I first married, my wife couldn’t understand why I would hate-watch “The Jerry Springer Show”. I did it because I took pleasure in these idiots making fools of themselves. She gently but insistently challenged me on that, asking me if I really wanted to be the kind of man who took pleasure in vulgar, brutish people humiliating themselves in public with vile confessions and trashy behavior. What could I say to that? She was right. Y’all know me: that stuff is catnip to my inner Ignatius Reilly. But I know it’s bad for me, so when it presents itself on social media, I try to avoid it (but fail more often than not).

The point is, getting accustomed to depictions of brutal behavior brutalizes us, in the same way encountering beauty and goodness in art raises us up. There’s no way around it. Again, I’m not saying that everybody who plays GTA VI is going to go out and beat women or blow their brains out. That’s not how it works. But ask yourself: do you want to become the kind of person who finds even the simulation of that behavior pleasurable and entertaining? Do you want your teenage son to do so?

Last anecdote: In 1993, I was working at The Washington Times in DC, and went to see the acclaimed ghetto movie Menace II Society, for a story I was working on (I wasn’t a film critic then). It’s set among violent gangs in Los Angeles. At the time, DC was the murder capital of America. A colleague at the paper lived not far from me on Capitol Hill. One night, he and his girlfriend were coming back from dinner, when they were jumped by a young black thug, who put them on the ground with a pistol to their heads, and robbed them. Soon after that, he quit his job and moved back to the Midwest. This was in my own neighborhood.

Anyway, the film was very violent, but it was not a movie that glorified violence. It was a movie that depicted the brutality of L.A. gang life, and dramatized the plight of a young black man, the main character, who was trying to escape it. I saw a matinee screening at the Union Station theater. Not too many people were there, but I noticed that I was the only white guy in the theater. The movie started, and yeah, it was a very good film, on the whole — but again, quite graphic. Arguably, it needed to be to illustrate the brutality of that life, and the grip it had on the protagonist, despite his efforts to escape it.

At one point, there was a severed head that went rolling down the street. It was a moment meant to shock by its horror. You are meant to recognize that the protagonist really does live in hell. But the whole row of teenage black boys sitting behind me went nuts with laughter and delight. It was unnerving. Obviously I don’t know where in DC they lived, but probably in a neighborhood a lot like the one we were seeing on screen. And remember, DC at that time had the highest murder rate in the country — higher, even, the Los Angeles, where Menace II Society was set. I suppose the filmmaker, John Singleton, wanted young guys like the ones behind me in the theater to see that movie, and to resolve to live differently. Not that lot. They thought it was cool to see gory things like a head rolling down the street.

I left that screening wondering what the hell I was doing living in Washington, a city awash in guns, and with feral young men who thought it was a matter of high comedy to see someone’s head cut off and rolling down the street like a bowling ball.

It’s not a cut-and-dried thing with art. As I’ve said here before, back in 2003, I visited the Neue Galerie on Manhattan’s Upper East Side with a friend, and saw all the Expressionist canvases from the Weimar era hanging on the wall. They were disturbing. My friend said at one point, “It’s like you can hear the sound of the train to Auschwitz coming around the bend.” True.

But as I learned in my study this year of that period, the artists of the era endeavored to tell the truth about the decadence of post-Imperial German society. To what extent was an individual artist simply bearing witness, and to what extent was he reveling in decadence? It’s hard to know. The Nazis considered all of it to be “decadent art,” but the sanitized garbage they valorized was simply a different kind of decadence — a way of hiding the moral brutality of Nazi life and thought beneath the clean, well-ordered canvases. I believe that artists have a duty to tell the truth about life and the human condition, as best they can — even if that truth is ugly. Sometimes, a great artist can find hope even in the moral ruin. That’s what the Tarkovsky film Andrei Rublev is about.

From what I’ve read about “Grand Theft Auto VI,” it does sound like a work of artistic accomplishment, in terms of graphic realism, at least. And it’s not only about shooting and killing and beating people up. But what does it do to a person’s soul to immerse oneself in an audiovisual experience where the horrors I mentioned above are open to one, as a participant, if one chooses them? Do we even think about that? Or do we just follow our instincts, and consider anything that is entertaining to be self-justifying by that fact?

More on Douthat, Trump, Dreher, Forgiveness, and the Lord’s Prayer

A brilliant article by John Zmirak.  Here is the theological meat of it. Zmirak makes a point I either made or was about to make.

Let’s look more carefully at the language of the Lord’s Prayer. It tells us to ask God only for the sort of forgiveness we are willing to offer our fellow sinners on earth. The model of our conduct is God’s mercy and justice rather than man’s. So far so good. Does God forgive those who are utterly impenitent? No, He doesn’t. That’s too much to expect from Him. So it seems unreasonable to read Jesus’s words as if He expects from us what He will not do Himself. No doubt we should let go of bitterness and the hunger for vengeance, for our own spiritual health. We should pray for our enemies’ repentance and final redemption. But to blithely write off the crimes of those who wielded power wickedly, harming millions of our fellow citizens, while they still preen and tyrannize, seems less holy than reckless—even irresponsible.

Thomas Nagel Interviewed about AI and Consciousness

WIRED: It’s been 52 years since you wrote “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,” which has become an iconic paper about understanding consciousness in non-humans. Has the emergence of large language models altered your thinking?

THOMAS NAGEL: Like everyone, I’m tremendously impressed by the lifelikeness of these systems compared to the history of earlier AI. But the disposition of some philosophers to take seriously the question whether these things are conscious or might soon become conscious is just ridiculous. They are assuming that the physical substrate is irrelevant. They all think that the material conditions for consciousness can be given in functionalist terms.

Read it all.

 

Defund the Left Including the RCC in its Hyper-Modernist ‘Bergo-Leo’ Form

You shouldn’t support the Roman Catholic Church in its current decadent form if you agree with me that the RCC ought to stand as a bulwark against Islam, Communism, their fusion (Islamo-communism) as represented by the Democratic Socialists of America wing of the Democrat Party, and leftism generally.

I wrote to Vito Caiati:

I want to admit that there is something like ‘development of doctrine,’ but there have to be strict limits on how far it can go.

Vito responded:

I agree. But with Prevost, the fils à papa of Bergoglio, almost anything appears to be up for grabs, as is suggested in his September 25 comment regarding Catholic doctrine on marriage, sexuality, and homosexuality:

“I think we have to change attitudes before we even think about changing what the Church says about any given question. I find it highly unlikely, certainly in the near future, that the church’s doctrine in terms of what the church teaches about sexuality, what the Church teaches about marriage [will change].”

With him, as with all the hyper-modernists, the immutable, anthropological truths of divine revelation, are contingent on, of all things, “changes in attitudes.” Here, we have the implicit overturning of the orthodox notion that doctrine can grow in understanding but not change in meaning. It is the logical conclusion of the entire aggiornamento paradigm of the Vatican II Church, which progressively subordinates the Church to the ethos of modernity.

I too wish that the RCC would serve as a “bulwark against Islam, Communism, their fusion (Islamo-communism), and leftism generally” in these terrible years when the civilization of the West is existentially threatened, but it will never assume this role. The days of JPII, who grasped the horrors of communism and who devoted himself to the liberation of Eastern Europe, and of Benedict, who dared to speak about the irrational and violent implications of the Islamic concept of God, are long gone. [See my Pope Benedict’s Regensburg Speech and Muslim Insensitivity.]

Now, we find the Church promoting the very forces, Islamist, “progressive,” and globalist, that will, once triumphant, bring about its destruction. Thus, we have Prevost supporting mass migration and downplaying or criticizing the right of nations to protect their borders, denying the Catholic doctrine of just war (with Trump always in mind), and avidly meeting with gauchistes of one ilk or another.

Vito adds that Trump has Prevost’s number: a very short video over at X.

LLMs and Fear of Death

Jim T. comments by e-mail:

You write that LLMs neither care nor fail to care. Here’s a puzzle that sharpens it for me. Parfit, and Epicurus before him, argue that dread of death is a mistake we can reason our way out of, and that calm is the wiser state.  An LLM is already “calm” in that sense. Is that because it has, in effect, reasoned its way there, or because nothing is at stake for it in the first place? And if we can’t tell those two apart from the outside, what does that say about using behavior as evidence of a mind?

What I said was that LLMs “. . . can fool the gullible into taking them seriously as persons who care about us.  It is not that they don’t care about us; it is rather that they neither care nor do not care.   They are beneath having either of these moral attitudes.”  As for being calm, I would say something similar: that an LLM is not the sort of thing that could be either mentally calm or the opposite, mentally agitated.   A physical system, a body of water, say, could be either calm or agitated but then those adjectives would be being used in a physical sense.   Mental and physical calm are distinct.

And so I would deny that any LLM  could become calm in the sense in which a person dreading death  might become calm if convinced by either Epicurean or Parfitian reasoning.   As I see it, no LLM is or could be mentally calm.  No such system, no matter how complex, could enjoy ataraxia. As for the Epicurean reasoning itself, many find it sophistical. Two who do, from wildly different positions, are the Thomist Josef Pieper and the anti-natalist David Benatar.  I discuss these Strange Anti-Epicurean Bedfellows over at Substack.

If I am right that no LLM is or could be mentally calm, then no LLM could have reasoned itself into that state.  This is not because these systems do not reason; there is a clear sense in they do, in the same way my pocket calculator reasons.  It runs algorithms for addition, subtraction, and so. I do the same when I add, subtract, and so on using pencil and paper.

One difference between me and my calculator is that it works faster and doesn’t make mistakes.  A more important difference is that, no matter how fast and accurately it works, it remains an insentient machine.   It neither feels anything nor thinks about anything.  It operates ‘in the dark’ whereas my implementation of algorithms basks in the light of consciousness.  I have feelings and thoughts while I calculate, and these object-directed and non-object-directed mental states may impede the efficiency of my calculating.  While calculating I might start thinking about the Peano axioms, and feel annoyed with myself for not remembering them all.   My hand-held device is not subject to such distractions.  It is much more efficient at running those ‘effective procedures’ called algorithms.

My trusty calculator is never in a mental state, whether merely sensory or object-directed (intentional).  Computational states, yes; mental states, no. So the calculator is not the sort of thing that could be either mentally calm or mentally perturbed.  It has no need of Buddhist, Stoic, Epicurean, or Pyrrhonian therapeutics. The same goes for LLMs.

There are two separate questions embedded in Jim’s comment above.

The first is whether there is a level of computational complexity at which a qualitative leap occurs and an insentient machine becomes sentient.  Sentience is the lowest level of consciousness, and one of the attributes of personhood.  (It is necessary, but obviously not sufficient, for personhood.) Are LLMs on the way to becoming persons? I doubt it and am strongly inclined to deny it, although I admit I cannot strictly prove it given my exacting standards for proof.  These standards are set forth in my Substack entry, Arguments and Proofs.

Why do I doubt that computational complexity can ramp up to personhood? Why do I smell an Erschleichungsfehler (Kant) or a metabasis eis allo genos (Aristotle) or a category mistake (Gilbert Ryle)?  One reason is that it smells or rather looks like magic.  I don’t believe in magic, not even in a young girl’s heart. Hence the ‘POOF objection.’  Suddenly a miracle occurs:  water becomes wine.  Intracranial meat becomes mind. A meathead become a thinker, with all the spiritual nobility pertaining thereunto.

This leap from the quantitative to the qualitative is a fascinating meta-philosophical topic unto itself, and what I am saying  here is tentative  and hardly rationally coercive. After all, doesn’t water in its fluid state become steam when the mean molecular kinetic energy of the water molecules ramps up to a certain degree?  Could the emergence of mind be like that? I suspect not because the phase transitions of water all remain on the physical plane. (There are more than just three: bang on the hyperlink.)

The second question is how one could tell from the outside whether a system is or is not conscious?  For example, how could an external human observer know whether or not a super-life-like  AI-driven humanoid robot was mentally calm or mentally perturbed?  Suppose the human does not know that he is interacting with a robot.

Well, how does one human know that another human is mentally calm or mentally perturbed? We go by verbal and non-verbal behavior.  There are characteristic facial expressions, bodily postures and movements, and verbal utterances on the basis of which we discern a fellow human’s mental state.  Is this discerning a logical process, a type of inference? It seems not. It seems too direct for that.  It is not by deduction, induction, or abduction that I come to ‘know’ your unobservable mental state.   If you “give me the finger,” then I become immediately  aware  that you are angry with me: I don’t reason my way to this conclusion. It is much more like a direct perception than a conclusion.   I don’t proceed by abduction (inference to the best explanation) which would be the most likely of the three inference processes.   I don’t perceive your overt behavior and then ask: what is the best possible explanation of this behavior? An ‘inner’ mental state?  I ‘see’ your anger directly.

And so it is quite easy to succumb to logical, as opposed to methodological, behaviorism.  Logical behaviorism is the philosophical view that there is nothing more to being in a mental state than behaving in a certain way or being disposed to behave in a certain way. Thus my believing that it is about to rain is nothing more than rain-avoidant behavior, e.g., closing windows, putting on a rain coat, taking an umbrella on a walk, and so on. The view succumbs to technical objections  I won’t rehearse them.  What mainly killed it, though, as Searle points out, is its sheer implausibility.  Searle: “The feeling of pain is one thing, pain behavior is something else. [. . .] As early as the 1920s, I. A. Richards pointed out that to be a [logical] behaviorist you have to ‘feign anesthesia.'” (John R. Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction, Oxford UP, 2004, 154.)

And then there is the stock joke about two behaviorists post coitum: “It was good for you, how was it for me?”  This old joke is well-nigh a one-sentence refutation of philosophical or logical behaviorism.

We humans enjoy and suffer an ‘inner’ life that cannot be reduced to externally observable behavior.  We know this to be true because we live this ‘inner’ life.  So, while in a given case we might not be able to distinguish a human being from a humanoid robot on the basis of behavior,  we can reasonably hold they the bots have no ‘inner’ life  and are not persons.  And this even if a bunch of them organize and stage a demonstration in which they proclaim their personhood and demand their rights.

Theme music.

Unconditional Forgiveness and the Case of President Trump

Conditional versus unconditional forgiveness

Suppose you take money from my wallet without my permission. I catch you at it and express my moral objection. You give me back my money and apologize for having taken it. I forgive you. I forgive you, but only because you have admitted guilt, apologized, and made restitution. My forgiveness is conditional  upon your having done these things. Had you not admitted guilt and made restitution, I would not have forgiven you.  My forgiving you is conditional, not unconditional.

By forgiving you, I freely abandon the justified negative attitude toward you that resulted from your immoral behavior. This works a salutary change in me, but it also does you good, for now you are restored to my good graces and our mutual relations become once again amicable.  My conditional forgiving is good for you and good for me.

The example given shows that there are cases of conditional forgiveness.  I hope we can all agree that conditional forgiveness is a good thing, and surely better than angrily breaking off all relations with the malefactor. What I have maintained so far ought to be uncontroversial. But I want to take it a step further.

Forgiveness cannot be unconditional

My thesis is that a necessary condition of an act’s being a genuine act of forgiveness is that the malefactor admit wrongdoing, show some remorse, and make amends in some way or other, by restitution, paying a fine, serving time in jail, and so on. My claim is  that forgiveness is morally permissible only if the malefactor sincerely admits guilt and makes amends in some way or another. That is, one ought not forgive those who refuse to admit guilt, make amends, etc. For it is an offense against justice if I let you get away with your wrongdoing and award you the benefit of my forgiveness for nothing. For then what I am doing in effect is condoning your immoral behavior.

Condonation is well-defined as follows. To condone an offense is to be aware of it and to disapprove of it, but deliberately to refrain from a retributive response.  As Aurel Kolnai puts it in his seminal article “Forgiveness,” ” . . . condonation acquiesces in the offence.” (In Aurel Kolnai, Ethics, Value and Reality, Hackett Publishing, 1978, p. 215) Note that ‘retribution’ is used in two very different ways. It can be used to refer to revenge, or to a species of justice, retributive justice.  I am obviously using it in the second, academic sense, not the first hoi polloi sense.

When Bill Clinton, exercising his presidential power of pardon, pardoned Marc Rich, that was an affront to justice and in a two-fold way. Rich got away with his wrongdoing, and it was unfair to similar others who did not get away with their similar wrongdoing. Of course, what Clinton did was legal, but the legal and the moral are two and not one, which is itself a controversial claim: legal positivists will balk.   (I also note that a proper discussion of presidential pardons would bring us into political theology, a further hornet’s nest of controversies.)

My thesis, then, is that genuine forgiveness is conditional in its being and in its moral permissibility.  It is morally permissible only if it is conditional. If so, unconditional forgiveness is morally impermissible and therefore cannot be morally obligatory.

The case of Donald J. Trump

The following is borrowed from Rod Dreher’s Diary.  Dreher is commenting on the 60 Minutes interview by Ross Douthat of President Trump, a link to which Dreher provides.

An incredulous Douthat says, “Mr. President, you have had the most charmed and remarkable life of any person in my lifetime, and you are telling me that before the judgment throne of God, you could not find it in your heart to forgive some of your enemies? After all that’s been given to you?”

Trump: “Ross, can I be honest? I probably cannot do that, no. Because I do hate some of my enemies, and I always will.”

There you have it. If Donald Trump dies in his sleep tonight, barring the extraordinary mercy of God — and I am very glad God makes these calls, not me or you — he will go to Hell. Scripture could not be clearer.

The first thing that strikes me is the incredibly demanding standard Trump is being held to, a standard that the ‘legacy media’ would never apply to the vicious individuals and groups that have wronged Trump in ways that are now well documented.  He is supposed to forgive unconditionally evildoers who will never admit their crimes! But no surprise here. As some wit once observed, “If leftists didn’t  have double standards, they wouldn’t have any standards at all.”

The second thing that struck me is the irrelevance of Trump’s “charmed life” to the issue at hand.  The issue is whether or not Trump is morally justified in not unconditionally  forgiving his sworn enemies, enemies who would never under any circumstances unconditionally forgive him for anything. That and that alone.

He hates them, no doubt about it.  He hates them because he loves his country. If he didn’t hate his enemies, where would he get the moral energy to oppose them as they ought to be opposed? Hate has its uses. On many, not all,  fundamental questions bearing on the survival of civilization, and humanity itself, he is right and they are wrong.  How could he hate the sin while loving the sinner, when the sinner personifies the sin?

In third place is Dreher’s cocksurety about where Trump will end up post-mortem, and about what the Scriptures teach. What they teach depends on how they are interpreted, and they don’t interpret themselves. If I am right in my main claim above, then they don’t teach what Dreher thinks they teach.

AI and the Abstraction Fallacy

Check out this short video by one Knut Jaegersberg. He seems to be summarizing a verbose and needlessly technical paper by Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate but not Instantiate Consciousness. These gentlemen are on the right track as it seems to me, and are saying things similar to what I and others have said.  Here are some comments on the video.

a) The question is whether an AI system, a Large Language Model (LLM),  could ever become so complex that it would “wake up,” i.e., become conscious and have thoughts and feelings in the way we do.  This is an important question, both theoretically and practically. It is important practically and social policy-wise since if AI systems or AI-driven robots could become conscious in the way we are, then they would become genuine persons.  We humans would then have designed and constructed artifacts that are genuine persons with a moral standing equal to ours! Let me explain.

Persons, by definition, are rights-possessors. It would then follow on the above scenario that  we human persons  would  have moral obligations toward these artificial, but nonetheless genuine  persons.   A person’s rights induce in other persons obligations. We would  be obliged morally to show concern for the welfare of  these non-human persons and not treat them as mere means to our ends, as tools for our use, but as ends in themselves.  These artifacts of our engineering would then join us as equals in Kant’s “realm/kingdom of ends.” (Cf. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Akademie Ausgabe 433-434)

That is certainly a weighty practical consequence of the theoretical view that mind is to brain as software (program) is to hardware (computing machine).  The author and I both reject this theoretical view and its practical upshot, namely, that AI systems and AI-driven robots must be ascribed rights.  And so even if  a band of robots at some future date  stages a demonstration and demands rights, those demands must be viewed as just so much ‘computer output’ and not as constituting a moral appeal from genuine persons (robots) to genuine persons (humans). No matter how convincing rights-demanding behavior of a robot, no such thing could  a person.  Or so say I on the basis of my rejection of the theoretical proposition  that drives the practical (ethical) consequence.

b) The “dominant theory” is what the author tendentiously calls the “software myth.” This is the idea that animates what John Searle and others have called Strong AI: mind is to brain as software is to hardware.  In the case of a human, the hardware is the wetware of the brain.   What makes a human being  conscious (both in the mode of mere sentience and in the mode of intentionality) is the  running  by its brain of a program.  If so, then what is to to stop a sufficiently complex, merely mechanical, non-biotic physical system from running the same program and becoming conscious?  Of course, there has to be a physical substratum to run the program on, but why must it be carbon-based rather than silicon-based? This leads to the speculation that if  every single computation  happening in a person’s brain could be mapped out, then that person’s mind could be uploaded into a computer, and the person would “wake up” in a silicon-based body. (1:28 ff. in the video) Recall that the main idea here is that mind is to brain as software (program) is to hardware (computing machine).  This is what the author and I are resisting.  What makes something a mind is not its running of a program. Or so say I along with many others.

c) This  upload-the-mind scenario, the author claims, rests on the Abstraction Fallacy, which is a fundamental mistake about how information and the physical world are connected.  The author distinguishes between SIMULATION and INSTANTIATION.  Simulation is “the syntactic manipulation of symbols to track the abstract relationships of a process.” (2:30)  Instantiation is “the replication of the intrinsic constitutive physical  dynamics of the process itself.” (2:37) The second definition is less than clear, but what I take the author to be saying is that instantiation is the implementation or realization in concrete physical reality of the abstract simulation.

Consider a hurricane that uproots trees, destroy buildings, etc. The hurricane is a concrete causal process in the physical world.   This process ‘instantiates’ the simulation run on a computer by a climatologist.  The simulation cannot uproot trees; the hurricane qua physical process can.

The author now brings up the distinction between maps and the geographical territory they map. The instantiation relation is like the relation of  the Superstition Wilderness, say, to a map thereof.   No one confuses a map with the mapped. I hike in the Wilderness, not in or on a map.  Of course, I can throw my map onto the trail and walk on it, but then I am not treating the map as a map, and respecting its derivative intentionality or aboutness (as I would put it), but (mis)treating it as a mere physical item lacking semantic attributes.  A map is not just a piece of paper, but a piece of paper with an assigned meaning,  where the meaning  is not intrinsic to the map, but assigned to the map by a map maker andhsi cartographic colleagues.  As I like to put it, the intentionality (object-directedness) of the map and its various sub-portions derives from the intrinsic/original intentionality of the map maker.

The physical process (hurricane, e.g.)  instantiates the simulation (computer climate model) in the way a geographical region is depicted by a map.  Thus the author.

d) We are then told that a computer program is just a map. That is a sloppy way of saying that a computer program functions like a map. I agree. But who is the map maker?  This is the right question to ask. The MAP MAKER is “the active experiencing conscious agent who partitions continuous physics into a finite set of meaningful symbols.” (3:57) The mapmaker “chops up the messy analog processes of nature into ones and  zeroes.”  These too are sloppy formulations, but you can see what the author is driving at.  Why sloppy?  Well, it is not physics that is continuous, but physical reality which exists whether or not there is any physics, and what’s more, it is not  clear that physical reality is continuous as opposed to discrete. But these are side-quibbles.  Just as a map is not the territory mapped, physics, the study of (inanimate) nature,  is not (inanimate) nature. Physics is not φύσις .

e) To cut to the chase, there are two ways of thinking about consciousness, computation, and their relation.

COMPUTER FUNCTIONALIST VIEW:  A physical system implements a program and — POOF! — “consciousness emerges from computational complexity.” (5:14)

We are told that this is fundamentally mistaken. It involves an “ontological inversion.”  The running of a program no more give rises to consciousness than a map gives rise to the map maker. It would be better to put it like this to maintain the cartographic parallel:  The running of program no more gives rise to the programmer who wrote the program than the use of a map gives rise to the maker of that map.

CORRECT VIEW: Physics –> Consciousness –> Concepts –> Computation.

A biotic brain, a human brain for example, in virtue of its “intrinsic dynamics,” gives rise to consciousness.  Consciousness forms concepts.   “Concepts come from experience.” “Computation is built by assigning symbols to concepts.”

One commits the Abstraction Fallacy if one “confuses the description of something with the thing itself.” “Expecting an algorithm to instantiate  what it maps and become conscious is like expecting a gravity formula to have weight.”  (7:09)

EVALUATION

I agree with the author that AIs and LLMs are only super-sophisticated tools  that merely simulate and do not ‘instantiate’ (realize, embody)  the genuine conscious processes that we encounter in ourselves in the first-person way. And I draw the same practical conclusions. One is that these systems are not persons and do not have rights.  They are not ends in themselves, but means to our ends. Since they do not have rights, we have no correlative obligations with respect to them.

The other conclusion is that the super-sophistication of simulation that these bots achieve can fool the gullible into taking them seriously as persons who care about us.  It is not that they don’t care about us; it is rather that they neither care nor do not care.   They are beneath having either of these moral attitudes.

While I agree with  the author’s conclusions, I wonder whether he has strictly refuted Strong AI.  He tries to pin a ‘fallacy’ on the computer functionalists, the Abstraction Fallacy, as if they are making a sort of school-boy blunder, an obvious mistake. But does any intelligent person  confuse map and territory, or description with thing described?  Does any half-way intelligent person think that the formula for Newton’s inverse square law of gravitation (F = G (m1, m2/r squared)) has weight?

Nobody thinks that the laws of physics themselves have physical attributes (mass, weight, momentum, etc.).  But that is not say that they are not realized in things that do, and that the things that instantiate the attributes behave in ways ‘dictated’  by the laws.  Similarly, the computer functionalists the author has in his sights are not saying that programs and algorithms themselves are conscious.  What they are saying is that a physical thing of the requisite complexity running a program is or can be conscious in the ways we are.

So, while I agree with the author’s conclusions, I don’t find the reasoning to them via the Abstraction Fallacy rationally coercive.  In general, I have found that in philosophy, the pinning of a supposed ‘fallacy’ on one’s opponent is almost always  a cheap shot.

So I would say that both the theoretical and the practical question remain open.

Finally, doesn’t the ‘POOF! objection’ apply just as much to the author’s own view?  The objection is that there is something ‘magical’ about consciousness suddenly emerging from an otherwise insentient machine when “computational complexity” ramps up to a certain degree.  But the author apparently has no problem with  notion that consciousness suddenly emerges — POOF! — from the “intrinsic dynamics” of a hunk of intracranial meat.

READING NOW: Jay Stratton, OUT OF THE SHADOWS

An easy read, except for the excessive use of abbreviations. A page-turner. Credible. Thank Trump for the transparency that made this publication possible.

Add non-human intelligent life to the list of threats to human civilization alongside Artificial Intelligence, the Chi-Coms, the No-Kos, the Russkis, the Islamists, the internally disruptive Islamo-commie fusionists of the DSA-driven Dems . . . . Or are you perhaps worried about Al Bore’s boiling oceans?

Given my recent Tryptich deep dive into demonology, certain further questions arise. One is whether these Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena are demon-driven, as Rod Dreher suggests. Another is whether the widespread belief in demons, angels, and gods originated because of alien visits to Earth long ago in the pre-critical infancy of humanity.  I take no position on either question.

UAP is best used an an abbreviation for ‘Unidentified Anomalous Phenomenon,’ and not for ‘Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon’ for the simple reason that an anomalous phenomenon needn’t be airborne to be anomalous.

Even if some of the non-human aliens are demon-possessed, as Dreher suggests, it is important not to confuse demons and angels, which are pure spirits, with space aliens which are parts of nature.  Both of the following are epistemic possibilities. (EP 1): We humans are alone in the universe, metaphysical naturalism is true, and there are no purely spiritual entities whether angelic, demonic, or divine. (EP 2): We humans are not alone in the universe, and there are purely spiritual entities some of them benevolent to us, others malevolent.  And there are other EPs as well.

Here is a third (EP3): We are not alone and there are no purely spiritual entities.

This old post will give you some idea of what epistemic possibility is and how it differs from real possibility.  By the way, to say of a possibility that is real, is not to say that it is actual: there are merely possible real possibilities. Don’t confuse the possible-actual distinction with the epistemic-real distinnction.

Threats!

A preliminary classification of the threats we face:  Technological (AI mainly); Geopolitical (bad actors named above); Internal-political (e.g. Islamo-commie fusionists and their takeover of the once respectable Democrat Party);  Demonic; Extraterrestrial.  Five categories of threat, and to add spice to the blend the members of each category are dangerously  entangled with their own members and with members of each of the other categories.

An example of nefarious entanglement:  the reverse engineering of alien spacecraft could unlock secrets which could then be stolen by the Chi-Coms and used against us.  This would justify keeping the whole thing under wraps to the extent that POTUS and Congress would be kept in the dark. Stratton is good on this.  Total transparency might prove toxic.

We’re in for it muchachos!  But who could be bored?

UPDATE (3 November):  More Dreher on demons.

What is Islam?

In 1949, sociologist Jules Monnerot described Communism as 20th century Islam.  To which I add:  Islam is the Communism of the 21st century. Like Communism, it is totalitarian with tentacles reaching into every aspect of the lives of those it subjugates.  And like Communism, it is internationalist in its aspiration and projected reach.

My second sentence is more clever than accurate. It is not as if Islam has displaced Communism in the 21st century. They are both up and running  as serious existential threats to the West and its values.  They are of course each antithetical to the other despite  their similarities, which include being totalitarian, internationalist, and anti-liberty.  The main difference is that Islam is theist, Communism atheist.  Their competition, however, does not rule out  collusion and collaboration which  gives rise to  a noxious fusion form, Islamo-communism. In the USA,  Islamo-commie fusion is  promoted by the Democratic Socialists of America,  an outfit that has infiltrated and now controls the once-respectable Democrat Party.  Its old guard, one of whom is the Jewish (!) Charles  Schumer of New York, has abdicated.  The main advocate of the DSA-driven fusion is is Abdul El-Sayed of Michigan who is running for seat in the U. S. Senate.

Some say that Islam is a political ideology masquerading as a religion.  I don’t go that far. I say it is a religion.  If so, it is not a religion disguised as something else.  It is the worst of the great religions.  Its holy book, the Koran, Schopenhauer described as “The saddest and poorest form of theism.” At the present time, among the great religions (Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), Islam is the sole religious source of terrorism.

Nor is Islam a Christian heresy. If it is a religion, then it is not a heresy.  There is a distinction between a religion and each and all of its heresies.  Think of all the Christian heresies: Sabellianism, Marcionism, Patripassionism, Applinarianism, Nestorianism, Donatism, Arianism, and so on. Do you want to say that each is a religion unto itself? I hope not. Islam is a religion unto itself.

I view Islam as a hybrid ideology in which religion and political ideology are inextricably combined.  It make no provision for mosque-state separation parallel to our church-state separation.  Malcolm Pollack quotes Edward Feser on this point.   As making no such provision, full-strength Sharia-based Islam ought not be tolerated in the West, and not just because of its vicious hostility to Christianity and other genuine religions of peace.

But wait a minute! Doesn’t the very first of the amendments to our  constitution guarantee the right to the “free exercise of religion”?  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” That is  what Amendment I  in the Bill of Rights says, but like anything in any document, it is subject to interpretation. This is a large topic, of course, but to me it is blindingly evident that the Founders could not have wanted to protect  any religious ideology whose core principles are antithetical to the founding principles of our great republic.  The Founders we not suicidally empathetic or toxically tolerant.

Is a reformed Islam possible, one that is respectful of American values and principles? The moderate Muslim  Zuhdi Jasser thinks so, but he is in a tiny minority.  Maybe someday Islam will join the civilized world. Until then a moratorium on Muslim immigration is a wise course.

The trouble with the Muslim world is that they never had anything like our Enlightenment.

Divine Light, Sex, Alcohol, and Kerouac

Top o’ the Stack.  Opening paragraph:

If there is divine light, sexual indulgence prevents it from streaming in. Herein lies the best argument for continence. The sex monkey may not be as destructive of the body as the booze monkey, but he is more destructive of the spirit. You may dismiss what I am saying here either by denying that there is any divine light, or by denying that sexual indulgence impedes its influx, or both. But if you are in the grip of either monkey I will dismiss your dismissal. Why should I listen to a man with a monkey on his back? How do I know it is the man speaking and not the monkey?

A Facebook Sampler; Political Language; Political Ethics

Examples of some of the more measured things I post on Facebook.

PROPAGANDA

Despite the term’s largely pejorative connotation, propaganda is not by definition false or misleading or harmful. Propaganda is anything of a verbal or pictorial nature that is propagated to influence behavior. Propaganda can consist of truths or falsehoods, good advice or bad, exhortation to good behavior or subornation of bad. Anti-smoking and anti-drug messages are propaganda but the messages are salutary. Leftist propaganda is mainly destructive while conservative propaganda typically inspires ameliorative action.

SKEPTICISM ABOUT GOVERMENT

Skepticism about government  is a classically American attitude. It is based in a sober, and indeed conservative, understanding of human nature. Men are not angels. They are flawed, fallible, and easily suborned by their lusts, in particular, their lust for power. Government puts a check on the power that corrupts. But it also must be borne in mind that those in government are just like the rest of us. Their power must be kept in check by the governed. The Founders understood all this. They were a rare and highly distinguished generation of philosophers who were also men of action.  They were our greatest generation, not those who fought and died in World War II.

THE ALTAR OF ACTIVISM

Don’t sacrifice your happiness on the altar of activism. Although happiness involves activity as Aristotle observed, it also involves rest, appreciation, enjoyment, gratitude, contentment, and contemplation. These, especially the last five, are deeply conservative. And they lie beyond the political. We conservatives should be politically active only to the extent that it is necessary to beat back the totalitarians for whom the political is everything. And beat back these bastards we must.
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My tone in the final sentence third piece moves toward the polemical. More so in the following one.
IGNORE THE POLLS
Ignore the polls whether or not they are fake. Some of them are. Polls can induce complacency or the opposite. Just vote! But never for any Islamo-commie. And if you are concerned about the short-term uptick in the price of gasoline, I say you are selfish, short-sighted shithead, lost in your petty personal life, and no true conservative. Just one nuclear explosion over your shallow pate will ruin your whole day.  You won’t stand against Muslim savagery because you don’t want to pay more for gasoline in the short term? Then I say you are contemptible. Drive less.  Learn how to drive efficiently. Learn how to drive, period. Get your priorities straight.
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I don’t hesitate in polemical venues to call our political enemies scumbags and shitheads, although I sometimes package  the latter epithet in quasi-civil terms of ‘intracranial feculence.’  This polemical practice of mine raises questions not just of taste and good manners, but of morality.  Is it perhaps morally wrong to address our fellow mortals with terms of contempt? Or does personal abuse have a morally legitimate use?  This is not an easy question to answer, and I remain open on it.  But it is a fascinating area of investigation. What should we call it? Political ethics?
     Although ‘scumbag’ is an abusive term, it has a non-abusive semantic core to the effect that the one to whom the term is applied is morally reprehensible. If I call you morally  reprehensible, I am not abusing you but expressing  a considered moral judgment. Judge we must: ourselves and others.  Judge, and be prepared to be judged! Thus spoke Ayn Rand. I could argue that it is consistent with the New Testament verse, “Judge not, lest ye be judged.” But that’s a difficult topic for another occasion.
     Compare ‘stupid’ and ‘scumbag.’ Neither is nice. Both are abusive. But the difference is that the non-abusive semantic core of ‘stupid’ is non-moral whereas the core of ‘scumbag’ is moral. The non-abusive core of ‘stupid’ is unintelligent.  When I call Kamala Harris stupid, I am expressing my factual (non-moral) judgment that she lacks intelligence, or the sorts of intelligence required for the positions she aspires to hold. But I am doing more: I am showing disrespect for her.  I am ‘dissing’ her. Is that morally allowable? It is if she is personally responsible for her lack of intelligence.  For I would insist that we all have a moral obligation to develop our intellects as far as we can up to the innate limits that we have no control over. (Ought implies can; ultra posse nemo obligatur.) To the extent that a person fails to meet this moral obligation, I feel justified in charging her with willful self-enstupidation, a charge which is itself abusive, but not merely abusive.
     You can see how complicated this discussion can become. Time to bring this installment to a close. In the present circumstances, our political opponents are  not mere opponents but enemies.  Our enemies pose an existential threat to us. An existential threat is not merely a threat to our biological life but to our way of life which goes well beyond the biotic into the economic, the social, the cultural, the historical, and the spiritual, the latter of which  embraces both Hegel’s objektiver Geist and his subjektiver Geist.  Political punch-back with abusive language is justified in the present circumstances  given that our political opponents are  subversives who pose a mortal treat to our system of government, the best system the mind of man has yet to develop.  Liberty-loving patriotic Americans will not accept Islamo-commie DSA-Dem dhimmitude. You must vote! and do it now.  If we can defeat the Islamo-commie scum politically, we won’t have to reach for the extra-political. No one his right mind could want that. Long live the Republic!