Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains
Two Assurances of Religion . . .
. . . and the case of the philosophically sophisticated rapist. Top o’ the Stack.
2 thoughts on “Two Assurances of Religion . . .”
A recurring theme.
1) “rationally coercive” – despite the years of your consistent use of this phrase, i still don’t understand its intended meaning.
Surely it must be one of the following:
any argument (A) is “rationally coercive”:
(i) if it happens to convince at least one ~A believer that A is, in fact, true, but at least one of the other ~A-believers, privy to the A-argument, continues in his ~A-beliefs;
or
(ii) once presented with A, it is the case any ~A-believer necessarily ceases to continue in his ~A belief, and commences in the belief that A;
So. (ii) is demonstrably false. (to the extent that initial belief is causal, its analysis is also recursive. This recursion is also an interesting cynosure for the idea of free will.)
2) you say: “Is there a Platonic realm of agential oughts and ought-nots that subsist independently of mind and matter…”
why does the “ought/ought not” need to be Platonic?
by my lights, what human individuals “ought/not” to do is rooted in – is inherent in – their natures as human beings: i.e. as rational animals.
in the same way that God can’t make a 3-sided square, or something that is not self-identical, or that the number 37 is not prime, He cannot make human beings for whom murder, rape, etc., are morally permissible.
it’s not Him, or his decrees: it’s in the nature of what He creates.
A recurring theme.
1) “rationally coercive” – despite the years of your consistent use of this phrase, i still don’t understand its intended meaning.
Surely it must be one of the following:
any argument (A) is “rationally coercive”:
(i) if it happens to convince at least one ~A believer that A is, in fact, true, but at least one of the other ~A-believers, privy to the A-argument, continues in his ~A-beliefs;
or
(ii) once presented with A, it is the case any ~A-believer necessarily ceases to continue in his ~A belief, and commences in the belief that A;
So. (ii) is demonstrably false. (to the extent that initial belief is causal, its analysis is also recursive. This recursion is also an interesting cynosure for the idea of free will.)
2) you say: “Is there a Platonic realm of agential oughts and ought-nots that subsist independently of mind and matter…”
why does the “ought/ought not” need to be Platonic?
by my lights, what human individuals “ought/not” to do is rooted in – is inherent in – their natures as human beings: i.e. as rational animals.
in the same way that God can’t make a 3-sided square, or something that is not self-identical, or that the number 37 is not prime, He cannot make human beings for whom murder, rape, etc., are morally permissible.
it’s not Him, or his decrees: it’s in the nature of what He creates.
point of clarification:
in my first paragraph, i mean to point out a heretofore unmade distinction between “rational coercion”, and “doxastic coercion”.
the relationship between reason and belief is much vexed; even moreso when emotion is thrown into the mix, as it inevitably is.
that is to say, whether or not some argument, A, is rationally coercive, is irrelevant if that selfsame argument does not also compel belief.
but belief is a horse of a different color…
i think that it is possible to compel reason; but not belief.