John Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life (Routledge 2003), p. 52:
. . . the whole of the religious impulse arises from the profound sense we have of a gap between how we are and how we would wish to be . . . .
This is not quite right, as it seems to me. The sense of the gap between 'is' and 'ought' is undoubtedly part of the religious impulse, but there is more to it than this. It must be accompanied by the sense that the gaping chasm between the miserable wretches we are and what we know we ought to be cannot be bridged by human effort, whether individual or collective. Otherwise, the religious sensibility would collapse into the ethical sensibility. There is more to religion than ethics. The irreligious can be aware of the discrepancy between what we are and what we should be. The religious are convinced of the need for moral improvement together with a realization of their impotence in bringing it about by their own efforts.
But now, if I may be permitted to argue against myself: "Haven't you maintained more than once that Buddhism is a religion? And isn't Buddhism a religion of self-help? And haven't you quoted the 'Be ye lamps unto yourselves' verse? So something has to give. If Buddhism counts as a religion, then it cannot be essential to a religion that it invoke 'other-power' for moral improvement. And if the latter invocation is essential to religion, then Buddhism is not a religion."
Well, my man, it looks like we are going to have to think about this some more.
"And another thing. You say that there is more to religion than ethics. This implies that ethics is an essential component of religion. But doesn't Kierkegaard speak of the teleological suspension of the ethical? Might it not be that one can have religion without ethics?"
A religion worth having cannot be decoupled from ethics. See Abraham, Isaac, and an Aspect of the Problem of Revelation and Kant on Abraham and Isaac.