Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

God, Doubt, Denial, and Truth: A Note on Van Til

Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 4th ed., P&R Publishing, 2008, p. 294: "To doubt God is to deny him."

I take that to mean that to doubt that God exists is to deny that God exists. The obvious objection to this is that doubt and denial are very different propositional attitudes. In most cases, one can doubt that p without denying that p.  I can doubt that Biden will get a second term without denying that he will. 

In almost all cases. But in every case?  Suppose we replace 'p' with 'truth exists.'  Can we doubt that truth exists without denying that truth exists.  No! In the case of truth, the distinction between doubt and denial collapses. 

To doubt that truth exists is to presuppose that truth exists. For if you doubt that truth exists, you are doubting whether it is true that truth exists.  The same goes for denial. If you deny that truth exists, you affirm that it is true that truth does not exist. 

Whether you doubt or deny that truth exists, you presuppose that truth exists. Truth is such that doubt and denial are the same. Truth cannot be doubted and it cannot be denied. The existence of truth is the ultimate transcendental condition of all our intellectual operations, doubt, denial, affirmation, predication, reasoning, and so on. So we may say:

To doubt truth is to deny her.

Of course, it remains that case that doubt and denial are different propositional attitudes. But in the case of truth, doubt becomes denial.

Therefore,  if God is identical to truth, then Van Til is right: "To doubt God is to deny him." If God is identical to truth, then God is the ultimate transcendental condition of all our intellectual operations, including giving arguments for God's nonexistence! If so, then Van Til and his followers are not begging the question against atheists and agnostics by simply assuming what they need to prove; they are giving a noncircular transcendental argument for the existence of God.

But is God identical to truth? Is it true that God is identical to truth? These remain open questions. I grant that if God is identical to truth, then God exists as the necessary condition of all affirmation, denial, and argument, including atheistic argument.  But how do we know that the antecedent of this conditional is true?

It may be that in reality apart from us, God and truth are the same. But from our point of view, the only POV available to us, God and truth are not the same. To see this, note that it is conceivable (thinkable without contradiction) that God not exist, but not conceivable that truth not exist. So it might be true that God exists and it might be true that God does not exist.  The 'might' in the preceding sentence in both of its occurrences is epistemically modal. It is epistemically possible that God exist and epistemically possible that God not exist.  For all we know, either could be the case. But it is epistemically necessary that truth exist: we cannot help presupposing it.  Given that we know anything at all, truth must exist. So the argument could be put like this:

a) That truth exists is epistemically necessary: we cannot help presupposing that it exists.

b) That God exists is not epistemically necessary: we can conceive the nonexistence of God.

Therefore

c) God cannot be proven to exist by proving that truth exists.

Therefore

d) The Transcendental Argument for God fails as a proof.

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Bill Vallicella

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6 responses to “God, Doubt, Denial, and Truth: A Note on Van Til”

  1. Kurt Schneider Avatar
    Kurt Schneider

    I can’t read the context of the quoted passage, but is it possible that to “doubt God is to deny him” means denying God the worship that is owed to Him? In other words, can you properly give worship and thanksgiving to God if you doubt His existence?

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  2. Elliott Avatar
    Elliott

    >>The obvious objection to this is that doubt and denial are very different propositional attitudes.<< Right. That is the first point that came to my mind when I read the quotation from The Defense of the Faith. >>But is God identical to truth? Is it true that God is identical to truth? These remain open questions.<< I understand what it means to say that God is the ultimate condition of all our intellectual operations. But I’m not sure I understand what it means to say that God is identical to truth. For one thing, God has causal power. Plausibly, truth lacks causal power. So how can God be identical to truth? For another thing, a belief can have the property of being true, but that doesn’t mean it has the property of being God, since God is not a property. Thirdly, God is omniscient. He knows all true propositions and believes no false ones. But it doesn’t even make sense to say that truth knows all true propositions and believes no false ones.

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  3. BV Avatar
    BV

    Very good points, Elliot. My exposition leaves something to be desired.
    To nuance the issue distinguish the following:
    1) Propositional/sentential truth. Heidegger’s Satzwahrheit.
    2) Ontic truth. The truth of beings. Heidegger’s ontische Wahrheit.
    3) Ontological truth. Heidegger’s ontologische Wahrheit.
    This tripartition is already in Aquinas.
    To say that God is truth is to say that God is ontological truth, the Source of ontic and sentential truth.
    There is more to be said, but it is time to break my fast and see what horrors have occurred overnight.

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  4. Elliott Avatar
    Elliott

    Bill, I agree with your distinction between propositional truth and ontological truth. I thought something like ontological truth is what you had in mind, but your question “Is it true that God is identical to truth” made me wonder if you also had propositional truth in mind.
    Is God identical to ontological truth? That is a very interesting question.
    Overnight horrors? I hope you are feeling well. How long was your fast?

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  5. James Anderson Avatar
    James Anderson

    Bill,
    I don’t think this quite captures what VT has in mind. In context, he is arguing against the idea of a “neutral methodology” for evaluating truth-claims about reality (whether scientific or metaphysical). The underlying thought is that one’s theory of reality and one’s theory of knowledge must be coordinated; there is no metaphysically-neutral epistemology, no epistemology that is entirely indifferent to the nature and existence of God, the nature of the universe, the nature of man and his relationship to his environment, etc. Specifically, a “neutral methodology” (as VT conceives it) holds the pretense that human knowledge and reasoning are possible whether or not God exists; thus the question of the existence of God is an open one from the outset, just like questions about the existence of black holes or Higgs bosons. VT reasons that if God exists (specifically, the absolute God of the Reformed Christian tradition) then all human knowledge necessarily depends on God. All creaturely knowledge is a kind of divine revelation; an analogical reconstruction of God’s definitive interpretation of his creation. As VT often put it, human knowledge is “thinking God’s thoughts after him.” A distinctively Christian metaphysics implies a distinctively Christian epistemology, in which case a “neutral” epistemology (if such were possible) would be a de facto denial of the Christian God. A method of inquiry according to which the existence of God and the existence of divine revelation are open questions is an anti-Christian method. That’s what VT means by “to doubt God is to deny him” — or, as he puts it two sentences later, “Neutrality toward God is in effect negation of God.”
    All this to say, I don’t take VT to be offering or defending a transcendental argument here; if anything, he is simply assuming the transcendental necessity of God. He isn’t reasoning from epistemology to metaphysics, but rather from (Christian) metaphysics to (Christian) epistemology. The idea that there can be no religiously-neutral epistemology is one of the animating themes of VT’s entire philosophy (although not one to which he holds exclusive rights).
    No doubt VT’s position is provocative, even for philosophers with Christian convictions. Whether his objection to a “neutral methodology” is cogent is a matter of debate. I offer these comments as an explanation rather than as a defense. Sufficient for the day is the trouble thereof. 🙂

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  6. BV Avatar
    BV

    Thank you, James! I will bring your thoughtful comments to the top of the blogpile and respond there.

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