Consider the following two sentences:
a) Lions are smaller than dragons.
b) Mice are smaller than elephants.
From this datanic base a puzzle emerges.
1) The data sentences are both true.
2) 'Smaller than' has the same sense in both (a) and (b).
3) In both (a) and (b), 'smaller than' has the same reference: it refers to a dyadic relation.
4) No relation holds or obtains unless all its relata exist.
What we have here is an aporetic tetrad. The four propositions just listed are individually plausible but collectively inconsistent: they cannot all be true. What we have, then, is a philosophical problem in what I call canonical form. Any three of the above four, taken in conjunction, entails the negation of the remaining one. Which limb of the tetrad should we reject?
One might reject (4) while upholding (1), (2), and (3). Accordingly, some relations connect existents to non-existents. It is true that lions are smaller than dragons despite it being the case that dragons do not exist. The sense of 'smaller than' is the same in both (a) and (b). And 'smaller than' picks out one and the same dyadic relation in both (a) and (b).
The idea here is that there is nothing in the nature of a relation to require that its obtaining entails the existence of all its relata. Contrast thinking about the Trevi Fountain in Rome and thinking about the Fountain of Youth. Some will say that in both cases the intentional nexus is a genuine relation since there is nothing in the nature of a relation (to be precise: a specific relatedness) to require that all of its relata exist. It is the same relation, the intentional relation, whether I think of an existing item or think of a non-existent item.
If you don't like this solution you might try rejecting (2) while upholding the remaining limbs: 'smaller than' does not have the same sense in our data sentences. Accordingly, 'are smaller than' in (b) picks out a relation that actually connects mice and elephants. But in (a), 'are smaller than' does not pick out that relation. In (a), 'is smaller than' has the sense 'would be smaller than.' We are thus to understand (a) as having the sense of 'Lions would be smaller than dragons if there were any.'
(2)-rejection arguably falls afoul of Grice's Razor, to wit: one ought not multiply senses beyond necessity. Here is what Grice himself says:
[O]ne should not suppose what a speaker would mean when he used a word in a certain range of cases to count as a special sense of the word, if it should be predictable, independently of any supposition that there is such a sense, that he would use the word (or the sentence containing it) with just that meaning. (Grice, 1989, pp. 47-48, Quoted from Andrea Marchesi, "A radical relationist solution to intentional inexistence," Synthese, 2021.)
Pick your poison.
Leave a Reply to BV Cancel reply