This from a reader:
Jordan Daniel Wood . . . affirms that God does not have possibilities within himself to actualize and thus the Incarnation—God becoming a human being—must in some way [be] actual prior to its historical event; God does not become a human being but in some way already is a human being . . . .
Very interesting.
The simple God is actus purus. Purely actual, he embodies no unrealized powers or unactualized potentialities. He is, eternally, all that he can be. We think of the Incarnation, however, as a contingent event. In the patois of 'possible worlds': The triune God exists in all metaphysically possible worlds, but the Second Person of the Trinity becomes human in only some of them. The following argument suggests itself:
1) The Word became flesh and dwellt among us.
2) The Word's becoming flesh is a contingent event.
3) There is no contingency and no becoming in any of the three divine persons: the Word cannot become flesh, that is, assume human nature.
Therefore
4) The Word (Logos, Second Person) had a divine and human nature from all eternity.
How could a classical Christian trinitarian theist rebut this argument? (Part of being a classical Christian theist is accepting the divine simplicity.)
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