Londoner in Lockdown writes,
I am still puzzling about the connection between your
(1) X ceases to be temporally present by becoming wholly past.
and
(2) X ceases to exist.
I think I understand (2). It means that there was once such a thing as X, but there is no longer such a thing as X.
But what does (1) mean? Does it mean what (2) means? In that case, (2) indeed follows from (1).
But you can't have intended that. So what do you mean by (1)?
Perhaps a spatial analog of (1) will help convey what I mean:
1*) X ceases to be spatially present by becoming wholly elsewhere.
Now (1*) is not idiomatic English, but the thought is clear. And the thought is trivially true. Suppose the boundaries of the spatially present are given by the dimensions of my lot. So when I say 'here' I refer to the area of my lot together with all its sub-areas. Suppose a cat that is wholly within the boundaries of my lot trespasses onto your adjacent lot thereby becoming wholly elsewhere. Max was wholly here in my yard, but now he is wholly there in yours. Spatial translations such as this one typically occur without prejudice to the existence of the moving item. Thus the cat does not cease to exist by moving from my property onto your property. (Nor does the cat suffer any diminution of its degree of existence, if there are degrees of existence, or any change in its mode of existence, if there are modes of existence.)
In short, Max the cat exists just as robustly in your yard as in mine. Spatial translation is existence-neutral. No one is a spatial presentist. No one holds that all and only what exists here, exists.
Surely it is conceivable — whether or not it is true — that becoming wholly past is existence-neutral. It is conceivable that something that becomes wholly past not be affected in its existence by its becoming wholly past. On this understanding of (1), (1) does not straightaway — i.e., immediately, without auxiliary premises — entail (2). (1) and the negation of (2) are logically consistent.
Now if you insist that (1) entails (2), then I will point out that this is so only if you assume that all and only the temporally present exists.
Do my sparring partners now see that there is a genuine question here? The question is whether it makes sense to maintain that, among the items that exist in time, some are non-present. I say that it does make sense, whether or not in the end it is true; consequently, tenseless theories of time cannot be simply dismissed out of hand. A corollary of this is that presentism is not obviously true, or even more outrageously, a matter of common sense as some have the chutzpah to say.
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