This post is the third in a series. The first discussed authority, the second autonomy. The topic at present is the alleged conflict between them.
There are three ways of responding to a contradiction: deny the first limb, deny the second limb, deny the contradiction. In the present case: deny the legitimacy of the state's claim to authority; deny that there is a moral obligation to be autonomous; deny that there is a genuine contradiction.
Wolff denies the first limb: he asserts that there is no obligation to obey the state's commands. On his view they lack legitimacy, binding moral force. (18) This is not to say that the anarchist will not comply with state commands. He may do so for prudential or even sentimental reasons: they are the commands of the government of his country and his feelings of attachment to his country may incline him to comply with its government's laws. The point, however, is that the laws have "no objective moral basis." (19) American laws have no more moral claim on Wolff than the laws of Sri Lanka. "All authority is equally illegitimate. . . ." (19)
Towards a Critique
It is important to note that Wolff is talking about not only all instances of state authority, but all types of authority whether state or non-state. The illegitimacy of state authority is but a special case of the illegitimacy of authority as such. Note also that W's position implies that legitimate authority is not just nonexistent, but impossible where the impossibility is grounded in the very concepts of authority and autonomy. After all, he arrives at his antinomy by 'unpacking' (explicating) the concepts of authority and autonomy.
W's position thus implies that no parent could ever have authority over any child, and that the concept of a God having authority over his creatures is necessarily vacuous or uninstantiated. But these implications are arguably reductiones ad absurdum of the Wolffian position.
Consider first the parent and child case. Suppose a wise and loving parent — there must be one somewhere! — has her fifteen year old child's best interests constantly in view. What I mean is that the child's best interest is identical to one of the mother's interests. The parent wants all and only what is best for the child, and the wisdom of the parent is in part constituted by her knowledge of what is best and how to attain it. The child, however, does not know all of what is in her best interest. So there will be situations in which the parent will issue a command to the child, a command backed up by force, a command that the child will not be able to validate and accept given her level of knowledge, moral insight, and reasoning ability. The child will simply have to obey the parent's command, and indeed because the parent has commanded it (i.e., not because the child sees why it is morally necessary).
Now the question is this: Has the parent violated the autonomy of the child? Or is the parent's commanding and the child's obeying consistent with the child's autonomy? I would say that there is no violation of autonomy. This is because the child's best interest — something she is not in a position to appreciate at present but will be able to appreciate in future — is identical with one of the mother's interests. In other words, the mother is commanding what the child would herself agree to if she knew her best interest. So there is no conflict between the mother's authority and the child's ideal autonomy. The mother's authority is legitimate because it aims at what is best for the child. And the child's obedience is no violation of her automony since she herself will be in a position later to validate the mother's command.
Wollf claims in effect that the autonomous person recognizes no commands. (15) There is clearly something right about this. But it is only an ideal. At the ideal limit of moral and intellectual development, one would obey no commands just because they were commanded. To put it another way, at the ideal limit, there would be no need for obedience taken in the strict sense. Recall that, strictu dictu, for A to obey B is not for A to do as B says, but for A to do as B says because B has said (commanded) it.
But from the fact that there is no need nor justification for obedience at the ideal limit, it does not follow that there is no need nor justification for obedience here and now. Many children and adolescents and some adults do not know their own best interests. Their autonomy is not violated if they obey wise and benevolent dictators.
But are there any wise and benevolent dictators? Yes, there are a few parents who fit this description. But even if they were merely possible, that would suffice to defuse Wolff's antinomy. For recall: his argument is that it is conceptually impossible that authority — any authority — be compatible with autonomy.
W's argument, in effect, is that since all authority is illegitimate, then state authority is illegitimate. I have just argued that it is false that all authority is illegitimate. So W's argument that state authority is illegitimate collapses.
But for all I have said, it might still be the case that state authority is illegitimate. But if so, a different and more specific argument is needed to show that.
Nota Bene: I am not arguing that any existing state, or any past state, is comparable to a wise and benevolent parent. I am not even arguing that it is possible that there be a state that is comparable to a wise and benevolent parent. I am arguing only that W is wrong to assert that "All authority is equally illegitimate. . . ." (19)