A lawyer from Pennsylvania e-mails:
. . . I have a philosophy question. Is it possible that cosmology generally, with its theory of multiverses — all possible universes exist — provides an argument, somewhat like the old
ontological argument, for a non impersonal God? To wit:1) Multiverses — the set of all possible universes — exist.
2) Each multiverse is different from the other as to the arrangement of
matter, time, space, etc.3) In the set of all possible universes there exists a universe where a
personal God (the God of the Bible) exists, where Christ rose from the
dead, and where Christ was God.4) That God of the Bible is omnipotent.
5) So if there is one such universe, with an omnipotent God, there is a
set of all universes with an omnipotent God, as an omnipotent God can
operate across boundaries of matter, time, space, etc.6) A personal God exists in our universe as we exist in one of the set
of all universes.
I don't think this is a good argument for a couple of reasons.
1. First of all, I am bothered by the seeming conflation of the MODAL notion of possible worlds with the COMOLOGICAL notion of a multiplicity of universes. If there are many physical universes, as some cosmologists speculate, they are parts of total physical reality, albeit disconnected parts thereof, and therefore parts of the total way things are, using 'are' tenselessly. But the total way things are is just what we mean by the actual world. To invoke the Tractarian Wittgenstein, "The [actual] world is all that is the case." "The [actual] world is the totality of facts not of things." The actual world is the total (maximal) way things are, and merely possible worlds are total ways things could have been. Therefore, if there are many physical universes, they are all 'located within' the actual world in the sense that they are all parts of what is actually the case. For example, the physicist Lee Smolin in the '90s invented a scenario he calls evolutionary natural selection according to which universes are born from the interiors of black holes. These universes are part of total physical reality and are therefore part of the actual world. None of them are merely possible.
2. I grant arguendo the first two premises of the above argument. I have no philosophical objection to the existence of a multiplicity of physical universes or to the idea that each of these universes differs from every other one. But I question the third premise. The God of the Bible is a purely spiritual being. But no physical universe is such as to contain any purely spiritual being. So premise (3) is false. It cannot be that any physical universe contains the God of classical Western theism. I of course grant the plausibility of saying that there is a POSSILE WORLD in which this God exists. But then we are brought back to my opening remark about the conflation of the modal notion of possible worlds with the cosmological notion of a multiplicity of universes.
3. I grant (4) on a suitable interpretation of 'omnipotent' but not the inference to (5). Again, God is not a physical being and so is not in any physical universe. And if God is omnipotent it does not follow that he can do just anything.
4. What my correspondent is trying to do is use contemporary cosmology with its numerous different theories of mutliple universes to bolster the modal ontological argument. But the result is a mishmash. It would be better to stick to the modal ontological argument, the gist of which is as follows. God is a noncontingent being: either existent in all possible worlds or in none. But God is possible: he exists in at least one possible world. Therefore, he exists in all possible worlds, whence it follows that he exists in the actual world (since the actual world is one of the possible worlds). But to exist in the actual world is to exist. Therefore, God exists.
I should add that if there are multiples universes — a thesis a cosmologist could maintain without maintaining that every possible physical universe is actual — this tends to undermine theism since it suggests that the apparent designedness of the universe can be explained without invoking an intelligent designer. The idea, roughly, is that if there are many universes, then it is not so surprising that our universe should feature physical constants and other conditions within a range suitable for the emergence of intelligent life. Indeed, if every possible physical universe is actual, then the probability that intelligent life arise somewhere is 1.
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