Remember Moritz Schlick? He wrote, "All real problems are scientific questions; there are no others." ("The Future of Philosophy" in The Linguistic Turn, ed. R. Rorty). The Schlickian dictum sires an antilogism.
1) All real problems are scientific.
2) The problem whether all real problems are scientific is real.
3) The problem whether all real problems are scientific is not scientific.
Each of these propositions is plausible, but they are collectively inconsistent: they cannot all be true. Which member of the trio should we reject?
I reject (1). There are real (genuine) problems that are not scientific in the way that the natural sciences are scientific. Scientific problems are amenable in principle to solution by empirical observation and experiment. This is not so for (1). So I must disagree with Schlick the positivist.
Related: The Death of Moritz Schlick
Exercise for the reader: Is the meaning of the proposition below the method of its verification? If yes, then what method might that be?