Matthew 5:27-28 is a powerful verse I learned as a boy and have never forgotten. It struck me then and I continue to feel its impact. It is probably the source of my long-held conviction that not only deeds, but also thoughts and words are morally evaluable. Here is the verse:
27 You have heard that it was said, ‘Do not commit adultery.’ 28 But I tell you that anyone who looks at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.
I am not a theologian. What follows is an exercise in moral philosophy, not moral theology.
a) The first point I want to make is that the mere arisal of a lustful thought, whether or not accompanied by physical arousal in the form of an erection, say, is morally neutral. Spontaneous unbidden lustful thoughts, with or without physical manifestation, are natural occurrences in healthy human beings. No moral culpability attaches to such occurrences. This is level 0 of moral culpability.
b) But after the occurrence of the thought, its suppression is morally obligatory and its entertainment and elaboration morally impermissible. Thus one ought to practice self-censorship and put the lustful thought out of one’s mind. Why? Because thoughts and words are the seeds of deeds, and if lustful or otherwise evil, are likely to sprout into evil deeds. This is level 1.0 of moral culpability. Depending on the degree of the ‘hospitality’ of the entertainment one might want to distinguish levels 1.1, 1.2, and so on.
c) Thus taking pleasure in the lustful thought is morally impermissible even if no intention is formed to act on the thought either verbally, by saying something to the object of lust, or physically, by doing something to her by touching, fondling, groping, ‘making an advance,’ or something worse. Discharge of lustful thoughts and inclinations via masturbation leads to a separate but related topic which we can discuss later. We are still at level 1.0. This paragraph merely unpacks paragraph (b).
d) Morally worse than (c) is the deliberate decision to act on the lustful thought by forming the intention to commit adultery or rape. But to decide to do X is not the same as doing X. I might decide to tell a lie without telling a lie or decide to commit rape without committing rape. ‘Adultery in the heart’ is not adultery in the flesh. Nevertheless, the decision to commit adultery is morally censurable. We are now at level 2.0.
e) Side issue: How are rape and adultery related? Rape, by definition, is in every case non-consensual, whereas adultery is in most case consensual. In most cases, but not in every case. Three types of case: (i) rape without adultery where an unmarried person rapes an unmarried person; (ii) adultery without rape; (iii) rape with adultery where a married person rapes an unmarried or married person or an unmarried person rapes a married person. I should think that moral culpability is additive. So if an unmarried man rapes a married woman, that is worse than a rape by itself or an adulteration of her marriage by itself.
f) Now suppose I freely decide to commit adultery or freely decide to commit a rape, but ‘come to my senses’ and decide not to do either. The ‘adultery in the heart’ is and remains morally wrong, and the same goes for the ‘rape in the heart,’ but morally worse would be to follow through on either initial decision. It seems we are still at level 2.0. Or do I get moral credit for rescinding my decision?
g) A different case is one in which one does not ‘come to one’s senses,’ i.e., freely rescind one’s decision to do an evil deed, but is prevented by external forces or agents from raping or committing adultery or engaging in sex acts with underaged girls. Suppose the “Lolita Express” on which you are riding to Sin Central crashes killing all on board. Does the NT verse imply that the free decision to commit illicit sex acts will get one sent to hell as surely as the commission of the deeds would?
In this case one could plausibly claim that the ‘adultery in the heart’ is just as egregious, just as morally culpable, as the ‘adultery in the flesh.’ For although the free decision to commit adultery is not the same as the physical act of adultery, the physical deed would have followed from the decision were it not for the external prevention. But it is not entirely clear.
There is a distinction between the physical deed, adultery say, and its moral wrongfulness. Where does the wrongfulness reside? Is it present already in the prior free decision to do the deed whether or not the deed is done? I say it isn’t. Ed Farrell seems to be saying that it is. Can I argue my case? Well, the wrongfulness cannot hang in the air. If it is present in the deed, then the deed must exist, i.e., must have occurred. If. on the other hand, the wrongfulness is already present in the free decision, whether or not the deed is done, then the question is begged.
h) Level 3.0 is reached when on does the evil deed that one intended to do.
Bill,
How is Christ justified in calling it adultery when adultery is an issue involving at least one married individual, while in the above statement neither party seems to have to be married for “adultery” to have occurred?
Richard,
I know what I mean by ‘adultery,’ but I have no idea what Hebrew word Jesus had in mind or what Aramaic word he used on that occasion. I would guess that whatever those words were, they had a broader meaning than what we mean by ‘adultery.’ My interest in OT and NT passages is not scholarly, but ‘existential.’ I want to know what the truth of the matter is. Can a mere thought be evil? Or are mere thoughts morally insignificant, or better, morally neutral?
Bill,
“Thus one ought to practice self-censorship and put the lustful thought out of one’s mind. Why? Because thoughts and words are the seeds of deeds, and if lustful or otherwise evil, are likely to sprout into evil deeds.”
Are such thoughts evil in themselves, distinct from the possibility of their realization? Imagine, for instance, a man with total erectile dysfunction who willingly entertains lustful thoughts about a married woman but who is physically impeded from committing the imagined sexual act. Or a man with such thoughts separated from the object of his desire by impractical distance or the great passage of time. How would you judge the lustful thoughts of these persons? Aquinas would say that they are evil (“sinful”) because they are opposed to chastity and contrary to right reason. But he is advancing a moral theology, and you are not. For you, is the possible realization of the lustful thoughts essential to judging them as evil?
Vito
Vito,
My view is that in both of your examples, the willing entertainment of lustful thoughts about any man or woman, married or unmarried, to whom one is not married, is morally wrong. Are they sinful? This is a different question. I expect you to agree with me that, on a careful use of terms, sin is an offense against God such that, if there is no God, there cannot be any sin. I hold that whether or not God exists, moral wrongs exist. This is not obvious, but the opposite is not obvious either. Did you see Dennis Prager on Mark Levin’s show last Sunday night?
Prager, a very bright Jewish public intellectual (like Levin) and no philosopher except *sensu lato*, thinks it quite obvious that without God there are no rights or wrongs non-relatively speaking. Values (one of his favorite words) would be just a matter of subjective feeling. We can discuss this later if you like.
But why would be it be morally wrong (whether or not it is sinful) merely to think lustful thoughts about a woman not one’s wife if there is no possibility of acting on the thoughts? I go some way toward answering this question in (g) above, but rereading that section, it is insufficiently clear. I’ll try to come back to this question tomorrow. We also need to discuss what theology is before we can discuss the distinction between moral theology and moral philosophy.
Bill,
As I’ve tried to say, it’s not so much an issue of what I think. For me, it’s an issue of what Christ says–and this without the mediating influence of Athens which in this case tries to take an uncompromising ethic and realign it to more reasonable human expectations. I think my reading of the passages in Matthew we’ve been discussing (in which Christ equates sinful action and sinful thought) is in pretty close alignment with that of the early church, at least. The early church-formulated seven deadly sins are all sins of the mind. At least half of the first volume of the Eastern Church’s Philokalia is concerned with dealing with sins of the mind. And of course Christ’s ethic is concerned with sin, not morals.
I didn’t become a Christian until I was 45. I was never raised in a church, never went to Sunday school, etc. I sometimes wondered about God but never with any sense of conviction. Through most of that time I would have conceded that adultery is immoral, mainly because you gave your word when you married that you wouldn’t engage in it and going against your word is contemptable. This was a strong but largely personal ethic and I’m not exactly sure of it’s origin. THOUGHTS about adultery didn’t enter into this equation. Such thoughts seemed fruitless and somewhat masochistic when you’d determined you wouldn’t act on them come what may, but they couldn’t be classed as immoral. Plus your private thoughts were nobody’s damned business.
I still believe that a person’s private thoughts are nobody’s damned business but having accepted Christ, I also assume that God knows my thoughts far better than I ever will and certainly sees through any deceptions about myself I’ve created or labored under. But mainly, accepting Christ highlighted a question I’d never really put to myself, which is: “For whom are you ethical?” Ethical behavior always implies that it is likely carried out in spite of your normal, selfish inclinations. But if it’s not done for you, who is done on behalf of? Before Christ, I don’t know that I would have thought of this in terms of “who,” but rather “what,” which drags the question into the realm of theory and abstraction. And while rational abstractions may have explanatory power, they’re a weak motivator, unless the “what” promises tangible rewards or threatens real punishment. But all this completely changed under Christ. Under Christ, I am ethical for Christ, so that I can know his unadulterated ethic and by living it learn to be Christ. “Ethics” ceases to be a theoretical issue and becomes a practical one of knowing God’s will and following it.
Is where Athens and Jerusalem dig their heels in?
Thanks, Ed. Very interesting. In your first paragraph you mention the Seven Deadly Sins (SDS). As you well know, there are different lists of different lengths with different definitions of the items on the lists. Like Vito, my background is pre-Vatican II RC. Vat II ran from ’62-’65. The priests and the nuns got hold of me when I was 6 in ’56 and my pious Italian mother from the get-go.
You say that the SDSs are “all sins of the mind.” Years ago, in my own thinking about them, it occurred to me that they belong to two groups: sins of the mind/heart/will and sins of the flesh. Pride, anger, and envy make up the first group; lust, gluttony, sloth, and greed make up the second. Consider angels and demons, where a demon is a fallen angel.
Angels are by nature unembodied: they lack animal bodies, and this lack is not a defect; they don’t have sex organs. So, while they desire, they have no sexual desires. So if by ‘lust’ we mean sexual desire, angels don’t lust after anything. If by the sin of lust we mean inordinate and/or misdirected sexual desire, then angels cannot commit this sin. This is why I classify lust as a sin of the flesh and not as a sin of the mind. If I am right, then it cannot be the case that the Seven Deadlies are “all sins of the mind.” Similarly with gluttony. Angels don’t eat or drink. Are they greedy or avaricious (avaritia)? No. They have no need for money. As for sloth (acedia) it is rooted in bodily sluggishness. No body, no sloth.
But Lucifer the light-bearer became the Prince of darkness because of pride. Anger and envy are in the same boat. The demons hate God and they hate us. They also envy us because we can sin in ways they can’t and also because we are allowed pleasures they will never know due to our bodily nature such as orgasm. So I classify pride, anger, and envy as sins of the mind/spirit.
We humans are composite beings: spirit and flesh. So we are subject to all of the SDSs.
You say, “Christ equates sinful action and sinful thought.” I say: sinful action and sinful thought cannot be equated, and that therefore your interpretation of the verse is eisegetical. Or do you think that Biblical texts need no interpretation, that they wear their meaning on their sleeve?
Bill,
I’d meant to get back to this but I’ve been waylaid. Eisegetical? Certainly my intent is exegetical. I’ll try again, at greater length. Christ says:
“You have heard that it was said, ‘YOU SHALL NOT COMMIT ADULTERY’; but I say to you that everyone who looks at a woman with lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. Matthew 5:27-29
“Adultery” (μοιχεύω in the Koine Greek) is here used in its literal sense. Friberg’s Analytical Greek Lexicon elaborates: μοιχεύω (1) literally, of sexual intercourse with someone who is married to another commit adultery (Matt 5.27); (a) active, as referring to the man alone with the feminine accusative as the object commit adultery with (Matt 5.28; Luke 16.18); (b) passive, as referring to the woman commit adultery (Matt 5.32; 19.9); (2) metaphorically, of spiritual unfaithfulness to God (Revelation 2.22)
When Christ says “You have heard it said” what is he referring to? He’s referring to the Mosaic law (“You shall not commit adultery” (Exodus 20:14, Deuteronomy 15:18)).
When Christ says “but I say to you” what does this signify? It signifies that what follows supersedes or gives additional context to what was heard under the Mosaic law. This is based on the hermeneutical principle that when the New Testament and the Old Testament treat the same subject, the New Testament treatment takes precedence. In this case, Christ gives additional context to the Mosaic law (which only covered the ACT of adultery): “everyone who looks at a woman with lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.” “Heart” in the Koine Greek is καρδία, which, according to Friberg signifies in the New Testament “inner self; (1) viewed as the seat of physical vitality; (2) viewed as the innermost self, the source and seat of functions of soul and spirit in the emotional life, the volitional life, the rational life; (3) viewed as the human dwelling place of heavenly beings and powers.”
So while the Mosaic law gave commandments that governed people’s actions under the Mosaic covenant, Christ says that to look at a woman in lust is also to commit adultery “in your heart.” But committing adultery in your heart isn’t the same as the physical act of adultery. Why does Christ refer to them both as “committing adultery?” I see three possibilities: 1) He is mistaken, 2) he is speaking figuratively or hyperbolically, and 3) he is speaking as God from a perspective foreign to us that initially seems irrational (or inconvenient at the very least), but once revealed becomes open to rational thought, subject to the divine perspective.
Speaking as a Christian, I’m going to rule out the first possibility on the assumption that God doesn’t lie or make mistakes.
Is he speaking figuratively or hyperbolically? What would a “figurative” meaning be in this case? If adultery “in the heart” can’t be a equated with the physical act, and adultery is a physical act, then “adultery in the heart” is not really adultery. So why does he say that it is? Is he a guilt-mongering propagandist pulling a fast one in an attempt to colonize our thought? Of course that would make him a liar which I’ve ruled out. Is he using hyperbolic language? To say what? That looking at a woman with lust is sinful and may lead to the worse sin of adultery but is not by itself the same as adultery? That’s clear enough and wasn’t hard to say; if that’s what he means, why didn’t he just say it? And if that’s all that he means, what is his purpose in elevating it through hyperbole? The thought is quite available to us through reason, and if Christ’s “revelation” is simply to say the same, it’s not really revelatory. So, that he’s speaking figuratively or hyperbolically simply doesn’t scan, and the fact that the remaining alternative explanation seems irrational doesn’t make it scan any better.
So, on to the seemingly irrational explanation. I think this is best approached through your question of where the wrongfulness resides in adultery. My assumption is that the wrongfulness more generally resides in sin, not adultery per se. I understand sin to be an inborn condition that separates us from God no matter what we do in the attempt to set it right. I further assume that original sin predisposes us to rebellious, adulterous, murderous, lustful, etc. attitudes that we may or may not act on, depending on the conditions. But our sin, and its relentless fostering of sinful attitudes, remains and stands between us and God whether we act on it or not. From this perspective, Christ is saying what he says over and over again to the Pharisees: you can’t hide by obeying the law (Thou shall not commit adultery) because God knows your innermost self, and it’s full of sin (you’ve already committed adultery in your heart). This is where Christ’s revelations go far beyond the Mosaic covenant, and further reveal that without God’s intervention, we are helpless in overcoming our sin which we can never wholly eradicate from our innermost selves. This insight prepares his disciples for Christ’s atonement as the sole means of removing the barrier of sin.