Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

On Swimming the Tiber: Reasons for Leaving Protestantism

I had put the question to Russell B, "What were your reasons for becoming a Protestant in the first place and then leaving Protestantism, apart from acceptance of DDS? [The doctrine of Divine Simplicity?] And what sect did you leave? Here is his response; I have intercalated some comments of my own.
 
1) The reason I became a Protestant was due to poor catechesis, unfortunately. I went to Biola as an undergrad where I attended an Anglo-Catholic church in Newport Beach (Still a great and lively one). Unsurprisingly, my metaphysics class (which was actually labeled as an ontology class) just presupposed the thin theory of existence. 
Then you probably did not take that class from J. P. Moreland, who very favorably reviewed my A Paradigm Theory of Existence
My primary reasons for leaving Protestantism: 
 
A) One has to admit the Church was fundamentally wrong for 1500 years until Luther came around (an impossible pill to swallow) 
 
B) Unification of the church: you need a ‘head’ to settle disputes (much like a Supreme Court). I think orthodoxy struggles with this as well: they are seemingly split too. 
 
C) I am a big-time social conservative (I would say I am slightly ‘left’ leaning economically) and couldn’t square most Protestant churches caving to the cultural winds of secularism. The Catholic Church has problems, of course, but not compromising on things like abortion and homosexuality, for example, struck me as very attractive. I also read portions of Alex Pruss’ One Body which sealed the deal. 
 
D) The lives of the Saints especially Aquinas, Teresa of Avila, Catherine of Siena, Anselm, Francis and St John of the Cross. 
 
Now, I don’t want to knock Protestantism too hard. Of course one can be a Protestant and subscribe to DDS and endorse a thick conception of Existence.  
2) The two upward paths, that of religion and that of philosophy, come together as one at the apex of the ascent in the divine simplicity.  The ascent to the Absolute is thus onto-theological.
 
Beautifully written. I also want to thank you for your clear prose. I love Barry Miller and his work but at points he was a little sloppy and difficult to understand. I didn’t encounter that with your work. 
 
PS:
 
1) I was recently listening to your episode on Dale Tuggy’s podcast. I hate recommending podcasts but I think my friend Pat Flynn—podcast called Philosophy for the People—reached out to you. If you have time, you should definitely consider going on it. His podcast is the only one that I am aware of that consistently talks about DDS, thin/thick existence, analytic philosophy’s dismissal of existence, etc.—basically everything that would appear on your blog. (Feser, Koons, Dolezal have all had appearances)
Russell's (B) above raises questions about the pros and cons of a teaching authority to unify doctrine and settle disputes.
 
One who refuses to accept, or questions, a teaching of the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) may be accused of reliance upon private judgment and failure to submit to the Magisterium or teaching authority of the Church.  Two observations on this accusation.

First, for many of us private judgment is not merely private, based as it is on consultation with many, many public sources.  It is as public as private. Everything I've read over the years from Parmenides on down in the West, the Bible on down in the Near East, and the Upanishads on down in the Far East feeds into my 'private' judgment.  So my 'private' judgment is not merely mine as to content inasmuch as it is a collective cultural upshot, albeit processed through my admittedly fallible and limited pate. Though collective as to content, its acceptance by me is of course my sole responsibility.  My first point, then, is that we ought to distinguish wider and narrower senses of 'private' and realize that a 'private' judgment might not be merely private.

Second, the party line or official doctrine of any institution is profoundly influenced by the private judgments of individuals. Think of the profound role that St. Augustine played in the development of Roman Catholic doctrine.  He was a man of powerful will, penetrating intellect, and great personal presence.  He was trained in rhetoric in Carthage and in Rome. Imagine going up against him at a theological conference or council!   

Summing up the two points, the private is not merely private, and the official is not merely official.

Of course, part of the official doctrine of the Roman church is that its pronunciamenti anent faith and morals are guided and directed by the Holy Ghost. (Use of the old phrase, besides chiming nicely with der Heilige Geist, is a way for this conservative to thumb his nose at Vatican II-type innovations which, though some of them may have had some sense, tended to be deleterious in the long run.  A meatier question which I ought to take up at some time is the one concerning the upsurge of priestly paederasty after Vatican II: post hoc ergo propter hoc? That should give pause to any one thinking of swimming the Tiber. Rod Dreher, who took the plunge, kept swimming, eastward. We could say he swam the Tiber first, and then the Bosporus, when, disgusted by priestly paedophilia, and the RCC's mafia-like protection of their own, he embraced Eastern Orthodoxy.)

What I have just written may sound as if I am hostile to the Roman Church. I am not. Nor have I ever had any negative experiences with priests, except, perhaps to have been bored by their sermons. All of the ones I have known have been upright, and some exemplars of the virtues they profess.  In the main they were manly and admirable men.  But then I'm an old man, and I am thinking mainly of the pre-Vatican II priests of my youth. 

I have no time now to discuss the Church's guidance by the third person of the Trinity, except to express some skepticism: if that is so, how could the estimable Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI) be followed by the benighted Bergoglio? (Yes, I am aware that there were far, far worse popes than the current one, and I am aware of  the theme of Satan's grip on the sublunary.)

Of course, I have just, once again, delivered my private judgment. But, once again, it is not merely private inasmuch as it is based on evidence and argument: I am not merely emoting in the manner of a 'liberal' such as Bergoglio when he emoted, in response to the proposed Great Wall of Trump, that nations need bridges, not walls. What an unspeakably stupid thing to say! Well, then, Vatican City needs bridges not walls the better to allow jihadis easy access for their destructive purposes. Mercy and appeasement must be granted even unto those who would wipe Christianity from the face of the earth, and are in process of doing so.

But how can my judgment, even if not merely private, carry any weight, even for me, when it contradicts the Magisterium, the Church's teaching authority, when we understand the source and nature of this authority? ('Magisterium' from L. magister, teacher, master.)

By the Magisterium we mean the teaching office of the Church. It consists of the Pope and Bishops. Christ promised to protect the teaching of the Church : "He who hears you, hears me; he who rejects you rejects me, he who rejects me, rejects Him who sent me" (Luke 10. 16). Now of course the promise of Christ cannot fail: hence when the Church presents some doctrine as definitive or final, it comes under this protection, it cannot be in error; in other words, it is infallible. 

In a nutshell: God in Christ founded the Roman church upon St. Peter, the first pope, as upon a rock. The legitimate succession culminates in Pope Francis. The Roman church as the one true holy catholic and apostolic church therefore teaches with divine authority and thus infallibly. Hence its teaching on indulgences not only cannot be incorrect, it cannot even be reasonably questioned. So who am I to — in effect — question God himself?

Well, it is obvious that if I disagree with God, then I am wrong.  But if a human being, or a group of human beings, no matter how learned, no matter how saintly, claims to be speaking with divine authority, and thus infallibly, then I have excellent reason to be skeptical. How do I know that they are not, in a minor or major way, schismatics diverging from the true teaching, the one Christ promised to protect?  Maybe it was some version of Eastern Orthodoxy that Christ had in mind as warranting his protection.

These and other questions legitimately arise in the vicinity of what Josiah Royce calls the Religious Paradox


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2 responses to “On Swimming the Tiber: Reasons for Leaving Protestantism”

  1. DaveB Avatar
    DaveB

    Much food for thought, thanks.

  2. Vito B. Caiati Avatar
    Vito B. Caiati

    Bill,
    With regard to the Royce’s religious paradox, what of those instances where “The identifying marks” of a divine revelation fall outside or contradict the very marks that are “in the believer’s mind prior to the acceptance of the revelation as valid.” In other words, what of events that are entirely unanticipated or unexpected and, more correctly, regarded as impossible, given what the believer takes to be previously established divine truths? Take, for example, the disciples confronted by the Resurrection, that is, the empty tomb, the angelic proclamation, and the subsequent appearances among them in glorified bodily form of Jesus. Nothing in the theology or post-exilic Judaism would have led these twelve, nor the women at the tomb and the 500 of whom Paul speaks to expect the rising of a dead man. Instead, observant Jews who were followers of “The Sadducees denied the resurrection [of the body] and any meaningful life afterward…. When the body dies, the whole person ceases to exist… For the rephaim [a variety of meanings for nephesh: “vital principle or life-force,” “soul,” “person” or “self” (39)] continue to survive biological death, even if they are comatose and eventually fade away (91).” * While for those who followed the Pharisees the soul, separated from the body, continues to exist in the intermediate state between death and the general resurrection of the dead at the end of time, but this soul it is only a diminished form of the person. The body of no person rises before the final judgement. ** So, with the Resurrection we have an instance in which all existing notions of divine revelation are overturned: A dead man walks with a new glorified, material body right now before the eyes of his disciples and followers and not at some distant moment when all are supposed to leave their tombs. And when this event is placed alongside of the words of Jesus foretelling his resurrection, words that were not understood when he uttered them, along with those words that proclaimed his divinity, then the disciples, shocked by an astonishing miraculous event, completely alien to their way of thinking about death, declare what they have witnessed as divine.
    Vito
    * John W. Cooper, Body Soul and Life Everlasting, Eerdmans (1989); N. T. Wright [The Resurrection of the Son of God, Fortress Press (2003)] concurs: ““Basically, the Sadducees denied resurrection: it seems more than likely that they followed a quite strict interpretation of the Old Testament, and denied a significant future life at all (131).”
    **See (D. S. Russell, Between the Testaments, 157, quoted by Cooper 86).

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