The Dark Ostrich extracts the following argument from a TED video:
(1) It is wrong that anyone subject to the force of the law should not be subject to its protection, but
(2) those immediately outside the border and forcibly prevented from entering are subject to the force of the law but not its protection, ergo
(3) this is wrong.
The conclusion follows from the premises, but the conclusion is false. Therefore, one of the premises is false. Which one? The first. To accept (1) is equivalent to rejecting nations and their sovereignty.
If you insist that the above deductive argument is sound in the technical sense in which most philosophers use the term (valid in point of logical form and possessing premises all of which are true), then I will point out that it is not rationally compelling.
For it can be run in reverse with no breach of logical propriety. "One man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens."
I could also say that the above argument begs the question at the first premise.
If you accuse me of begging the question, then I say we have a stand-off. I will then suggest that you leave my country and go live in the borderless world of your dreams.
…………………………..
Jacques responds:
"If you accuse me of begging the question, then I say we have a stand-off. I will then suggest that you leave my country and go live in the borderless world of your dreams."
I think it's not even a stand-off (rationally). Either premise 2 is patently false, or the argument is just invalid, or 1 has to be interpreted in such a way that 1 is patently false:
First of all, when American immigration agents (legally) deport people or keep them from entering the country, they usually do so in ways that are legal relative to American law. And they can be charged with crimes themselves if they don't. They don't mow down would-be illegal immigrants with machine guns or drop them back in Mexico from helicopters. They don't force them to convert to Islam or steal their pocket change. When aliens [are] being deported or prevented from entering [,] the legal standing or rights assigned to such people by American law are generally respected, and are supposed to be respected under American law. So 2 is patently false on one reasonable interpretation.
BV: I agree.
Maybe the meaning of premise 2 is that illegal aliens, or would-be illegal aliens, are not legally granted exactly the same protections (rights or powers or whatever) as some other people–American citizens, for example. But then, in order for the argument to be valid, premise 1 would have to say something like this:
BV: That is the way I read premise (2).
(1*) It is wrong that anyone subject to the force of the law should not be subject to all the same legal 'protections' to which any other arbitrary person subject to the force of the law is subject.
BV: And that is the way I read premise (1).
But 1* is even more absurd than 1. If 1* were true, then all the following scenarios would be morally wrong:
i. The President of the United States is legally protected by the Secret Service in ways that some Americans are not.
ii. Some citizens who are poor and unemployed are legally protected against starvation and life-threatening illness by means of welfare payments and publicly subsidized healthcare but the President of the United States is not.
iii. Some citizens who are not convicted child molesters are legally protected against certain forms of invasion of privacy in ways that citizens who are convicted child molesters are not.
iv. Some citizens who are not in the process of carrying out an armed robbery are legally protected against gunfire from police officers but some of those who are in the process of carrying out armed robberies are not.
v. Female citizens are legally protected against sexual harassment in ways that male citizens are not.
vi. Citizens who are 7 years old are legally protected against certain forms of self-harm–doing tequila shots at strip clubs, for example, or having sexual relationships with people who are 30 years old–but some other citizens are not.
BV: Those are all good points.
Well, this could go on for a while. So either 2 is patently false or 1, on the relevant interpretation, is patently false.
BV: I say that (1) is false, (2) is true, charitably interpreted, the argument is valid but unsound. I think we agree or could agree on this.
Why then did I say that it is a stand-off? Because the open borders defender could bite the bullet and insist on (1)/(1*). To so insist is equivalent to denying the moral legitimacy of nation-states and their sovereignty. If he is denying said legitimacy, and I am affirming it in virtue of running the argument in reverse, then we are at loggerheads and we have a stand-off.
Of course I could go on to argue why we have need of nation-states and why they are morally justified. But then we are deep into the bowels of political philosophy. What if the opponent turns out to be a (philosophical) anarchist who denies the moral justification of states and their coercive powers? We will soon encounter other stand-offs. For example, we will soon enough enter the philosophy of human nature (philosophical anthropology). What if he takes the anarchist line that people are by nature good and that states and their laws are corrupt and corrupting? Of course, one can argue against that too, and as a conservative I will, but have sophisticated anarchists been decisively refuted to the satisfaction of all competent practitioners of political philosophy?
The task of the political philosopher is to dig down to the deepest underpinnings of the 'surface' debates such as DACA, the need for a border wall, etc. Unfortunately, when we dig deep, we find that we cannot get to bedrock, a bedrock upon which we can all agree.
I fear that I must now open the ComBox.
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