A reader presents two putative counterexamples to my claim that burden-of-proof considerations have no useful role to play in philosophy:
I agree that BOP’s in the legal sense don’t exist in philosophical argument, but there seems to be something like a BOP in certain kinds of philosophical debate. I’ll give you two examples and let you tell me what you think. (1) A candidate appears before his committee to defend his dissertation. Depending on the topic and the committee, the candidate knows (and he is told) that he has a significant BOP. His dissertation can be rejected if an examiner does not believe that the work is rigorous and credible enough. The candidate needs to persuade all his examiners that his dissertation is good enough or he will be an unsuccessful candidate. (2) A young Ph.D. wants to publish his dissertation with a top press like OUP. He knows the editor of that press (and his referees) have very high standards respecting clarity and rigor and substance. The young man has a difficult BOP in persuading OUP to accept his work.
I would deny that in these dialectical situations there is philosophical debate strictly speaking. In philosophical debate assertions are tested and either proven or disproven. It is about the probing of propositions, not of persons. But in the dissertation defense the candidate himself is being tested as to his competence and must prove himself. Or at least that is what dissertation defenses were before they became formalities.
Similarly in the publication case. The person submitting his work to a press is not entering into a debate with the referees of the press about certain philosophical claims which he must establish to get published; he is having the quality of his work evaluated. After all, he doesn't have to persuade the referees that the claims in his book are true, but only that they meet a certain professional standard of workmanship. Both the dissertation defender and the submitter to a prestigious press can 'win' without persuading their respective audiences of the truth of philosophical assertions; but in a genuine philosophical debate, the proponent of a philosophical thesis cannot be said to have won unless he has succeeded in persuading his audience.
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