Let's think about the perfectly ordinary and obviously intelligible sentence,
1. They are surrounding the building.
I borrow the example from Thomas McKay, Plural Predication (Oxford 2006), p. 29. They could be demonstrators. And unless some of them have very long arms, there is no way that any one of them could satisfy the predicate, 'is surrounding the building.' So it is obvious that (1) cannot be analyzed in terms of 'Al is surrounding the building & Bill is surrounding the building & Carl is surrounding the building & . . . .' It cannot be analyzed in the way one could analyze 'They are demonstrators.' The latter is susceptible of a distributive reading; (1) is not. For example, 'Al is a demonstrator & Bill is a demonstrator & Carl is a demonstrator & . . . .' So although 'They are demonstrators' is a plural predication, it is not an irreducibly plural predication. It reduces to a conjunction of singular predications.
How about a relational reading? 'Sam and Dave met' cannot be understood in terms of 'Sam met & Dave met.' You have to bring in a dyadic relation: Msd. McKay argues that this sort of approach cannot work for examples like (1). I'll assume he is right for the space of this post.
McKay also rejects set-theoretical, mereological, and other forms of singularism. Accordingly we cannot take 'they' in (1) to refer to some one single thing over and above individual persons whether this single thing be a set or a mereological sum, or anything else. If sets are abstract entities (i.e., causally inert and nonspatial), then it is clear that no set can surround a building. It is not clear to me that no other sort of whole could serve as the logical subject of the predicate 'is surrounding the building.' But for present purposes, I will just assume that singularism is out.
The idea, then, is that in some cases, (1) being an example, predication is irreducibly plural. In such predications, there is no one single item which is the logical subject of the predication. I am having some trouble deciding whether this is a coherent notion. I have the inchoate sense that, in that case, we wouldn't know what we are talking about. Let's try to make this inchoate sense less inchoate.
Suppose one and the same building is being surrounded by some Commies and some Nazis. Bill assertively utters a token of (1) thereby referring to the Commies. (Bill intends to refer to the Commies and succeeeds in so referring using a token of (1).) Peter assertively utters a token of (1) thereby referring to the Nazis. Mike assertively utters a token of (1) thereby referring to both the Commies and the Nazis. Bill and Peter and Mike at the same time and in the same context are referring to three different groups using tokens of the same sentence-type. We may even assume that the three use exactly the same type of sweeping arm gesture to draw attention to the people surrounding the building.
But how is it possible that Bill, Peter, and Mike are referring to three different groups if there are no groups? Whatever a group is, and it needn't be an abstract entity, it is a single item distinct from its members, though of course not wholly distinct from them inasmuch as it cannot exist without its members existing. But if there are no groups, and there are just the demonstrators, then 'they' in (1) has no definite reference as used by Bill, Peter, and Mike.
What my example shows is that 'they' in (1), if it is taken to be an irreducibly plural referring term, cannot be taken to refer to all of the demonstrators, for it could just as easily be taken to refer to some of them (the Commies) or some others of them (the Nazis). 'They' therefore has no definite reference. Lacking a definite reference, the sentence of which it is a part lacks a definite sense. But if (1) lacks a definite sense or meaning, then there is no point in attempting an analysis of that meaning.
So what are we talking about when we utter (1) in the context described? If it is just assumed that 'they' in (1) refers to all the demonstrators, then it is being assumed that there is some unifying feature that makes it precisely them who are being referred to, the feature of being a demonstrator, say. But then how could there fail to be a 'collective entity' corresponding to this feature? It might not be a set (as defined by standard set theory); it mght not be a sum (as defined by standard mereology); but there would have to be some one single collective entity distinct from the demonstrators.
I don't believe I am expressing "singularist prejudice" here. I am not just assuming that there cannot be irreducibly plural predication. I gave an argument, the Bill-Peter-Mike argument, for the incoherence of irreducibly plural predication. That 'they' in (1) could have a definite reference without there being anything at all that collects the individual persons I find incoherent.
A similar problem arises with
2. Demonstrators are surrounding the building.
It doesn't mean that each is surrounding the building, nor does it mean that some set is surrounding the building. (2) looks to be an irreducibly plural predication: the demonstrators are surrounding the building. But again we can ask: all of them or only some of them? Either way, (2) could be true.
Presumably (2) means that all the demonstrators are surrounding the building, both the Commies and the Nazis in terms of our earlier example. But (2) cannot mean that all the demonstrators are surrounding the building if the predication is irreducibly plural. For if the reference of 'demonstrators' in (2) is purely plural, absolutely plural, then it is indeterminate with respect to all or some. For the reference to be determinate, for (2) to mean that all the demonstrators are surrounding thre building, a 'collective entity' of some sort must be brought into the analysis. I grant, however, that it cannot be a mathematical set.
Leave a Reply