Herewith, a bit of commentary on R. G. Swinburne's "Miracles" (Phil. Quart. vol. 18, no. 73, October 1968. Reprinted in Rowe and Wainwright, pp. 446-453) To be fair, I should consider what Swinburne says in his later publications on this topic; perhaps in subsequent posts.
1. What is a miracle? Swinburne writes,
I understand by a miracle a violation of a law of Nature by a god, that is, a very powerful rational being who is not a material object (viz., is invisible and intangible). My definition of a miracle is thus approximately the same as Hume's: "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity or by the interposition of some invisible agent." (446)
2. What is it to violate a law of nature? It goes without saying that a violation of a law of nature is nothing like a violation of a civil or moral law. By a violation of a law of nature, Swinburne understands "an occurrence of a non-repeatable counter-instance to a law of nature." (446) It follows that a miracle is a violation of a law of nature by a non-repeatable event. But aren't some repeatable events accounted miracles, and rightly so accounted? There is the miracle of the bestowal of manna upon the Israelites in the desert. This miraculous bestowal is supposed to have occurred numerous times during the Israelites' forty-year desert sojourn. The miraculous real presence of Christ in the eucharist is also a repeatable event.
3. What is the rationale for this distinction between repeatable and non-repeatable events? Swinburne:
Clearly, as Hume admitted, events contrary to predictions of formulae which we had good reason to believe to be laws of nature often occur. But if we have good reason to believe that they have occurred and good reason to believe that similar events would occur in similar circumstances, then we have good reason to believe that the formulae which we previously believed to be the laws of nature were not in fact such laws. Repeatable counter-instances do not violate laws of nature, they just show propositions purporting to state laws of nature to be false. (446, emphasis added)
I am puzzled by this passage. On the one hand, from the last sentence it seems clear that Swinburne is distinguishing between laws of nature and propositions that state or purport to state laws of nature. A law-proposition, like any proposition, can be either true or false. But a law of nature cannot be similarly bivalent: there are no false laws of nature. A false law of nature would be no law of nature at all. Every law of nature is true. But to be precise we should use a different word. We should say that every law of nature obtains. Strictly speaking, this is redundant. If L is a law at all, then of course L obtains. To illustrate the point, suppose that laws are just regularities, cosmic uniformities. Law L = uniformity U. Clearly, either U exists or it does not. It would be senseless to say that U exists but is false, or that U exists but does not obtain. A proposition or statement can exist without being true, but a law cannot exist without obtaining.
We can then think of the scientific enterprise as one of formulating (expressing, capturing in propositions) the laws of nature. If there are laws at all, they are independent of us and our formulations. Recall the distinction made in an earlier post between laws of nature and scientific laws. The laws of science are corrigible while the laws of nature are not. What could it mean to correct a law of nature? It either exists or it does not. What we correct are our formulations of the laws of nature. Our science is corrigible; nature is not corrigible. But on the other hand, Swinburne seems to be conflating laws of nature and propositions that state or purport to state laws of nature. Glance back at the first sentence in the passage quoted. Swinburne speaks as if the formulations ARE the laws. He could easily have written that the formulations express the laws, but he didn't write that.
Swinburne seems to be saying that if a formulation of a law of nature has repeatable counter-instances, then no law of nature has been violated, it is simply that a formulation of a law of nature has been shown to be false. But if a formulation of a law of nature has a non-repeatable counter-instance, then a law of nature has been violated. I don't get it. Why not say in the second case, as in the first, that a formulation of a law of nature has been shown to be false?
I am back to the old puzzle of how it is even logically possible that a law of nature be 'violated.' A law either is or entails an exceptionless regularity, and it is clear that an exceptionless regularity (logically) cannot have an exception. So if there are laws of nature, and if a miracle is defined as a violation of a law of nature, then miracles are logically impossible. You either have to deny that there are laws of nature or deny that a miracle is a violation of a law of nature.
If, on the other hand, you are talking about formulations of laws of nature, then they can easily have counter-instances. But these show at most that the formulations are false, not that laws of nature have been violated.
Suppose you are a traditional theist who believes that God exists and causes unusual things to happen from time to time. For example, he causes a bush to catch fire and burn without being consumed, or he causes some people to hang out for a time in a fiery furnace without being injured. Why not say that these happenings are not miracles defined as violations of laws of nature, but simply marvels: events that do not violate any laws of nature but are presently inexplicable given our understanding of the laws of nature, an understanding that is of course limited?