I’m Free! Some Thoughts on Compatibilism

I meant that I was doing what I wanted to do as I wanted to do it. I was not subject to any external or internal impediments, or any external or internal compulsions. An example of an external impediment would be a snowstorm or an uncooperative companion, while an example of an internal impediment would be acrophobia. An example of external compulsion would be being forced at gunpoint to hike. And if I suffered from cacoethes ambulandi, a pathological itch to ramble, a syndrome I have just invented, then that would count as an internal compulsion. But unencumbered as I was by any such impediments or compulsions, I was doing what I willed (wanted, desired, chose, . . .).

1. P wills (wants, desires, chooses, etc.) to do A.

2. P's willing (wanting, etc.) to do A is unencumbered by any internal or external impediment, or subject to any internal or external compulsion.

Perhaps we should add a third condition:

3. P's willing (wanting, etc.) to do A is motivated by reasons rather than passions, and is indeed motivated by good reasons.

For example, I did not will and execute my backpacking excursion while in the grip of wild passions, but after calm thought and for presumably good reasons: to benefit from a particularly strenuous form of exercise; to appreciate the incredible beauty of John Muir's "Range of Light"; to have intense experiences impossible down below, etc.

There is no denying that the above definition specifies a legitimate sense of the word 'free.' It is also clear that one is free in this sense whether or not the universe is deterministic. A deterministic universe is one in which the present state of things is the only possible state of things given (a) the actual past and (b) the actual laws of nature. Equivalently, on determinism, the universe's present state, in all its details, is necessitated by its past states via the laws of nature.

So, on determinism, was my backpacking 'up to me' or not? Well, in one sense it was: my locomotion was willed by me, without constraint or compulsion, and for good reasons. What more could one want in terms of being free? Why not adopt something like the above compatibilist understanding of freedom? One reason for not adopting it is that we do think ourselves to possess something more when we account ourselves free. We feel that the action willed is 'up to one' in the sense that 'one could have done otherwise' not in the sense that one would have done otherwise if other (countervailing) reasons had presented themselves or if one had willed otherwise; but in the unconditional sense that one could have done otherwise with all the antecedent and circumambient conditions the same.

Some of us believe in an absolute spontaneity of action. We feel ourselves to be the unmoved movers of (some) of our actions, whether these be such mental actions as decision, or the physical implementations of decisions.  This is called the liberty of indifference.  The classical phrase is liberum arbitrium indifferentiae. The great Leibniz rejects it, but in rejecting it seems to contradict himself (translation by Spur):

All actions are determined and never indifferent. For there is always a reason that inclines us to one rather than the other, since nothing happens without reason. It is true that these inclining reasons are not at all necessitating and destroy neither contingence nor liberty.

A liberty of indifference is impossible. So it cannot be found anywhere, even in God. For God is determined by himself always to do the best. And creatures are always determined by internal or external reasons.

Inasmuch as Leibniz holds that reasons incline without necessitating, he rejects determinism and embraces liberty of indifference. For a determining reason is a necessitating reason. But he plainly states that all actions are determined. So he rejects liberty of indifference. The waffle phrase 'inclines but does not necessitate' was censured severely by Schopenhauer in his classic On the Freedom of the Will (pp. 15, 61)

That the great Leibniz gets tangled up shows the depth of the problem. Why doesn't this defender of the principle of sufficient reason just come out unambiguously in favor of determinism? Schopenhauer would say that it is because of Leibniz's theological commitments: he needs to get God off the hook for the evil in the world. But less cynically we could say that Leibniz feels as I do a sense of his own absolute spontaneity in the generation of (some of) his actions. We feel ourselves to be in some sense spontaneous and ultimate originators of (some of) our actions. We act for reasons that incline us this way and that but do not (we feel) necessitate our actions.

When I keenly regret and feel gulty about doing something or leaving something undone, I have a sense of moral responsibility. I say to myself: I ought not to have done that! (Think of a case of genuine moral as opposed to prudential regret.) Since 'ought' implies 'can,' I infer that it was within my power to refrain from doing the regrettable deed. And that means: it was within my power to refrain from doing the deed even given all the antecedent and circumambient conditions and all the motives and excuses swirling before my mind at the time of the deed.

In short, moral responsibility entails libertarian freedom of the will. If I were free merely in some such compatibilist sense as the one above defined, then there would be no accounting for one's sense of moral responsibility. One could of course claim that moral responsibility and regret for past misdeeds are illusory psychological phenomena.  Accordingly, one feels guilt and regret, but these emotions are not revelatory of anything: one simply did what one had to do in the circumstances, and it is a mistake to feel guilt or regret or moral responsibility. But if one holds that they are not illusory, then I think one is committed to libertarian freedom of the will.