This is a guest post by Peter Lupu. Minor editing by BV.
1) In One Fallacy of Objectivism (henceforth, OFO) I gave an argument that a distinction Objectivists insist upon between “metaphysical” or natural-facts vs. volitional-facts logically presupposes the traditional modal distinction between contingent vs. necessary – a logical presupposition they vehemently deny. Three kinds of objections were presented against my argument. The first kind challenged my argument by questioning the sense in which the distinction between natural vs. volitional facts logically presupposes the modal distinction. The second kind of objection alleges that since the contingent and the possible are the offspring of human volitional action, they cannot possibly exist antecedently to and independently from the sphere of human volition. The third kind of objection maintains that a certain Objectivist theory about concept acquisition and concept formation refutes my argument. I shall ignore here objections that belong to this last category because they deserve a separate treatment. So I shall focus exclusively on the first two objections.
2) One of my arguments in OFO was basically this. The concept of a volitional fact logically presupposes two things: (a) while in fact I have done A, I could have done B instead; (b) doing A logically presupposes that I recognize that it is possible for me to do A, which in turn logically presupposes that certain counterfactual propositions of the form “if I were to do such and such, then so and so would result” are true about this world. Now, in OFO I did not distinguish (a) and (b) because I was merely concerned to show that volitional facts in general logically presuppose concepts that belong to the modal distinction. Here I wish to distinguish them and focus on (b).
3) It is useful to get clear first about the notion of logical presupposition used in my argument. Presuppositions are properties of acts; in this case the act of asserting a proposition. So what do I mean when I say that asserting one proposition logically presupposes another? Here is a simple way of fixing this idea in our mind. An assertion of S logically presupposes S* just in case the proposition S logically entails the proposition S*. Logical entailment, in contradistinction to presupposition, is a property of propositions. Assertions of the propositions P and Q constitute a performative contradiction just in case one of the propositions asserted logically entails a third proposition which logically contradicts the second proposition asserted. So now we can focus first upon logical entailment and subsequently transfer the pertinent conclusions to assertions.
4) Objectivists hold the following three theses:
Thesis A: There is a fundamental conceptual distinction everyone does or ought to accept between “metaphysical or natural facts” vs. “volitional or man-made facts”.
Thesis B: The content of the traditional philosophical distinction between contingent vs. necessary facts is either (a) reducible to the distinction between natural vs. volitional facts, in which case it is superfluous as an additional distinction; or (b) to the extent that it is not so reducible, it is conceptually incoherent, meaningless, or cannot be clearly demarcated, in which case it ought to be discarded as worthless; or (c) to the extent that the modal distinction is coherent and meaningful, it is extensionally equivalent to the natural vs. volitional distinction and, therefore, it fails to apply to new facts beyond the ones already demarcated by the later distinction.
Thesis C: Every contingent fact in the world stems from or originates with a volitional act.
Note: I have slightly revised the language of Theses A and B; Thesis C was not addressed in OFO.
5) I maintain the following two propositions:
Proposition (I): Theses A and B are logically inconsistent (i.e., they entail a logical contradiction);
Proposition (II): Thesis C is false.
6) Let us exclude for the purposes of the present debate volition-deniers so that we can all agree on the following two propositions about volitional acts:
(P1) There exist in the world certain volitional acts;
(P2) There exist in the world certain successful volitional acts (in the sense that the outcome of the volitional act achieves its intended purpose).
I maintain that (P1) logically entails that there are certain counterfactual propositions about the world (not merely about volitional agents and their acts) the truth-value of which is independent from and prior to the existence of volitional facts. That is, no event can be a volitional act unless it is caused in the right way by certain internal processes that must include counterfactual beliefs about the world. While in the case of mere volitional acts (in contradistinction to successful ones) these counterfactual beliefs may or may not be true, their truth-value depends upon the way the world is. The existence of counterfactual beliefs logically entails that there are counterfactual propositions that are either true or false. If I successfully demonstrate the above, then I have shown that the modal concepts of contingency and possibility are not reducible to the concept of volition; that these modal concepts are meaningful; and that these modal concepts are not extensionally equivalent to the concept of volitional acts.
7) I think we can all agree that volitional acts must have the following three elements: (i) an external component which is a behavior that causally interacts with the environment in a manner not unlike the causal interaction exhibited by non-volitional events; (ii) an internal conscious process that consists of propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, goals, etc; a faculty capable of means-ends reasoning; a deliberative capacity; and a will which bestows upon the chosen outcome of the other conscious processes causal efficacy to execute the plan. One way of conceptualizing these internal conscious processes is to think of the propositional attitudes, the faculty of means-ends reasoning, and the deliberative processes together as producing an intentional-design that has prescriptive force. The role of the intentional design is to prescribe the kind of behavior that can bring about a state of affairs in the world which satisfies the desired ends or goals. And finally our will endows this intentional-design with the causal efficacy to bring about the external component; namely, the behavior; (iii) the intentional design must be the principal cause of the external behavior. This condition is required so as to exclude cases where the internal conscious process produces a certain intentional-design but the causal efficacy of this intentional-design is trumped by other internal processes. Under such circumstances, the actual behavior does not fit the behavior prescribed by the intentional design (in fact, we can imagine even more radical cases where the behavior conflicts with its intended purpose). In such cases the intentional design exists, but it is not the cause of the behavior that was actually undertaken.
8) Suppose I wish to clear a field of big rocks. To simplify matters, let’s assume that I have no access to any machinery. Suppose I correctly estimate the weight of most rocks to be over 500 pounds. Will it make sense to form an intention to clear the field, given that I know that I can lift about 70 pounds? I don’t think so. Why will it make no sense to do so? Because given the weight of the rocks and my lifting ability, I cannot move most of the rocks. Thus, in order to set out to devise a plan for action, an intentional design, I must believe that I can move the rocks. Let us now suppose that I correctly estimate that the heaviest rock weights no more than 50 pounds. Will it make sense to form an intention to clear the field, given that I know that I can lift about 70 pounds? It certainly will make sense because I believe that I can exert sufficient lifting force to move the rocks. Now, I have been speaking here about certain sorts of beliefs about what I can and cannot lift as a precondition to plan volitional acts. What sorts of beliefs are these? I think that they have the form of the following counterfactual beliefs: if I were to exert a force equivalent to 70 pounds, then such a force would (or would not) move each rock to a certain point in space (outside the boundaries of the field). Therefore, whether or not I even devise a plan to clear the field, a plan for a volitional act, depends upon such beliefs and on my estimate of the weight of the rocks.
8.1) The above reasoning involves certain counterfactual beliefs about what would happen if I were to do such-and-such. But while these beliefs are in some sense about me and my physical abilities, they must be derived from some more general counterfactual propositions that I must believe and these later proposition have nothing to do with me. These more general counterfactual propositions have roughly the following form:
(CF) If a force that equals x pounds were to be continuously exerted upon an object that weights less/more than x pounds, then this force would/would-not move the object in question.
8.2) I must believe some counterfactuals such as (CF) in order to derive (by instantiation) the counterfactual beliefs I must have about what I can or cannot do. And the later sort of counterfactual beliefs, we have seen, are required in order to devise a plan, an intentional design, for a volitional act. And, therefore, the existence of volitional facts logically entails the existence of certain counterfactual propositions such as (CF).
8.3) Notice that counterfactual propositions such as (CF) are completely general; i.e., they apply to every object and force whether or not the object in question was, is currently, or ever will be the focus of a volitional agent and was, is, or ever will be subjected to a force produced by a volitional act. There must be untold number of such objects that were never and never will be the focus of an intentional act. Therefore, if there are counterfactual propositions such as (CF), then the range of their application (their extension) is beyond the domain of volitional facts. Therefore, if there are counterfactual propositions of the sort just discussed, then clause (c) of Thesis B is false.
8.4) Someone might object as follows:
“You completely misconstrue what is involved in the rock-example.” There is no need to introduce counterfactual beliefs such as “if I were to exert a force equivalent to 70 pounds, then such a force would (or would not) move each rock to a certain point in space (outside the boundaries of the field)” when it is enough that the agent has the following belief: “If I exert a force equivalent to 70 pounds on a rock, then such a force will (or will not) move each rock to a certain point in space.” And this later proposition does not have the form of a counterfactual; it is more like a conditional prediction. Therefore, volitional facts at most entail conditional predictions of the sort just proposed and these are not counterfactual propositions; hence, volitional facts do not logically entail counterfactual propositions.
8.5) First, I think that the semantics (i.e., truth-conditions) of these conditional predictions is going to be equivalent to my formulation in terms of explicit counterfactual conditionals. Therefore, my opponent’s proposal is a stylistic variation upon my proposal; its deep structure however is modal in nature, if mine is. But even if my semantic hunch is incorrect and the conditional predictions have a different semantics than the counterfactual propositions I have proposed, the following question arises: How do we obtain these conditional predictions? i.e., what are the grounds for my belief that the object will move provided I exert such-and-such force on it? The most viable answer is this: under the conditions stated, I predict that the object will be moved because I believe that under these conditions it can be moved. For suppose that I did not believe the later proposition. Then I will not believe the prediction that the object will move either. So my belief in the conditional prediction is based upon a prior belief in the kind of counterfactual propositions expressed by (CF).
9) Of course, my estimate about the weight of the rocks may be completely wrong; they are in fact much heavier than estimated. Then my intention to clear the field is going to fail. While I might try to clear the field and in so doing perform certain volitional acts with the purpose of clearing the field, I will not be successful. In order to actually be successful, my estimates must be roughly correct. And my belief in the counterfactual proposition that if I were to exert a force equal to 70 pounds on the rocks, then such a force would move each rock to a certain point in space (outside the boundaries of the field) must be true. And so must be (CF). Therefore, if there are any successful volitional facts, then there are true counterfactual propositions. Since proposition (P2) states that there are such volitional acts, it follows that there are true counterfactual propositions about the world and some of these are true about states of affairs that never were, are, or will be the focus of volitional acts.
10) If the existence of volitional acts logically entails the existence of counterfactual propositions and the existence of successful volitional acts logically entails the existence of true counterfactual propositions, then propositions expressing contingent and possible state of affairs must be meaningful, if propositions expressing volitional facts are meaningful. Moreover, since propositions expressing volitional facts logically entail propositions requiring modal concepts, the later cannot be reducible to the former nor can they be superfluous. And since the extension of these modal concepts extends way beyond the extension of volitional concepts, their extensions cannot be equivalent to the later. Therefore, Thesis A logically implies that modal concepts are meaningful, not reducible to volitional concepts, and are not extensionally equivalent to the later. But these logical implications contradict all three clauses of Thesis B. Therefore, Thesis A and B are logically inconsistent.
11) By the definitions given in # (3) above, anyone who asserts, sponsors, or maintains Thesis A and B simultaneously is involved in a performative contradiction. Since Objectivists assert, in fact insist, upon Thesis A and B, they are committing a performative contradiction.
12) Thesis C basically says that every contingent or possible fact is caused by a volitional act. But, if that were so, then there could not be contingent facts that are independent or volitional acts. But we have seen above that there are plenty of true counterfactual propositions about objects that were not, are not currently, and never will be causally connected to any volitional acts. Therefore, the extension of modal notions is wider than the extension of volitional notions. Hence, Thesis C is false.
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