For context see Pavel Tichy on Existence, the posts chained to it, and the comments to these posts.
My view is that existence belongs to individuals in the way it would not belong to them if Frege and Russell and Pavel Tichy were right about existence. These three maintain that existence is exclusively a property of concepts, propositional functions, and offices, respectively. I maintain that there are legitimate first-level uses of ‘exist(s)’ in addition to the legitimate second-level uses. This commits me to saying that, in a suitably broad sense of ‘property,’ existence is a property of individuals. No doubt it is a very peculiar property, indeed a sui generis property, but it is a property nonetheless. Or so I maintain. Sometimes I avoid the potentially misleading term ‘property’ altogether and simply say that existence belongs to individuals in the way it would not belong to them if Frege and Russell were right. If Russell is right, then existence is like numerousness. Plainly, one cannot predicate being numerous of an individual, e.g., ‘Socrates is numerous’ and ‘This pencil is numerous’ are nonsense. I say Russell’s view is mistaken. Although second-level uses of ‘exist(s)’ are like the uses of ‘numerous,’ ‘exist(s)’ has legitimate first-level uses unlike ‘numerous’ which has no legitimate first-level uses.
Materna said: To say “a exists” means “a is a member of the universe” (which is the non-empty set of individuals).
BV responded: Tichy cannot say what you attribute to him, namely,
a exists =df a is a member of a nonempty set of individuals.
For he explicitly denies that existence is a property ascribable to individuals . Since he denies this, he cannot say that existence is the property of being a member of the universe. His point about existence is that it is a second-level property, a property of offices, the property of being occupied. Since existence = the property of being occupied, he is committed to saying that ‘a exists’ is meaningless, given that ‘a’ is an individual constant. For it is surely meaningless to say of an individual (as opposed to an individual office) that it is occupied or filled.
Materna replied: Well, formally you are right. I should have said something like
“If we said ´a exists´ it would be futile, for we would mean just that a is a member of a non-empty set (viz. the universe). So why should we use the term ´exist´ in such a case, where there is no possibility that an individual would not ´exist´?
BV answered: Given that the universe is a non-empty set of existing individuals, there is no point in saying of any individual, a for example, that it exists. Since all the individuals in the universe exist, ‘a exists’ does not distinguish a from any other individual in the universe. So in that sense ‘a exists’ is as you say “futile.” But this is consistent with existence being a property of individuals.
You say that there is no possibility that an individual would not exist. But it seems to me that, even though every individual in the universe exists, every individual in the universe is possibly such that it not exist. Are they not contingently existing individuals? It seems wrong to say that they exist necessarily, and also wrong to say that they exist neither contingently nor necessarily.
Materna countered: there are no contingently existing individuals. Having a set {a, b, c, …} you have a fixed set; it is impossible that, e.g., b would “take its holiday” and cease for some time being member of that set. Can you adduce some example of a ‘contingently existing’ individual? (This is one of, say, two points where I agree with Quine’s joking about ‘possible individuals’.)
Materna added: By the way, notice the following facts: If existence is an empirical notion then it cannot concern individuals. As for mathematical existence, it is just the existential quantifier what fills the bill . . .
And now BV says: It is true that the set {a, b, c . . .} is a “fixed set” if what you mean is that the set has its members essentially, and that its very identity as a set is bound up with its having precisely the members it in fact has. But this fact, which I concede, does not show that the members of the set are not contingently existing individuals. Note also that a contingently existing individual is not the same as a merely possible individual such as Quine’s ‘possible fat man in the doorway.’ A contingently existing individual exists whereas a merely possible individual does not exist. I am not committed to merely possible individuals.
So I simply do not understand what you are trying to say. When you say “There are no contingently existing individuals” are you saying that the individuals in the universe of discourse necessarily exist? Or are you saying that they neither necessarily nor contingently exist? That would imply (with the help of an auxiliary premise) that they do not exist at all. If you mean that the individuals in the U of D do not exist at all, are you saying that they are Meinongian individuals jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein?
You mention mathematical existence, but that is not our concern here. So we can leave that to one side. You say that ” If existence is an empirical notion then it cannot concern individuals.” This brings epistemology into the discussion and is not strictly relevant. In any case, why do you say what I have quoted you as saying?
You want an example of a contingently existing individual. But surely there is no lack of examples. I am one and you are another. I exist but I might not have existed. Therefore, I am a contingently existing individual.
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