Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Solubility Skepticism, Religion, and Reason

Stack topper.  Here are four addenda to what I say in the Substack entry.

1) A skeptic is an inquirer, not a denier. Too many confuse doubt, the engine  of inquiry, with denial. If I doubt that such-and-such, I neither affirm it nor deny it.

2) Is doubting whether a proposition is true the same as suspending judgment as to its truth-value? A subtle question. I think we should say that it is not. For if doubt is the engine of inquiry, then we doubt in order to attain such truth as we are able to attain. But if one suspends judgment as to the truth-value of some proposition P — if one 'suspends P'  for short — one may do so with no intention of trying to determine whether P is true. For example, I suspend judgment, take no doxastic stance, on the question whether the number of registered Democrats in Maricopa County is odd or even. I don't know, I don't care, and I will do nothing to find out.  Suspension, not doubt.

3) Another subtle difference is that between suspension (withholding of assent) or Pyrrhonist epoché in the broad sense, which is related to but quite different from Husserlian epoché, and Pyrrhonist epoché in the narrow sense.   A standard treatment of the former is along the following lines (Wikipedia):

The Pyrrhonists developed the concept of "epoché" to describe the state where all judgments about non-evident matters are suspended to induce a state of ataraxia (freedom from worry and anxiety). The Pyrrhonist philosopher Sextus Empiricus gives this definition: "Epoché is a state of the intellect on account of which we neither deny nor affirm anything." This concept is similarly employed in Academic Skepticism but without the objective of ataraxia.

Benson Mates adds a nuance by distinguishing between withholding assent with respect to truth-value and withholding assent with respect to sense (Frege's Sinn).  I endorse the distinction. Consider the proposition expressed by the standard Trinitarian formula, 'There is one God in three divine persons.' (My example.) What mental attitudes can we take up with respect to this proposition?  I count five: Affirm, Deny, Doubt, Suspendtv (withhold assent with respect to truth-value), Suspends (withhold assent with respect to the question whether the proposition has a determinate sense or meaning).  For example, one might maintain that the Trinitarian formula has or makes no sense, which is to say that no definite proposition is expressed by the verbal utterance or inscription. If the formula makes no sense, then it does not express a proposition, a proposition being a sense, whence it follows that the formula cannot have a truth-value. 

4) A solubility skeptic with respect to the central problems of philosophy is not the same as a problem skeptic. I am not a problem skeptic. I don't doubt that the central problems are genuine, pace the later Wittgenstein. The central problems are genuine, not pseudo, but I doubt whether they are soluble by us. So doubting, I conjecture that they are not soluble by us as the best explanation of why they haven't been solved.

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Bill Vallicella

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15 responses to “Solubility Skepticism, Religion, and Reason”

  1. Vito B. Caiati Avatar
    Vito B. Caiati

    Bill,
    I may be wrong about this, but it seems to me that by its very nature belief is bound up with latent, often unconscious uncertainty of the truth of what is believed; this sort of doubt remains in the background and only surfaces and becomes active when what is believed is called into question, either by internal enquiry or outside challenge. Belief/doubt are therefore inherently linked, notwithstanding the denial of this fact by those proclaiming, for instance, the truth-value of certain religious beliefs, even when these entail what appear to be logical contradictions; for such persons wrongly treat belief as if it were a species of knowledge and insist that others must regard it as such. None of this entails that doubt requires the forfeiture of what is believed, but simply the recognition that the latter is necessarily tentative.
    Vito

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  2. BV Avatar
    BV

    Vito,
    >> by its very nature belief is bound up with latent, often unconscious uncertainty of the truth of what is believed;<< We need to distinguish between belief THAT and belief IN. Call the first propositional belief and the second personal belief. This is the difference between believing that God exists and believing in God. One can believe that God exists without trusting in God which involves establishing or trying to establish a personal relation with him. For a mundane example, substitute 'Trump' for 'God.' Your formulation implies that the topic is propositional belief. If so, then it is not clear that it is the nature of belief to be bound up with uncs. uncertainty of the truth of what is believed. For if I know that p, where p is a proposition, then I believe that p. But if I know that p, then I am at least subjectively certain that p is the case. But then my belief is at least subjectively certain. What you may be assuming is what many have held, namely, that belief and knowledge exclude one another, i.e., that what one believes one does not know and that what one knows one does not believe. For example, in ordinary language people will often say, "I don't believe that, I KNOW it!" To which one can respond, along the lines of Plato's JTB analysis of 'knows': "But if you know it, then you believe it!" The nature of belief is a very difficult topic. Your overall comment, however, is very good. More later. I hope our resident epistemologist, Elliot, pipes up.

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  3. Vito B. Caiati Avatar
    Vito B. Caiati

    Thanks for your helpful response, Bill. I am in over my head here, but the topic is of great interest to me.
    One, perhaps naïve, question: Is not Believing That (propositional) required for Believing In (personal), the latter being epistemologically dependent on the former? If I do not settle in my mind the question of God’s existence, how can I believe in Him?
    Vito

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  4. BV Avatar
    BV

    Vito,
    Yes, of course. I cannot believe IN God unless I believe THAT God exists; I can, however, believe THAT God exists without believing IN God.
    The same holds for any person, divine or human.

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  5. BV Avatar
    BV

    Vito @ 4:30:
    >> Belief/doubt are therefore inherently linked, notwithstanding the denial of this fact by those proclaiming, for instance, the truth-value of certain religious beliefs, even when these entail what appear to be logical contradictions; for such persons wrongly treat belief as if it were a species of knowledge and insist that others must regard it as such.<< For example, Trinity and Incarnation are essential to orthodox (miniscule 'o') Xianity. But both entail what appear to be logical contradictions. And yet orthodox Xians affirm, i.e., believe, both. And then some of them assert that these beliefs are a species of knowledge. In Thomas et al. one finds the phrase cognitio fidei which means knowledge by/of faith. This is of course puzzling to the post-medieval mind. How can faith, and in particular faith in what appears to be contradictory, be a kind of knowledge? Aren’t faith and knowledge polar opposites?
    So what I take you to be saying, Vito, is that religious faith (religious belief) necessarily involves an element of latent doubt. That seems right. To go a bit beyond what you are sayng: the religious believer, attempting consciously or unconsciously to suppress this latent doubt, waxes dogmatic and asserts as objectively certain what is not objectively certain.
    I think we agree that this dogmatism, whether religious or political or political-theological, can lead to the torture chamber and the gulag.
    If I am objectively certain that Christ alone is the way, the truth, and the life, then why would I not be morally justified in torturing you to death for your own good in an attempt to get you to confess the objective truth?

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  6. BV Avatar
    BV

    The following is relevant to my last comment: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giordano_Bruno

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  7. Elliott Avatar
    Elliott

    Bill,
    I agree that doubt is not denial.
    >>Is doubting whether a proposition is true the same as suspending judgment as to its truth-value? A subtle question. I think we should say that it is not.<< I agree. One can suspend judgment (i.e., take no doxastic stance) regarding p and yet at the same time not doubt that p. Your example concerning Maricopa County demonstrates this point. I also think, though this is more controversial, that one can doubt that p and, at the same time, believe that p. My position requires that doubt and belief are propositional attitudes (more specifically, doxastic attitudes) that come in degrees. On this position, sometimes called doxastic gradualism, one can believe a proposition with more or less confidence. (Epistemologists sometimes refer to such doxastic attitudes as “credences.”) For example, one might believe with 99% confidence that the sun will rise tomorrow, and with 60% confidence that the Dodgers will win the World Series this year. Moreover, one can entertain some degree of doubt that p but not reject that p. The person who believes with 60% confidence that the Dodgers will win also, at the same time, has some degree of doubt that the Dodgers will win. How can he be in such a doxastic position? Suppose that the relevant and available evidence indicates that the Dodgers have a good chance of winning this year; say, the objective probability is .6. However, because of injuries and various slumps that players have fallen into, the team has some cracks in its hull which might sink its World Series ambitions. There is a .4 probability that the team will lose. Understanding this, one believes with 60% (subjective) confidence that the team will win yet harbors some doubt that the team will win. He believes the team will win but isn't willing to bet on it. On this view, one can both doubt that p and believe that p, as long as (a) the belief has some degree of confidence between .5 and 1 -- that is, above .5 and below 1 such that .5 is a counterbalanced suspension of judgment and 1 is complete subjective certainty, and (b) the doubt is not at total or 100% strength. On this view, subjective certainty entails absence of any degree of doubt. Doubt entails absence of subjective certainty, that is, presence of subjective uncertainty. Doubt is thus consistent with belief that falls short of subjective certainty but inconsistent with subjective certainty. I also agree with your characterization of the difference between Pyrrhonistic skepticism and Academic skepticism. The Pyrrhonists used the epoché as a means to ataraxia. The Academics did not do this. Rather, for them, the epoché seemed to be a kind of critical holding room for propositions that are epistemically uncertain. If you have a proposition that lacks epistemic certainty yet has some degree of plausibility, you place it in the holding room and, rather than pronouncing dogmatically on it, you continue inquiring into it, even if for practical purposes you accept or act on it. Lastly, I accept your distinction between solubility skepticism and problem skepticism.

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  8. Elliott Avatar
    Elliott

    It seems to me that doxastic gradualism best explains our actual doxastic attitudes or stances and the doxastic stances we ought to take. This position also helps to understand how one might be reasonable to believe with, say, 90% confidence that there is a tree in one’s backyard, and 75% confidence that one will win the game, but with 60% confidence that some religious or political doctrine is true.

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  9. Elliott Avatar
    Elliott

    Hello, Vito.
    You wrote “by its very nature belief is bound up with latent, often unconscious uncertainty of the truth of what is believed …”
    This is an interesting point, and well worth exploring, especially regarding the inclination that some have to speak dogmatically about matters of objective uncertainty.
    I’m not sure that belief itself is by nature linked to uncertainty, either of the objective or subjective sort.
    One can believe a claim with subjective certainty (that is, with total confidence), and one can believe a claim that is objectively certain. Examples of the former: one is subjectively certain and completely confident that one will go to heaven after death; one is subjectively certain and totally confident that the ball will fall to the ground if one drops it. Examples of the latter: one believes that all bachelors are unmarried; one believes that all triangles have three angles.
    But it is quite plausible to say that belief in matters of objective uncertainty is linked to subjective uncertainty. It seems there are many ways in which we could explore such links.

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  10. BV Avatar
    BV

    Elliot @ 1:43. Your comment is excellent and pushes the discussion forward. I hadn’t considered the business of variable credence. I distinguished between the following attitudes toward a proposition: Affirmation, Denial, Doubt, and two sorts of Suspension. I was assuming that to affirm a proposition is to believe it (occurrently, not dispositionally) and that to disbelieve a proposition is to deny it (occurrently, not dispositionally). And I suppose I was assuming that belief and doubt are mutually exclusive: what I believe I do not doubt and what I doubt, I do not believe.
    But you make a strong case that one and the same mental state can involve both belief and doubt. For example, I believe that the monsoon winds will not uproot any of my trees, but I am not subjectively certain that they won’t (and of course I am not objectively certain that they won’t). My doxastic confidence is, however, less than 100%. Perhaps we should say that my belief is tentative (held with less than full subjective certainty) rather than that doubt is mixed in with my belief. Or am I now quibbling semantically? I’ll have to think about this some more.
    I think you have captured what Vito was getting at in this first comment.
    Our topic is the epistemology of religious belief; so we should look at some religious/theological examples.

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  11. Vito B. Caiati Avatar
    Vito B. Caiati

    Thank you for your very helpful comments on the topic of belief and doubt.
    While I see what you mean when you write, “One can believe a claim with subjective certainty (that is, with total confidence), and one can believe a claim that is objectively certain,” I instinctively, and perhaps quite wrongly, regard the subjective confidence that one would have in going to heaven as not being of the same nature as the subjective confidence that a ball will fall to the ground. You are the philosopher and I am not, but it seems to me that the former belief, which concerns future, highly speculative metaphysical realities is inherently linked to doubt, albeit doubt that is highly variable and often unconscious among believers, while the latter is not. Perhaps the great mystics and saints are subjectively confident of a post-mortem existence in heaven, but if so, they are a tiny fraction of humanity; the rest of us are left with something less than full, although perhaps unadmitted, subjective confidence in this transcendent matter and others of the same type. Please correct me if I am misguided in arguing this.
    One final point: I really benefited from your very insightful discussion of doxastic gradualism, and I wonder it what you say there might work well with what I am arguing in the previous paragraph.
    Vito

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  12. Elliott Avatar
    Elliott

    Bill, you raise a good point about tentative beliefs. >>Perhaps we should say that my belief is tentative (held with less than full subjective certainty) rather than that doubt is mixed in with my belief.<< Is a belief held with less than full subjective certainty explainable in terms of its tentativeness or in terms of its being mixed with doubt? What would explain the tentativeness if not that there is some doubt that generates the tentative stance? I suppose it would help to offer an essential or analytic definition of ‘doubt.’ As I trust you will appreciate quite well, such definitions are hard to come by. For one thing, it’s very difficult to find the necessary and sufficient conditions for a mental state to count as a state of doubt. But there’s another problem: the term is not used univocally. What sense of ‘doubt’ do we have in mind when we wonder if doubt is consistent with belief? Consider the following samples from various dictionaries. Merriam-Webster: Doubt (v): --to call into question the truth of; --to be uncertain about; Doubt (n): --an inclination not to believe or accept; --uncertainty of belief or opinion; --a deliberate suspension of judgment https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/doubt
    Cambridge:
    Doubt (n):
    –(a feeling of) not being certain about something
    Doubt (v):
    –to not feel certain or confident about something or to think that something is not probable
    — to not believe someone or something
    https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/doubt
    Collins:
    Doubt (n):
    –If you have doubt or doubts about something, you feel uncertain about it and do not know whether it is true or possible. If you say you have no doubt about it, you mean that you are certain it is true.
    Doubt (v):
    –If you doubt something, you believe that it might not be true or genuine.
    https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/doubt
    Now, on one hand, if to doubt is to question, then it seems that doubt is consistent with belief. I can question whether or not I set my car alarm before entering the grocery store and yet believe that I did set it.
    If doubt is uncertainty, then doubt is consistent with belief. I can believe something for which I am uncertain, such as that the hurricane will hit my hometown rather than veer off in another direction.
    Again, if doubt is an inclination not to believe, then doubt is consistent with belief. Arguably, one can believe that p even though one has an inclination not to do so. One might believe that one did well on the test, yet because of poor self-esteem, one might be inclined not to believe so.
    And if doubting that p is believing that p might not be true, then doubt is consistent with belief. One can believe that p and yet believe that p might not be true. For example, one might believe that the entire Old Testament is divinely inspired and yet believe that this proposition might not be true.
    On the other hand, if doubt is deliberate suspension of judgment, then doubt is inconsistent with belief. But we have already ruled out this sense of ‘doubt’ with your example of Maricopa County. Moreover, if to doubt that p is to not believe that p, then doubt is by definition not consistent with belief. If Jones does not believe that he will get the job, then it is not the case that he believes that he will get it.

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  13. Elliott Avatar
    Elliott

    >>Our topic is the epistemology of religious belief; so we should look at some religious/theological examples.<< Yes, this is a good idea. How about these examples to start? One might believe, doubt, disbelieve, suspend judgement, etc. on the following religious claims, taken from various religious traditions: - God exists. - There is only one God. - There are many divine beings. - God created everything other than himself. - The entire Bible is divinely inspired. - The doctrine of the Trinity is true. - Occurrent belief in the life, death, and saving work of Jesus is a necessary condition for being saved. - Occurrent belief in the life, death, and saving work of Jesus is a sufficient condition for being saved. - There is an afterlife. - "The Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra — that is, when in the exercise of his office as pastor and teacher of all Christians he defines, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the whole Church — is, by reason of the Divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer wished His Church to be endowed in defining doctrines of faith and morals; and consequently that such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of their own nature (ex sese) and not by reason of the Church's consent.” https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07790a.htm#IIIB
    – Desire and ignorance lie at the root of suffering. (The Second Noble Truth of Buddhism) https://guides.monmouth.edu/c.php?g=1161526&p=8479628
    – All human relationships involve a set of defined roles and mutual obligations; each participant should understand and conform to his/her proper role. (A basic claim of Confucianism: https://asiasociety.org/education/confucianism )
    – The soul reincarnates, evolving through many births until all karmas have been resolved, and moksha, liberation from the cycle of rebirth, is attained. Not a single soul will be deprived of this destiny. (Basic claim of Hinduism: https://www.hinduismtoday.com/hindu-basics/nine-beliefs-of-hinduism/ )
    – The Hindu scriptures are a reliable guide to truth and moral action.
    – The soul exists.
    – Zeus exists.
    – Cronos defeated Uranus and became king of the gods.
    – There is a god of wisdom, learning, and knowledge called Quetzalcoatl. (Aztec religious belief)

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  14. Elliott Avatar
    Elliott

    Vito, thanks for your response.
    After reading your post from August 26 at 4:59 AM and re-reading your post from August 23 at 4:30 AM, I see that what you have in mind seems to be religious belief in particular rather than belief in general. For example, you wrote: “it seems to me that the former belief, which concerns future, highly speculative metaphysical realities is inherently linked to doubt, albeit doubt that is highly variable and often unconscious among believers, while the latter is not.”
    I agree that belief about the afterlife is generally linked to doubt because of its objective uncertainty. I hesitate to say that such belief is inherently linked to doubt, because it is possible that some people believe it with complete subjective certainty. It seems to me that the latter belief (the one about the ball falling to the ground) is open to doubt if one assumes a metaphysical position that rules out actual physical balls falling to real physical grounds.
    It might help to distinguish between descriptive and normative claims about belief. Descriptively speaking, some folks seem to be absolutely (subjectively) certain that some religious claims are true, despite the fact that such claims are objectively uncertain. Normatively speaking, however, perhaps we ought to align our subjective degree of confidence that p with the objective probability that p.
    For example, take the proposition that there is an afterlife. Suppose that, if we consider all the best arguments for an afterlife and all the best arguments against an afterlife, the objective (epistemic) probability is .6 that there is an afterlife. In that case, normatively speaking, perhaps we should be 60% subjectively confident that there is an afterlife, and we should avoid waxing dogmatically about such claims, pretending that we are certain when we are not.
    What do you think?
    Also, your point unconscious doubt is very interesting. On one hand, what does it mean to say that doubt is unconscious?
    On the other hand, it has occurred to me before, when speaking with religious believers who talk as if they are absolutely certain that their beliefs are true, despite the fact that they believe propositions that are objectively uncertain, that such believers have perhaps buried their doubts, which have become unconscious.
    If one doubts that p, and yet is told that one’s eternal life requires that he believe that p with 100% confidence and nothing less, one might bury one’s doubt about p, refuse to listen to or speak with anyone who raises questions about p, etc. In such cases, though, does the person really believe with complete confidence? Or does one will such a belief? If the latter, the mental state seems to be one of volition, not of belief.

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  15. Vito B. Caiati Avatar
    Vito B. Caiati

    Elliott,
    Once again, I thank you for your informed and insightful response to my comments.
    Here are my thoughts on two of the points that you make. You would be a better judge than I am about the merit of what I say.
    (1) “Suppose that, if we consider all the best arguments for an afterlife and all the best arguments against an afterlife, the objective (epistemic) probability is .6 that there is an afterlife. In that case, normatively speaking, perhaps we should be 60% subjectively confident that there is an afterlife, and we should avoid waxing dogmatically about such claims, pretending that we are certain when we are not.
    What do you think?”
    I think that the calculation of objective probability, even roughly, of certain religious beliefs, such as the existence of God or the reality of an afterlife, is certainly useful in determining the subjective confidence that are warranted by such beliefs. But I notice–and I may well be wrong about this–from your list of “religious claims, taken from various religious traditions,” this methodology has more or less utility, depending on the nature of the belief in question. Specifically, the more philosophical the belief, the greater its utility; the more theological, the lesser. Thus, in matters such as God existence or the soul’s existence and survival, objective probability is determined by a rational assessment of arguments that are independent of any particular religious tradition and that are empirical or logical in nature, such as the cosmological, ontological, teleological, or moral arguments (God’s existence) or those of consciousness, personal identity, free will and moral responsibility (soul’s existence and survival). However, how would one even begin to calculate such theological claims as, say, the Catholic doctrines of the perpetual virginity of the Virgin Mary or transubstantiation? In beliefs such as these, the calculation of probability is reduced to nothing more than guesswork, for any percentage assigned for or against these beliefs is essentially subjective. The same would hold true of the most demanding theological claims of other religions.
    (2) “If one doubts that p, and yet is told that one’s eternal life requires that he believe that p with 100% confidence and nothing less, one might bury one’s doubt about p, refuse to listen to or speak with anyone who raises questions about p, etc. In such cases, though, does the person really believe with complete confidence? Or does one will such a belief? If the latter, the mental state seems to be one of volition, not of belief.”
    I think that you are right about this, but I also think that what you are describing here is quite common among religious believers, and if so, perhaps we should think a bit more about how this situation affects the utility of probability calculations. Fear of one kind or another, whether falling into heresy, abandoning tradition, or living with uncertainty, seems to be commonly part of the process by which beliefs are affirmed. The will exerts its force on reason, whether consciously or unconsciously.
    Vito

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