It is a curious fact that some philosophers will enlist common sense in support of the wild metaphysical views they maintain. Karel Lambert, for example, thinks that common sense favors Meinong's doctrine of Aussersein! (See his Meinong's Principle of Independence, Cambridge UP, 1983, p. 17.)
I should think that common sense with its "robust sense of reality" (Russell) opposes Aussersein, the doctrine that some items, despite their being mind-independent, have no being (Sein) whatsoever. They are said to be jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein, "beyond being and nonbeing."
Contra Peter van Inwagen, the doctrine is not logically contradictory, but it is, I maintain, unintelligible. (I hope this amounts to more than a purely autobiographical remark.) I simply do not understand how some definite item, the golden mountain, say, that is mind-independent, can be an item without some mode of being. Must not a pure essence, ein reines Sosein, have at least what Henry of Ghent called esse essentiae, the being of essence?