Whatever King Midas touched turned into gold. The philosophers have something akin to it: whatever they touch turns into a puzzle. (I borrow the thought from Wilfrid Sellars.)
Saturday Night at the Oldies: A Half Dozen Dedications
To Horace Jeffery Hodges who describes himself thusly:
I've gone from the Arkansas Ozarks through Texas, California, Switzerland, Germany, Australia, and Israel to South Korea. I've traveled to Mexico, Belgium, Holland, East Germany, England, France, Denmark, Austria, Czechoslovakia (before it split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Russia, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and Scotland. Hence: "Gypsy Scholar."
To Peter Lupu, Forty Cups of Coffee and Smoke Smoke That Cigarette.
To Mike Valle, Ghost Riders in the Sky.
To Philoponus the Impecunious, Money.
To William the Nominalist, The Name Game.
To David Brightly, Heartaches by the Numbers.
Oikophobia
Fist and Hand, Statue and Lump: The Aporetics of Composition
1. Some maintain that a hand, and that same hand made into a fist, are identical. And there are those who would say the same about a piece of bronze and the statue made out of it, namely, that they are identical at every time at which both exist. This is not an unreasonable thing to say. After all, fist and hand, statue and bronze, are spatially coincident and neither has a physical part the other doesn't have. A fist is just a certain familiar arrangement of hand-parts. There is no part of the fist that is not part of the hand, and vice versa. So at looks as if first and hand are identical. But we need to be clear as to what identity is.
2. Identity is standardly taken to be an equivalence relation (reflexive, symmetrical, transitive) governed by the Indiscernibility of Identicals (InId) and the Necessity of Identity (NecId). The first principle says that, if two items are numerically identical, then they share all properties. The second says that if two items are numerically identical, then this is necessarily the case. Both principles strike me as beyond epistemic reproach. 'Identity' is short for 'numerical identity.'
3. Despite the considerations of #1, it looks as if fist and hand, statue and hunk of bronze, cannot be identical since they differ in their persistence conditions. The hunk of bronze can, while the statue cannot, survive being melted down and recast in some other form. The hand can, while the fist cannot, survive adoption of a different 'posture.' In both cases, something is true of the one that is not true of the other. So even at the times at which the fist is the hand, and the bronze is the statue, the two are not identical: the 'is' is not the 'is' of identity. It is the 'is' of composition and what you have are two things, not one.
What I have just given is a modal discernibility argument. Let me spell it out. Consider a time t at which the hand is in the shape of a fist. At t, the hand, but not the fist, has the modal property of being possibly such as to to be unfisted. So the hand cannot be identical to the fist given that, for any x, y, if x = y, then x, y share all properties.
But there is also this nonmodal discernibility argument. The hunk of bronze existed long before the statue came into existence, and the hunk of bronze exists while the form of a statue. So the hunk of bronze exists at more times that the statues does, which implies the the hunk of bronze is not identical to the statue.
There is also this consideration. Identity is symmetrical. So we can say either fist = hand or hand = fist. But is it the fist or the hand that both are? Intuitively, it is the hand. The hand is the fundamental reality here, not the fist. So how can fist and hand be identical? It seems that fist and hand are numerically distinct, albeit spatially coincident, concrete individuals.
4. The Law of Excluded Middle seems very secure indeed, especially in application to presently existing things. So either the fist is identical to the hand, and there is just one thing, a fisted hand, or the fist is not identical to the hand and there are two spatially coincident things, a fist and a hand. So which is it?
5. If you say that the fist = the hand, then when you make a fist nothing new comes into existence, and when the potter makes a pot out of clay, nothing new comes into existence. And when a mason makes a wall out of stones, nothing new comes into existence. He started with some stones and he ended with some stones. Given that the stones exist, and that the mason's work did not cause anything new to come into existence, must we not say that the single composite entity, the wall, does not exist? (For if it did exist, then there would be an existent in addition to the stones.) But it sounds crazy to say that the wall the mason has just finished constructing does not exist.
6. If, on the other hand, you say that the fist is not identical to the hand, then you can say that the making of a fist causes a new thing to come into existence, the fist. And similarly with the statue and the wall. After the mason stacks n stones into a wall, he has as a result of his efforts n +1 objects, the original n stones and the wall.
But this is also counterintuitive. Consider the potter at his wheel. As the lump of clay spins, the potter shapes the lump into a series of many (continuum-many?) intermediate shapes before he stops with one that satisfies him. Thus we have a series of objects (proto-pots) each of which is a concrete individual numericallt distinct from the clay yet (i) spatially conicident with it, and (ii) sharing with it every momentary property. And that is hard to swallow, is it not?
7. We appear to be at an impasse. We cannot comfortably say that the fist = the hand, nor can we comfortably say that the fist is not identical to the hand. Nor can we comfortably give up LEM. If there are no fists, statues, walls, artifacts generally, then there cannot be any puzzles about their composition. But we cannot comfortably say that there are no such things either.
Do we have here an example of a problem that is both genuine but insoluble?
Guest Post: Is There a Real Distinction Between Reductionism and Eliminativism?
What follows is a guest post by a long-standing card-carrying member of the MavPhil commentariat, William the Nominalist. He is eager to hear any thoughtful and pertinent comments you may have.
The distinction between reductionism and eliminativism is widely recognised in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science. It also seems to be very clear. Here it is, as explained by William Ramsey.
Ontologically conservative theory change occurs when the entities and posits of the replaced theory are relocated, often with some degree of revision, in the replacing theory. For example, as our theory of light was gradually replaced by our understanding of electro-magnetic radiation, our conception of light was dramatically transformed as we recognized ways in which our old conception was mistaken or incomplete. Nevertheless, at no point did we come to say that there is really no such thing as light. Rather, light was eventually identified with a form of electro-magnetic radiation.
By contrast, our notion of demons did not come to find a new home in contemporary theories of mental disorder. There is nothing in the theories of schizophrenia, Tourette's Syndrome, neuro-pathology or any of the other modern explanations for bizarre behavior, that we can sensibly identify with malevolent spirits with supernatural powers. The notion of a demon is just too far removed from anything we now posit to explain behavior that was once explained by demonology. Consequently, the transition from demonology to modern accounts of this behavior was ontologically radical. We dropped demons from our current ontology, and came to realize that the notion is empty — it refers to nothing real.
But after a moment's reflection, I find it is not very clear at all. Why?
Continue reading “Guest Post: Is There a Real Distinction Between Reductionism and Eliminativism?”
The Last Refuge of a Liberal
The last refuge of a liberal are charges of bigotry and intolerance. Charles Krauthammer:
. . . promiscuous charges of bigotry are precisely how our current rulers and their vast media auxiliary react to an obstreperous citizenry that insists on incorrect thinking.
— Resistance to the vast expansion of government power, intrusiveness and debt, as represented by the Tea Party movement? Why, racist resentment toward a black president.
— Disgust and alarm with the federal government's unwillingness to curb illegal immigration, as crystallized in the Arizona law? Nativism. [and racism and xenophobia]
— Opposition to the most radical redefinition of marriage in human history, as expressed in Proposition 8 in California? Homophobia.
— Opposition to a 15-story Islamic center and mosque near Ground Zero? Islamophobia.
For just one example of what Krauthammer is rightly protesting, read Robert Reich's Anatomy of Intolerance. You will note that here as elsewhere in liberal screeds there is no attempt at engaging conservative arguments. What is offered is name-calling and psychologizing. According to Reich,
Most Americans approve of Arizona’s new law allowing police to stop anyone who looks Hispanic and demand proof of citizenship.
This is plainly false and looks to be an outright lie. A man as intelligent and well-informed as Robert Reich cannot possibly be unaware at this late date of the content of AZ SB 1070. The law does not allow the the police to stop anyone who looks Hispanic to check citizenship status. It disallows this. See The Misrepresentations of Arizona SB 1070 Continue.
On Reconciling Creatio Ex Nihilo with Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit
This post examines Richard C. Potter's solution to the problem of reconciling creatio ex nihilo with ex nihilo nihil fit in his valuable article, "How To Create a Physical Universe Ex Nihilo," Faith and Philosophy, vol. 3, no. 1, (January 1986), pp. 16-26. (Potter appears to have dropped out of sight, philosophically speaking, so if anyone knows what became of him, please let me know. The Philosopher's Index shows only three articles by him, the last of which appeared in 1986.)
I. THE PROBLEM
We first need to get clear about the problem. On classical conceptions, God creates ex nihilo, out of nothing. He is not a Platonic demiurge who operates upon some preexistent stuff: he creates without it being the case that there is something out of which he creates. Nor does God create out of himself, a notion that presumbaly would give aid and comfort to pantheism. God creates out of nothing. Given that God creates out of nothing, how is this consistent with the apparent truth that something cannot come from nothing? The latter, the principle of ex nihilo nihil fit, seems to be an intuitively self-evident metaphysically necessary truth. Let us assume that it is. As metaphysically necessary, it is not a truth over which God has any control. Its truth-value is not within the purview of the divine will. Our problem is to understand, if possible, how it can be true both that God creates out of nothing, and that out of nothing nothing comes. Potter offers an ingenious solution.
Ex nihilo nihil fit is interpreted by Potter in terms of the following Principle of Creation by Compounding:
PCC. For any object O and time t, if O comes into being at t, then there exist some objects out of which O is composed and those objects existed prior to t.
Potter sees the problem as one of reconciling (PCC) with the following principle:
ENP. God created contingent objects in such a way that there was a time t1 at which contingent objects came into being, although there was no time prior to t1.
On the face of it, (PCC) and (ENP) are logically inconsistent.
Continue reading “On Reconciling Creatio Ex Nihilo with Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit“
Robert Royal on the GZM
Here. Excerpt:
If you’re like me, you’ve probably heard enough about the mosque. But the problem for me is that what I’m hearing doesn’t seem to address the main question. When NY Mayor Bloomberg says it’s a tragedy if 9/11 results in the loss of religious liberty – as if Islam were being curtailed here – I feel like I’m listening to a political class that’s taken leave of its senses. To put the matter baldly, some of us now think America is merely a matter of legal precedents, not a human community.
Two things are clear: 1. in America, religious liberty is an unshakeable right and houses of worship may be built, allowing for local zoning laws and other reasonable restrictions; 2. there is reason for doubt whether the mosque should be built, as last week even President Obama was forced to acknowledge.
Liberals have suddenly discovered a virtual absolute right for religion – primarily Islam – to be assertive anywhere, any time. Strange, because the Left has for decades sought to minimize religion in the public square.
Latest example: Utah crosses ruled unconstitutional.
Hats Off to Hentoff: “Pols Clueless on Ground Zero Mosque”
Here. Excerpts:
Imam Rauf has refused to call Hamas a terrorist organization and had no comment when, on Aug. 15, Mahmoud al-Zahar, its co-founder, strongly supported the Imam's mosque near Ground Zero, saying, Muslims "have to build everywhere" (Associated Press, Aug. 16). Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., said the support by Hamas of the Imam's mosque carried no weight because "Hamas is a terrorist organization."
How's that for bizarro reasoning? Any normal person would take Hamas support for the GZM to be worrisome indeed. But not Schumer the liberal. No bigot he. He takes the fact that Hamas is a terrorist organization as somehow giving us a reason to ignore its support!
This imam – widely lauded in much of the press as "a moderate" Muslim – is not reticent, however, in his firm commitment to Sharia (Islamic law), which regards women as far less than fully human. In the Dec. 9, 2007 Arabic newspaper Hadi el-Islam, Rauf insisted:
Throughout my discussions with contemporary Muslim theologians, it is clear an Islamic state can be established in more than just a single form or mold. It can be established through a kingdom or a democracy. The important issue is to establish the general fundamentals of Sharia that are required to govern.
I would greatly appreciate it if Imam Rauf explained, maybe Pelosi will ask him, more fully what he meant in his 2004 book, "What's Right With Islam is What's Right With America." In it he declares: "American Constitution and system of governance uphold the core principles of Islamic law." Rauf says Sharia law is a core principle of Islamic law. Does that also include a core principle of our Constitution?
Gutting, Dawkins, and Russell’s Celestial Teapot
In his recent NYT Opinionator piece, On Dawkins's Atheism, Notre Dame's Gary Gutting writes, describing the "no arguments argument" of some atheists:
To say that the universe was created by a good and powerful being who cares about us is an extraordinary claim, so improbable to begin with that we surely should deny it unless there are decisive arguments for it (arguments showing that it is highly probable). Even if Dawkins’ arguments against theism are faulty, can’t he cite the inconclusiveness of even the most well-worked-out theistic arguments as grounds for denying God’s existence?
He can if he has good reason to think that, apart from specific theistic arguments, God’s existence is highly unlikely. Besides what we can prove from arguments, how probable is it that God exists? Here Dawkins refers to Bertrand Russell’s example of the orbiting teapot. We would require very strong evidence before agreeing that there was a teapot in orbit around the sun, and lacking such evidence would deny and not remain merely agnostic about such a claim. This is because there is nothing in our experience suggesting that the claim might be true; it has no significant intrinsic probability.
But suppose that several astronauts reported seeing something that looked very much like a teapot and, later, a number of reputable space scientists interpreted certain satellite data as showing the presence of a teapot-shaped object, even though other space scientists questioned this interpretation. Then it would be gratuitous to reject the hypothesis out of hand, even without decisive proof that it was true. We should just remain agnostic about it.
The claim that God exists is much closer to this second case. There are sensible people who report having had some kind of direct awareness of a divine being, and there are competent philosophers who endorse arguments for God’s existence. Therefore, an agnostic stance seems preferable to atheism.
I have a serious problem with Gutting's response to the Russell-Dawkins tag team. Gutting concedes far too much in his reply, namely, that it even makes sense to compare the claim that there is an orbiting teapot with the claim that God exists. Instead of attacking this comparison as wrongheaded from the outset, Gutting in effect concedes its aptness when he points out that, just as there could be (inconclusive) scientific evidence of a celestial teaspot, there could be (inconclusive) experiential and argumentative evidence for the existence of God. So let me try to explain why I think that the two existence claims ('God exists' and 'A celestial teapot exists') are radically different .
Continue reading “Gutting, Dawkins, and Russell’s Celestial Teapot”
Of Dhimmitude and Derriere
Western licentiousness meets the panty jihad. Quotable:
This is a traditional tactic of the Islamic march to domination. One fight at a time, one street at a time, one billboard at a time, one school at a time, one book at a time, one TV news report at a time. Islam must always be acknowledged to be above Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and other ancient religions.
The eventual state whereby Christians and Jews acknowledge Islam’s authority and superiority is called the dhimmitude. Dhimmis will be invited to convert to Islam, but if they do not, they will be allowed to continue to practice their own religions, although with restrictions, and they must profess submission to Islamic laws.
Shamefully, Sloggi is marching down that road.
Peter van Inwagen, Artifacts, and Moorean Rebuttals
Two commenters in an earlier van Inwagen thread, the illustrious William the Nominalist and the noble Philoponus of Terravita, have raised Moore-style objections to an implication of PvI's claim that "every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple" (MB 98), namely, the implication that "there are no tables or chairs or any other visible objects except living organisms." (MB 1) The claim that there are no inanimate objects, no tables, chairs, ships and stars will strike many as so patently absurd as to be not worth discussing. Arguments to such a conclusion, no matter how clever, will be dismissed as unsound without evaluation on the simple ground that the conclusion to which they lead is preposterous. This is the essence of a Moorean objection. If someone says that time is unreal, you say, 'I ate breakfast an hour ago.' If someone denies the external world, you hold up your hands. If someone denies that there are chairs, you point out that he is sitting on one. And then you clinch your little speech by adding, 'The points I have just made are more worthy of credence than any premises you can marshall in support of their negations.'
I myself have never been impressed with Moorean rebuttals. To my mind they signal on the part of those who make them a failure to understand the nature of philosophical (in particular, metaphysical) claims. See, e.g., Can One See that One is not a Brain in a Vat?
Though I disagree with van Inwagen's denial of artifacts, I think he can be quite easily defended against the charge of maintaining something 'mad' or something refutable by a facile Moorean rejoinder.
Chapter 10 of Material Beings deals with the Moorean objection. Van Inwagen does not deny that we utter such true sentences as 'There is a wall that separates my property from my neighbor's.' But whereas most of us would infer from this that walls exist, and thus that composite non-living things exist, van Inwagen refuses to draw this inference maintaining instead that the truth of 'There is a wall that separates my property from my neighbor's' is consistent with there being no walls.
This is not as crazy as it sounds. For suppose that what the vulgar call a wall is (speaking with the learned) just some stacked stones, some stones arranged wall-wise. And to simplify the discussion, suppose the stones are simples. Then the denial that there is a wall is a denial that there is one single thing that the stones compose. But this is consistent with the existence of the stones. Accordingly, the sentence 'There is a wall that separates my property from my neighbor's' is true in virtue of the existence of the stones despite the fact that there is no wall as a whole composed of these stony parts.
Or consider the house built by the Wise Pig years ago out of 10, 000 blocks (which for present purposes we may consider to be honorary simples.) (The tail tale of the Wise Pig is recounted on p. 130 of Material Beings.) At the completion of construction, did something new come into existence? I would say 'yes.' Van Inwagen would say 'no.' All that has happened on PvI's account is that some blocks have been arranged house-wise. His denial then, is that there is a y such that the xs compose y. He is not denying the xs (the blocks construed as simples); he is denying that there is a whole that they compose. And because there is no whole that they compose, the house does not exist.
Furthermore, because the house does not exist, there can be no question whether the house built by the Wise Pig years ago, and kept in good repair by him and his descendants by replacement of defective blocks, is the same as or is not the same as the one that his descendants live in today. The standard puzzles about diachronic artifact identity lapse if there are no artifacts.
Does this fly in the face of Moorean common sense? If madman Mel were to say that there are no houses he would not mean what the metaphysican means when he says that there are no houses. If Mel is right, then it cannot be true that I have been living in the same house for the last ten years. But the truth of 'I have been living in the same house for the last ten years' is consistent with, or at least not obviously inconsistent with, PvI's denial of houses (which is of course not a special denial, but a consequence of his denial of artifacts in general). This is because PvI is not denying the existence of the simples which we mistakenly construe as parts of a nonexistent whole.
But then how are we to understand a sentence like, 'The very same house that stands here now has stood here for three hundred years'? Van Inwagen proposes the following paraphrase:
There are bricks (or, more generally, objects) arranged housewise here now, and these bricks are the current objects of a history of maintenance that began three hundred years ago; and at no time in that period were the then-current objects of that history arranged housewise anywhere but here. (133)
I am not endorsing PvI's denial of artifacts, I am merely pointing out that it cannot be dismissed Moore-style.
Hodges Weighs in on ‘Suicide Bomber’
Dear Bill,
Interesting discussion on 'suicide' bombers. I prefer the expression "suicide bomber" to "homicide bomber." I think that the term "bomber" implies that the individual is aiming not solely at suicide but at other killing or destruction, too. I also like the fact that Islamists object to the term "suicide" since suicide is forbidden in Islam, so the insult is useful.
Yours,
See Dr. Hodges' Islamism: Radicalism at the Core of Islam? Follow the links and use the search function to locate other of Hodges' Islam(ism) posts. And now I note that he just posted on Christopher Hitchens' take on the Ground Zero mosque. By the way, those who complain about this moniker, objecting that the provocation in question will not be located precisely at Ground Zero, need to be reminded that (i) there is no way that it could be located precisely there, and that (ii) debris from one of the trade towers hit the building whose demolition is to make way for the GZM.
More on ‘Suicide Bomber’/’Homicide Bomber’
I have been receiving e-mail about my earlier post on this topic. Here is one letter:
I fear you may have been a little harsh on Bill Keller in your recent post about the virtues of calling suicide bombers 'homicide bombers'. Whilst I accept the conceptual and definitional analysis of the terms, surely the simple point is that ANY bomber who kills other humans is a homicide bomber, but it is only the suicide bomber who kills himself/herself and other humans. The term 'suicide bomber', in my opinion, is perfectly apt as it emphasises that this individual was prepared to kill himself/herself in the pursuit of killing others (rather than planting a bomb and detonating it remotely, for example). It may not be conceptually neat, but it's a worthy distinction to make, and one that is obscured by the term 'homicide bomber'.
Since the point I have just made is so simple and luminous, it is reasonable to conjecture that you were blinded to its alethic luminosity by your right-wing bias, a bias that is reinforced on a quotidian basis by the crowd you run with.
I really enjoy reading the blog.
Very clever. I see your point, but let's think about it a bit more. There are three cases: (1) the bomber who kills himself while killing others; (2) the bomber who kills himself without killing others; (3) the bomber who kills others without killing himself. In all three cases the bomber is a homicide bomber. In the first two cases, the bomber is a suicide bomber. Because 'suicide bomber' applies in both the first and the second cases, the term 'suicide bomber' does not distinguish between them. To that extent 'suicide bomber' is not sufficiently precise.
You write, ". . . it is only the suicide bomber who kills himself/herself and other humans." Not so: you are ignoring case (2). Case (2) splits into two subcases: (2a) the bomber intends to blow only himself up and succeeds; (2b) the bomber intends to blow himself and others up, but succeeds only in blowing himself up.
Consider an example. A Palestinian Arab walks into a Tel Aviv pizza parlor and detonates his explosive belt killing himself and 100 Israelis. It would be misleading to say that this man has committed suicide even though he assuredly has, given that suicide is the intentional taking of one's own life. It is misleading because he hasn't merely killed himself, he has killed himself in order to commit mass murder.
As a conservative, I detect left-wing bias in the use of 'suicide bomber' in a case like this. It is biased because it plays down the element of mass murder of others. It puts the emphasis on the poor terrorist — a product of oppressive circumstances we will be told — instead of where it belongs, on the slaughter of civilians. So from my conservative point of view, 'homicide bomber' seems more apt. This is reinforced by the linguistic fact that when one hears 'suicide' one does not usually think of homicide even though suicide is a form of homicide. The word 'homicide' in ordinary English carries the connotation of the killing of others. If a man commits suicide we typically do not say that he committed homicide, and if a man commits homicide we do not normally think of the case in which he commits homicide by committing suicide.
I will concede to you, though, that since 'homicide bomber' covers all three cases, it fails to convey the notion that the terrorist killed himself in order to kill others. So we may have a stand-off here: neither of us can compellingly show that the other's usage is incorrect or to avoided.
Thank You Zoe Pollock of The Daily Dish
When I logged on yesterday, I was surprised to see that my readership was way up: by the end of the day I had logged 2,698 page views for the day. That's about double what I was getting the few days preceding. Here is the link from Zoe Pollock.
Hell, if I knew she was going to link to that meditation on death and Hitchens, I would have polished it. Almost everything I post on this site is first-draftish. That is the nature of the 'sport' of blogging. The idea is to see if you can bang out something interesting, substantive, penetrating, muscular yet elegant, without spending the whole day doing it.
I have been blogging for over six years now on a daily basis. Something tells me I'm in it for the duration. It has added very considerably to the quality of my life, especially because of the likeminded friends I have made. You guys know who you are. The social networking that the Internet makes possible solves a very nasty problem of human relations: How can one find people one can relate to?