Maverick Philosopher – Page 372 – Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Cats

Loving Spoonful, Nashville Cats, 1966. They's playin' since they's babies.

Harry Chapin, Cat's in the Cradle. For you fathers out there. Bond with your son when he's five. Wait till he's 50 and he won't give you the time of day.

Tokens, The Lion Sleeps Tonight, 1961

Bent Fabric, Alley Cat, 1962. Bent fabric can be said to have a kink in it. Therefore,

Kinks, Phenomenal Cat

Tom Jones, What's New Pussycat? 1965. This reminds me to get my wife a pussyhat for her birthday to wear while I watch O'Reilly and the boys.

Norma Tanega, Walkin' My Cat Named 'Dog.' The queen of the one-hit wonders?

Mongo Santamaria, El Pussycat. If you remember this one, I'll buy you a pussyhat and a watermelon. While we have Mongo Santamaria cued up, here is his rather better-known Watermelon Man, muchachos.

Buck Owens, Tiger by the Tail. This one goes out to Kathy P.

Stray Cats, Stray Cat Strut

Ted Nugent, Cat Scratch Fever

Sue Thompson, Paper Tiger, 1965. This one's for Barack "Red Line" Obama.

Elton John, Honky Cat, 1972

Robert Petway, Catfish Blues, 1941. An influential song in the history of the blues.

Note to Correspondents

Please don't take it amiss if I fail to respond to your missives or do so in a cursory manner. I must be selective. Philosophia longa, vita brevis. The clock is running, and I have a lot to finish before the flag falls.

Diversity Can Be Our Weakness

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada responding to the fatal shooting at the Centre culturel islamique de Québec located in the Ste-Foy neighbourhood of the city of Québec:

Diversity is our strength, and religious tolerance is a value that we, as Canadians, hold dear.

I should think that strength derives from unity, not diversity. "United we stand; divided we fall." See Mark 3:25: "And if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand"; Matthew 12:25: "And Jesus knew their thoughts, and said unto them, Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand," and Luke 11:17: "But he, knowing their thoughts, said unto them, Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and a house divided against a house falleth."

Diversity is of course good within limits. But a diversity worth having must submit to the control and discipline of the competing value, unity. Otherwise, diversity divides and destroys.

Given that we are united in our commitment to religious liberty, we can tolerate a diversity of religious and anti-religious views. Unfortunately, Islam is not known for its toleration of competing faiths and non-faiths. In its core doctrine Islam is radically totalitarian and suppressive of dissent. So radical Islam cannot be tolerated since it opposes toleration and religious liberty.

A diversity so diverse that it tolerates the enemies of toleration and diversity is destructive.

Much of the yammering about diversity by liberals is nothing but empty virtue-signalling. Liberals need to show appreciation for the competing value of unity. Until they do so we should denounce them as destructive fools.

I of course condemn the attack on the Québec mosque.

The Dilemma of Sebastian Rodrigues in Endo’s Silence: Ethical or Merely Psychological?

This entry assumes familiarity with the story recounted by Shusaku Endo in his novel, Silence. Philip L. Quinn's "Tragic Dilemmas, Suffering Love, and Christian Life" (The Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 17, no. 1, Spring 1989, 151-183) is the best discussion of the central themes of the novel I have read. I thank Vlastimil Vohanka for bringing Quinn's article to my attention.

Quinn argues powerfully and plausibly that Rodrigues is "trapped in an ethical dilemma." (171) I will suggest, however, that while the dilemma is genuine, it cannot be ethical. Let us first hear what Quinn has to say:

When Rodrigues tramples on the fumie [image of Christ] what he does, I think, is both to violate a demand of his religious vocation binding on him no matter what the consequences and to satisfy an equally pressing demand for an expression of love of neighbor. The case resists subsumption under one but not the other of these descriptions. Both demands are characteristic of distinctively Christian ethic. They spring from a single source: the commandment that we both love God with total devotion and love our neighbor as ourselves. The misfortune is that Rodrigues cannot, given that he is the kind of person his life has made him, satisfy one of these demands without violating the other. He is, I suggest, trapped in an ethical dilemma. (170-171)

Quinn then proceeds to explain what an ethical dilemma is:

There is an ethical dilemma when a person is subject to two ethical demands such that he cannot satisfy both and neither demand is overridden or nullified. [. . .] Demands that are neither overridden nor nullified are in force. When one confronts two conflicting ethical demands both of which are in force, one is caught in an ethical dilemma. It seems to be that this is the situation of Sebastian Rodrigues.

I will now attempt to set forth the problem as clearly as I can.

A. The two great commandments that contain the whole law of God are:

Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind, and with thy whole strength;
Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

And one of them, a doctor of the Law, putting him to the test, asked him, "Master, which is the great commandment in the Law?" Jesus said to him, "'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind.' This is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like it, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.' On these two commandments depend the whole Law and the Prophets." (Matthew 22:35-40)

B. Both demands are morally obligatory because they are divinely commanded.

C. Both are equally obligatory: neither takes precedence over the other.

D. Neither demand can be overridden and neither can be nullified.

E. An exterior act of apostasy such as trampling on the fumie even without a corresponding interior act of apostasy counts as a violation of the first commandment.

F. Failing to engage in a simple exterior act such as trampling on the fumie that will save many from prolonged torture and death is a violation of the second commandment. Therefore:

G. Rodrigues faces a dilemma: he must satisfy both demands, but he cannot satisfy both demands.

But is this dilemma an ethical dilemma? Arguably not.

H. Ought implies Can: If one ought to do x, i.e., if one is morally obliged to do x, then it must be possible that one do x. Contrapositively, if it is not possible that one do x, then one is not morally obliged to do x.

I. It is not possible that Rodrigues satisfy both demands in the terrible situation in which he finds himself. Therefore:

J. Rodrigues is not morally obliged to satisfy both demands in the situation in which he finds himself. This is not to say that, in general, a Christian is not morally obliged to satisfy both demands; it is is to say that a person in the situation in which Rodrigues find himself is under no moral obligation to satisfy both.

At best he is in an awful psychological bind. The dilemma is psychological, not ethical. Quinn may be committing a non sequitur when we writes (emphasis added),

The misfortune is that Rodrigues cannot, given that he is the kind of person his life has made him, satisfy one of these demands without violating the other. He is, I suggest, trapped in an ethical dilemma.

From the fact that R. is deeply psychologically conflicted due to the circumstances he is in and the kind of person his life has made him, it does not follow that he is in an ethical dilemma. He cannot be morally obliged to do what it is impossible for him to do. So:

K. Rodriguez is not "trapped in an ethical dilemma."

L. We should also note that if Rodrigues does face an ethical dilemma, then this would seem to show that there is something deeply incoherent about Christian ethics. This would not follow if the dilemma is merely psychological.

M. So what should Rodrigues do? Exactly what he is depicted as doing in the novel. I can think of two reasons that justify trampling upon the fumie and saving the prisoners from torture.

The first is that his apostasy is merely external, not in his heart, and therefore arguably not apostasy at all in the precise circumstances in which he finds himself. So (E) above, even if true in general cannot be true for R. in the circumstances.

The second is that, given the silence of God, it is much better known (or far more reasonably believed) that the prisoners should be spared from unspeakable torture by a mere foot movement than that God exists and that Rodrigues' exterior act of apostasy would be an offence God as opposed to a mere betrayal by Rodrigues of who he is and has become by his life choices.

Proof that I am a Native American

A while back a front page story in the local rag of record, The Arizona Republic, implied that one is either a native American, a black, or an Anglo. Now with my kind of surname, I am certainly no Anglo. And even though I am a 'person of color,' my color inclining toward a sort of tanned ruddiness, I am undoubtedly not black either.

It follows that I am a native American. This conclusion is independently supported by the following argument:

1. I am a native Californian.
2. California is in America.
3. If x is native to locality L, and L is within the boundaries of M, then x is a native M-er.
Therefore
I am a native American.

This argument is impeccable in point of logical form, and sports manifestly true premises. What more do you want?

Note that (2) is true whether 'America' is taken to refer to the USA or to the continent of North America.

Let us also observe that since I am a native American, it cannot be the case that "we are all immigrants" as far too many liberal knuckleheads like to claim.

We need more mockery of liberals. There is little point in attempts to engage them on the plane of reason, for that is not the plane they inhabit.

Two Good Articles on Predication Theory

Ignacio Angelelli, Predication Theory: Classical versus Modern

Gyula Klima, The Essentialist Nominalism of John Buridan

The SCOTUS Argument for Trump Vindicated

Had he lost the election, Trump would be remembered mainly for his ugly words. But having won, he is redeemed by his already long string of ameliorative actions, the latest and best of which has been his nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court. Gorsuch is the recipient of high praise from many quarters, including the precincts of NeverTrumpers like Robert P. George.

One has to wonder what these NeverTrumpers were thinking and drinking when they fancied that the Republic could survive 4-8 years of Hillary and her destructive SCOTUS appointments, then to be miraculously saved — by whom? Mitt Romney? Jeb! Bush? But perhaps it is now time to show charity and cease rubbing the noses of the NeverTrumpers in their bad judgment.

I doubt whether any of these prominent NeverTrumpers will publicly confess their errors, but from the columns they are now writing one can see that many of them are coming around.

"Power is the ultimate aphrodisiac." (Henry Kissinger)

A Religious Test for Immigration Unconstitutional? Schumer’s Lie

Many Democrats use 'unconstitutional' rather broadly to refer to anything they don't like. Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) apparently favors this broad (mis)use of the term. He claimed — wait for it — that President Donald Trump's temporary ban on Muslim immigration from seven Muslim countries is "unconstitutional" because it applies a religious test.

But of course it isn't. In Article VI, paragraph three of the United States Constitution we read that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." This has nothing to do with immigrants; it pertains to citizens who seek public office. (It is also worth noting that the clause says nothing about the states; it pertains to seekers of Federal offices. See here.)

So it is clear that Schumer made a false statement. Did he lie? Did he knowingly make a false statement? It is a good bet that he did given his leftist agenda. And he thought he could fool us, too.

It is plain, then, that there is nothing unconstitutional about applying a religious test to immigrants. It might nevertheless be argued that a religious test is being applied, unconstitutional or not, and that there is something dubious about this. "It is not who we are," some bien-pensant liberal will gush. But is the test religious?

Bear in mind that Islam is a hybrid worldview: it is as much a political ideology as a religion. The reason Muslims are singled out and subjected to a test for immigration-worthiness and found wanting is not because of their specifically religious views but because of their political views. As ought to be clear by now, Islamic law or Sharia is incompatible with the values of the United States. The state needn't care about anyone's views about abstruse theological questions such as the Trinity, the divinity or non-divinity of Christ, the exact mechanism of divine revelation, etc. But every state has a right to defend itself against subversive elements.

"Is every Muslim a subversive element?" Don't be stupid.

Stupor Bowl Prediction

V. Putin will hack the scoreboard the way he hacked the voting machines in November, tilting the tabulation of the vote in favor of fellow fascist, Donald J. Trump. (Adapted from a Dennis Miller riff.)

Bridges or Walls?

We already have a 'bridge.' Its name is 'legal immigration.' Now we need a wall. Its name is 'rule of law.'

Know-Nothing Catholics on Muslim Immigration

William Kilpatrick:

It can be expected that Catholic bishops will respond with dismay to President Trump’s order banning immigration from seven Muslim nations. When Trump first proposed banning Muslims from entering the U.S., Archbishop Joseph Kurtz, the president of the USCCB issued a statement repudiating “the hatred and suspicion that leads to policies of discrimination.” At about the same time, Archbishop William Lori of Baltimore said Catholics could “not possibly countenance” restricting entry to the U.S. solely on the basis of religious affiliation. It can also be expected that bishops will employ an argument they have long used against opponents of Muslim immigration—namely, that Catholic immigrants were once treated with similar suspicion.

The willful stupidity of Catholic bishops never ceases to amaze me on this issue and on others. Many of them give the impression of being leftists first, and Catholics second, if at all.

But it is worse than willful stupidity: it is a vile slandering of decent people who maintain a sound view backed with arguments.

It must be remembered that Islam is a hybrid ideology: both a religion and a political system. Sharia, or Islamic law, is essential to it. Coming from God, it cannot be questioned by man: man must submit to it. The primary meaning of 'Islam' is submission. God's law must be imposed on all and woven into the fabric of everyday life. It is theocratic right out of the box. There is no provision in Islam for mosque-state separation. But that is to put it in the form of an understatement. Islam positively rules out mosque-state separation.

John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (Yale UP, 1989, pp. 48-49):

From the point of view of the understanding of this state of islam [submission to Allah] the Muslim sees no distinction between the religious and the secular. The whole of life is to be lived in the presence of Allah and is the sphere of God's absolute claim and limitless compassion and mercy. And so islam, God-centredness, is not only an inner submission to the sole Lord of the universe but also a pattern of corporate life in accordance with God's will. It involves both salat, worship, and falah, the good embodied in behaviour. Through the five appointed moments of prayer each day is linked to God. Indeed almost any activity may be begun with Bismillah ('in the name of Allah'); and plans and hopes for the future are qualified by Inshallah ('if Allah wills'). Thus life is constantly punctuated by the remembrance of God. It is a symptom of this that almsgiving ranks with prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and confession of faith as one of the five 'pillars' of Islam. Within this holistic conception the 'secular' spheres of politics, government, law, commerce, science and the arts all come within the scope of religious obedience.

What Hick calls a "holistic conception," I would call totalitarian. Islam is totalitarian in a two-fold sense. It aims to regulate every aspect and every moment of the individual believer's life. (And if you are not a believer, you must either convert or accept dhimmitude.) But it is also totalitarian in a corporate sense in that it aims to control every aspect of society in all its spheres, just as Hick points out supra.

Islam, therefore, is profoundly at odds with the values of the West. For we in the West, whether (old-time) liberals or contemporary conservatives, accept church(mosque)-state separation. We no doubt argue heatedly over what exactly it entails, but we are agreed on the main principle. I regularly criticize the shysters of the ACLU for their extremist positions on this question; but I agree with them that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . ." This implies that the government shall not impose any religion upon the people as the state religion.

This raises a very serious question. Is Islam – pure, unEnlightened, un-watered-down, fundamentalist, theocratic Islam — deserving of First Amendment protection? We read in the First Amendment that Congress shall not prohibit the free exercise of religion. Should that be understood to mean that the Federal government shall not prohibit the establishment and free exercise of a totalitarian, fundamentalist theocratic religion in a particular state, say Michigan?

The USA is a Christian nation with a secular government. Suppose there was a religion whose aim was to subvert our secular government. Does commitment to freedom of religion enjoin toleration of such a religion?

Obviously not! Sharia is essential to true Islam. But Sharia is subversive of our system of government. So we are under no obligation from the Constitution to tolerate Sharia-based Islam. The Constitution is not a suicide pact. This implies that Muslims who do not renounce Sharia should not be eligible for positions in the government.

"But this violates Article VI of the Constitution!" No it doesn't. There we read that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." But this cannot be interpreted sensibly in such a way as to allow into the government elements subversive of the system of government the Constitution defines.

Why is Islam incompatible with the West? One reason is because Islam violates the separation of the religious and secular spheres. But why should they be kept apart? One reason is that we in the West have come to realize over the centuries that no one can legitimately claim to know the answers to the Big Questions about God, the soul, the purpose of human existence, the nature of the good, and so on. Only if one were absolutely certain of the answers to these questions would one be justified in imposing them via state power on everyone and forcing everyone to live in accordance with them. If we know that the Bible is the inerrant word of God and that God has condemned sodomy, and sanctioned the killing of sodomites, then we would perhaps be justified in outlawing sodomy and punishing it by death as it is indeed punished in some ten Muslim countries.

But surely no one of us KNOWS that God exists, let alone that God has revealed himself to man, let alone in a particular book or set of books, let alone inerrantly. Not knowing these things we have a good reason to tolerate homosexual and heterosexual sodomites, subject to certain restrictions, e.g. 'between consenting adults,' etc. We have reason to allow such behavior as legally permissible even if it in fact morally impermissible. For again, even if sodomy is is in fact morally impermissible because condemned by God, no one can legitimately claim to KNOW that it is.

Thomas Aquinas Against Open Borders

Thomas D. Williams:

In a surprisingly contemporary passage of his Summa Theologica, Aquinas noted that the Jewish people of Old Testament times did not admit visitors from all nations equally, since those peoples closer to them were more quickly integrated into the population than those who were not as close.

The ‘Is’ of Identity and the ‘Is’ of Predication: Contra Sommers

Dedication: To Bill Clinton who taught us that much can ride on what the meaning of 'is' is.

………………

The Opponent has a very good post in which he raises the question whether the standard analytic distinction between the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication is but fallout from an antecedent decision to adhere to an absolute distinction between names and predicates according to which no name is a predicate and no predicate is a name. If the distinction is absolute, as Gottlob Frege and his epigoni maintain, then names cannot occur in predicate position, and a distinction between the two uses of 'is' is the consequence. But what if no such absolute distinction is made? Could one then dispense with the standard analytic distinction between the two uses of 'is'? Or are there reasons independent of Frege's function-argument analysis of propositions for upholding the distinction between the two uses?

To illustrate the putative distinction, consider

1. George Orwell is Eric Blair

and

2. George Orwell is famous.

Both sentences feature a token of 'is.' Now ask yourself: is 'is' functioning in the same way in both sentences? The standard analytic line is that 'is' functions differently in the two sentences. In (1) it expresses (numerical) identity; in (2) it expresses predication. Identity, among other features, is symmetrical; predication is not. That suffices to distinguish the two uses of 'is.' 'Famous' is predicable of Orwell, but Orwell is not predicable of 'famous.' But if Blair is Orwell, then Orwell is Blair.

Now it is clear, I think, that if one begins with the absolute name-predicate distinction, then the other distinction is also required. For if 'Eric Blair' in (1) cannot be construed as a predicate, then surely the 'is' in (1) does not express predication. The question I am raising, however, is whether the distinction between the two uses of 'is' arises ONLY IF one distinguishes absolutely and categorially between names and predicates.

Fred Sommers seems to think so. The Opponent follows him in this. Referencing the example 'The morning star is Venus,' Sommers writes, "Clearly it is only after one has adopted the syntax that prohibits the predication of proper names that one is forced to read 'a is b' dyadically and to see in it a sign of identity." (The Logic of Natural Language, Oxford 1982, p. 121, emphasis added) The contemporary reader will of course wonder how else 'a is b' could be read if it is not read as expressing a dyadic relation between a and b. How the devil could the 'is' in 'a is b' be read as a sign of predication?

The question can be put like this. Can we justify a distinction between the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication even if we do not make an absolute distinction between names (object words) and predicates (concept words)? I think we can.

Is it not obvious that if an individual has a property, then it is not identical to that property? Tom is hypertensive. But it would be absurd to say that Tom is identical to this property. This is so whether you think of properties as universals or as particulars (tropes). Suppose the property of being hypertensive (H-ness) is a universal and that Tom's brother Sal is also hypertensive. It follows that they share this property. So if Tom = H-ness, and Sal = H-ness, then, by the transitivity and symmetry of identity, Tom = Sal, which is absurd.

If properties are tropes, we also get an absurdity. On a trope bundle theory, Tom is a bundle of tropes. But surely Tom cannot be identical to one of his tropes, his H-trope. On a trope substratum theory, tropes are like Aristotelian accidents inhering in a substance. But surely no substance is identical to one of its accidents.

So whether properties are universals or tropes, we cannot sensibly think of an individual's having a property in terms of identity with that property. If H-ness is a universal, then we would speak of Tom's instantiating H-ness, where this relation is obviously asymmetrical and for this reason and others distinct from identity.

Now 'H' is a predicate whereas 'H-ness' is a name. But nothing stops us from parsing 'Tom is hypertensive' as 'Tom instantiates hypertensiveness.' This shows that we can uphold the distinction between the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication with a two-name theory of predication, and thus without making Frege's absolute distinction between names and predicates. It appears that Sommers is mistaken in his claim that "Clearly it is only after one has adopted the syntax that prohibits the predication of proper names that one is forced to read 'a is b' dyadically and to see in it a sign of identity."

I am assuming of course that we cannot eke by on predicates alone: we need properties. By my lights this should not be controversial in the least. My nominalist Opponent will demur. In 'Orwell is famous' he seems to be wanting to say that 'Orwell' and 'famous' refer to the same thing. But what could that mean?

First of all, 'Orwell' and 'famous' do not have the same extension: there are many famous people, but only one Orwell. 'Orwell is famous' is true. What makes it true? Presumably the fact that 'Orwell' and 'famous' denote one and the same individual. And which individual is that? Why, it's Orwell! But Orwell might not have been famous. Since it is contingent that Orwell is famous, but noncontingent that Orwell is Orwell, the truth-maker of 'Orwell is famous' cannot be Orwell alone. It has has to be the fact of Orwell's being famous, which fact involves the property of being famous in addition to Orwell.

Nominalists insist that we ought not multiply entities beyond necessity. They are right! But there is no multiplication beyond necessity here since we need to admit properties as features of extralinguistic reality. To explain why 'Orwell is famous' is contingent, one must distinguish Orwell from his contingently possessed properties. Man does not live or think truly by predicates alone.

Matriarchy Mitigated: Another Trumpian Accomplishment

The mitigation of creeping matriarchy requires, among other things, a 'war' against puellafication. I coined the word 'puellafication' here. An ugly word for an ugly thing. Christina Hoff Sommers combats the thing. While so doing she provides further proof that the Left is devoid of common sense:

Across the country, schools are policing and punishing the distinctive, assertive sociability of boys. Many much-loved games have vanished from school playgrounds. At some schools, tug of war has been replaced with “tug of peace.” Since the 1990s, elimination games like dodgeball, red rover and tag have been under a cloud — too damaging to self-esteem and too violent, say certain experts.

Tug of peace? Is that a joke? Peace is better than war, of course, but to secure and maintain peace one must be prepared to wage and win war. Or as the Latin saying has it, Si vis pacem, para bellum. "If you want peace, prepare for war."

Life is competitive and hierarchical. Supervised and respectful competition in the schools on the playing fields and in the classrooms is good preparation for life.

A little tuggy-wuggy never hurt anybody. Dale Tuggy would approve of this message.

And another thing. Bring back the monkey bars and the long summer vacations. Enough with the wussification. (Not a word? It is now.)

Scott Adams’ Starting Point

Here:

For new readers of this blog, my starting point is the understanding that human brains did not evolve to show us reality. We aren’t that smart. Instead, our brains create little movies in our heads, and yours can be completely different from mine. We see that situation now. Half the country thinks President Trump is well on his way to becoming a Hitler-like dictator. But many other Americans think Trump is an effective business person with good intentions. They can’t both be right.

"They can't both be right." True, but how could Adams possibly know this if the human brain does not "show us reality"? According to the "little movie" in Adams' head, Trump cannot be both Hitlerian and non-Hitlerian. But there is this other guy, Shmadams, in whose head a "completely different little movie" plays according to which Trump can be both Hitlerian and non-Hitlerian.

So I tax Adams with the following dilemma. If he is justified in his claim that "They can't both be right," then our brains sometimes "show us reality" and Adams' theory refutes itself. If, on the other hand, Adams' theory is true, then he is not justified in his assertion that "They can't both be right." Nor is he justified in believing that his theory is true.

But I hasten to add that Adams' silly speculation about the brain and reality in no way detracts from his insights into Trump's modus operandi.

He understands that Trump is a negotiator who opens the bidding with an extreme offer so as to be in a position to dial it back to something reasonable. In this way he manages to mollify, to some extent at least, the extremists on his Right and those on his Left.

Every reasonable person must grant that there must be some restrictions placed on whom to allow to immigrate. Trump will alienate Muslims and leftists but he will also insure that what has already happened in Europe won't happen here.

You lefties need to cool your jets, to use an old '70s expression, and give the man a chance. The stroke you prevent may be your own. The more extreme and thuggish your protests, the more asinine your Hitler comparisons, the more you will discredit yourselves in the eyes of the sane.