Maverick Philosopher – Page 371 – Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Against Ostrich Nominalism

As magnificent a subject as philosophy is, grappling as it does with the ultimate concerns of human existence, and thus surpassing in nobility any other human pursuit, it is also miserable in that nothing goes uncontested, and nothing ever gets established to the satisfaction of all competent practitioners. (This is true of other disciplines as well, but in philosophy it is true in excelsis.) Suppose I say, as I have in various places:

That things have properties and stand in relations I take to be a plain Moorean fact beyond the reach of reasonable controversy. After all, my cat is black and he is sleeping next to my blue coffee cup. ‘Black’ picks out a property, an extralinguistic feature of my cat.

Is that obvious? Not to some. Not to the ornery and recalcitrant critter known as the ostrich nominalist. My cat, Max Black, is black. That, surely, is a Moorean fact. Now consider the following biconditional and consider whether it too is a Moorean fact:

1. Max is black iff Max has the property of being black.

As I see it, there are three main ways of construing a biconditional such as (1):

A. Ostrich Nominalism. The right-hand side (RHS) says exactly what the left-hand side (LHS) says, but in a verbose and high-falutin' and dispensable way. Thus the use of 'property' on the RHS does not commit one ontologically to properties beyond predicates. (By definition, predicates are linguistic items while properties are extralinguistic and extramental.) Predication is primitive and in need of no philosophical explanation. On this approach, (1) is trivially true. One needn't posit properties, and in consequence one needn't worry about the nature of property-possession. (Is Max related to his blackness, or does Max have his blackness quasi-mereologically by having it as an ontological constituent of him?)

B. Ostrich Realism. The RHS commits one ontologically to properties, but in no sense does the RHS serve to ground or explain the LHS. On this approach, (1) is false if there are no properties. For the ostrich realist, (1) is true, indeed necessarily true, but it is not the case that the LHS is true because the RHS is true. Such notions as metaphysical grounding and philosophical explanation are foreign to the ostrich realist, but not in virtue of his being a realist, but in virtue of his being an ostrich.

C. Non-Ostrich Realism. On this approach, the RHS both commits one to properties, but also proffers a metaphysical ground of the truth of the LHS: the LHS is true because (ontologically or metaphysically speaking) the concrete particular Max has the property of being black, and not vice versa.

Note 1: Explanation is asymmetrical; biconditionality is symmetrical.

Note 2: Properties needn't be universals. They might be (abstract) particulars (unrepeatables) such as the tropes of D. C. Williams and Keith Campbell. Properties must, however, be extralinguistic and extramental, by definition.

Note 3: Property-possession needn't be understood in terms of instantiation or exemplification or Fregean 'falling-under'; it might be construed quasi-mereologically as constituency: a thing has a property by having it as a proper ontological part.

Against Ostrich Nominalism

On (A) there are neither properties, nor do properties enter into any explanation of predication. Predication is primitive and in need of no explanation. In virtue of what does 'black' correctly apply to Max? In virtue of nothing. It just applies to him and does so correctly. Max is black, but there is no feature of reality that explains why 'black' is true of Max, or why 'Max is black' is true. It is just true! There is nothing in reality that serves as the ontological ground of this contingent truth. Nothing 'makes' it true. There are no truth-makers and no need for any.

I find ostrich nominalism preposterous. 'Black' is true of Max, 'white' is not, but there is no feature of reality, nothing in or at or about Max that explains why the one predicate is true of him and the other is not!? This is not really an argument but more an expression of incomprehension or incredulity, an autobiographical comment, if you will. I may just be petering out, pace Professor van Inwagen.

Can I do better than peter? 'Black' is a predicate of English. Schwarz is a predicate of German. If there are no properties, then Max is black relative to English, schwarz relative to German, noir relative to French, and no one color. But this is absurd. Max is not three different colors, but one color, the color we use 'black' to pick out, and the Germans use schwarz to pick out. When Karl, Pierre, and I look at Max we see the same color. So there is one color we both see — which would not be the case if there were no properties beyond predicates. It is not as if I see the color black while Karl sees the color schwarz. We see the same color. And we see it at the cat. This is not a visio intellectualis whereby we peer into some Platonic topos ouranos. Therefore, there is something in, at, or about the cat, something extralinguistic, that grounds the correctness of the application of the predicate to the cat.

A related argument. I say, 'Max is black.' Karl says, Max ist schwarz. 'Is' and ist are token-distinct and type-distinct words of different languages. If there is nothing in reality (no relation whether of instantiation or of constituency, non-relational tie, Bergmannian nexus, etc.) that the copula picks out, then it is only relative to German that Max ist schwarz, and only relative to English that Max is black. But this is absurd. There are not two different facts here but one. Max is the same color for Karl and me, and his being black is the same fact for Karl and me.

Finally, 'Max is black' is true. Is it true ex vi terminorum? Of course not. It is contingently true. Is it just contingently true? Of course not. It is true because of the way extralinguistic reality is arranged. It is modally contingent, but also contingent upon the way the world is. There's this cat that exists whether or not any language exists, and it is black whether or not any language exists.

Therefore, I say that for a predicate to be contingently true of an individual, (i) there must be individuals independently of language; (ii) there must be properties independently of language; and there must be facts or truth-making states of affairs independently of language. Otherwise, you end up with (i) total linguistic idealism, which is absurd; or (ii) linguistic idealism about properties which is absurd; or (iii) a chaos, a world of disconnected particulars and properties.

The above is a shoot-from-the hip, bloggity-blog exposition of ideas that can be put more rigorously, but it seems to to me to show that ostrich nominalism and ostrich realism for that matter are untenable — and this despite the fact that a positive theory invoking facts has its own very serious problems.

Metaphilosophical Coda: If a theory has insurmountable problems, these problems are not removed by the fact that every other theory has problems. For it might be that no theory is tenable,while the problem itself is genuine.

‘Liberal’ Name-Calling

One wonders how there can be peace with 'liberals.' Whence their slanderous scumbaggery?

Liberal Immigration Hyper-Hypocrisy

Trump Labor Secretary nominee Anthony Puzder is under fire for having employed an illegal immigrant as a housekeeper. But why should liberals care given that they do not distinguish legal from illegal immigrants while standing for open borders and sanctuary jurisdictions in defiance of the rule of law? Suddenly, these destructive leftists care about immigration law? Liberals should praise Puzder for giving the poor woman a job. After all, as they say, no human being is illegal!

What the Left is doing here is employing a Saul Alinsky tactic. The fourth of his Rules for Radicals reads:

Make the enemy live up to its own book of rules.

Leftists judge us by rules for which they have nothing but contempt.

The ordinary hypocrite will not practice what he preaches, but at least he preaches, thereby paying lip service to ideals of conduct that he puts forth as binding on all. The Alinksyite leftist is a hyper-hypocrite who preaches ideals of conduct, not to all, but to his enemies, ideals that he has no intention of honoring.

Of course, I am not saying that Puzder did not do wrong in hiring the illegal immigrant. He did, assuming he knew she was illegal.

Predication as Identity: Another Round

The Opponent is a patient man:

Trying again.

(1) Sam is poor at t1 iff Sam is identical with some poor person at t1
(2) Sam is poor at t1 iff Sam is self-identical at t1

(1) is self-evidently true. For it cannot be true that Sam is poor, but not identical with some poor person. Nor can it be false that Sam is poor, but true that he is identical with some poor person.

But (2) is false. Sam is necessarily self-identical, but not necessarily poor. Therefore (2) does not follow from (1), for a false statement cannot follow from a true one.

The fallacy is in assuming that being identical with some poor person is the same fact as being identical with oneself.

I plead innocent of the charge of having committed a logical mistake. I accept (1) but I reject (2) and for the very reason the Opponent supplies: "Sam is necessarily self-identical, but not necessarily poor." In fact, this is the very point I use against him. I claim that his theory cannot accommodate it.

The Issue

The issue is whether predication can be assimilated to identity. 'Sam is poor' is an example of a sentence which, on the face of it, features a predicative use of 'is' as opposed to an identitarian use. Connected with this is the fact that 'poor' is a predicate adjective, not a noun proper or common. So surface indications are that predication cannot be assimilated to identity, or vice versa, and that the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication are distinct and mutually irreducible.

When we say that Sam is poor we cannot possibly mean that Sam is identical to the property of being poor. Why not? First, if Sam is identical to a property, then he is a property — which is precisely what he isn't. Second, if Sam is poor and his father Dave is poor, and to be poor is to be identical to the property of being poor, then, by the Transitivity of Identity, Sam is identical to Dave, which is absurd.

On the other hand, 'Sam is poor' is equivalent to 'Sam is a poor man.' What we have done is replace the adjective with a (common) name. This lends sanction to the notion that our original sentence can be construed to express an identity between the denotatum of 'Sam' and exactly one of the denotata of 'poor man.' We can give this poor guy a (proper) name: 'Poboy.'

I now ask: what is the truth-maker of 'Sam is a poor man' given that the 'is' expresses numerical identity? What in the world makes-true 'Sam is a poor man'? (If the Opponent declares that there is no need for a truth-maker for this obviously contingent true sentence, then Game Over, and we have nothing more to discuss.) The answer has to be, on the theory under discussion: the numerical identity of Sam with Poboy. Since Sam and Poboy are one and the same, this amounts to saying that the truth-maker of 'Sam is a poor man' is Sam's being Sam.

The Problem

The difficult with this identity theory of predication ought to be obvious. It succumbs to two related objections as I said earlier:

Objection 1. Sam might not have been poor. But it is not the case that Sam might not have been Sam. So the manifestly contingent truth of 'Sam is poor' cannot be explained in terms of identity.

Objection 2. That was a modal objection; now for a temporal one. The poor have been known to become rich. Suppose Sam goes from poor to rich. The identity theory implies that Sam, who was identical to Poboy, ceases to be identical to Poboy and becomes identical to Richboy. But surely this is absurd inasmuch as it is equivalent to saying that Sam, who was numerically the same as himself, is now no longer numerically the same as himself.

This is absurd because, if Sam changes in respect of wealth, going from poor to rich, there has to be a self-same substrate of this change. Sam must remain numerically the same through the change. After all, the change is accidental, not substantial. The identity theory of predication, however, cannot accommodate these truisms. For if Sam is poor in virtue of being identical to one of the poor individuals, then he cannot become rich without ceasing to be himself.

An Alternative Which Avoids These Objections

Suppose we construe 'Sam is poor' to express the instantiation by Sam of the property of being poor. Then the objections can't get started. The Opponent, however, cannot avail himself of this way out since he is a nominalist, one who rejects properties. He may appreciate that man does not live by bread, or bed, alone, but he does not appreciate that the philosopher does not live by predicates alone — even if he turns them into names.

But I am not endorsing the alternative since it too has difficulties. Here is one. Sam's going from poor to rich or hot to cold or whatever is an intrinsic accidental change, a real change in Sam. It is not a relational change. But if Sam merely instantiates the property of being poor, and this property is a universal, and indeed a universal that is not a constituent of Sam, then it would seem that what is plainly an intrinsic change has been misconstrued as a relational change.

Scholarly Blog Index Summary of my ‘Post-Truth’ Entry

Here.

The entry in full is here.

UPDATE:

I just re-read the full entry. It's good! Might I be biased? Is such a thing so much as possible? The summary appears machine-generated. Not so good.

John Peterson’s Thomist Analysis of Change

1. The Riddle of Change. Change is ubiquitous. It is perhaps the most pervasive feature of our experience and of the objects of our experience. But is it intelligible? Change could be a fact without being intelligible. But the mind seeks intelligibility; hence it seeks to render change intelligible to it.

There is something puzzling about change inasmuch as it seems to imply a contradiction. When a thing changes, it becomes different than what it was. But unless it also remains the same, we cannot speak, as we do, of one thing changing. But how can this one thing be both the same and different? We ought not assume that there is an insoluble problem here. But we also ought not assume that a simple solution is at hand, or that some simple fallacy has been committed. We must investigate. We do well to begin with some mundane, Moorean fact.

This is because alteration (accidental change) is neither destruction nor duplication. The ripening of an avocado does not cause it to cease to exist. And it is clear that one cannot speak of change if there are two avocados, A and B, indiscernible except in respect of ripeness/unripeness, such that A is unripe at time t while B is ripe at time t* (t*> t). Alteration requires that one and the same thing have incompatible properties at different times. This is necessary for alteration; whether it is sufficient is a further question.

Thus there is an apparent contradiction: the ripe avocado is both the same and not the same as the unripe avocado. If you think this puzzle is easily solved, then you haven't understood it. You cannot understand philosophy unless you understand the problems to which its theories and theses are the responses. Philosophy may be more than aporetics, but it is at least aporetics. If you lack the 'aporetic sense' then you lack the "feeling of the philosopher" Plato describes at Theaetetus 155.

2. Reality is contradiction-free. There are no contradictions in reality, but only in our thoughts about reality. That there are no contradictions in reality is not perfectly obvious, but it is very reasonably assumed to be true, and we have to start somewhere. Now if it is true, and if, as is obvious, changes occur, then the apparent contradiction has to be removed. If the apparent contradiction cannot be removed, that is, shown to be merely apparent, then change, which obviously exists in some sense, will have to be demoted to the status of a Bradleyan appearance. (See F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, Book I, Chapter 5.)

The task, then, is to remove the apparent contradiction.

3. Avocado A, having altered, is both the same and different. How is that possible? One solution involves a distinction between numerical and qualitative sameness. A is numerically the same over the interval during which it goes from unripe to ripe, but not qualitatively the same over that interval. The sense in which A is the same is not the same as the sense in which A is not the same: A is numerically the same over the interval but not qualitatively the same over the interval. I will say no more about this solution in this post.

4. Instead of distinguishing two senses of 'same,' one can distinguish two senses of 'individual.' On an Aristotelian-Thomistic analysis, as presented by John Peterson ("Persons and the Problem of Interaction," The Modern Schoolman LXIII, January 1985, 131-137), the individual₁ is the primary substance, the avocado in our example. This primary substance is the individual substance, the individual this-such, together with its accidents. The primary substance at time t (when the ripening process begins) is the unripe avocado, and the primary substance at t* (when the process is completed) is a numerically different primary substance. It follows that the primary substance is not the substratum of change!

The substratum of change — that which stays the same throughout the change — is the individual₂, the secondary substance 'in' the individual₁. The secondary substance 'in' a primary substance is its individuated essence. Primary substances are capable of independent existence. Secondary substances, as constituents of primary substances, are not capable of independent existence. Yet these secondary substances are what ground diachronic identity. So what grounds identity over time and underlies the change and persists through it is the individuated essence.

One can see how this distinction between two senses of 'individual' removes the contradiction. It is the individual₂ (the individuated essence) that is the same over time, and the individual₁ that is different over time. There is no one concretum that is the same and different. There are two 'things' in the changing concretum.

It follows that the unripe avocado I saw on my counter a week ago is not numerically the same ripe avocado that I see on my counter today. It is a numerically different avocado.

5. The scholastic analysis can be applied to persons and the problem of their identity over time and through change. Persons are individuals₂. Thus they are individuated essences or secondary substances. Elliot drunk and Elliot sober are the same person because the same individuated essence, the same instance of humanity, underlies the change in accidents. But they are numerically different primary substances and thus numerically different human animals.

Peterson thinks this solution superior to the Cartesian view according to which a person is identified with a res cogitans. On the Cartesian view, the person is a primary as opposed to a secondary substance. As a primary substance, the person on the Cartesian view is capable of independent existence. Given that a person remains self-same through change, the res cogitans must remain self-same though change. But then how can Elliot drunk and Elliot sober be the same person? "For individuals₁, as was said, are not substrates through any change but are rather the termini in any change, that is, the terminus ad quem [endpoint toward which] and terminus a quo [endpoint from which] of a change." (p. 135)

6. Let us now consider existential or substantial change. When an avocado ripens, it acquires the property of being ripe and loses the property of being unripe. It seems as obvious as anything that alterational or accidental change requires a substratum. But when the ripe avocado becomes the stuff of guacamole, it suffers a much more radical change. The avocado ceases to exist. Can one speak here too of a substratum of change, something in the thing that remains the same through the change?

There is likewise a difference between Elliot's sobering up and Elliot's dying. When he sobers up, the substratum of the change on the Thomistic view is his individuated essence. But what is the substratum of the radical existential change which occurs when he dies? Peterson writes, "The substrate of this change, of course, cannot be a particular human essence since it is just this which has passed away." (135) The particular human essence is subject to passing away since it is a compound of form and matter. So Peterson proposes the Aristotelian view according to which "The substrate of change in the case of essential change is simply the potentiality on the part of any individual to become something essentially different from what it is." (135) This potentiality is matter. Since it is that which individuates the form, matter is an individual in a third sense. There are then three senses of 'individual':

Individual₁ = primary substance
Individual₂ = secondary substance = substrate of accidental change
Individual₃ = matter = substrate of essential or existential change

7. Possible Lines of Critique

A. Peterson's theory implies that the unripe avocado and the ripe avocado are two primary substances, not one. (Likewise for Elliot sober and Elliot drunk.) But since now there is only one, the ripe one, the unripe one must have passed out of existence. This consequence of Peterson's theory seems to collide with the Moorean fact mentioned above, namely, that alterational or accidental change does not involve the destruction of the thing that changes. If the thing that changes is the unripe avocado one sees and touches, then that thing does not remain self-same over time: it passes out of existence. What remains the same over time is the individuated essence which one does not see and which is not a substance in its own right.

B. Matter, as the substrate of essential change, is prime matter. It is very difficult to see how the notion of materia prima can be rendered intelligible.

Trump Against the Pussycons

'Pussycon' is a crude moniker for those I have variously described as milquetoast conservatives, yap-and-scribble do-nothings, and bow-tie boys. Esther Goldberg:

The hanky-clutching, cluck-clucking, tsk-tsking faction of the Conservative movement is in for a rough and bumpy ride over the next four to eight years.

They’re the ones who wanted a Republican president who looked like the male manikin on top of the wedding cake. You know, like Mitt Romney. And who were shocked when they got one who wore a baseball cap and spoke with a Queens accent. Like Al Capp’s S.W.I.N.E. (Students Wildly Indignant about Nearly Everything), they are perpetually offended by everything Donald Trump says and does. By the fact that he simply exists.

I call them the Pussycons. They’re demanding a prissiness from Republican politicians, a refined politesse that distinguishes them from the swinish multitude. For George Will, you had to be able to imagine him “in an Iowa living room, with a macaroon in one hand and cup of hot chocolate balanced on a knee.” A George H.W. Bush, dangling a tea cup. Or a Mitt Romney, so much more elevated than his 47 percent of “takers.”

Continue reading “Trump Against the Pussycons”

Reading Now: When Reason Goes on Holiday (Encounter, 2016)

Neven Sesardić is a Croatian philosopher, born in 1949. He has taught philosophy at universities in Croatia, the United States, Japan, England, and Hong Kong. An earlier book of his is Making Sense of Heritability (Cambridge U. P., 2005).

“Gripping, thoroughly researched and documented, judiciously argued, and alternately depressing and infuriating, Sesardić’s courageous book offers the astounding spectacle of some of the greatest minds of the past century―including Carnap, Einstein, Gödel, and Wittgenstein―adopting odious political views, supporting Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, for simplistic and plainly fallacious reasons. More shocking still is the story of how prominent journals, encyclopedias, and the American Philosophical Association itself have sacrificed academic integrity on the altar of political activism. Great philosophers repeatedly reveal themselves as terrible thinkers when it comes to morality and politics, plunging headlong into complex controversies without drawing elementary distinctions or differentiating degrees of good or evil.” ―Daniel Bonevac, professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin

The book arrived yesterday. Flipping though it, I was surprised and pleased to find a quotation from one William Vallicella on p. 168. This is from a letter that protests a proposed group resolution on the death penalty:

What then could justify the APA in taking sides on the sort of broadly philosophical issues that tend to become bones of contention in the political arena? . . . Furthermore, by what principle was the death penalty chosen as the topic of an APA resolution rather than, say, partial-birth abortions? Should the APA endorse a package of positions, issuing pronunciamentos on the Balanced Budget Amendment, handgun control and ebonics? If not, why not? (William Vallicella).

Here is a second, later letter of protest (November 2003) that I sent to the A. P. A. before cancelling my membership:

An Identity Theory of Predication

I will sketch a two-name, quasi-Scholastic, nominalistic/reistic theory of predication that I believe is quite hopeless. But it may serve as a foil against which and in comparison to which a more plausible theory may be developed.

Suppose it is true that Sam is poor. What are the truth-conditions of 'Sam is poor'? Rewrite the sentence as 'Sam is a poor individual.' Think of 'Sam' ('S') and ''poor individual' ('P') as names where the first name is proper and the second common. We assume that there are no universals. Accordingly, 'poor' in our original sentence cannot be construed as an abstract substantive, as a proper name for the universal poorness. It must be construed as a common name for poor individuals.

And because we are assuming that there are no universals, we cannot parse 'Sam is poor' as 'Sam instantiates poorness.' Nor can we take the truth-maker of 'Sam is poor' to be the state of affairs, Sam's being poor.

First idea. 'Sam is a poor individual' is true just in case:

A. For some x, 'S' denotes x and for some x, 'P' denotes x.

This is obviously insufficient since it doesn't guarantee that the item denoted by 'S' is numerically the same as one of the items denoted by 'P.' While the second two occurrences of 'x' are bound variables, they are not bound by the same quantifier. So we try

B. For some x, 'S' denotes x and 'P' denotes x.

This is much better. The second and third occurrences of 'x' are bound by the same quantifier. This ensures that the item denoted by 'S' is identical to one of the items denoted by 'P.' The first item is called 'Sam' and the second we can call 'Poboy.' Obviously these names denote one and the same item given that our sentence is true.

This yields an identity theory of predication. A simple predicative sentence such as 'Sam is poor' is true just in case the denotatum of the subject term is identical to one of the denotata of the predicate term. The truth-maker of the sentence is the identity of Sam with Poboy, i.e., the identity of Sam with himself.

Objection 1. Sam might not have been poor. But it is not the case that Sam might not have been Sam. So the manifestly contingent truth of 'Sam is poor' cannot be explained in terms of identity.

Objection 2. That was a modal objection; now for a temporal one. The poor have been known to become rich. Suppose Sam goes from poor to rich. The identity theory implies that Sam, who was identical to Poboy, ceases to be identical to Poboy and become identical to Richboy. But surely this is absurd inasmuch as it is equivalent to saying that Sam, who was numerically the same as himself, is now no longer numerically the same as himself.

This is absurd because, if Sam changes in respect of wealth, going from poor to rich, there has to be a self-same substrate of this change. Sam must remain numerically the same through the change. After all, the change is accidental, not substantial. The identity theory of predication, however, cannot accommodate these truisms. For if Sam is poor in virtue of being identical to one of the poor individuals, then he cannot become rich without ceasing to be himself.

Notice how these problems disappear if properties are admitted. Sam instantiates the property of being poor, but he might not have. Sam instantiates the property of being poor at one time but not at others.

I now invite the Noble Opponent to show how his version of the identity theory circumvents these objections, if it does.

Carnap and Clarity

Potentiality and the Substance View of Persons

Objective Truth as a Condition of Intelligibility

Divine Simplicity and God's Contingent Knowledge: An Aporetic Tetrad

The Rage of Sally Haslanger

Here.

I discuss, not her rage, but some of her ideas in Is Beef Food? and in the ComBox to 'Women are Better at Looking After Children.'

The Continuing Meltdown of Bill Kristol

An excellent piece by Chris Buskirk

Can Friendship Survive Deep Disagreement?

Clearly friendship can survive deep disagreement if it is over some abstruse topic in the philosophy of language, say. The question I intend, however, is whether friendship can continue among those who find themselves in profound disagreement over matters that touch us 'existentially.' Politics and religion supply plenty of examples. Here too friendship can survive and even thrive. It may be worth reminding ourselves of this in these dark times.

In an optimistic piece entitled "The Value of Unexpected Friends," K. E. Colombini cites examples of prominent ideological opponents who were on friendly terms. The case that surprised me was the friendship of Ruth Baader Ginsburg with the late Antonin Scalia.

When Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia passed away unexpectedly in February 2016, perhaps the colleague who mourned the most was Ruth Bader Ginsburg. While they differed greatly in their day jobs, they formed a surprisingly deep friendship based on mutual respect and interests. [. . .]

“From our years together at the D.C. Circuit, we were best buddies,” Justice Ginsburg’s statement reads, in part. “We disagreed now and then, but when I wrote for the Court and received a Scalia dissent, the opinion ultimately released was notably better than my initial circulation. He was a jurist of captivating brilliance and wit, with a rare talent to make even the most sober judge laugh. It was my great good fortune to have known him as working colleague and treasured friend.”

[. . .]

One of Scalia’s more famous quotes, shared often in social media these days, was given in a 2008 interview on 60 Minutes: “I attack ideas, I don’t attack people—and some very good people have some very bad ideas.”

[. . .]

Separating ideas from people, like hating the sin but not the sinner, is a challenging act, but it is one that is ultimately valuable. Taking the time to get to know someone—even the person we battle with—opens doors that help us understand not only the debated issue, but also ourselves, better.

While there are cases of ideological opponents who remain on good terms, there are even more cases in which they don't.

Colombini article here.