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Category: Substack
The Paradox of the Misanthropic Naturalist Animal Lover
Top of the Stack. It concludes:
You may recall the case of Timothy Treadwell, who camped among grizzlies, and whose luck ran out.
In an Outside article, the author, Doug Peacock, reports that Treadwell "told people he would be honored to 'end up in bear scat.'" And in his last letter, Treadwell refers to the grizzly as a "perfect animal." There are here the unmistakable signs of nature idolatry. Man must worship something, and if God be denied, then an idol must take his place, whether it be nature with its flora and fauna, or money, or sex, or the Revolution, or some other 'icon.'
Deny God, devalue man, and end up bear shit. Way to go 'man.'
The Paltry Mentality of the Copy Editor
At the head of the Stack this fine morning.
Questions about Global Warming
Crisis or hoax? How much of which? At the top of the Stack.
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Ed Buckner writes,
I can help with your first three questions.
1. Is global warming (GW) occurring?
2. If yes to (1), is it naturally irreversible, or is it likely to reverse itself on its own? And if irreversible, how would you know that?
3. If GW is occurring, and will not reverse itself on its own, to what extent is it anthropogenic, i.e., caused by human activity, and what are the human causes?
To the first, undeniably yes. The science is that as the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has a physical effect that causes temperature to rise, all other things being equal. Note the rider: things are generally not equal, as there are other (well known) effects on climate. This also answers your third question. Yes, the warming caused by CO2 is man-made.
BV: You did not answer my third question. I asked to what extent is GW man-made. A priori, from the armchair, we know that if there is GW — if the Earth's atmosphere, land masses and oceans are in the aggregate getting warmer and warmer over time – then GW cannot be wholly anthropogenic and also that human activity cannot have zero effect on it. The empirical question for the climatologists is: how much of the GW is due to human activity? The answer to this question has serious repercussions for policy decisions. I suspect, though I do not claim to know, that the percentage of GW due to human activity — carbon emissions and what all else — is not high enough to justify the draconian "Green New Deal " measures of the GW alarmists. The onus probandi, I should think, is on them to prove otherwise.
Is the science settled with respect to the empirical question I have posed? Has consensus been reached among competent climatologists? That is not a rhetorical question. I would really like to know,
You write, "Yes, the warming caused by CO2 is man-made." I didn't ask that question. I didn't ask what causes the warming. I asked, given that GW is occurring, about the extent to which the causes — whatever they are — are man-made. Not that I deny that CO2 plays a role. But as you know, CO2 is also produced naturally, and some of the warming produced by naturally occurrent CO2 is precisely not man-made.
So here is another empirical question: How much of the CO2 in the atmosphere originates naturally and how much from human activity? Has scientific consensus been reached on this question?
However, there is other stuff you must know. First, the known physics does not explain the predicted rises in temperature. The predicted rises are based on speculation to do with water vapour ‘positive feedback’.
Second, ‘global warming’ is ambiguous between cause and effect. We know a bit about the forcing, less about the water vapour possible cause. Regarding effect, we only have temperature measurement to go by, and the records are not long term enough. I have looked at Antarctic data and there is no evidence of any change, except at the limb of the Antarctic peninsula, which is coastal and affected by the sea. Also, the peninsula is some way from the Pole, and is naturally quite warm.
BV: Very interesting. So you are saying that the water vapor caused by GW causes more GW?
Third, and this addresses your question about reversibility: for every amount of CO2 in the atmosphere there corresponds an equilibrium temperature. Were all CO2 emission to halt, the atmosphere would take a while to establish that equilibrium, then remain there, so long as the CO2 concentration remained constant (which it won’t, as it will tend to fall).
Fourth, and global warmists tend to avoid this fact like the plague, the rise in temperature is logarithmic to the CO2 concentration. If the concentration doubles, equilibrium temperature goes up x degrees. If it doubles again, another x degrees. And so on. So a lot of the scare stories show linear charts of concentration, not logarithmic, which is somewhat misleading.
Fifth, and here I agree somewhat with the warmists, while the effect of warming can be continuous with no step changes, there is a well-known step change that occurs when ice melts. With an average of 1/10 degree below freezing point, the ice will not tend to melt. With the same amount above, it will eventually melt. So Antarctica would melt if its average temperature were a tiny amount above freezing point. But that won’t happen because Antarctica is huge and most of it close enough to the Pole that temperatures are way way below freezing.
Hope that helps.
BV: It does indeed, and thanks very much. The fourth and fifth points add to my understanding of the topic. The fifth is particularly interesting since it raises the logico-philosophical question of the metabasis eis allo genos, the shift into another genus, the somersault from a quantitative change into a qualitative one.
By the way Ed, since you are an historian of logic, do you have a list of sources on the metabasis eis allo genos? I first encountered a reference to it in Kierkegaard. Does Trendelenburg say anything about it? Must go back to Aristotle. Medievals had to have addressed it.
One more question: if the issue is global warming, why the talk of climate change? That move involves an ascent from the species to the genus. Obviously the global climate can change by getting hotter and by getting cooler.
Can you answer me this one, Ed? (Knowing me, you know that I suspect wokeassed chicanery at work.)
COMBOX now open.
Latin or Anglo-Saxon?
Well-written advice on writing well from Brand Blanshard.
Simone Weil on False Gods
Over at Substack. If you haven't made the acquaintance of Simone Weil, may I introduce you?
Of ‘Blind Review’ and Pandora’s Box
Tony Flood sent me here for the latest outrage at Stanford.
But this crapola is old hat. On April Fool's Day, 2014, I worked myself into a fine lather over it. The latter manifested itself as a rant that is now available for your delectation at the top of my (Sub)stack. You will enjoy it.
As I wrote to Tony this morning after receiving his message:
Synchronicity City!
I was just reviewing an old post of mine on this very topic! This is nothing new, Tony. I shall upload my old rant to Substack.
The deeper I meditate, the more synchronicity. Post hoc ergo propter hoc? I am of course properly skeptical of Jung and his ideas. Doubt is the engine of inquiry as I have said too many times.Will respond to your other points and queries later.
A Sketch of Armstrong’s Naturalism
And some reasons to question it.
Top of the (Sub)stack.
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The exclusion of so-called abstract entities or abstract objects such as mathematical sets, unexemplified universals, and numbers from the roster of the real is because of their lack of causal power. What causal role could they play?And then I quoted Armstrong: "And if they play no causal role it is hard to see how we can have good reasons for thinking that they exist." (2)
Woland's Cat objects:
This reasoning is missing a step, I think. Abstract entities do exist when they are contemplated by a mind: assuming minds are 'real' (i.e. part of organisms, which are part of the space-time continuum of reality), then mathematical sets etc. become real when represented in the mind.
How would Armstrong reply? As follows. To exist is to exist extra-mentally. That is the only way anything can exist. If so, there cannot be two or more ways or modes of existing. He here follows, as other Australian philosophers do, his and their teacher John Anderson. Hence there is no such way of existing as existing intra-mentally, in the mind. Whatever I do when I think about something, I do not, in thinking about it, or contemplating it, confer upon it existence-in-the mind.
The following are candidate abstract entities: the number 7, the set {7}, the proposition expressed by '7 is prime,' the property of being prime. To say that they are abstract is to say that they are not in space or in time, and that they are 'causally inert,' which is to say that they do not enter into causal relations with anything: they neither cause nor are caused. Armstrong rejects the whole lot of them. Their existence is ruled out by his metaphysical naturalism according to which reality is exhausted by the space-time system and its contents. They don't exist outside the mind and, since that is the only way anything can exist, they don't exist inside the mind either.
So what am I thinking about then I think of {Max the cat, Manny the cat}? Sets or "classes supervene on their members — that is to say, once you are given the members, their class adds nothing ontologically, is no addition of being." (Sketch, 8) But then what am I thinking about when I think about the intersection of two disjoint sets? A set theorist will say: the null set, { }! You will also recall that in set theory, the null set is a subset of every set, and a member of every power set. Don't confuse subset and member as Armstrong does on p. 8, n. 1.
This presents a bit of a problem for Armstrong. He cannot say that the null set supervenes on its members since it doesn't have any. So of course he bites the bullet: he rejects the existence of the null set. "It would be a strange addition to space-time!" (p. 8., n. 1) The more I think about this, the more problematic it seems. If there is no null set, then there are no power sets. And if there is no null set, why should we think that there are unit sets or singletons such as {Quine} or {Max}? What is the difference between Max and the set whose sole member is him? If Max's singleton supervenes on him, then there is no singleton! If there are no singletons, then there is no intersection of {Max, Manny} and {Max, Maya}!
What would Woland's Cat say about that?
Memo to self: Re-read the section "Mysterious Singletons" in David Lewis, Parts of Classes. And blog it! You are not spreading yourself thin enough!
Remembering Albert Camus . . .
Galen Strawson on God
Substack latest. Does the fact of evil render the nonexistence of God certain?
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Tony Flood comments:
A good one, Bill. Bahnsen held that atheists, having no reason for affirming an absolute moral standard (which evil offends) can't even frame a problem of evil. He also held that the classic argument you summarized is missing a premise: God could not have a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil. (That He hasn't shared it with us is neither here nor there.) If He does, however, the argument doesn't go through. What atheist has even attempted to argue for it?
The Introvert Advantage
Currently atop the Substack pile. With a little help from Kafka, Heidegger, Schopenhauer, and Einstein.
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Thomas writes (12/29),
A very nice note for the (nearly) new year. It took me decades to realise I am one of those who was nearly socially self-sufficient all his life – no school yard bullying ever touched me, although I was one of the shorter ones until I grew late. And I had no problem concentrating, reading and creating (a few) new ideas in my work for hours on end (indeed, for years on end), whereas I find most people never ever perform such simple feats even once in their lives – concentrating and writing for 4 – 8 hours? How do you do it? How do you not do it, I reply . . .It takes a long time for me to understand the difference because of course we all think we are the same inside until we inspect some bit of human behaviour and find differences. One difference is: socially reliant people have no mental resilience. They can't deal with difficulties on their own. Therefore in crisis situations, which often occur in social groups reacting to wider events, most people determine their responses in a miasma of fear and group-think – a guarantee of poor quality outcomes. So the socially self-sufficient nearly always under-estimate the state of constant frustration (due to non-achievement) and anxiety (when no idle chat or other filler activity is available) of others. So we are amazed when society takes the turns it does. We are exceptionally ignorant, until we study mental lassitude scientifically!Your whisky aphorism has it right. We do need a bit. After all, wit (in the esprit sense) partly comes from talk. And the Kafka quote: responding to corns should just be done, not heard, while one is actually thinking about or discussing things of import, or at least containing some wit.But perhaps there is something to mindless chat? Maybe it serves a purpose such as to limit social violence, in the same way that greeting others (in European culture at least) with a kiss on both cheeks probably (?) limits fist-swinging, at least for that day. I have no idea.
Conscience, Brain, and Scientistic Pseudo-Understanding
Substack latest.
If nothing else, philosophy is prophylaxis against infection by scientistic pseudo-understanding. Take the jab! Boosters to follow.
A Battle of Titans
Substack upload.
It is sometimes said that there are only two kinds of philosophers, Platonists and Aristotelians. What follows is a quotation from Heinrich Heine which expresses one version of this useful simplification. Carl Gustav Jung places it at the very beginning of his Psychological Types (Princeton UP, 1971, p. 2. Jung does not properly source the Heine quotation.)
Tom and Van: A Tale of Two Idealists
Top of the Substack stack.
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Tony Flood comments (12/23):
This was enjoyable on so many levels. There's irony in labeling these gents "idealists" (I know the sense in which you meant it) since Marxists considered theists like Merton metaphysical "idealists," but and how could any mathematician, even a Marxist one, be anything but an idealist when it comes to the reality of numbers? Your historical vignette is rich and your comparison and contrasts apt.
I know that Karl Marx occupied himself with the foundations of analysis (calculus), but I don't know whether or not he wrote anything about the philosophy of mathematics. To answer Tony's question with a question: Why couldn't a Marxist take a nominalist tack and simply deny the existence of numbers and other mathematical items?
Tony replies (12/24):
"Why couldn't a Marxist take a nominalist tack and simply deny the existence of numbers and other mathematical items?"
Abstractly, Bill, I have no idea what tack Marxist materialists might take if pressed about the reality of numbers, e.g., what (and "where") they are (Plato's problem); how they're "unreasonably effective" in the natural sciences, which Marxists revere, i.e., how numbers can cause mathematical belief (Benacerraf's problem); and how numbers are knowable on the materialist/naturalist terms to which Marxists subscribe, i.e., what neural process could possibly answer to the perception of a mathematical object (Goedel's problem). I wish I could have asked Stalinist mathematician Dirk Struik (1896-2000) these questions when he and I were comrades, but I wasn't asking them then. (I'm not asking them these days, but your question stimulated memories of when I did.) Nominalism is not an integral way out for Marxists, but what grounds Marxists have for valuing integral solutions, I have no idea.
Thanks for the Wigner pdf. It gets at a question that fascinated me when I was a student of electrical engineering at the end of the 'sixties. How is it that the theory of complex numbers — developed a priori in response to a purely theoretical question about the roots of negative integers — finds application in alternating current theory?
I say 'developed,' Wigner says 'invented.' "The principal emphasis [in mathematics] is on the invention of concepts. Mathematics would soon run out of interesting theorems if these had to be formulated in terms of the concepts which already appear in the axioms." I wrote 'developed' because of my platonizing tendency to view mathematical entities — 'entities' betrays me too inasmuch as it begs the question I am about to pose – as discovered rather than invented. The question that my use of 'entities' begs is precisely the question whether mathematical 'items' — a colorless, non-question-begging bit of terminology — are made up by us (in which case they cannot be called entities or beings) or are really but non-spatially 'out there' in Plato's topos ouranios. My platonic drift links up with my classical theism and issues in the view that the unspeakably vast actual infinity of mathematical items are accusatives of divine awareness: their Being is their being-known/created by the archetypal intellect. This sort of view allows for the mediation of two extremes, a synthesis if you will.
Thesis: math items exist in themselves in splendid independence of ectypal intellects (whether human, Martian, angelic, whatever). Antithesis: math items do no such thing; they are the conceptual/linguistic fabrications of ectypal intellects such as ours. And now my mind drifts back to Hartry Field's nominalistic Science without Numbers, circa 1980, the gist of which is that science can be done without ontological commitment to any so-called abstract entities. There are some very smart nominalists and they are hard to beat. Shooting from the hip, I say Field 'out-quines' Quine.
But here's a thought. Suppose Wigner is right and mathematica are inventions by us, which is to say that they are conceptual/linguistic fabrications that do not refer to anything real anywhere, whether in Plato's heaven or on Aristotle's earth. Would that not make the problem of the applicability of mathematics to the physical world utterly insoluble?
There is a Kantian-type solution, but then you have to take on board the Kantian baggage.
It looks like I have, willy-nilly this Christmas eve, added a log to my aporetic fire in support of my metaphilosophical thesis that the central problems of philosophy, though obviously meaningful, pace the later Ludwig, are all of them absolutely insoluble by intellects of our constitution. Insofar forth, I am mightily impressed by the thesis of the infirmity of reason. The Fall had noetic consequences.
Below: Raphael, The School of Athens depicting Plato gesturing upwards, as if to the mundus intelligibilis and Aristotle downwards as if to the mundus sensibilis.
Care of Soul, Care of Body
A Sunday Substack sermon.

