Category: Language Matters

The Truth Operator and the Truth Predicate

This is an addendum to our earlier discussion which I hope will advance it a step or two.  We heard Alan Rhoda claim that the following sentence is false: 'If nothing exists, then it is true that nothing exists.'  Let's think further about this.  We first note that 'If nothing exists, then it is true that nothing exists' can be parsed in two ways:

1. If nothing exists, then it is true that (nothing exists).

2. If nothing exists, then it is true (that nothing exists).

Call (1) the operator construal.  'It is true that ( )' is a sentential operator the operand of which is a sentence.  The result of the operation is itself a sentence.  If the operand is true, then the resulting sentence  is true.  If the operand is false, then the resulting sentence is false. Please note that prefixing 'It is true that' to a sentence cannot change the truth-value of the sentence.  In this respect, the truth operator 'It is true that ( )' is unlike the negation operator 'It is not the case that ( ).'  Assuming Bivalence — as I have been doing throughout — if you negate a true sentence you get a false one, and vice versa.

Call (2) the predicate construal.  The consequent of (2) is of course a sentence, but it is not the result or product of a sentential operator operating upon a sentence. For what is within the parentheses is not a sentence.  'That nothing exists' is not a sentence.  It does not have a truth-value.  If I assertively utter it I do not convey a complete thought to my audience.  'That nothing exists' is the name of a proposition.  It follows that 'it is true' in the consequent of (2) functions as a predicate as one can more clearly see from the equivalent

3.  If nothing exists, then that nothing exists is true.

In (2) and (3)  a predicate is attached to a name, whereas in (1) this is not the case: a sentential operator is attached to a sentence.

Not only are the parsings different, the ontological commitments are as well.  (2) commits us to propositions while (1) doesn't.  And (1) seems to commit us to operators while (2) doesn't. 

Here is the place to comment on my asterisks convention.  Putting asterisks around a declarative sentence forms a name of the proposition expressed by the sentence.  'The Moon is uninhabited' is a declarative sentence.  '*The Moon is uninhabited*' is not a sentence but a name.  It names an entity that has a truth-value, but it itself does not have a truth-value.  (2) and (3) can also be rendered as

4. If nothing exists, then *Nothing exists* is true.

With the operator/predicate distinction under our belts we may be in a position to see how one philosopher (Alan)  could reasonably reject 'If nothing exists, then it is true that nothing exists' while another accepts it.  The one philosopher gives the original sentence the predicate construal which is committed to propositions.  This philosopher then reasons that, if nothing exists, then no propositions exist either, and are therefore not available to instantiate the property of being true.  The other philosopher gives the original sentence the operator construal and finds it impossible to understand how anyone could reject the original sentence so construed.  This philosopher insists that if nothing exists, then it is true that nothing exists; that this truth is not nothing, and that therefore it is something, which implies that it cannot be the case that nothing exists.

 

‘No News is Good News’

Spencer Case, 'on the ground' in Afghanistan, writes:

Try translating the following sentence into logic:  "No news is good news."

Whenever I try it, I end up saying that there isn't any good news and that's not what I mean to say. If you're not too terribly busy, I'd like to see how the trick is done.

Also, the Idaho State Journal has been publishing my blog online. It is available here.

Clearly, the translation cannot be: (x)(Nx –> ~Gx).  For what the sentence means is not that no news report is a good news report.  What it means is that it is good not to receive news reports. (For if one receives no news, one will not receive any bad news.)  But even this  is not quite right.  To be precise, what the target sentence expresses in standard contexts of use is that every report that there is nothing to report is a good report.  For any x and y, if x is a first-order report of recent events, and x expresses the proposition *There is nothing to report*, then x is a good report.  In symbols: (x)(y)(Rx & Exy & y = *There is nothing to report* –>Gx).

But there may be a better parsing.

 

Can There be False Clichés?

I just heard Dennis Prager say that there are both true and false cliches.  Now Prager is a font of wisdom and good sense and a national treasure.  The fact that the Left hates him is proof positive of that.  But I can't see that he is right on this point. 

A cliche is a trite or hackneyed expression.  It is a form of words regularly and often thoughtlessly repeated.  'Haste makes waste.' 'Don't put all your eggs in one basket.' 'He who hesitates is lost.' 'The early bird gets the worm.'  'As old as the hills.' 'Dead as a doornail.'  'Proof positive.'  'First and foremost.' What makes a cliche a cliche is a lack of novelty or originality but not a lack of truth.  One typically 'parrots' a cliche, and those whose conversations are filled with them we suspect of being shallow and unreflective.  One can, of course, repeat a cliche without 'parroting' it.  We conservatives like many cliches since they are as it were the distillate of hard-won wisdom. After all, in most instances, haste does make waste as experience teaches.  I can point that out both thoughtlessly and thoughtfully.  Think of how foolish it would be to refuse to teach a child this truth on the ground that it is a cliche!  Only a liberal could be so foolish.  Better a stale truth than a false novelty.  Think of all the Madoff investors who to their serious detriment violated ' Don't put all your eggs in one basket.'

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Bogus Quotations: Did Einstein Really Say That?

Politicians and popular writers who retail in bogus quotations should have a close cousin of the logic stick applied to their silly heads.

Senator Charles Grassley (R) was on C-Span the morning of 7 March 2005 talking about Social Security reform among other things. He attributed the following quotation to Albert Einstein: "Compound interest is the only miracle in the world." Did Einstein say that? I rather doubt it. It is too stupid a thing for Einstein to say.

There is nothing miraculous about compound interest, and there is no 'magic' in it either. It is very simple arithmetic. Suppose you invest $2000 at 10% compounded annually. At the end of the first year, you have $2,200. How much do you have at the end of the second year, assuming no additions or subtractions from the principal? $2,400? No. What you have is $2,200 + 220 = $2, 420. Where did the extra twenty bucks come from? That is interest on interest. It is the interest on interest on interest . . . that make compounding a powerful tool of wealth enhancement.

But there is nothing miraculous or magical about it. Words mean things. Use them wisely.

And don't look to Einstein for advice on personal finance.

Alienans Adjectives

A reader inquires:

I find your blog interesting and educational.  A while ago you mentioned that there is a term for an adjective which is used not to specify a particular sort of the noun which it modifies, but rather a thing which does not meet the definition of that noun.  (I've likely somewhat mangled the description of this term in trying to recall it.)  For example 'polished leather' and 'red leather' are kinds of leather, but 'artificial leather' refers to things which aren't leather at all.  I have tried to find the post that talked about this but I forgot what the topic was when you mentioned it.  Can you please tell me the name for this?

'Artificial' in 'artificial leather' functions as an alienans adjective.  It 'alienates' the sense of the noun it modifies.  In the case of specifying adjectives,  an FG is a G, where F is an adjective and G a noun. Thus a nagging wife is a wife, a female duck is a duck, cow's leather  is leather, and a contingent truth is a truth. But if 'F' is alienans,   then either an FG is not a G, or it does not follow from x's being an  FG that x is a G. For example, your former wife is not your wife, a   decoy duck is not a duck, artificial leather is not leather, and a   relative truth is not a truth. Is an apparent heart attack a heart   attack? It may or may not be. One cannot validly move  from 'Jones had an apparent heart attack' to 'Jones had a heart attack.' So 'apparent' in  'apparent heart attack' is alienans.

Note that I was careful to say 'artificial' in 'artificial leather' is an alienans adjective.  For it does not function as such in every context.  'Artificial' in 'artificial insemination' is not alienans: you are just as inseminated if it has come about artificially or naturally.

Two more examples of alienans adjectives that I borrow from Peter Geach: 'forged' in 'forged banknote' and 'putative in 'putative father.'  If x is a forged banknote it does not follow that x is a banknote.  And if x is the putative father of y, it does not follow that x is the father of y. Here is an example I got from the late Australian philosopher Barry Miller:  'negative' in 'negative growth.'  If my stock portfolio is experiencing negative growth,  then it is precisely not experiencing growth.

Of course, I am not suggesting that every adjective (as employed in some definite context) can be classified as either specifying or alienans.  Consider the way 'mean-spirited' functions in 'mean-spirited Republican.'  In most contexts, the implication is not that some Republicans are mean-spirited and some are not; the implication is that all are.  To be a Republican is just to be mean-spirited.  Is there a name for that sort of adjective?  I don't know.  But there ought to be, and if I ever work out a general theory of adjectives, I'll give it one.

Now consider 'Muslim terrorist.'  A politically correct idiot might take offense at this phrase  as implying that all Muslims are terrorists or even that all and only Muslims are terrorists.  But no intelligent person would take it this way.  If I say that Hasan is a Muslim terrorist , then the plain meaning to anyone with his head screwed on properly is that Hasan is a Muslim and a terrorist, which obviously does not imply that all Muslims are terrorists. 

When Is a Tautology Not a Tautology?

My Aunt T. was married to a gruff and taciturn Irishman who rejoiced under the name of 'Morris.' Thinking to engage Uncle Mo in conversation during one of my infrequent visits to the Big Apple, and knowing that Morris drove a beer truck, I once made some comment about the superiority of German over American beer. Uncle Mo, not to be seduced  into the bracing waters of dialectic, replied, "Beer is beer." End of conversation.

But the beginning of an interesting line of thought. A tautology is a logical truth. To be precise, a tautology is a logical truth within the propositional calculus. (Every tautology is a logical truth, but not every logical truth is a tautology.  The logical truths of the predicate calculus are not tautologies, strictly speaking.)

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It Is What It Is

Maybe not. It all depends on what the meaning of 'is' is.

Seriously, though, this saying is seeing quite a lot of use lately.  It is a sort of present-tensed Que sera, sera.  Things are the way they are.  Don't kick against the pricks.  Acceptance and resignation are the appropriate attitudes.

From a philosophy-of-language point of view, what is interesting is the use of a tautological form of words to express a non-tautological proposition.  What the words mean is not what the speaker means in uttering the words.  Sentence meaning and speaker's meaning come apart.  The speaker does not literally mean that things are what they are — for what the hell else could they be?  Not what they are?  What the speaker means is that (certain) things can't be changed and so must be accepted with resignation.  Your dead-end job for example.  'It is what it is.'

There are many examples of the use of tautological sentences to express non-tautological propositions.  'What will be, will be' is an example, as is 'Beer is beer.'  When Ayn Rand proclaimed that Existence exists! she did not mean to assert the tautological proposition that each existing thing exists; she was ineptly employing a tautological sentence to express a non-tautological and not uncontroversial thesis of metaphysical realism according to which what exists exists independently of any mind, finite or infinite.

'What will be will be' is tautologically true and thus necessarily true.  What the sentence is typically used to express, however, is the non-tautological, and arguably false, proposition that what will be, will necessarily be, that it cannot be otherwise.  So not only do sentence meaning and speaker's meaning come apart in this case; a modal fallacy is lurking in the background as well, the ancient fallacy of confusing the necessitas consequentiae with the necessitas consequentiis.

Now you know what I think about on those long training runs (3 hours, 18 minutes last Sunday).  Running is marvelous for 'jogging' one's thoughts.

‘Merry Xmas’

When I was eight years old or so and first took note of the phrase 'Merry Xmas,' my piety was offended by what I took to be the removal of 'Christ' from 'Christmas' only to be replaced by the universally recognized symbol for an unknown quantity, 'X.' But it wasn't long before I realized that the 'X' was merely a font-challenged typesetter's attempt at rendering the Greek Chi, an ancient abbreviation for 'Christ.' There is therefore nothing at all offensive in the expression 'Xmas.' Year after year, however, certain ignorant Christians who are old enough to know better make the mistake that I made when I was eight and corrected when I was ten. See here.

It just now occurs to me that 'Xmas' may be susceptible of a quasi-Tillichian reading.  Paul Tillich is famous for his benighted definition of 'God' as 'whatever is one's ultimate concern.' Well, take the 'X' in 'Xmas' as a variable the values of which are whatever one wants to celebrate at this time of year. So for some, 'Xmas' will amount to Solsticemas, for burglars Swagmas, for materialists Lootmas, for gluttons Foodmas, for inebriates Hoochmas, and for ACLU extremists Antichristianitymas.

A Language Rant: ‘Perks’

A C-Span segment one morning bore the title, 'Congressional Perks.' It was a good program, as almost all C-Span offerings are, but would it have killed them to use the right word, 'perquisites'? 

If this were an isolated example, then you could accuse me, with justification, of being a pedantic ass. Some of you will do so in any case. But I could give a hundred similar examples, and you hope I won't.

Ohne Fleiß Kein Preis

Loosely translated: No pain, no gain. Der Fleiß (Fleiss) is German for diligence. Thus 'Heidi Fleiss' is a near aptronym, diligent as she was in converting concupiscence into currency.

Another interesting German word is Sitzfleisch. It too is close in meaning to diligence, staying power. Fleisch is meat and Sitz, seat, is from the verb sitzen, to sit. One who has Sitzfleisch, then, has sitting meat. Think of a scholarly grind who sits for long hours poring over tome after tome of arcana.

And that reminds me of a story. Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann were German philosophers of high repute, though Scheler was more the genius and Hartmann more the grind. As the story goes, Scheler once disparaged Hartmann thusly, "My genius and your Sitzfleisch would make a great philosopher!"

On Exaggeration

Why do people exaggerate in serious contexts? The logically prior question is: What is exaggeration, and how does it differ from lying, bullshitting, and metaphorical uses of language? A physician in a radio broadcast the other morning said, "You can't be too thin, too rich, or have too low a cholesterol level."

Note first that the medico was not joking but making a serious point. But he couched this serious point in a sentence which is plainly false. Since he had no intention of deceiving his audience, and since the point he was making (not merely trying to make) about cholesterol is true, he was not lying. He was not bullshitting either since he was not trying to misrepresent himself as knowing something he does not know or more than he knows.

Political Correctness and Gender Neutral Language

I am writing a review of J. P. Moreland's The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism (SCM Press, 2009).  It is a very good book, and J. P. Moreland is one of my favorite philosophers.  I don't know the man personally, but I rather doubt that he is politically liberal.  And yet throughout his book one find sentences like the following: "If a naturalist is going to admit into his/her ontology an entity whose existence cannot be explained naturalistically, then he or she must adopt a dismissive strategy that in some way or other shows why it is no big deal that we do not have such an explanation." (p. 169)

Why the political correctness as indicated by "his/her" and "he or she"?  The PC jargon might have been foisted upon him by an editor, but if so, Moreland could have removed it.  For Ed Feser's adventures with a PC copy editor, see here.

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Fun With English: Is ‘None’ Singular or Plural?

To my ear, the following sounds grammatical:

1. None of the members were present at the meeting

whereas the following sounds ungrammatical:

2. None of the members was present at the meeting.

But isn't 'none' just a contraction of 'no one'? If it is, then (2) is grammatical and (1) is not. Now compare

3. All of the members were present at the meeting

4. All of the members was present at the meeting.

(3) sounds grammatical to me, while (4) sounds decidedly ungrammatical.

But surely (3) is logically equivalent to the ungrammatical

3*. Each of the members were present at the meeting

and (4) is logically equivalent to the grammatical

4*. Each of the members was present at the meeting.

Let this serve as a warning to school marms and copy editors  and those who would imitate them: be careful when you criticize another's English. He may have thought a lot harder and deeper than you. Your petty rules may collapse under logical scrutiny.