Religion of Peace or Religion of Pieces? Islamists Destroy Christian Monastery

The oldest Christian monastery in Iraq has been reduced to a field of rubble by the Islamic State's relentless destruction of ancient cultural sites.

The monastery, called Dair Mar Elia, is named for the Assyrian Christian monk — St. Elijah — who built it between 582 and 590 A.C. It was a holy site for Iraqi Christians for centuries, part of the Mideast's Chaldean Catholic community.

In 1743, tragedy struck when as many as 150 monks who refused to convert to Islam were massacred under orders of a Persian general, and the monastery was damaged. For the next two centuries it remained a place of pilgrimage, even after it was incorporated into an Iraqi military training base and later a U.S. base.

But of course, Islam is the religion of peace and no true Muslim would have been involved in such destruction.

See my The No True Muslim Fallacy.

Death by a Thousand Cuts

"Popular exams in UK to be rescheduled to avoid Ramadan." The UK commits cultural suicide.  Not all at once, but little by little, bit by bit, concession by concession.  A culture is doomed when it no longer has the will to defend itself.  (HT: London Karl)

In the West, Muslims are accommodated.  In Muslim lands, Christians are persecuted and suppressed even unto beheading and crucifixion.  And Barack Hussein Obama worries about global warming and the National Rifle Association?  By the way, his presidency  is a clear indicator of our decline: that a feckless fool, a know-nothing, could be elected and then re-elected.  We may just be getting what we deserve.  A foolish folk, fiscally irresponsible, addicted to panem et circenses, gets a POMO idiot who works to increase the dependency of the people on government while violating their liberties and undermining the rule of law.

Meanwhile, conservative inaction gives traction to the likes of Donald Trump.

Related: Low-Level, Random, but Unceasing Violence

Hic Rhodus, Hic Salta

"Here is Rhodes, jump here" (through the hoops of political correctness).  A graduate of Oriel College, Oxford University, sent me this statement concerning the Rhodes Must Fall petition.  A memorial to Cecil Rhodes, that is.  Can you say Der Untergang des Abendlandes?

"Here is Rhodes, jump here."  From Aesop's Fables #209, "The Boastful Athlete."  A man who had been off in foreign lands returns home.  He brags of his exploits.  He claims that in Rhodes he made a long jump the likes of which had never been seen before.  A skeptical bystander calls him on his boast:  Here's your Rhodes, jump here!

The moral?  Put your money where your mouth is.  Don't talk about it, do it!

Perhaps an erudite classicist such as Mike Gilleland could say more on this topic.  He would have to do at least the following:  dig up all the ancient sources in Greek and Latin; trace the saying in Erasmus and Goethe; comment on Hegel's variation on the saying in the Vorrede zur Philosophie des Rechts, explaining why he has saltus for salta; find and comment on Marx's comment on Hegel's employment of the saying.

Finally, if Alan Rhoda were to rename his cleverly titled, but now defunct, weblog Alanyzer — and I'm not saying he should — he might consider Hic Rhoda, Hic Salta.  He is a very tall man; I'm 6' 1'' and had to look up to see his face when I met him in Las Vegas some years back.  To jump over him would be quite a feat.

UPDATE 12/19:  Dave Lull, argonaut nonpareil of cyberspace and friend and facilitator of bloggers, informs me that Dr. Gilleland has taken note of my call for an erudite classicist.  This bibliomaniac, antediluvian, and curmudgeon does not, however, consider himself "truly erudite."  If his self-deprecatory consideration is just, then he had me fooled.

As for Mr. Lull, here is a tribute to him.

Related articles

The Lapse of Laïcité: Cause and Effect

Alain Finkielkraut:

Laicity is the solution that modern Europe found in order to escape its religious civil wars. But contemporary Europe doesn’t take religion seriously enough to know how to stick to this solution. She has exiled faith to the fantastic world of human irreality that the Marxists called “superstructure”… thus, precisely through their failure to believe in religion, the representatives of secularism empty laicity of its substance, and swallow, for humanitarian reasons, the demands of its enemies.

I haven't read anything by Finkielkraut except the above and a few other excerpts translated and edited by Ann Sterzinger.  But that won't stop me from explaining what I take to be the  brilliant insight embedded in the above quotation. 

Laicity is French secularity, the absence of religious influence and involvement in government affairs.  It has had the salutary effect of preventing civil strife over religion.  But to appreciate why laicity is important and salutary one must understand that the roots of religion lie deep in human nature.  Religion is even less likely to wither away than the State. Leftists, however, are constitutionally  incapable of understanding that man by nature is homo religiosus and that  the roots of religion in human nature are ineradicable.  The Radicals don't understand the radicality (deep-going rootedness) of religion. (Radix is Latin for 'root.')  In their superficial way, leftists think that religion is merely "the sigh of the oppressed creature" (Marx) and will vanish when the oppression of man by man is eliminated, which of course will never happen by human effort alone, though they fancy that they can bring it about if only they throw enough people into enough gulags.  Leftists cannot take religion seriously and they don't think anyone else really takes it seriously either, not even Muslims.  They don't believe that most Muslims really do believe in Allah and divine origin of the Koran and the 72 black-eyed virgins and the obligation to make jihad.  They project their failure to understand religion and its grip into others.  See my Does Anyone Really Believe in the Muslim Paradise in which I report on the Sam Harris vs. Scott Atran debate.

The issue is not whether religion is true but whether it answers to deep human needs that cannot be met in any other way.  My point is not that leftists think that religion is false or delusional, although they do think it to be such; my point  that they don't appreciate the depth of the religious need even if it is a need that, in the nature of things, cannot be met.

Not understanding religion, leftists fail to understand how important laicity is to prevent civil strife over religion.  And so they don't properly uphold it. They cave in to the Muslims who reject it.  Why don't they understand the dire existential threat that radical Islam poses to European culture?  I suspect that it is because they think that Muslims don't really believe in all their official claptrap and what Muslims really want are mundane things such as jobs and material security and panem et circenses.

In nuce:  leftists, who are resolutely secular, fail to uphold the secularity that they must uphold if they are to preserve their loose and libertine way of life, and they fail to uphold it  by failing to understand the dangers of religion, dangers they do not understand because they fail to take religion seriously and to appreciate the deep roots it has in human nature.  Even pithier:

Leftists, whose shallow heads cannot grasp religion, are in danger of losing their heads to radical jihadi.  Cause and effect of the lapse of laicity.

Two quibbles with Finkielkraut.   First, it is not that leftists "do not believe in religion," but that they do not believe that religion is a powerful and ineradicable force in human affairs.  You don't have to believe in religion to believe facts about it.  Second, if I remember my Marx, the superstructure (Ueberbau) though a repository of fantastic ideas devoid of truth such as religious ideas and the ideas of bourgeois law and morality, also contains all ideology and therefore the 'liberating' Marxist ideology as well.  It too is a reflection of the Unterbau, the social base and the means of production.  So not everything  in the superstructure is "fantastic."  This conception leads to relativism, but that's not my problem.

Related:  Alain Finkielkraut vs. the End of Civility

I Feel a Little Guilty . . .

. . . at deriving so much intellectual stimulation from the events of the day.  It is fascinating to watch the country fall apart. What is a calamity for the citizen, however, is grist for the philosopher's mill. Before he is a citizen, the philosopher is a "spectator of all time and existence" in a marvellous phrase that comes down to us from Plato's Republic (486a).  And if the philosopher is an old Platonist who has nearly had his fill of the Cave and its chiaroscuro, he is ever looking beyond this life, and while in no rush to bid it a bittersweet adieu, is not affrighted at the coming transition either.  The owl of Minerva spreads its wings at dusk.  The old Platonist owl lives by the hope  that the dusk of death will lead to the Light, a light unmixed with darkness.

National decline is not just grist for the philosopher's mill, however; it is also perhaps a condition of understanding as Hegel suggests in the penultimate paragraph of the preface to  The Philosophy of Right:

When philosophy paints its grey on grey, then has a shape of life grown old.  By philosophy's grey on grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood.  The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only at the falling of the dusk.

Daughter of Jupiter, Minerva in the mythology of the Greeks is the goddess of wisdom.  And the nocturnal owl is one of its ancient symbols.  The meaning of the Hegelian trope is that understanding, insight, wisdom  arise when the object to be understood has played itself out, when it has actualized and thus exhausted its potentialities, and now faces only decline.

When a shape of life has grown old, philosophy paints its grey on grey.  The allusion is to Goethe's Faust wherein Mephisto says

Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,
Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum.

Grey, dear friend, is all theory
And green the golden tree of life.

Philosophy is grey, a "bloodless ballet of categories" (F. H. Bradley) and its object is grey — no longer green and full of life.  And so philosophy paints its grey concepts on the grey object, in this case America on the wane.   The object must be either dead or moribund before it can be fully understood.  Hegel in his famous saying re-animates and gives a new meaning to the Platonic "To philosophize is to learn how to die."

In these waning days of a great republic, the owl of Minerva takes flight.  What we lose in vitality we gain in wisdom.

The consolations of philosophy are many.

On the other hand, it ain't over until it's over, and as citizens we must fight on, lest our spectatorship of all time and existence suffer a premature earthly termination.  The joys if not the  consolations of philosophy are possible only in certain political conditions.  We are not made of the stern stuff of Boethius though we are inspired by his example.

Recognizing Microagressions and the Messages They Send

A remarkable document.  Tell me what you think.

To understand the Left you must understand that central to their worldview is the hermeneutics of suspicion which is essentially a diluted amalgam of themes from Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.

Thus nothing has the plain meaning that it has; every meaning must be deconstructed so as to lay bare its 'real meaning.'

Suppose I say, sincerely, "The most qualified person should get the job."  To a leftist that means:  "People of color are given extra unfair benefits because of their race."

Or suppose I describe a black malefactor as a thug.  What I have actually said, according to the hermeneutics of suspicion, is that the malefactor is a nigger.  But 'thug' does not mean 'nigger.'  'Thug' means thug.  There are thugs of all races.

Leftists often call for 'conversations' about this or that. Thus Eric Holder famously called for a 'conversation' about race.  But how can one have a conversation — no sneer quotes — about anything with people who refuse to take what one sincerely says at face value?

I now hand off to Dennis Prager, American Universities Begin to Implode.

Leftist Insanity Update

Every day brings further evidence that contemporary liberals have lost their minds.

A yoga class has been cancelled at the University of Ottawa on the ground that participants are complicit in 'oppression' and 'cultural genocide.'  By the way, we are talking about hatha yoga here which is essentially just stretching.

So you might think that re-labelling the course 'Stretching' would solve the problem.  But no!

This is a good place to observe that stretching is an essential ingredient in a balanced physical fitness program along with aerobic exercise (walking, hiking, running, biking, etc.), anaerobic  work (weight-lifting), and activities that maintain good hand-eye coordination (tennis, pickleball, etc.)  The Maverick recommends a four-pronged approach. 

Why is Canada such a Pee Cee place?  I should think that with all that rugged country up there, those vast empty expanses, and the  ass-freezing temperatures a tougher breed of cat would live there and not a bunch of pc-whipped pussies.

Another 'interesting' development is the assault on free speech.  According to Pew Research, 40% of millennials think it acceptable to limit speech offensive to minorities.

Trouble is, almost anything will be found offensive by the members of some minority or other.  Some  blacks have shown themselves to be absurdly sensitive to the slights they imagine embedded in such words and phrases as 'niggardly,' 'denigrate,' 'black hole,' and 'watermelon.'  

Some take offense at 'chink in the armor.'  But if 'chink in the armor' is about Asians, then the Asians in question would have to be rather tiny to hang out interstitially in, say, a coat of mail.

Why not take offense at 'chunk'?  Someone might get it into his Pee Cee head that a chunk is a fat chink.

There is no end to this madness once it gets going, which is why we sane and decent people need to mock and deride liberals every chance we get.  Mockery and derision can achieve what calm reasoning cannot. 

One cannot reason with those who are permanently in a state of self-colonoscopy.

Finally, this outrage at Mizzou against Thomas Jefferson.

Are Values Objective? Can Values be Universal but Non-Objective?

Commenting on a recent post of mine, Malcolm Pollack takes issue with the notion that values are objective.  While granting that there are objective truths, he denies that there are objective values because of a theory of value that he holds according to which values have their origin in valuing beings and merely reflect the needs and interests of these valuing beings.  

The wider context of the debate is the assault upon Western values by those who would infiltrate our societies and foist Islamic values upon us.  I had made the claim that in defending the values of the West we should insist that these are not just values for us in the West but are values for all.  In this sense these values are universal and valid for all human beings even though not universally recognized as valid for all human beings, and even though they were first 'sighted' in the West.  I pointed out that values could be universal without being universally recognized.  That is indisputably true.  What is not indisputably true, however, is the claim that there are objective values.  If there are objective values, then these values are universal, i.e., valid for all.  Does the converse also hold?  Is it also true that if there are universal values, then they are objective?  I don't think so.  It may well be that some values are universal despite their being non-objective. 

What I am going to argue is that, even if one were to concede what I don't concede, namely, that there are no objective values, it still would not follow that that there are no universal values.  But first we need to discuss the question of the objectivity of values and give some examples of the values that we are concerned with.

I claim that there are some objective values.  Malcolm claims that there are no objective values.  He doesn't deny that  are values, and I am confident that he and I agree on what some of the Western values are; what he denies is that these values are objective values. But first some examples of Western values.

Open inquiry I take to be an example of a Western value.  Inquiry is open to the extent that it is not interfered with by religious or political authorities.  The value of open inquiry presupposes the values of knowledge and truth.  Inquiry is a value because knowledge is a value, and knowledge is a value because truth is a value.  But the pursuit of truth via inquiry requires the free exchange of ideas.  So freedom of expression is a value, whether in speech or in writing.  Connected with this is the value of toleration.  We tolerate other voices and opposing points of view because their consideration is truth-conducive.  There are of course other values championed in the West such as equality of rights.  But I will take as my central example the value of truth.   

When I say that truth is a value I mean that truth is something  that has value.  I mean that truth is a valuable item.  In general we ought to distinguish between an item that has value and its property of being valuable. And neither is to be confused with an act of valuation or with a disposition to evaluate.

The question, however, is whether truth is objectively valuable or else valuable only relative to beings having interests and needs.

In this discussion 'truth' is to be taken extensionally as referring to truths (the propositions, beliefs, judgments . . . that are true) and not intensionally as referring to that property in virtue of which truths are true.  Now on to Malcolm's axiological theory.

Malcolm writes:

Where do values come from? In general values represent some interest of their owner, and such interests range from such hard-wired preferences as biological survival and the survival of our offspring, to whether one roots for the Yankees or the Red Sox. In particular, many of the most important valuations humans make have a social context; in addition to valuing such obvious things as food, pleasure, comfort, sex, and shelter, humans tend to value those things that elevate their status in their group, and that help their group compete with other groups. Indeed, for creatures like us, social values can often trump more personal interests — because if your group is wiped out, you are too. Humans will make tremendous personal sacrifices both for the well-being of the group, and to attain and signal high status in whatever way it is acquired and displayed.

[. . .]

Let me put this another way: for a fish, a pre-eminent “value” is to be, at all times, fully immersed in water. This is not the case for a cat. Human groups may not differ from each other as much as fishes and cats do — but they differ enough, I think, that one group’s cherished value can be another’s damnable sin.

Let's examine this admittedly plausible view.  The idea is that nothing is valuable or the opposite,  in itself or intrinsically.  If a thing is valuable, it is valuable only relative to a being who wants, needs, or desires it. If a thing lacks value, it lacks value only relative to a being who shuns it or is averse to it. In a world in which there are no conative/desiderative beings, nothing has or lacks value.    Such a world would be value-neutral.  This is plausible, is it not? How could an object or state of affairs have value or disvalue apart from a valuer with specific needs and interests? (As Malcolm might rhetorically ask.)

Imagine a world in which there is nothing but inanimate objects and processes, a world in which nothing is alive, willing, striving, wanting, needing, desiring, competing for space or scarce resources.   In such a world nothing would be either good or bad, valuable or the opposite. A sun in a lifeless world goes supernova incinerating a nearby planet. A disaster? Hardly. Just another value-neutral event. A re-arrangement of particles and fields.  But if our sun went supernova, that would be a calamity beyond compare — but only for us and any other caring observers hanging around.  For we are averse to such an event — to put it mildly — and this aversion is the ground of the disvalue of our sun's going supernova, just as our need for light and a certain range of temperatures is what confers value upon our sun's doing its normal thing.

An axiological theory  like this involves two steps.  The first step relativizes value claims.  The second step provides a naturalistic reduction of them. 

First,  sentences of the form 'X is good (evil)' are construed as elliptical for sentences of the form 'X is good (evil) for Y.'  Accordingly, to say that X is good (evil) but X is not good (evil) for some Y would then be like saying that Tom is married but there is no one to whom Tom is married. 

The second step is to cash out  axiological predicates  in naturalistic terms. Thus,

D1. X has value for Y =df X satisfies Y's actual wants (needs, desires)

D2. X has disvalue for Y =df X frustrates Y's actual wants (needs, desires).

It is clear that on this theory value and disvalue  are not being made relative to what anyone says or opines, but to certain hard facts, objective facts, about the wants, needs, and desires of living beings.  That we need water to live is an objective fact about us, a fact independent of what anyone says or believes.  Water cannot have value except for beings who need or want it; but that it does have value for such beings is an objective fact. 

The needs of fish and the needs of cats are objective facts about fish and cats respectively; but the value of being totally immersed in water at all times is a value only for fish, not for cats.  It follows on the axiological theory we are considering that values are relative: they are relative to the needs and interests of evaluators.  

Does it follow from this that no value is universal?  No. (Recall that 'universal' in this discussion of Western values in the context of the civilizational struggle between the West and the Islamic world means 'valid for all human beings.'   It does not mean 'universally recognized.')  It doesn't follow because a value could be non-objective in that it is necessarily tied to the needs/interests of evaluating beings and thus relative to beings having these needs/interests while also being universal. This will be the case with respect to all values that originate from needs that all humans possess.  Thus being fully immersed in water at all times (without special breathing apparatus) is a universal disvalue for all human beings.  And ingesting a certain amount of protein per week is a universal value.

There are also universal values for all living things, or at least for all terrestrial living things.  For they all need our sun's light and a certain range of temperatures.  The corresponding value is a value for all terrestrial biota despite the fact that this value is not universally recognized by these organisms.  So once again a value can be non-objective, universal,  and not universally recognized.  Indeed, not even universally recognizable.  For there is no possibility that an amoeba recognize the value of what it needs to exist.

As for the fish and the cats,  they both need oxygen and they both get oxygen, but in different ways via gills and lungs respectively.  So getting oxygen is a universal value for the union of the set of fish and the set of cats, and this despite the fact that this value is not only not universally recognized by these critters, but not recognized by them at all.  The point I have just made is of course consistent with the fact that being fully immersed in water at all times is a value for fish but not for cats on the axiological theory under examination.  (Note that it is not only not a value for cats, but a disvalue for them.)  

As for truth, we presumably  agree as to the first-order claim that truth has value.  And I hope we can agree also on the first-order claim that truth trumps human feelings, that truth is of higher value than that no injury to  human feelings occur, though I cannot expect any contemporary liberal to perceive this.  The dispute occurs at the meta level: given that X (e.g. truth) has value, what is it for X to have value?

Suppose that values are non-objective: they merely reflect the interests and needs of evaluators.  Given that truth is a value, the ground of truth's being valuable is that we need truth.  And we do need it, and not only for the life of the mind.  We need it to live well as animals.  Truth is conducive to human flourishing, indeed, to a human existence that is not nasty, brutish, and short.  Since we all need truth, truth is a universal value.  Thus it is a value even for those who do not value it: it is a value even for those who are unwilling or unable to recognize its value for us.

Conclusion

After thinking the matter through once again in the light of Malcolm's comments, I stand by what I said earlier:

The values of the West are universal values.  They are not Western values or Caucasian values except per accidens.  They are universal, not in that they are recognized by all, but in that they are valid for all.  If a proposition is true, it is true for all including those who are unwilling or unable to recognize its truth. If a value is valid or binding or normative it is these things for all including those who are unwilling or unable to recognize its validity.

What I didn't realize at the time I wrote this was that the quoted paragraph is consistent both with my view that values are objective  and with those views according to which values reflect the interests and needs of evaluators.

On my view, the universality and intersubjective validity of values is secured by their objectivity.  On a view like that of Malcolm's, the universality of (some) values is secured by the objective fact that all the members of a class of evaluators share the need that is 'father' to the value.  Thus all human beings, and indeed all intelligent beings, need truth to flourish, whence it follows that this value is universal even if non-objective.

What is crucial here is the distinction between a value's being universal and a value's being universally recognized.  This distinction  'cuts perpendicular' to the distinction between objective and non-objective values. The Islamic world, benighted and backward as it is, either will not or cannot recognize certain values that are conducive to human flourishing, all human flourishing, including the flourishing of Muslims.

The message we need to convey to the Muslims and to the leftists who will listen is not that Western values are superior because they are Western but that they are best conducive to everyone's flourishing even that of Muslims and leftists. We have to convince them that we are not out to foist 'our' values on them, but to get them to recognize values that are valid for all.   

Paris and the Fall of Rome

An important essay by Niall Ferguson.  The meat of the article (emphases and parenthetical material added):

Let us be clear about what is happening. Like the Roman Empire in the early fifth century, Europe has allowed its defenses to crumble. As its wealth has grown, so its military prowess has shrunk, along with its self-belief. It has grown decadent in its shopping malls and sports stadiums. At the same time, it has opened its gates to outsiders who have coveted its wealth without renouncing their ancestral faith.

The distant shock to this weakened edifice has been the Syrian civil war, though it has been a catalyst as much as a direct cause for the great Völkerwanderung [migration of the tribes/peoples] of 2015. As before, they have come from all over the imperial periphery — from North Africa, from the Levant, from South Asia — but this time they have come in their millions.

To be sure, most have come hoping only for a better life. Things in their own countries have become just good enough economically for them to afford to leave and just bad enough politically for them to risk leaving. But they cannot stream northward and westward without some of that political malaise coming along with them. As Gibbon saw, convinced monotheists pose a grave threat to a secular empire.

It is conventional to say that the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Europe are not violent, and that is doubtless true. But it is also true that the majority of Muslims in Europe hold views that are not easily reconciled with the principles of our modern liberal democracies, including those novel notions we have about equality between the sexes and tolerance not merely of religious diversity but of nearly all sexual proclivities. And it is thus remarkably easy for a violent minority to acquire their weapons and prepare their assaults on civilization within these avowedly peace-loving communities.

I do not know enough about the fifth century to be able to quote Romans who described each new act of barbarism as unprecedented, even when it had happened multiple times before; or who issued pious calls for solidarity after the fall of Rome, even when standing together in fact meant falling together; or who issued empty threats of pitiless revenge, even when all they intended to do was to strike a melodramatic pose.

I do know that 21st-century Europe has only itself to blame for the mess it is now in. For surely nowhere in the world has devoted more resources to the study of history than modern Europe. When I went up to Oxford more than 30 years ago, it was taken for granted that in the first term of my first year I would study Gibbon. It did no good. We learned nothing that mattered. Indeed, we learned a lot of nonsense to the effect that nationalism was a bad thing, nation-states worse, and empires the worst things of all.

“Romans before the fall,” wrote Ward-Perkins in his “Fall of Rome,” “were as certain as we are today that their world would continue for ever substantially unchanged. They were wrong. We would be wise not to repeat their complacency.”

What’s Next, Book Burning?

"Roughly 150 Black Lives Matter protesters reportedly stormed a library at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire, Thursday night to berate students studying there for their supposed racial privilege."  Here.

The solution, of course, is to expel the BLM thugs.  But that would be a 'racist' thing to do.  So is it the leftist view that blacks are thuggish by nature and simply cannot be expected to behave in a civilized manner?  So who are the real racists here?

Related: Some Questions About White Privilege

TRIGGER WARNING!  The above contains careful thought and big words and will upset and offend the 'safe space' crybullies, the BLM thugs, and the liberal- left scum who apologize for them.

Addendum (11/20):  If the secular sphere has a 'sacred' space, that would be the university library, the repository of the best thoughts of humanity.  The university is finished if such a space is allowed to be invaded and disrupted by thugs and savages. 

Colander Girl

With apologies to Neil Sedaka, Calendar Girl.

A 'pastafarian' idiot was allowed to wear a colander in an official DMV photo in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  Bring on the hoodies, the sombreros, the ski masks . . . .  Story here.

Does this have anything to do with the decline of the West?  Something.  It is just another little indication of the abdication of those in positions of authority.  A driver's license is an important document.  The authorities should not allow its being mocked by a dumbass with a piece of kitchenware on her head.  But Massachusetts is lousy with liberals, so what do you expect?  A liberal will tolerate anything except common sense and good judgment.

A penne for her thoughts as she strains to find something to believe in.  If only she would use her noodle.

Pasta2

A Note on Civil Courage

Responding to a commenter who states that one exposes oneself to tremendous risk by speaking out against leftist insanity, Malcolm Pollack writes:

Most bloggers who write from a contrarian position about these things seem to use noms de plume. In fact, I do have another blog I’ve set up for this purpose, but I almost never post anything to it. I prefer to speak under my own name — not because I’m trying to be “brave”, which this really isn’t at all, but just because it feels more honest, and because I have a right to, and because I’m ornery. (Running into that theater in Paris to try to save the people inside, knowing you are overwhelmingly likely to be killed: that’s brave. Writing grumpy blog-posts from the comfort and safety of my home is not.)

I would underscore the First Amendment right to free speech under one's own name without fear of government reprisal.   Use it or lose it.  (Unfortunately, the disjunction is inclusive: you may use it and still lose it.)  But use it responsibly, as Pollack does. The right to express an opinion does not absolve one of the obligation to do one's level best to form correct opinions.  Note however that your legal (and moral) right to free speech remains even if you shirk your moral (but not legal) obligation to do your best to form correct opinions.  

I would add to Pollack's reasons  for writing under his own name  the credibility it gives him.  You lose credibility when you hide behind a pseudonym.  And when you take cover behind 'anonymous,' your credibility takes a further southward plunge, and shows a lack of imagination to boot.  

Pollack is right: it doesn't take much civil courage to do what he and I do.  I've made mine, and he is on the cusp of making his, if he hasn't already.  (You could say we are 'made men.') We don't need jobs and we have no need to curry favor.  And our obscurity provides some cover.  Obscurity has its advantages, and fame is surely overrated. (Ask John Lennon.)

This is why I do not criticize the young and not-yet-established conservatives who employ pseudonyms. Given the ugly climate wrought by the fascists of the Left it would be highly imprudent to come forth as a conservative if you are seeking employment in academe, but not just there.  

What is civil courage?  The phrase translates  the German Zivilcourage, a word first used by Otto von Bismarck in 1864 to refer to the courage displayed in civilian life as opposed to the military valor displayed on the battlefield.  According to Bismarck, there is more of the latter than of the former, an observation that holds true today.  (One example: there is no coward like a university administrator, as recent events at the university of Missouri and at Yale once again bear out.) Civil courage itself no doubt antedates by centuries the phrase.