Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Constituent Ontology

  • Trope Troubles: An Exercise in Aporetics

    Elliot C. asked me about tropes. What follows is a re-post from 30 March 2016, slightly emended, which stands up well under current scrutiny.  Perhaps Elliot will find the time to tell me whether he finds it clear and convincing and whether it answers his questions. ………………………….. A reader  has been much exercised of late…

  • Some Questions about Existence, Part I

    Pat F. inquires: Your theory is that existence is the unity of a thing’s constituents. What I wasn’t entirely clear on is just what those constituents are. In one section of your book, you argue for the real distinction between essence and existence, which gave me the impression that existence was a constituent (rather than,…

  • Semirealism about Facts: An Exchange with Butchvarov

    Facts are the logical objects corresponding to whole declarative sentences, or rather to some of them. When it comes to facts, Panayot Butchvarov appreciates the strengths and weaknesses of both realism and anti-realism. For the realist, there are facts. For the anti-realist, there are no facts. Let us briefly review why both positions are attractive…

  • Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Divine Simplicity

    Dominik Kowalski has a question for me about footnote 3 in Peter van Inwagen's "God's Being and Ours" in Miroslav Szatkowski, ed., Ontology of Theistic Beliefs, de Gruyter, 2018, pp. 213-223. (Van Inwagen's essay is right after my "Does God Exist Because He Ought to Exist?, pp. 203-212. I managed to upstage van Inwagen, but…

  • Bare Particular as Limit Concept

    I have already shown that the concept prime matter is a limit concept.  The same holds for the concept bare particular. Both are lower limits of ontological analysis. I will be using 'bare particular' in Gustav Bergmann's sense. What is a Particular? Particulars in the sense relevant to understanding 'bare particular' may be understood in…

  • Some Responses to Tim Mosteller re: Existence

    The following is from a work in progress by Tim Mosteller, posted with his permission.  I thank him for his critical engagement with my work. Here are some responses.  My corrections in red; my comments in blue.

  • Metaphysical Explanation Again

    One question I am discussing with Micheal Lacey is whether any sense can be attached to the notion of metaphysical explanation. I answer in the affirmative. Perhaps he can tell me whether he agrees with the following, and if not, then why not. Tom is a tomato of my acquaintance. The predicate 'red' is true…

  • Is There Such a Thing as Metaphysical Explanation?

    M. L. writes,   I've been enjoying your critique of [Peter] van Inwagen. [The reader is presumably referring to  my "Van Inwagen on Fiction, Existence, Properties, Particulars, and Method" in Studia Neoaristotelica: A Journal of Analytical Scholasticism, 2015, vol. 12, no. 2, 99-125]  I was initially astonished at his claim that metaphysics/ontology doesn't explain, but…

  • Penultimate Draft: Meinertsen Review for Metaphysica

    REVIEW ARTICLE Bo R. Meinertsen, Metaphysics of States of Affairs: Truthmaking, Universals, and a Farewell to Bradley's Regress, Springer 2018, 174 + xviii pp. Summary Professor Meinertsen's detailed treatment of states of affairs agrees with the spirit and much of the letter of David M. Armstrong's middle period as represented in his A World of…

  • Meinertsen on the Merely Apparent Existence of Thick Particulars

    This is the second in a series on Bo Meinertsen's 2018 book. It is part of a 'warm-up' for a review article to appear in Metaphysica.  Here is the first installment. A thick particular in the parlance of David Armstrong is an ordinary particular taken together with its non-relational properties. But an ordinary particular is…

  • Non-Substantial Change, Trope Bundle Theory, and States of Affairs

    I am presently writing a review article for Metaphysica about Bo R. Meinertsen's Metaphysics of States of Affairs: Truthmaking, Universals, and a Farewell to Bradley's Regress (Springer 2018). Since I will probably incorporate the following critical remarks into my review, I want to give Bo a chance to respond.  Substantial and Non-Substantial Change One way…

  • Contingency and Composition

    Joe, who describes himself as "a high school student with a passion for philosophy of religion and metaphysics," asked me a long series of  difficult questions. Here is one of them: After reading [Edward] Feser's Five Proofs, I have had difficulties with the concept of sustaining causes. First, Feser argues  that composites require a sustaining…

  • Constituent and Relational Ontology

    A good discussion with links to various people including your humble correspondent. His vanity notes the following: Bill Vallicella’s account of the two approaches and a moderate defence of Constituent Ontology. Very accessible – W.V. does a lot more for philosophy in his retirement than certain philosophers of Law who will remain nameless do in…

  • Working Draft: The Case Against Facts

    Comments appreciated if you are en rapport with the subject matter.   The Case Against Facts   Arianna Betti, Against Facts, The MIT Press, 2015, pp. 296 + xxvii   If Buridan's contribution to the bestiarum philosophorum was the ass, and David Armstrong's the ostrich, Arianna Betti's is the hedgehog bristling with spines. The hedgehog…

  • Facts and States of Affairs: Terminological and Substantive Questions

    Bo Meinertsen writes, Do you prefer the term 'facts' to 'states of affairs'? I take it you do — you certainly used the former most. But why, actually, did you use the latter in your Nous article? Personally, I used 'facts' in my Ph.D. dissertation, but afterwards started using 'state of affairs', very much to…