From a U. K. reader:
I'm currently reading up on my substance dualism for a philosophy of mind course, and thought I'd pose a question to you. I heartily agree with your frequent calls to eschew the parody of dualism as positing a kind of soul-stuff, but given this, I wonder how you think of the ontological status of mental properties. Most physicalists claim that such properties inhere in a physical substance, but if we avoid talk of substance in preference of a subject (as you have, in my opinion rightly, done in the past) how are these mental properties a) grounded (to avoid a Humean bundle view) and b) ontologically possible. I remember you suggesting that say, the property of being odd was not based on a material substance, as it was associated with a non-material number. But presumably both properties and subjects (however these are related) are concreta. And I find it hard to see how that method works for them.
1. The reader asks about the ontological status of mental properties and how they are related to the items that instantiate them. First some examples. If I say 'I am feeling anxious,' I self-ascribe the non-intentional mental property of feeling anxious. If I say, 'I see a coyote,' I self-ascribe the intentional mental property of seeing a coyote. If I say, 'I weigh 180 lbs.,' I self-ascribe the physical property of weighing 180 lbs. Properties in general can be defined in terms of instantiation: properties are instantiable entities. Thus:
P is a property =df P is possibly such that it is instantiated.
Not all entities are instantiable: neither Socrates nor his singleton are instantiable. I assume that properties are universals where universals are repeatable entities and particulars are not. That properties are universals is of course controversial and will be denied by trope theorists. To maintain that properties are universals is to reject that form of nominalism according to which everything that exists is a particular. I also reject the form of nominalism according to which properties are linguistic in nature. What's more, I reject the conceptualist theory that properties are mental in nature. Thus I tend to think that both physical and mental properties are universals that can exist uninstantiated, and whose existence is independent of the existence of any (finite) mind. Mental properties are not 'in the mind' if what this means is that mental properties exist only as accusatives of mental acts. Nor do mental properties require for their existence the existence of any (finite) minds.
I should also say something about 'abstract' and 'concrete' inasmuch as my reader speaks of concreta. ('Concreta' is the plural of 'concretum' the latter referring to any concrete item.) I suggest the following definition:
X is concrete (abstract) =df X is (is not) causally active/passive.
Continue reading “On Mental Properties and the Subject of Experience”
