A 2008 article by Thomas Nagel. Ladder Man calls it "comically bad." You decide who the joker is.
Author: Bill Vallicella
Imago Dei in Relation to Aquinas and Christology
This just over the transom from Will Duquette:
A fool rushes in…
In your comment on Peter Lupu's guest post, you say
> Man was not created in God's material image, since he has none; he
> was created in God's spiritual image. But this implies that what is
> essential to man is not his animal body which presumably can be
> accounted for in the naturalistic terms of evolutionary biology, but
> his spirit or consciousness.However, St. Thomas would say that it is man's nature to be a
rational animal, and hence man's animal body most certainly is
essential. I appreciate that you might be working in a broader
theistic context rather than an explicitly Christian context; but
given that Christ is God Incarnate, and now dwells in eternity,
it seems to me that man now just is created in God's image, body
and soul both. From the standpoint of eternity God created the
universe, man in it, and become incarnate as a man as one single
act.I enjoy your blog; it's part of my continuing education. Thanks
for providing it.
You're welcome, Mr. Duquette. Your comment is pertinent and raises a number of difficult and important questions.
Continue reading “Imago Dei in Relation to Aquinas and Christology”
A Modal Fallacy to Avoid: Confusing the Necessity of the Consequence with the Necessity of the Consequent
No one anywhere can utter 'I am talking now' without saying something true. Indeed, that is necessarily the case: it doesn't just happen to be the case. Letting T = 'I am talking now,' we can write
1. Necessarily, for any speaker S, if S utters T, then T is true.
But it would be a mistake to infer
2. For any speaker S, if S utters T, then T is necessarily true.
The same goes for 'I exist now.' It cannot be tokened, in language or thought, without it being the case that a truth is expressed; but it does not follow that the one who tokens it necessarily exists. Its negation, 'I do not exist now,' cannot be tokened in language or thought without it being the case that a falsehood is expressed; but it does not follow that the nonexistence of the one who tokens it is impossible.
The illicit inferential move from (1) to (2) illustrates the ancient modal fallacy of confusing the necessitas consequentiae with the necessitas consequentiis, the necessity of the consequence with the necessity of the consequent.
The point is not to confuse 'Nec(p –> q)' with 'p –> Nec q.'
A sophomoric fatalist might argue like this. "Necessarily, whatever happens, happens. Therefore, whatever happens, necessarily happens, so that whatever occurs could not have been otherwise." But this reasoning commits the modal fallacy in question.
Or take someone who argues that, necessarily, whatever is known is true; ergo, whatever is known is necessarily true. This reasoning likewise confuses the necessity of the consequent with the necessity of the consequence.
If someone argues that 'I exist' is not a first-level predication of existence on the ground that if it were then the sentence in question would be necessarily true — which it isn't — then I would tax such a person with the modal fallacy in question.
And if someone were to argue that 'I do not exist' is nonsense on the ground that it is necessarily false, then I would suspect him of falling into the same trap.
A Double Standard
The wrongs done us seem so real, so inexcusable, so unjust. But the wrongs done others by ourselves and by others appear in a less unfavorable light: not that important, excusable, and horribile dictu __ entertaining.
A Sense/Reference Objection to the Irreducibility of Phenomenally Conscious States
I agree with Thomas Nagel, John Searle, and others that conscious experiences are irreducible to physical states. I have endorsed the idea that felt pain, phenomenal pain, pain as experienced or lived through (er-lebt), the pain that hurts, has a subjective mode of existence, a "first-person ontology" in Searle's phrase. If this is right, then phenomenally conscious states cannot be reduced to physical states with their objective mode of existence and third-person ontology. As a consequence, an exclusively third-person approach to mind is bound to leave something out. But there is an objection to irreducibility that needs to be considered, an objection that exploits Frege's distinction between sense and reference.
Imago Dei and the Meaning of Life (I)
This is a guest post by Peter Lupu. Lightly edited by BV with his comments in blue.
In a post titled Imago Dei, (December 4, 2009), Bill clarifies the meaning of this important theistic concept. However, in his typical way, he does much more. He offers us guidelines to see and appreciate the broader implication of a proper understanding of imago Dei. In the present post I shall confine myself to the task of fleshing out these implications, as I understand them. In subsequent posts, and with the gracious cooperation of Bill, I will try to wrestle with these implications to the best of my abilities. I should make clear at the outset that I agree with Bill’s exposition of the meaning and significance of imago Dei within a theistic conception. If there is anything with which I disagree, or have some reservations, is the principal conclusion Bill draws from the concept of imago Dei regarding the meaning of life.
A Note on Analytic Style
The precise, explicitly argued, analytic style of exposition with numbered premises and conclusions promotes the meticulous scrutiny of the ideas under discussion. That is why I sometimes write this way. I know it offends some. There are creatures of darkness and murk who seem allergic to any intellectual hygiene. These types are often found on the other side of the Continental divide. "How dare you be clear? How dare you ruthlessly exclude all ambiguity thereby making it impossible for me to yammer on and on with no result?"
Ortega y Gasset somewhere wrote that "Clarity is courtesy." But clarity is not only courtesy; it is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of resolving an issue. If it be thought unjustifiably sanguine to speak of resolving philosophical issues, I have a fall-back position: Clarity is necessary for the very formulation of an issue, provided we want to be clear about what we are discussing.
So we should try to be as clear as possible given the constraints we face. (In blogging, one of the constraints is the need to be pithy.) But it doesn't follow that one should avoid, or legislate out of existence, topics or problems that are hard to bring into focus. It would be folly to avoid God, the soul, Mr. Bradley's Absolute, the meaning of life and all the Big Questions just because it is hard to be clear about them. To give up metaphysics for logic on the ground of the former's messiness, makes no sense to me: the good of logic is intrumental not intrinsic. (See Fred Sommers Abandons Whitehead and Metaphysics for Logic.) We study logic to help us resolve substantive questions. If all you ever do in philosophy is worry about such topics as the logical form of 'Everyone who owns a donkey beats it,' then I say you have not been doing philosophy at all, but something preliminary to it.
Clarity, then, is a value. But it ceases to be one if it drives us to such extremes as the logical positivist's Verifiability Princiople of cognitive signicance, or the extreme of a fellow who once said that "If it cannot be said in the language of Principia Mathematica, then it can't be said." My response to that would be: so much the worse for the language of Principia Mathematica.
A Language Rant: ‘Perks’
A C-Span segment one morning bore the title, 'Congressional Perks.' It was a good program, as almost all C-Span offerings are, but would it have killed them to use the right word, 'perquisites'?
If this were an isolated example, then you could accuse me, with justification, of being a pedantic ass. Some of you will do so in any case. But I could give a hundred similar examples, and you hope I won't.
Slang and slovenliness have their places and there is some here. But shouldn't C-Span be held to a higher standard than this weblog? For a blogger to blur the boundary between slang and formal discourse is par for the course: we bloggers are experimenting, often playfully, with a new medium. But there should be precincts in which formal discourse is preserved.
I once had an idiot of a student who complained about my 'high-brow' language. I felt disgust for her and her ilk: the people (including administrators and professors) who think a university exists to pander to a paying clientele and sink to the level of the surrounding society. But that's a separate rant with several subtopics: abdication of authority; the misuse of student teaching evaluations; the political correctness that allows a moron such as Ward Churchill to be hired and get tenure. . . .
Imago Dei
Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram . . . (Gen 1, 26) Let us make man in our image and likeness. . .
Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam. . . (Gen 1, 27) And God created man in his image. . .
I used to play chess with an old man by the name of Joe B., one of the last of the WWII Flying Tigers. Although he had been a working man all his life, he had an intellectual bent and liked to read. But like many an old man, he thought he knew all sorts of things that he didn’t know, and was not bashful about sharing his ‘knowledge.’ One day the talk got on to religion and the notion that man was created in the image and likeness of God. Old Joe had a long-standing animus against the Christianity of his youth, an animus probably connected with his equally long-standing hatred for his long-dead father.
Recalling some preacher’s invocation of the’ image and likeness’ theme, old Joe snorted derisively, "So God has a digestive tract!?" In Joe’s mind this triumphal query was supposed to bear the force of a refutation. Joe’s ‘reasoning’ was along these lines:
1. Man is made in God’s image.
2. Man is a physical being with a digestive tract, etc.
Therefore
3. God is a physical being with a digestive tract, etc.
But that’s like arguing:
1. This statue is made in Lincoln’s image.
2. This statue is composed of marble.
Therefore
3. Lincoln is composed of marble.
A Common Liberal Fallacy: The Diachronic Red Herring
Much opposition to contemporary political conservatism involves a curious argumentative fallacy that I shall dub the Diachronic Red Herring. A liberal succumbs to this fallacy when he (i) appeals to the past accomplishments of liberalism to justify contemporary liberalism while ignoring the ways in which contemporary liberalism has come to occupy extreme positions; and (ii) criticizes contemporary conservatism by bringing up past failings of conservatives while ignoring the fact that contemporary conservatism accepts many of the advances of paleo-liberalism.
Continue reading “A Common Liberal Fallacy: The Diachronic Red Herring”
Kindness
Small acts of kindness have the power to transfigure the bleak face of existence. While gratefully remembering the words and gestures I have been fortunate to receive, I also regret the occasions I let slip where, at no cost to myself, I could have offered a word of encouragement or support to someone in need.
Intellectual Hypertrophy
Weight lifters and body builders in their advanced states of muscular development appear ridiculous to us. All that time and money spent on the grotesque overdevelopment of one's merely physical attributes ___ when in a few short years one will be dust and ashes. But isn't the intellectual equally unbalanced who overdevelops his logical and analytical skills to the neglect of body, emotions, and spirit? Is the intellectual wrestler all that superior to the physical one? Is one kind of hypertrophy better than another? What good is discursive hypertrophy if it is paid for in the coin of mystical and moral and physical atrophy?
Nihilist T-Shirt
On the front: Nothing matters!
On the back: And what if it did?
Mangan’s Blog Has Been Removed
If you try to access Dennis Mangan's weblog you receive the message: Sorry, the blog at mangans.blogspot.com has been removed. (HT: Malcolm Pollack) If you were to ask me to speculate I would say that the forces of political correctness have something to do with this. I quit using the Blogger/Blogspot platform almost six year ago, and I don't understand why people stick with it, apart from the fact that it is free. Note the link to "report abuse" and "objectionable content" at the top of the Blogger homepage. You can bet that idiots in great numbers will abuse this link, idiots who do not appreciate the good old classically liberal values of toleration, open inquiry, and free speech.
For more discussion of the Mangan case, see Malcolm Pollack's post Thoughtcrime, and a post by Laurence Auster.
UPDATE (5:15 PM): Mangan informs me that he is back in the saddle, here, at Typepad.
UPDATE (4 December): I see that Mangan's old blog has been restored by the powers that be. Interestingly, if you Google 'Mangan's' you are shown a link to his Racial Consciousness. It is but speculation on my part, but I should think that it is posts like this that certain people find objectionable, and that got him blacked out, if only temporarily.
Go read the post and ask yourself if there is anything in it that a reasonable person could find 'hateful' or 'racist' or sufficiently objectionable to warrant censure. If you answer in the affirmative, then you brand yourself as hopelessly obtuse, both morally and intellectually.
The Perils of Pleasure
The gods had given me almost everything. But I let myself be lured into long spells of senseless and sensual ease. I amused myself with being a FLANEUR, a dandy, a man of fashion. I surrounded myself with the smaller natures and the meaner minds. I became the spendthrift of my own genius, and to waste an eternal youth gave me a curious joy. Tired of being on the heights, I deliberately went to the depths in the search for new sensation. What the paradox was to me in the sphere of thought, perversity became to me in the sphere of passion. Desire, at the end, was a malady, or a madness, or both. I grew careless of the lives of others. I took pleasure where it pleased me, and passed on. I forgot that every little action of the common day makes or unmakes character, and that therefore what one has done in the secret chamber one has some day to cry aloud on the housetop. I ceased to be lord over myself. I was no longer the captain of my soul, and did not know it. I allowed pleasure to dominate me. I ended in horrible disgrace. There is only one thing for me now, absolute humility. (Emphasis added.)
Compare the words Plato puts in the mouth of Socrates in the Phaedo:
. . . every pleasure and pain has a kind of nail, and nails and pins her [the soul] to the body, and gives her a bodily nature, making her think that whatever the body says is true. (tr. F. J. Church St. 83)