Author: Bill Vallicella

More Christology: Freddoso on Supposita

To better understand the doctrine of supposita and the role it plays in the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation, we turn to Alfred J. Freddoso, Human Nature, Potency and the Incarnation (bolding added):

According to the Christian faith, as defined in this instance by the great Christological Councils and mirrored in centuries of liturgical practice and theological reflection, Jesus Christ is truly God and truly man. More precisely, he is a single divine person, the eternal Word, in whom are united, whole and unmixed, a divine nature and a human nature–so that he is, to quote Chalcedon, "one with the Father in his divinity and one with us in his humanity."

In expounding this doctrine medieval theologians fashioned the technical metaphysical notion of a suppositum (or hypostasis), i.e. an independently existing ultimate subject of characteristics.4 The philosophically astute will detect at once that, so understood, the concept of a suppositum is remarkably akin to that of an Aristotelian primary substance or individual(ized) nature. Indeed, had it not been for the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, medieval Christian thinkers would never have been led to assert that suppositum and substance (or: individual nature) are distinct concepts. To speak now only of the Incarnation, Christ's individual human nature, i.e. the individual composed of a body and an intellective soul and united to the Son of God, is a paradigmatic Aristotelian [primary] substance . . . .Yet, because of its metaphysical union with and dependence upon the eternal Word, this nature is not the ultimate metaphysical subject of Christ's characteristics–not even of his "purely human" characteristics. So in this one instance, known to us only by divine revelation, we have a substance which is not a suppositum, a substance which is metaphysically "sustained" by something distinct from it. To complete the picture, a person is just a suppositum with an intellectual nature, i.e. a suppositum essentially endowed with intellect and free will.

In technical medieval terminology, then, Jesus Christ is a divine suppositum or person, the Son of God, who has freely "assumed" and now "sustains" an individual human nature. What's more, this human nature is united to the divine person "hypostatically," i.e. in such a way that properties had immediately by the human nature have the Son of God as their ultimate metaphysical subject–in a manner analogous to that in which many properties had immediately by a proper part of a whole have the whole itself as their ultimate metaphysical subject.

Continue reading “More Christology: Freddoso on Supposita“

Ernst Bloch on Law and the State

Bloch Ernst Bloch, like Theodor Adorno, is a leftie worth reading. But here are two passages replete with grotesque exaggeration and plain falsehood.  Later, perhaps, I will cite something from Bloch that I approve of. The offensive passages are from the essay, "Karl Marx, Death, and the Apocalypse" in Man on His Own: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion (Herder and Herder, 1970, p. 32. The translation is by E. B Ashton):  

. . . the law as a whole, and the greater part of the criminal law as well, is simply an instrument by which the ruling classes maintain the legal standards that protect their interests . . . If there were no property, there would be no law and no need for its sharp-edged though hollow categories.

Continue reading “Ernst Bloch on Law and the State”

Does Inconceivability Entail Impossibility?

In an earlier thread James Anderson makes some observations that cast doubt on the standard entailment from inconceivability to impossibility.  (I had objected that his  theological mysterianism seems to break the inferential link connecting inconceivability and impossibility.) He writes,

But even though we have no direct epistemic access to any other inconceivability than our own, and despite the formidable historical pedigree of the idea, it still strikes me as implausible to maintain that inconceivability to us entails impossibility.  [. . .] For the principle in question is logically equivalent to the principle that possibility entails conceivability. But is it plausible to think that absolutely whatsoever happens to be possible in this mysterious universe and beyond must be conceivable to the human mind, at least in principle? Can this really be right?

I want to emphasize that I'm not advocating some form of modal skepticism, i.e., the view that our intuitions as to what is possible or impossible are generally unreliable. On the contrary, I think they're reliable. I just deny that they're infallible.

This does indeed give me pause.  Anderson is certainly right that if inconceivability entails impossibility, then, by contraposition, possibility entails conceivability.  These entailments stand or fall together.  But is it plausible to maintain that whatever is possible is conceivable?  Why couldn't there be possible states of affairs that are inconceivable to us?

But there may be an ambiguity here.  I grant that there are, or rather could be, possible states of affairs that we cannot bring before our minds.  These would be states of affairs that we cannot entertain due to our cognitive limitations.  But that is not to say that a state of affairs that I can bring before my mind and in which I find a logical contradiction is a possible state of affairs.  Thus we should distinguish two senses of inconceivable, where S is a state of affairs and A is any well-functioning finite cognitive agent:

S is inconceivable1 to A =df A entertains S and finds a contradiction in S.

S is inconceivable2 to A =df A is unable to entertain (bring before his mind) S.

Now it seems clear that inconceivability2 does not entail impossibility.  But I should think that inconceivability1 does entail impossibility.  For if S is contradictory, then that very state of affairs as the precise accusative of my thought that it is, cannot obtain.  Its possibility in reality is ruled out by the fact that it cannot be entertained without contradiction.

Now does possibility entail conceivability?  No, in that the possible need not be thinkable by us: there could be possibilities that lie beyond our mental horizon.  But possibility does entail conceivability if what we mean is that possible states of affairs that we can bring before our minds must be free of contradiction.

So, in apparent contradiction to what Anderson is claiming, I urge that we can be infallibly sure that a state of  affairs in which we detect a logical contradiction cannot obtain in reality.  There is more to reality, including the reality of the merely possible,  than what we can think of; but what we can think of must be free of contradiction if it is to be possible.

Conceivability without contradiction is no infallible guide to possibility.  But inconceivability1 is an infallible guide to impossibility.  Where Anderson apparently sees symmetry, I uphold the traditional asymmetry.

Rand Resurgent

Cathy Young's A Rand Revival offers a balanced appraisal.  Excerpts:

Politically, Rand wanted to provide liberal capitalism with a moral foundation, challenging the notion that communism was a noble but unrealistic ideal while the free market was a necessary evil best suited to humanity's flawed nature.

[. . .]

But Rand's work also has a darker, more disturbing aspect–one that, unfortunately, is all too good a fit for this moment in America's political life. That is her intellectual intolerance and her tendency to demonize her opponents. Speaking through her hero John Galt, Rand declared, There are two sides to every issue: one side is right and the other is wrong, but the middle is always evil.

For more on Rand, seen my Ayn Rand category.

Materialist Mysterianism

I wonder whether mysterianism in defense of such theological doctrines as the Trinity does not in the end backfire by making possible the philosophical justification of philosophical theses incompatible with it.  To ease our way into this line of inquiry, let us consider materialist mysterianism. 

1.  If mysterianism is an acceptable approach in theology, why can't a materialist make use of it in the philosophy of mind?  The (positive) mysterian maintains that there are true propositions which appear (and presumably must appear given our 'present' cognitive make-up) contradictory.  This is not to be confused with dialetheism, the view that there are some true contradictions.  For the mysterian there are no true contradictions, but there are some truths that must appear to us as contradictory due to our cognitive limitations. 

Continue reading “Materialist Mysterianism”

Innumeracy at the Highest Levels?

Barack Obama claims to have visited 57 U. S. states.  He also claimed that he had one more to go and that he wasn't allowed by his staff to visit Hawaii or Alaska.  Does he really think there are 60 states?  Of course not.  Let's be charitable.  The man was very, very tired and he got confused.  He said '57' instead of '47.' 

But here's the thing.  Had George Bush or Ronald Reagan or any conservative made this mistake, liberals would have seized upon it as proof of stupidity.  This says something about liberals.  For a liberal, conservatives are stupid no matter how much intelligence they display, and liberals are the opposite no matter how much stupidity they manifest, for example, the stupidity of thinking that one can spend one's way out of debt.

So who is really stupid?

Alvin Plantinga on YouTube: A Modal Argument for Dualism

Here.  The host, Robert Kuhn, "an old brain scientist" as he describes himself, can't seem to wrap his mind around the argument.  The argument goes like this, where 'B' denotes (rigidly designates) a person's body or else that part of a person's body (presumably the brain or a part of the brain) with which the materialist wishes to identify the person.

1. If x = y, then whatever is true of x is true of y and vice versa. (Leibniz's Law)

2. 'Possibly exists when B doesn't' is true of me but not true of B.

3. Therefore: I am not identical to B.  (From 1, 2 by Universal Instantiation and Modus Tollens)

Kuhn, at or around 4:26, objects that the distinction between a person and his body is "a possibility, an indeterminate fact."  No! The possibility of my existing when B doesn't entails the actual difference between me and my body, not the mere possibility of such a difference.  And Kuhn still doesn't get it after Plantinga explains it.

The argument is valid in point of logical form, and (1) is a principle than which a more luminous one cannot be conceived; but what is the evidence for (2)? How does one know that it is possible that one exist when one's body or brain doesn't?  Because one can imagine that state of affairs. Plantinga reminds us of Franz Kafka's short story, "The Metamorphosis" in which the protagonist, Gregor Samsa, wakes up one morning with the body of a beetle.  It is imaginable that one retain one's conscious identity while possessing a beetle body, and further imaginable that one's human body be destroyed; this, Plantinga maintains, is evidence for the truth of (2).

It didn't occur to Kuhn to question whether imaginability is evidence of possibility.

Can There be False Clichés?

I just heard Dennis Prager say that there are both true and false cliches.  Now Prager is a font of wisdom and good sense and a national treasure.  The fact that the Left hates him is proof positive of that.  But I can't see that he is right on this point. 

A cliche is a trite or hackneyed expression.  It is a form of words regularly and often thoughtlessly repeated.  'Haste makes waste.' 'Don't put all your eggs in one basket.' 'He who hesitates is lost.' 'The early bird gets the worm.'  'As old as the hills.' 'Dead as a doornail.'  'Proof positive.'  'First and foremost.' What makes a cliche a cliche is a lack of novelty or originality but not a lack of truth.  One typically 'parrots' a cliche, and those whose conversations are filled with them we suspect of being shallow and unreflective.  One can, of course, repeat a cliche without 'parroting' it.  We conservatives like many cliches since they are as it were the distillate of hard-won wisdom. After all, in most instances, haste does make waste as experience teaches.  I can point that out both thoughtlessly and thoughtfully.  Think of how foolish it would be to refuse to teach a child this truth on the ground that it is a cliche!  Only a liberal could be so foolish.  Better a stale truth than a false novelty.  Think of all the Madoff investors who to their serious detriment violated ' Don't put all your eggs in one basket.'

Continue reading “Can There be False Clichés?”

Whether Jesus Exists Necessarily

Lukas Novak comments by e-mail:

You list the following propositions in your post, Christology, Reduplicatives, and Their Truth-Makers:

1. The man Jesus = the 2nd Person of the Trinity.
2. The 2nd Person of the Trinity exists necessarily.
3. The man Jesus does not exist necessarily.

and then say that "each of these propositions is one that a Christian who understands his doctrine ought to accept." And then you develop a way how the (quite obvious) inconsistency could be explained away.

What I want to point out is that in fact the third proposition most certainly is not something that a Christian who understands his doctrine ought to accept. Quite to the contrary!

There is more to Dr. Novak's e-mail than the above excerpt, but it may help if I give an explicit argument for (3):

4. God is a necessary being: he exists in every possible world.

5. God's creation of a physical universe  is a libertarianly free act:  there are possible worlds in which God creates  a physical universe and there are possible worlds in which he does not.  So, although God exists in every possible world, he does not create in every possible world.

6. The existence of  a physical universe and of each physical thing in it is contingent.  (from 5)

7. Jesus is a man (a rational animal) born in Bethlehem of Mary,  etc.

8.  Animals, rational or not, are physical denizens of the physical universe.

9. Jesus is a contingent being. (from 6, 7, 8)

10.  That which exists contingently (in some but not all worlds) does not exist necessarily (in all worlds).  (Self-evident modal principle)

3.  The man Jesus does not exist necessarily. (from 10)

This appears to be a 'knock-down' argument.  Surely, (4) and (5) are propositions an orthodox Christian must accept. (6) follows from (5).  No orthodox Christian can deny (7). (8) is an analytic truth. (9) is a valid consequence of (6), (7), and (8) taken together.  (1) is a self-evident modal axiom. (3) follows directly from (10).

I suggest that this crystal-clear argument is more worthy of acceptance that the obscure doctrine of supposita with which Novak attempts to rebut (3).

Bogus Quotations: Did Einstein Really Say That?

Politicians and popular writers who retail in bogus quotations should have a close cousin of the logic stick applied to their silly heads.

Senator Charles Grassley (R) was on C-Span the morning of 7 March 2005 talking about Social Security reform among other things. He attributed the following quotation to Albert Einstein: "Compound interest is the only miracle in the world." Did Einstein say that? I rather doubt it. It is too stupid a thing for Einstein to say.

There is nothing miraculous about compound interest, and there is no 'magic' in it either. It is very simple arithmetic. Suppose you invest $2000 at 10% compounded annually. At the end of the first year, you have $2,200. How much do you have at the end of the second year, assuming no additions or subtractions from the principal? $2,400? No. What you have is $2,200 + 220 = $2, 420. Where did the extra twenty bucks come from? That is interest on interest. It is the interest on interest on interest . . . that make compounding a powerful tool of wealth enhancement.

But there is nothing miraculous or magical about it. Words mean things. Use them wisely.

And don't look to Einstein for advice on personal finance.

A Coherent Representing of the Incoherent

Drawinghands It is broadly logically impossible that there be a hand that both draws itself and is drawn by itself.  So what the Escher print represents is B-L impossible, and in this sense 'incoherent'  and 'unintelligible.'  But the Escher drawing itself is coherent and intelligible as a representation.  And so we can say that we understand the drawing while also saying that we do not understand that which is depicted in the drawing.

This post is a comment on a comment.

Saturday Night at the Oldies: It’s Not All Sex and Drugs

Here are my six favorite broadly religious songs in the rock/pop genre.  Clapton & Winwood, In the Presence of the Lord.  And now three by the 'philosophical' Beatle.  (If Ringo Starr is the 'regular guy' Beatle, and Paul McCartney the 'romantic' Beatle, and John Lennon the 'radical' Beatle, then George Harrison is the 'philosophical/religious' Beatle.  My Sweet Lord.  All Things Must Pass.  Give Me Love.

And now two by the protean Bob Dylan.  Father of Night.  Gotta Serve Somebody.

Finally, two powerful anti-drug songs.  Hoyt Axton, The Pusher. Steppenwolf version from "Easy Rider."  Buffy Sainte- Marie, Codeine.

David Stove on the Logos

Commenting on philosophy's alleged "deep affinity with lunacy," Australian positivist David Stove writes,

That the world is, or embodies, or is ruled by, or was created by, a sentence-like entity, a ‘logos’, is an idea almost as old as Western philosophy itself. Where the Bible says ‘The Word was made flesh’, biblical scholars safely conclude at once that some philosopher [Stove’s emphasis] has meddled with the text (and not so as to improve it). Talking-To-Itself is what Hegel thought the universe is doing, or rather, is. In my own hearing, Professor John Anderson maintained, while awake, what with G. E. Moore was no more than a nightmare he once had, that tables and chairs and all the rest are propositions. So it has always gone on. In fact St John’s Gospel, when it says’In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God’, sums up pretty accurately one of the most perennial, as well as most lunatic, strands in philosophy. (The passage is also of interest as proving that two statements can be consistent without either being intelligible.) (From The Plato Cult and Other Philosophical Follies, Basil Blackwell 1991, p. 32.)

A few comments are in order.

Continue reading “David Stove on the Logos”