Author: Bill Vallicella

Do You Want an Academic Job?

Thomas H. Benton, Dodging the Anvil:

Essentially, if you want an academic job, you'd better be really good at what you do. You should be at a top university (although sometimes less-famous institutions can be effective at local placements); have at least a few high-quality publications, preferably in top-tier journals; have a dissertation that's nearly a publishable book, preferably under contract with a university press; be a charismatic and challenging teacher; be socially energetic without being threatening; have well-known and well-connected advisers who will support you without any reservations; be willing to live anywhere; be prepared to work as a visiting professor and move a few times in the first decade of your career; and be willing to live with the possibility that you will always have an itinerant, insecure, poorly compensated existence.

But you knew all that already.

Related posts, and links to two other earlier Benton pieces, are filed under Academia.

Four Slants on Scripture

Suppose you are a theist (classically defined) and are also open to  the possibility of divine revelation. Suppose further that you are  open to the possibility of a written revelation. Call the scripture of  a religion its 'Book.' The three Abrahamic religions, Judaism,  Christianity, and Islam, sometimes called 'religions of the Book,'  each have their Book. Let's not worry about overlap, or translation, or influence, or sectarian squabbles over the canonicity or otherwise of certain writings. Let's think like philosophers in terms of big broad possibilities of interpretation. A philosopher worth his salt goes for the big picture. He is out to reconnoitre the conceptual  landscape, not get lost in details. Off the top of my head, there are four main possible slants on scripture. These interpretations can be arranged on a spectrum from the radically transcendent to the utterly immanent.*

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Can a Faith Commitment be Tentative?

Ed Farrell writes,

I greatly enjoy your blog and read it often.

I think your latest post (Mature Religion: More Quest than Conclusions) misses the mark.  For the believer of a revealed religion (I'm a Christian) the issue is not so much quest or conclusions as commitment.  It's true we can't know God in the sense you're speaking of but we can have faith that the biblical revelations are true as far as they go, which is to say in defining our relations to God and the terms of our reconciliation with Him.  The faith that's required here is not tentative but committed, because it will require action and probably sacrifice.  In this arena quest is put behind although theology may remain a kind of quest, for elucidation if not for the meaning supplied by faith.

Thanks for all your thought-provoking posts.

Thank you for writing, Mr. Farrell.  You too have a very interesting website.

You are right to point out the important role of faith.   I agree that faith, if it is genuine, must manifest itself in action and sacrifice.  Faith is not merely a verbal assent to certain propositions but a commitment to live in a certain way.  Where we seem to disagree is on the question whether a commitment can be tentative.  You write as if commitment excludes tentativeness, whereas I tend to think that a faith-commitment can and indeed must be tentative.  A living faith, one that is not a mere convenience, or merely a source of comfort or psychological security,  is one that regularly examines itself and is open to question.  A living faith is one that needs ongoing examination and renewal, with the possibility left open that the faith-commitment be modified or even abandoned.  But that does not imply that one does not act on one's commitments while they are in place.

The point of my post was that religion needs to be rescued from both the despisers and the dogmatists.  I expect that you'll agree that the nincompoops of the New Atheism with their flying spaghetti monsters and celestial teapots have no understanding of religion.  But neither can religion be reduced to doctrinal formulae that finitize the Infinite.  The spirit of my post is adumbrated in these sentences from Simone Weil's Gravity and Grace in the chapter, "Atheism as a Purification": "Of two men who have no experience of God, he who denies him is perhaps nearer to him than the others." (103) "Religion in so far as it is a source of consolation is a hindrance to true faith: in this sense atheism is a purification."

 

 

Mature Religion: More Quest than Conclusions

All genuine religion involves a quest since God must remain largely unknown, and this by his very nature. He must remain latens Deitas in Aquinas' phrase:

Adoro te devote, latens Deitas, Quæ sub his figuris vere latitas;
Tibi se cor meum totum subjicit, Quia te contemplans totum deficit.

Godhead here in hiding, whom I do adore, Masked by these bare shadows, shape and nothing more, See, Lord, at Thy service low lies here a heart Lost, all lost in wonder at the God thou art.

(tr. Gerard Manley Hopkins, here.)
  
But as religion becomes established in the world in the form of churches, sects, and denominations with worldly interests, it becomes less  of a quest and more of a worldly hustle. Dogmatics displaces inquiry, and fund-raising faith. The once alive become ossified.

Mature religion must be more quest than conclusions. It is vastly more a seeking than a finding. More a cleansing of windows and a polishing  of mirrors than a glimpsing. And certainly more a glimpsing than a comfortable resting upon dogmas.  Perhaps when religion and philosophy are viewed as quests they merge into one another. (But compare Leo Strauss on the tension between Athens and Jerusalem!)

The critic of religion wants to pin it down, reducing it to dogmatic contents, so as to attack it where it is weakest. Paradoxically, the atheist 'knows' more about God than the sophisticated theist — he knows so much that he knows no such thing could exist. He 'knows' the divine nature and knows that it is incompatible with the existence of evil — to mention one line of attack. Aquinas, by contrast, held that the existence of God is far better known than God's nature — which remains shrouded in a cloud of unknowing.

The religionist also wants religion pinned down and dogmatically spelled out for purposes of self-definition, doxastic security, other-exclusion, worldly promotion and political leverage. This is a reason why reformers like Jesus are met with a cold shoulder — or worse.

 

The Bitch Impecunia

Many are the goddesses that tempt the young, the romantic, the idealistic.  Time's alchemy will cause the masks of some to slip and reveal the bitch Impecunia.  Cirmcumstances straitened by devotion to one's art  or one's cause are better tolerated in the days of youth.  I do not advise that you abandon your high aspirations: they may be what is best in you.  Just realize that you have to pay your dues if you want to play the blues.  It don't come easy.

The Pinocchio ‘Paradox’

This curious bagatelle is wending its way through the World Wide WebPinocchio.  The cartoon is supposed to be paradoxical in some way.  The reader who brought it to my attention writes, "A friend and myself actually debated this at length over lunch, and I argued that at best it is a performative inconsistency.  I'm sure you have a more nuanced opinion on this silly meme!"   

Well, let's see.  The salient feature of Pinocchio is that his nose grows whenever he tells a lie.  From this one guesses that the paradox has something to do with lying.  Now a lie is not the same as a false statement; it is a false statement made with the intention to deceive  by someone who knows the truth.  (Or so I will assume for the space of this post.)  If this is what a lie is, then one cannot lie about matters that are not objectively the case and known to be such.  Suppose I predict that tomorrow morning, at 6 AM, my blood pressure will be 125/75, but my prediction turns out false: my blood pressure the next morning is 135/85.  No one who heard my prediction could claim that I lied when I made it even if I had the intention of deceiving my hearers.  For although I made (what turned out to be) a false statement with the intention to deceive, I had no way of knowing exactly what my blood pressure would be the next day. 

Similarly with 'My nose will grow now.'  This  sentence does not express an intention on Pinocchio's part to bring about a nose lengthening by the power of his will since presumably he never has such an intention.  The sentence is a future tense sentence which predicts what is about to happen.  'Now' does not refer to the time of utterance, but to a time right after it.  (If you argue that the presence of 'now' renders the sentence present tense, then the sentence is incoherent, and the 'paradox' cannot get off the ground.) 

It follows that Pinocchio cannot be lying.  Assuming the Law of Excluded Middle and Bivalence, what he says is either true or false.  Either way, no paradox arises that I can see.

But suppose Pinnochio utters the present tense sentence, 'My nose grows now' or 'My nose is growing now.'  Does this issue in paradox?

If  Pinocchio says 'My nose  grows now,' he is either lying or not.   If he is lying, then he is making a false statement, which implies that his nose does not grow now.  If he is not lying, then his statement is either true or false, which implies that either his nose does grow now or his nose does not grow now.  Therefore, either his nose does not grow now or his nose does grow now.  But that is wholly unproblematic. 

Therefore I fail to find any paradox here if a paradox is either a logical consistency or a performative inconsistency. 

What am I missing?  There is a 2010 Analysis article under this rubric.  But I don't have access to it at the moment, and I'm not sure the topic is exactly the same.

Ontological Analysis in Aristotle and Bergmann: Prime Matter Versus Bare Particulars

Berg1 Hardly anyone reads Gustav Bergmann any more, but since I read everything, I read Bergmann. It is interesting to compare his style of ontological analysis with that of the great hylomorphic ontologists, Aristotle and Aquinas. The distinguished Aristotelian Henry B. Veatch does some of my work for me in a fine paper, "To Gustav Bergmann: A Humble Petition and Advice" in M.S.Gram and E.D.Klemke, eds. The Ontological Turn: Studies in the Philosophy of Gustav Bergmann (University of Iowa Press, 1974, pp. 65-85)

I want to focus on Veatch's comparison of Aristotle and Bergmann on the issue of prime matter/bare particulars. As Veatch correctly observes, "all of the specific functions which bare particulars perform in Bergmannian ontology are the very same functions as are performed by matter in Aristotle . . . ." (81) What are these functions?

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Striving

Striving, we find what we can accomplish. But we also experience our limits, some of which are not merely ours but humanity's. Both upshots of striving are salutary. Learning what we can and cannot do we learn the extent of our powers and thereby who and what we are. Self-knowledge is good. So strive. 

Hic Rhodus, Hic Salta

"Here is Rhodes, jump here."  From Aesop's Fables #209, "The Boastful Athlete."  A man who had been off in foreign lands, returns home.  He brags of his exploits.  He claims that in Rhodes he made a long jump the likes of which had never been seen.  A skeptical bystander calls him on his boast:  Here's your Rhodes, jump here!

The moral?  Put your money where your mouth is.  Don't talk about it, do it!

This post is a stub.  Perhaps an erudite classicist such as Mike Gilleland could complete it.  He would have to do at least the following:  dig up all the ancient sources in Greek and Latin; trace the saying in Erasmus and Goethe; comment on Hegel's variation on the saying in the Vorrede zur Philosophie des Rechts, explaining why he has saltus for salta; find and comment on Marx's comment on Hegel's employment of the saying.

Finally, if Alan Rhoda were to rename his cleverly titled weblog Alanyzer — and I'm not saying he should — he might consider Hic Rhoda, Hic Salta.  He is a very tall man; I'm 6' 1'' and had to look up to see his face when I met him in Las Vegas some years back.  To jump over him would be quite a feat.

Walt Stack Remembered

Waltstack I find myself these days as enthusiastic about running as I was in the mid-'70s when I first took up the noble sport.  It is perhaps the proximity of the Grim Reaper, his sharp scythe glistening in the Arizona sunshine, that has imparted a spring to my step and a glide to my stride.  With the ultimate Repo Man on my tail and on my trail, I am out to grab for all the gusto there is while the sun shines.  I'm fixin' to make like Walt Stack who is gone but not forgotten.  How do you stack up?

The guy was a Commie, but I can forgive him that.  Running covers a multitude of sins.

What is Philosophy? Some Contemporary Views

The question about the nature of philosophy is itself a philosophical question:  metaphilosophy is a branch of philosophy.  And so one expects and finds a variety of competing answers.  Here are some.  I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the quotations.  My comments are in blue.  I conclude with a brief statement of my own.

Philosophy is thinking in slow motion. It breaks down, describes and assesses moves we ordinarily make at great speed – to do with our natural motivations and beliefs. It then becomes evident that alternatives are possible [John Campbell, Philosophers]

Nice as a characterization, but does not get the length of a definition.  You could say the same about physics.

One comes to philosophy already endowed with a stock of opinions. It is not the business of philosophy either to undermine or to justify these pre-existing opinions, to any great extent, but only to try to discover ways of expanding them into an orderly system.  It succeeds to the extent that (1) it is systematic, and (2) it respects those of our pre-philosophical opinions to which we are firmly attached. In so far as it does both better than any alternative we have thought of, we give it credence. [David Lewis, Counterfactuals]

Although I am a conservative across the board (socially, politically, fiscally, linguistically . . .), this characterization I find too conservative.  Like a good conservative, I am prepared to say that there is a presumption in favor of pre-existing opinions, but that it is a defeasible presumption.  Why shouldn't metaphysics be revisionary as opposed to descriptive, to allude to P. F. Strawson's old distinction?  (See the opening sentences of Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, Methuen, 1959.) Included in our stock of "pre-existing opinions" are our modal beliefs.  Must we uphold them at all costs?  Could it not be that there is no modality in reality, that modality is merely epistemic? And when one considers the absurd lengths to which David Lewis was driven "to expand into an orderly system" our modal opinions, then one could reasonably maintain that it would be better to jettison our ordinary modal opinions if the only suitable truthmakers for them are possible worlds conceived of as maximal mereological sums of concreta all equally real.

If one adopted Lewis's characterization, one would have to deny that F. H. Bradley was a philosopher.  For his was a revisionary project: he was not concerned to "expand into an orderly system" "our pre-existing opinions."  Quite the contrary: he was out to consign the whole lot of them to the realm of Appearance.  And it seems the question whether metaphysics should be descriptive or revisionary, a question which is itself philosophical,  would be ruled out if Lewis's characterization is accepted.

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