Bill Vallicella – Page 712 – Maverick Philosopher

‘Guns on the Street’

It's a liberal phrase, a silly phrase, a phrase that aids and abets thoughtlessness. Liberals speak of the 'guns on the street' and of getting them off the street. Now I've walked down many a street in
many a city in this world, but I have yet to see any guns on the street. But I have seen them in the hands of people. The liberal tendency is to blame the instrument not the agent. You hear this sort of thing all the time: Guns have killed X people in Y time. A gun can do no such thing. Do liberals know this? They must, but then why do they talk as if they don't? So maybe they don't know it.

I didn't leer at the girl, my eyeglasses did. I didn't insult my colleague, my tongue did. Tookie Williams is not responsible for brutal murders, society is. It's the same sort of nonsense.

Don Colacho’s Aphorisms

Ah, the webbiness of the Web! I used an aphorism of Nicolás Gómez Dávila three days ago for purposes of logical analysis and received a comment from one 'Stephen' who is the proprietor of an interesting site devoted to translations of Don Colacho's aphorisms. The blog is appropriately entitled Don Colacho's Aphorisms. Please do check it out if you are a lover of aphorisms. His are even better than mine, if I do say so myself. Here is an example:

“Social” is the adjective that serves as a pretext for all swindles.

Excellent! If I may be permitted to supply an example: social justice.

Another good aphorist is Deogolwulf, proprietor of The Joy of Curmudgeonry. Here is an example of one of his fewtrils: "The common man is never so clever as the politician says and never so stupid as the politician believes."

John Pepple on the Need for a Cultural Revolution

I drew your attention to John Pepple's weblog, I Want a New Left, a few days ago. Pepple identifies himself as a leftist, but what's in a label? If he were characteristic of leftists, which he isn't, I would have little or no problem with them. I find myself wholly in agreement with his post, We Need a Cultural Revolution. His topic is violent crime among the poor, and how the rebellious attitudes propagated by the 'Sixties Left have had terrible consequences for the poor without harming the well-off who spread the pernicious attitudes and who, after sloughing off their rebelliousness, slid comfortably back into the establishment. Excerpts, emphasis added:

The problem goes back to that cultural revolution called the Sixties, because this sort of thing [extreme gang violence] did not happen before that decade. Part of that decade was the rise of the left’s cultural dominance, and the left (whether the old left or the new left) has always been soft on crime. Pushing poor people into crime makes sense to the left because such criminals are seen by them as heroes against the evil capitalists. But in fact poor people who turn to crime basically rob other poor people, which means that the total gain for the poor is zero. Moreover, once businesses in poor neighborhoods realize they have to deal with criminals, they raise prices, either because they have to hire more security people or because they have to compensate for the goods lost through theft. Once again, this doesn’t really help the poor.

That is spot on. Leftists coddle criminals and the unproductive while penalizing productive behavior via taxation and regulation. But by attacking those who create wealth, they make everyone poorer. Fetishizers of equality, leftists would rather have everyone poor and equal rather than tolerate inequalities that benefit the worst off.

Continue reading “John Pepple on the Need for a Cultural Revolution”

Douglas Hyde: From Communist to Catholic

I am now reading Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism (HarperCollins 2009). Over 700 pages. The author's name is hardly donnish, but he is Emeritus Professor of Politics at Oxford University. There is a chapter entitled "The Appeals of Communism," and in it I came across a reference to Douglas Hyde:

For some who joined the Communist Party, a search for belief and a craving for certainty were important parts of their psychological make-up. One English Communist, Douglas Hyde, moved from being a young Methodist lay preacher, with an interest also in other religions, to becoming a Communist activist for twenty years, finishing up as news editor of the CPGB party newspaper, the Daily Worker, before resigning from the party in 1948 to become a proselytizing member of the Catholic Church. Although Hyde's political memoir, I Believed, written in the late Stalin period, is also a reasoned attack on Communist Party strategy and tactics, it holds that a majority of those attracted to Communism in those years were 'subconsciously looking for a cause which will to fill the void left by unbelief, or, as in my own case, an insecurely held belief which is failing to satisfy them intellectually and spiritually.' (p. 125)

People have strong doxastic security needs. They need a system of belief and practice to structure their lives. Few can tread the independent path. In the 2oth century many bright and earnest young people sought meaning and structure in Communism. In the 21st century radical Islam fills a similar need. Both snares and delusions, of course. It is arguably better to have no ideals rather than the wrong ideals, no beliefs rather than false and pernicious ones.

“Some of Us Just Go One God Further”

I've seen this quotation attributed to Richard Dawkins. From what I have read of him, it seems like something he would say. The idea, I take it, is that all gods are on a par, and so, given that everyone is an atheist with respect to some gods, one may as well make a clean sweep and be an atheist with respect to all gods. You don't believe in Zeus or in a celestial teapot. Then why do you believe in the God of Isaac, Abraham, and Jacob?

What Dawkins and the gang seem to be assuming is that the following questions are either senseless or not to be taken seriously: 'Is the Judeo-Christian god the true God?' 'Is any particular god the true God' 'Is any particular conception of deity adequate to the divine reality?' The idea, then, is that all candidates for deity are in the same logical boat. Nothing could be divine. Since all theistic religions are false, there is no live question as to which such religion is true. It is not as if there is a divine reality and that some religions are more adequate to it than others. One could not say, for example, that Judaism is somewhat adequate to the divine reality, Christianity more adequate, and Buddhism not at all adequate. There just is no divine reality. There is nothing of a spiritual nature beyond the human horizon. There is no Mind beyond finite mind. Man is the measure.

That is the atheist's deepest conviction. It seems so obvious to him that he cannot begin to genuinely doubt it, nor can he understand how anyone could genuinely believe the opposite. But why assume that there is nothing beyond the human horizon? The issue dividing theists and atheists can perhaps be put in terms of Jamesian 'live options':

EITHER: Some form of theism (hitherto undeveloped perhaps or only partially developed) is not only logically and epistemically possible, but also an 'existential' possibility, a live option;

OR: No form of theism is an existential possibility, a live option.

Theist-atheist dialog is made difficult by a certain asymmetry: whereas a sophisticated living faith involves a certain amount of purifying doubt, together with a groping beyond images and pat conceptualizations toward a transcendent reality, one misses any corresponding doubt or tentativeness on the part of sophisticated atheists. Dawkins and Co. seem so cocksure of their position. For them, theism is not a live option or existential possibility. This is obvious from their mocking comparisons of God to a celestial teapot, flying spaghetti monster, and the like.

For sophisticated theists, however, atheism is a live option. The existence of this asymmetry makes one wonder whether any productive dialog with atheists is possible.

Companion post: Russell's Teapot: Does It Hold Water?

The Hatfields and the McCoys

Whether or not it is true, the following has a clear sense:

1. The Hatfields outnumber the McCoys.

(1) says that the number of Hatfields is strictly greater than the number of McCoys. It obviously does not say, of each Hatfield, that he outnumbers some McCoy. If Gomer is a Hatfield and Goober a McCoy, it is nonsense to say of Gomer that he outnumbers Goober. The Hatfields 'collectively' outnumber the McCoys.

It therefore seems that there must be something in addition to the individual Hatfields (Gomer, Jethro, Jed, et al.) and something in addition to the individual McCoys (Goober, Phineas, Prudence, et al.) that serve as logical subjects of number predicates. In

2. The Hatfields are 100 strong

it cannot be any individual Hatfield that is 100 strong. This suggests that there must be some one single entity, distinct but not wholly distinct from the individual Hatfields, and having them as members, that is the logical subject or bearer of the predicate '100 strong.'

So here is a challenge to William the nominalist. Provide analyses of (1) and (2) that make it unnecessary to posit a collective entity (whether set, mereological sum, or whatever) in addition to individual Hatfields and McCoys.

Nominalists and realists alike agree that one must not "multiply entities beyond necessity." Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem! The question, of course, hinges on what's necessary for explanatory purposes. So the challenge for William the nominalist is to provide analyses of (1) and (2) that capture the sense of the analysanda and obviate the felt need to posit entities in addition to concrete particulars.

Now if such analyses could be provided, it would not follow that there are no 'collective entities.' But a reason for positing them would have been removed.

On Islam and Toleration (Peter Lupu)

In his post titled A Mosque Grows near Brooklyn Bill made the following statement:

“Muslims aren't very 'liberal,' are they? They are intolerant in their attitudes and their behavior. Now the touchstone of classical liberalism is toleration. Toleration is good, but it has limits. (See the posts in the category Toleration.) So why should we tolerate them when they work to undermine our way of life? The U. S. Constitution is not a suicide pact. We are under no obligation to tolerate the intolerant.”

This statement in turn provoked the following critical commentary by Prof. Richard Hennessey:

Now I personally know a number of Muslims. I can assure you that at least one of them is very liberal, at least one of them is tolerant in attitudes and behavior, and at least one of them is not working to “undermine our way of life.” The three universal statements that I see staring out at us from the quoted paragraph are all then false, as even the most rudimentary acquaintance with old Aristotle’s logic and its “square of opposition” would have you see.

I have no doubt that Prof. Hennessey knows at least one liberal Muslim, at least one tolerant Muslim, and at least one Muslim who is not intent on undermining the American way of life. So it seems that Prof. Hennessey conclusively refuted Bill’s statement. Did he?

Let us distinguish between four categories of what the term ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islam’ might mean:

(a) ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islam’ might refer to a *religion* just like ‘Christianity’, ‘Judaism’, ‘Buddhism’, etc;

(Peter is of course aware that the noun 'Muslim' cannot be used to refer to the religion, Islam; his point is that 'Muslim' as an adjective in 'Muslim religion' can used to refer to the religion, Islam.)

(b) ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islam’ might refer to a *class of people* whose heritage is Islam or adopted Islam as their religion;

(d) ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islam’ might refer to a country that has Islam as its official religion.

We are now in the position to evaluate Bill’s claim and Prof. Hennessey’s critical comments as quoted above relative to each of the above categories. Clearly, Prof. Hennessey is right when Bill’s claim is evaluated relative to category (b). But then again no one who reads Bill’s post thinks that he meant to say that every person whose heritage is Islam or adopted this religion is intolerant, anti-liberal, and intent to undermine Western Culture (See Bill’s reply in his Addendum and Corrigendum (7/22). Nevertheless, Prof. Hennessey scores one run here.

What about Bill’s statement interpreted in light of category (a)? One way of so doing is asking the following question: Does Islam as a religion promote the values of liberalism, toleration, and the Western way of life? I challenge Prof. Hennessey to answer this question. So far as I know, Islam as a religion does not promote any of these values. So at least in the eyes of this umpire Bill scores one run here. Thus far, the score is tied one to one.

When it comes to (c), the verdict is fairly clear: I doubt that anyone, including Prof. Hennessey, would challenge the notion that Islamism or Muslim Extremists abhor liberalism, toleration, and the Western way of life. So, what about (d)? Once again I think it is fairly clear that in most Muslim countries there is very little tolerance of other religions and certainly it is prohibited and dangerous to promote alternative religions. Moreover, most of the countries that have Islam as their official religion are anti-liberal and do not tolerate very well the Western way of life. At least this is so for the last ten or so years.

So it seems that Bill is right on three counts, whereas Prof. Hennessey is right on one count. Final score: three to one in favor of Bill, unless Prof. Hennessey wishes to challenge this umpire's score card. I invite him to do so.

I Need to Study Plural Predication

Here is a beautiful aphorism from Nicolás Gómez Dávila (1913-1994), in Escolios a un Texto Implicito (1977), II, 80, tr. Gilleland:

Stupid ideas are immortal. Each new generation invents them anew.

Clearly this does not mean:

1. Each stupid idea is immortal and is invented by each new generation anew.

So we try:

2. The set of stupid ideas is immortal in the sense that every new generation invents some stupid idea or other.

(2) is much closer to the intended meaning. The idea is that there are always stupid ideas around, not that any one stupid idea is always around. (2) seems to capture this notion. But (2) presents its own puzzles. A set is a collection, and a collection is not the mere manifold of its members: it is "a further entity over and above them" as Michael Potter puts it in Set Theory and its Philosophy (Oxford 2004, p. 22).

Potter speaks of collections versus fusions. The distinction emerges starkly when we consider that there is a distinction between a singleton collection and its member, but no distinction between a 'singleton' fusion and its member. Thus Quine is distinct from {Quine}, the set consisting of Quine and nothing else. But there is no distinction between Quine and the sum or fusion, (Quine). {Quine}, unlike Quine, has a member; but neither (Quine) nor Quine have members. A second difference is that, while it makes sense to speak of a set with no members, the celebrated null set, it makes no sense to speak of a null fusion. The set consisting of nothing, the null set { } is something; the fusion of nothing is nothing.

Getting back to stupid ideas, what I want to say is that 'stupid ideas are immortal' can be understood neither along the lines of (1) nor along the lines of (2). The generality expressed is quite obviously not distributive, but it is not quite collective either. We are not expressing the idea that there is some one entity "over and above" its members to which immortality is being ascribed. 'Stupid ideas' seems to pick out a fusion; but if a fusion is a pure manifold, how can it be picked out?

The puzzle is that immortality is not being predicated of each stupid idea, but it is also not being predicated of some one item distinct from stupid ideas which has them as members, whether this one item be a mathematical set or a mereological sum.

We know what we mean when we say that stupid ideas are immortal, but we cannot make it precise, or at least I can't make it precise given my present level of logical acumen.

So rather than contribute any stupid ideas of my own, I will go to the library and check out Thomas McKay's Plural Predication.

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Carmelita, Juanita, and the Wicked Felina

Warren Zevon, Carmelita. Linda Ronstadt's version. Stay clear of heroin and Pioneer chicken, both.

Flying Burrito Brothers, Juanita. Lyrics:

'No affection' were the words that stuck on my mind
When she walked out on me for the very last time.
Oh mama sweet mama can you tell me what to say?
I don't know what I've done to be treated this way.

In a cold dirty room that's where I found myself
With a bottle of wine and some pills off the shelf.
Oh mama sweet mama can you tell me what to say?
I don't know what I've done and I'm feeling so ashamed.

Then an angel appeared she was just 17
In a dirty old gown (town?) with a conscience so clean
Oh mama sweet mama can you tell me what to say?
She's brought back the life that I once threw away.

Delightfully ambiguous: Is Juanita the girl who walked out or the one who saved him? Or both?

Marty Robbins, El Paso. "Cradled by two loving arms that I'll die for/One little kiss and Felina, good-bye."

The Axiom of Infinity as Easy Way Out?

I posed the question, Can one prove that there are infinite sets? Researching this question, I consulted the text I studied when I took a course in set theory in a mathematics department quite a few years ago. The text is Karl Hrbacek and Thomas Jech, Introduction to Set Theory (Marcel Dekker, 1978). On pp. 53-54 we read:

It is useful to formulate Theorem 2.4 a little differently. We call a set A inductive if (a) 0 is an element of A; (b) if x is an element of A, then S(x) is an element of A. [The successor of a set x is the set S(x) = x U {x}.]

In this terminology, Theorem 2. 4 is asserting that the set of natural numbers is inductive. There is only one difficulty with this reformulation: We have not yet proved that the set of all natural numbers exists. There is a good reason for it: It cannot be done, axioms adopted so far do not imply existence of infinite sets. Yet the possibility of collecting infinitely many objects into a single entity is the essence of set theory and the main reason for its usefulness in many branches of abstract mathematics. We, therefore, extend our axiomatic system by adding to it the following axiom.

The Axiom of Infinity. An inductive set exists.

Intuitively, the set of all natural numbers is such a set.

Therefore, if we turn to the mathematicians for help in answering our question, we get the following. There are infinite (inductive) sets because we simply posit their existence! Thus their existence is not proven, but simply assumed. Philosophically, this leaves something to be desired. For it is not self-evident that there should be any infinite sets. If there are infinite sets, then they are actually, not potentially, infinite. (The notion of a potentially infinite mathematical set is senseless.) And it is not self-evident that there are actual infinities.

I will be told that there is no necessity that an axiom be self-evident. True: axiomhood does not require self-evidence. But if an axiom is an arbitrary posit, then I am free to reject it. Being a cantankerous philosopher, however, I demand a bit more from a decent axiom. I suppose what I am hankering after is a compelling reason to accept the Axiom of Infinity.

A comparison with complex (imaginary) numbers occurs to me. They are strange animals. But however strange they are, there is a sort of argument for them in the fact that they 'work,' i.e. they find application in alternating current theory the implementation of which is in devices all around us. But can a similar argument be made for the denizens of Cantor's Paradise? I don't know, but I have my doubts. Nature is finite and so not countably infinite let alone uncountably infinite. But caveat lector: I am not a philosopher of mathematics; I merely play one in the blogosphere. What you read here are jottings in an online notebook. So read critically.

Nietzsche’s Definition of ‘Nihilist’

Der Wille zur Macht #585 (Kroener Ausgabe):

Ein Nihilist ist der Mensch, welcher von der Welt, wie sie ist, urteilt, sie sollte nicht sein, und von der Welt, wie sie sein sollte, urteilt, sie existiert nicht.

A nihilist is one who judges of the world as it is, that it ought not be, and of the world as it ought to be, that it does not exist.

My translation is as beautiful as the German original. Don't you agree?

Mel Gibson, Misplaced Moral Enthusiasm, and Real Threats

Mel Gibson is in the news again. What I said about him on 1 August 2006 bears repeating:

What's worse: Driving while legally drunk at 87 miles per hour in a 45 mph zone, or making stupid anti-Semitic remarks? The former, obviously. And yet a big stink is being made about Gibson's drunken rant. I call this misplaced moral enthusiasm.

Calling a Jew a bad name won't kill him, but running him over in your speeding 2006 Lexus LS 430 will. On the one hand, offensive words that no reasonable person could take seriously; on the other hand, a deed that could get people killed.

Here is what Gibson said: "The Jews are responsible for all the wars in the world," and, addressing the arresting officer, "Are you a Jew?" Now compare Gibson with Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who repeatedly has called for the destruction of the State of Israel. Ahmadinejad's is speech that incites unspeakable violence, unlike Gibson's drunken rant which is no threat to anyone. So let's forget about Gibson, and concentrate on real threats.

Necessitas Consequentiae versus Necessitas Consequentiis

Take the sentence, 'If I will die tomorrow, then I will die tomorrow.' This has the form If p, then p, where 'p' is a placeholder for a proposition. Any sentence of this form is not just true, but logically true, i.e., true in virtue of its logical form. Now every sentence true in virtue of its logical form is necessarily true. (The converse, however, does not hold: there are necessary truths that are not logically true.) Thus we can write, 'Necessarily(if p, then p)' or

1. Nec (p –>p).

The parentheses show that the necessity attaches to the consequence, represented by the arrow, and not to the consequent, represented by the terminal 'p.' (When speaking of conditionals, logicians distinguish the antecedent from the consequent, or, trading Latin for Greek, the protasis from the apodosis.) Thus the above is an example of the necessitas consequentiae. This, however, must not be confused with the necessitas consequentiis, which is exemplified by

2. p–>Nec p.

In (2) the necessity attaches to the consequent. It should be obvious that (1) does not entail (2), equivalently, that (2) does not follow from (1). For example, although it is necessarily true that if I will die tomorrow, then I will die tomorrow, it does not follow, nor is it true, that if I will die tomorrow, then necessarily I will die tomorrow. Proving fatalism cannot be that easy. For even if I do die tomorrow, that will be at best a contingent occurrence, not something logically necessitated. (Think about it.)

To confuse (1) and (2) is to confuse the necessity of the consequence with the necessity of the consequent. This is an example of what logicians call a fallacy, i.e., a typical error in reasoning, and in particular a modal fallacy in that it deals with the (alethically) modal concepts of necessity and possibility and their cognates.

Class dismissed.

Can Federalism Save Us?

I fear that we are coming apart as a nation. We are disagreeing about things we ought not be disagreeing about, such as the need to secure the borders. The rifts are deep and nasty. Polarization and demonization of the opponent are the order of the day. Do you want more of this? Then give government more say in your life. The bigger the government, the more to fight over. Do you want less? Then support limited government and federalism. A return to federalism may be a way to ease the tensions, not that I am sanguine about any solution.

Federalism, roughly, is (i) a form of political organization in which governmental power is divided among a central government and various constituent governing entities such as states, counties, and cities; (ii) subject to the proviso that both the central and the constituent governments retain their separate identities and assigned duties. A government that is not a federation would allow for the central government to create and reorganize constituent governments at will and meddle in their affairs. Federalism is implied by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

Federalism would make for less contention, because people who support high taxes and liberal schemes could head for states like Massachusetts or California, while the conservatively inclined who support gun rights and capital punishment could gravitate toward states like Texas.

The fact of the matter is that we do not agree on a large number of divisive, passion-inspiring issues (abortion, gun rights, capital punishment, affirmative action, legal and illegal immigration, taxation, wealth redistribution, the purposes and limits, if any, of governmental power . . .) and we will never agree on them. These are not merely 'academic' issues since they directly affect the lives and livelihoods and liberties of people. And they are not easily resolved because they are deeply rooted in fundamental worldview differences. When you violate a man's liberty, or mock his moral sense, or threaten to destroy his way of life, you are spoiling for a fight and you will get it.

Worldview differences in turn reflect differences in values. Now values are not like tastes. Tastes cannot be reasonably discussed and disputed while values can. (De gustibus non est disputandum.) But value differences, though they can be fruitfully discussed, cannot be objectively resolved because any attempted resolution will end up relying on higher-order value judgments. There is no exit from the axiological circle. We can articulate and defend our values and clarify our value differences. What we cannot do is resolve our value differences to the satisfaction of all sincere, intelligent, and informed discussants.

Consider religion. Is it a value or not? Conservatives, even those who are atheistic and irreligious, tend to view religion as a value, as conducive to human flourishing. Liberals and leftists tend to view it as a disvalue, as something that impedes human flourishing. The question is not whether religion, or rather some particular religion, is true. Nor is the question whether religion, or some particular religion, is rationally defensible. The question is whether the teaching and learning and practice of a religion contributes to our well-being, not just as individuals, but in our relations with others. For example, would we be better off as a society if every vestige of religion were removed from the public square? Does Bible study tend to make us better people?

For a conservative like Dennis Prager, the answer to both questions is obvious. As I recall, he gives an example something like the following. You are walking down the street in a bad part of town. On one side of the street people are leaving a Bible study class. On the other side, a bunch of Hells [sic] Angels are coming out of the PussyCat Lounge. Which side of the street do you want to be on? For a conservative the answer is obvious. People who study the Bible with its Ten Commandments, etc. are less likely to mug or injure you than drunken bikers who have been getting in touch with their inner demons for the last three hours. But of course this little thought experiment won't cut any ice with a dedicated leftist.

I won't spell out the leftist response. I will say only that you will enter a morass of consideration and counter-consideration that cannot be objectively adjudicated.

My thesis is that there can be no objective resolution, satisfactory to every sincere, intelligent, and well-informed discussant, of the question of the value of religion. And this is a special case of a general thesis about the objective insolubility of value questions with respect to the issues that most concern us.

Another sort of value difference concerns not what we count as values, but how we weight or prioritize them. Presumably both conservatives and liberals value both liberty and security. But they will differ bitterly over which trumps the other and in what circumstances. Here too it is naive to expect an objective resolution of the issue satisfactory to all participants, even those who meet the most stringent standards of moral probity, intellectual acuity, knowledgeability with respect to relevant empirical issues, etc.

Liberal and conservative, when locked in polemic, like to call each other stupid. But of course intelligence or the lack thereof has nothing to do with the intractability of the debates. The intractability is rooted in value differences about which consensus is impossible. On the abortion question, for example, there is no empirical evidence that can resolve the dispute. Empirical data from biology and other sciences are of course relevant to the correct formulation of the problem, but contribute nothing to its resolution. Nor can reason whose organon is logic resolve the dispute. You would have to be as naive as Ayn Rand to think that Reason dictates a solution.

Recognizing these facts, we must ask ourselves: How can we keep from tearing each other apart literally or figuratively? Guns, God, abortion, illegal immigration — these are issues that get the blood up. I am floating the suggestion that federalism and severe limitations on the reach of the central government are what we need to lessen tensions.

Example: Suppose Roe v. Wade is overturned and the question of the legality of abortion is returned to the states. Some states will make it legal, others illegal. This would be a modest step in the direction of mitigating the tensions between the warring camps. If abortion is a question for the states, then no federal monies could be allocated to the support of abortion. People who want to live in abortion states can move there; people who don't can move to states in which abortion is illegal. Each can live with their own kind and avoid having their values and sensibilities disrespected.

I understand that my proposal will not be acceptable to either liberals or conservatives. Both want to use the power of the central government to enforce what they consider right. Both sides are convinced that they are right. But of course they cannot both be right. So how do they propose to heal the splits in the body politic?

Will Liberals Ever Retire the Race Card?

Why should they? As good leftists, they believe the end justifies the means, and their shameless race-baiting is a means conducive to their ends. It works. That's why they do it. They must at some level have an inkling of what vile people they are to employ such a shabby tactic, but whatever sense of moral decency is left in them is quickly smothered by their lust to win at all costs.

And it is indeed a well-rehearsed tactic which amounts to collusion on the part of liberal-left journalists and others to smear conservatives. This from the Christian Science Monitor:

When conservatives were criticizing Mr. Obama for his connection to the Rev. Jeremiah Wright in 2008, some JournoList members discussed a counterstrategy.

The Daily Caller writes that Spencer Ackerman, then of the Washington Independent, "urged his colleagues to deflect attention from Obama's relationship with Wright by changing the subject. Pick one of Obama's conservative critics, Mr. Ackerman wrote, 'Fred Barnes, Karl Rove, who cares – and call them racists.' "

See also Thomas Sowell's Race Card Fraud. Excerpt:

The latest attack on the Tea Party movement, by Ben Jealous of the NAACP, has once again played the race card. Like the proverbial lawyer who knows his case is weak, he shouts louder.

This is not the first time that an organization with an honorable and historic mission has eventually degenerated into a tawdry racket. But that an organization like the NAACP, after years of fighting against genuine racism, should now be playing the game of race card fraud is especially painful to see.

You should also read the posts in my Race category. There is plenty of documentation there of the race-baiting and scumbaggery which are the now the marks of contemporary Democrats, liberals, and leftists.

And you should do your bit to push back. The next time some scumbag of a liberal calls you a racist for standing up for fiscal responsibility or the rule of law, say this: You lie about us, we'll tell the truth about you.