Author: Bill Vallicella

On Hitchens and Death

I just caught the last third of an interview of Christopher Hitchens by Charlie Rose.  He looks bad, the chemotherapy having done a nasty tonsorial number on him.  But his trademark intellectual incandescence appeared undiminished.  'Brilliant' is a word I don't toss around lightly, but Hitch is one to whom it unarguably applies. Public intellectuals of his caliber are rare and it will be sad to see him go.  Agree or disagree with him, it is discourse at his level that justifies the high regard we place on free speech.

In the teeth of death the man remains intransigent in his unbelief.  And why not?  He lived in unbelief and so it is only fitting that he should die in it as well.  He lived for this life alone; it is fitting that he should die without hope. As I read him, God and the soul were never Jamesian live options.  To cop out now as debility and death approach must appear to him to be utterly contemptible, a grasping for straws, a fooling himself into a palliative illusion to ease the horror of annihilation.

For what he takes to be the illusion of immortality, Hitch substitutes literary immortality.  "As an adult whose hopes lay assuredly in the intellect, not in the hereafter, he concluded, 'Literature, not scripture, sustains the mind and — since there is no other metaphor — also the soul.'" (Here) But to the clearheaded, literary immortality is little more than a joke, and itself an illusion.  Only a few read Hitch now, and soon enough he will be unread, his books remaindered, put into storage, forgotten.  This is a fate that awaits all scribblers but a tiny few.  And even they will drink the dust of oblivion in the fullness of time.

To live on in one's books is a paltry substitute for immortality, especially when one recalls Georg Christoph Lichtenberg's aphorism: Ein Buch ist ein Spiegel, aus dem kein Apostel herausgucken kann, wenn ein Affe hineinguckt. "A book is a mirror:  if an ape peers in, no apostle will look out."  Most readers are more apish than apostolic.

To live on in one's books is only marginally better than to live on in the flickering and mainly indifferent memories of a few friends and relatives. And how can reduction to the status of a merely intentional object count as living on?

The besetting sin of powerful intellects is pride.  Lucifer, as his name indicates, is or was the light-bearer.  Blinded by his own light, he could see nothing beyond himself.  Such is the peril of intellectual incandescence.  Otherworldly light simply can't get through.  One thinks of Nietzsche, Russell, Sartre, and to a lesser extent Hitchens.  A mortal man with a huge ego — one which is soon to pop like an overinflated balloon.

The contemplation of death must be horrifying for those who pin all on the frail reed of the ego.  The dimming of the light, the loss of control, the feeling of helplessly and hopelessly slipping away into an abyss of nonbeing.  And all of this without the trust of the child who ceases his struggling to be borne by Another.  "Unless you become as little children, you cannot enter the kingdom of heaven."  But this of course is what the Luciferian intellect cannot do. It cannot relax, it must hold on and stay in control.  It must struggle helplessly as the ego implodes in upon itself.  The ego, having gone supernova, collapses into a black hole.  What we fear when we fear death is not  so much the destruction of the body, but the dissolution of the ego.  That is the true horror and evil of death.  And without religion you are going to have to take it straight.

Have you read Philip Larkin's Aubade?

What would Hitch lose by believing?  Of course, he can't bring himself to believe, it is not a Jamesian live option, but suppose he could.  Would he lose 'the truth'?  But nobody knows what the truth is about death and the hereafter.  People only think they do. Well, suppose 'the truth' is that we are nothing but complex physical systems slated for annihilation.  Why would knowing this 'truth' be a value?  Even if one is facing reality by believing that death is the utter end of the self, what is the good of facing reality in a situation in which one is but a material system? 

If materialism is true, then I think Nietzsche is right: truth is not a value; life-enhancing illusions are to be preferred.  If truth is out of all relation to human flourishing, why should we value it?

Islam’s Role in the Etiology of Terrorism

WARNING:  Free speech and political incorrectness  up ahead!

Our man on the ground in Afghanistan, Spencer Case, writes:

Here at Forward Operating Base Thunder, the captain has recently returned from leave, bringing with him his propensity for political debate. One hot subject in the office, the Ground Zero mosque, has led to a genuine philosophical question which I’d like to see you take up. The question is this: at what point is it appropriate to credit/blame an “-ism” for the deeds/misdeeds of professed adherents?

To me it seems perfectly correct to say that Islam causes terrorism, that 9/11 was an Islamic attack, and that Islam as an overarching worldview is responsible for certain evils. The captain thinks 9/11 was simply a crazy or evil attack. The fact that the attackers happened to be Muslim, rather than Christian, Buddhist, Communist or what-have-you is purely accidental (Allahu Akbar! notwithstanding).

First of all, the 9/11 hijackers were not 'crazy' or insane or irrational.  They displayed a high degree of instrumental rationality in planning and carrying out their mission.  It is a big mistake to think that evil actions are eo ipso crazy actions.  People who say or suggest this (typically liberals) simply do not take evil seriously or the free will that makes it possible.  They think that people who commit mass murder must be out of their minds.  No! Mass murder can be an entirely rational means for the furtherance of one's (evil) goals.  The 9/11 terrorists knew exactly what they were doing, did it deliberately and freely and consciously and rationally (in terms of instrumental rationality), and they dealt us a severe blow from which we are still reeling.  It is also a mistake to call Muhammad Atta and the boys 'cowards' as Bill O'Reilly and others have done.  On the contrary!  They displayed great courage in carrying out their evil deeds.  The fact that courage is a virtue is consistent with an exercise of courage having an evil upshot.

And your captain is certainly wrong if he thinks that it is an accidental fact about the 9/11 hijackers that they are Muslims.  Intentional actions derive from and reflect beliefs.  People do not act  in a doxastic vacuum.  And what they believe cannot help but influence their actions. A convinced pacifist is highly unlikely to be a suicide bomber.  Compare the number of Buddhist terrorists to the number of Muslim terrorists.  There are many more of the latter than of the former, to put it in the form of an understatement.   Obviously, the content of Buddhist/Muslim beliefs plays an important role in the etiology of pacifist/terrorist acts.

Continue reading “Islam’s Role in the Etiology of Terrorism”

Don’t Mess With Texas: After 9th DWI, Texas Man Gets Life

News accounts like this one give me hope that there is still some common sense left  in this crazy country dominated as it is by the politically correct.  The sentence is just.  Think about it.  This is the miscreant's 9th conviction.  The road to conviction is long.  First there must be an apprehension, then a trial, then a conviction.  How many times was this dude tried without being convicted?  How many times did he drive drunk without being caught? Perhaps hundreds. 

Kline on Cantor on the Square Root of 2

Morris Kline, Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty, Oxford 1980, p. 200:

. . . when Cantor introduced actually infinite sets, he had to advance his creation against conceptions held by the greatest mathematicians of the past. He argued that the potentially infinite in fact depends on a logically prior actually infinite. He also gave the argument that the irrational numbers, such as the square root of 2, when expressed as decimals involved actually infinite sets because any finite decimal could only be an approximation.

Here may be one answer to the question that got me going on this series of posts. The question was whether one could prove the existence of actually infinite sets. Note, however, that Kline's talk of actually infinite sets is pleonastic since an infinite set cannot be anything other than actually infinite as I have already explained more than once.  Pleonasm, however, is but a peccadillo. But let me explain it once more.  A potentially infinite set would be a set whose membership is finite but subject to increase.  But by the Axiom of Extensionality, a set is determined by its membership: two sets are the same iff their members are the same.  It follows that a set cannot gain or lose members.  Since no set can increase its membership, while a potentially infinite totality can, it follows that that there are no potentially infinite sets.  Kline therefore blunders when he writes,

However, most mathematicians — Galileo, Leibniz, Cauchy, Gauss, and others — were clear about the the distinction between a potentially infinite set and an actually infinite one and rejected consideration of the latter. (p. 220)

Kline is being sloppy in his use of 'set.'  Now to the main point.  Suppose you have a right triangle. If two of the sides are one unit in length, then, by the theorem of Pythagoras, the length of the hypotenuse is the sqr rt of 2 = 1.4142136. . . . Despite the nonterminating decimal expansion, the length of the hypotenuse is perfectly definite, perfectly determinate. If the points in the line segment that constitutes the hypotenuse did not form an infinite set, then how could the length of the hypotenuse be perfectly definite? This is not an argument, of course, but a gesture in the direction of a possible argument.

If someone can put the argument rigorously, have at it.

Does Potential Infinity Rule Out Mathematical Induction?

In an earlier thread David Brightly states that "The position on potential infinity that he [BV] is defending is equivalent to the denial of the principle of mathematical induction."  Well, let's see.

1.  To avoid lupine controversy over 'potential' and 'actual,' let us see if we can avoid these words.  And to keep it simple, let's confine ourselves to the natural numbers (0 plus the positive integers).  The issue is whether or not the naturals form a set.  I hope it is clear that if the naturals form a set, that set will not have a finite cardinality!  Were someone to claim that there are 463 natural numbers, he would not be mistaken so much as completely clueless as to the very sense of 'natural number.'  But from the fact that there is no finite number which is the number of natural numbers, it does not follow that there is a set of natural numbers.

2.  So the dispute is between the Platonists — to give them a name — who claim that the naturals form a set and the Aristotelians — to give them a name — who claim that the naturals do not form a set.  Both hold of course that the naturals are in some sense infinite since both deny that the number of naturals is finite.  But whereas the Platonists claim that the infinity of naturals is completed, the Aristotelians claim that it is incomplete.  To put it another way, the Platonists — good Cantorians that they are — claim that  the naturals, though infinite,  are a definite totality whereas the Aristoteleans claim that the naturals are infinite in the sense of indefinite.  The Platonists are claiming that there are definite infinities, finite infinities – which has an oxymoronic ring to it.  The Aristotelians stick closer to ordinary language.  To illustrate, consider the odds and evens.  For the Platonists, they are infinite disjoint subsets of the naturals.  Their being disjoint from each other and non-identical to their superset shows that for the Platonists there are definite infinities.

3.  Suppose 0 has a property P.  Suppose further that if some arbitrary natural number n has P, then n + 1 has P.  From these two premises one concludes by mathematical induction that all n have P.  For example, we know that 0 has a successor, and we know that if  arbitrary n has a successor, then n +1 has a successor.  From these premises we conclude by mathematical induction that all n have a successor.

4.  Brightly claims in effect that to champion the Aristotelean position is to deny mathematical induction.  But I don't see it.  Note that 'all' can be taken either distributively or collectively.  It is entirely natural to read 'all n have a successor' as 'each n has a successor' or 'any n has a successor.'  These distributivist readings do not commit us to the existence of a set of naturals.  Thus we needn't take 'all n have a successor' to mean that the set of naturals is such that each member of it has a successor.

5. Brightly writes, "My understanding of 'there is' and 'for all' requires a pre-existing domain of objects, which is why, perhaps, I have to think of the natural numbers as forming a set."  Suppose that the human race will never come to an end.  Then we can say, truly, 'For every generation, there will be a successor generation.'  But it doesn't follow that there is a set of all these generations, most of which have not yet come into existence.  Now if, in this example, the universal quantification does not require an actually infinite set as its domain, why is there a need for an actually infinite set  as the domain for the universal quantification, 'Each n has a successor'?

6.  When we say that each human generation has a successor, we do not mean that each generation now has a successor; so why must we mean by 'every n has a successor' that each n now has a successor?  We could mean that each n is such that a successor for it can be constructed or computed.  And wouldn't that be enough to justify mathematical induction?

Addendum 8/15/2010  11:45 AM.  I see that I forgot to activate Comments before posting last night.  They are on now. 

It occurred to me this morning that  I might be able to turn the tables on Brightly by arguing that actual infinity poses a problem for mathematical induction.  If  the naturals are actually infinite, then each of them enjoys a splendid Platonic preexistence vis-a-vis our computational activities.  They are all 'out there' in Plato's heaven/Cantor's paradise.  Now consider some stretch of the natural number series so far out that it will never be reached by any computational process before the Big Crunch or the Gnab Gib, or whatever brings the whole shootin' match crashing down.  How do we know that the naturals don't get crazy way out there?   How can we be sure that the inductive conclusion For all n, P(n) holds?  Ex hypothesi, no constructive procedure can reach out that far.  So if the numbers exist out there, but we cannot reach them by computation, how do we know they behave themselves, i.e. behave as they behave closer to home?  This won't be a problem for the constructivist, but it appears to be a problem for the Platonist.

On Strictu Dictu and Holus Bolus

If memory serves, I picked up strictu dictu from an article by the philosopher C. B. Martin. It struck me as a bit odd, but having found it in use by other good writers, I started using it myself. Using it, I am in good company. But classicist Mike Gilleland, who knows Latin much, much better than I do, considers it not a proper Latin phrase at all. See An Odd Use of the Second Supine and More on Strictu Dictu.

So I am inclined to drop strictu dictu. I should take the advice I myself give in On Throwing Latin ( a most excellent post that I cannot at the moment locate). I do strive to practice what I preach. But I will continue to pepper my prose with the unexceptionable mirabile dictu, horribile dictu, difficile dictu, and the like, ceteris paribus of course. And I will not apologize for my use of 'big words' such as ambisinistrous, animadversion, preternatural, desueteude, incarnadine, inconcinnity, unexceptionable, et cetera.   Am I writing for a pack of idiots?

"Why not forget the foreign ornamentation and just say what you want to say clearly and simply and in plain English?"

Well, sometimes I do exactly that. But I refuse to be bound by any one style of writing, or to pander to the appallingly limited vocabularies of my fellow citizens. George Orwell and others who reacted against the serpentine and baroque sentences of their Victorian fathers and grandfathers went too far in the opposite direction.  And now look what we have.  For a poke at Orwell, see here.  Zinnser I criticize here and here.   

It just now occurs to me that it wasn't strictu dictu that I picked up from C. B. Martin but holus bolus.  Holy moly, that too looks like bogus Latin. Perhaps the estimable Dr. Gilleland will render his verdict on this construction as well.

My Angelic Wife

One indicator of her angelicity is her support of my chess activities — in stark contrast to the wives of two acquaintances both of whose 'better' halves destroyed their chess libraries in fits of rage at time spent sporting with Caissa. "Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned," wrote old Will.

I'm no bard, but here's my ditty in remembrance of my two long lost Ohio chess friends:

   Forget that bitch
   And dally with me.
   Else I'll decimate
   Your library.

Innumeracy in the Check-Out Line

The Sarah Lee frozen pies were on sale, three for $10, at the local supermarket. I bought two, but they rang up as $4.99 each. I pointed out to the check-out girl that this was wrong, and she sent a 'gofer' to confirm my claim. Right I was. But now the lass was perplexed, having to input the correct amount by hand and brain. She had to ask me what 10 divided by 3 is. I was nice, not rude, and just gave her the answer sparing her any commentary.

(It's a crappy job, standing up eight hours per day, in a confined space, an appendage of a machine. I make a point of trying to relate to the attendants, male and female, as persons, at the back of my mind recalling a passage in Martin Buber's I-Thou in which he says such a relation is possible even in the heat of a commute between passenger and bus driver.)

But now I can be peevish. They learn how to put on condoms in these liberal-run schools but not how to add, subtract, multiply and divide? And how many times have I encountered pretty young things in bars and restaurants who are clueless when it comes to weights and measures?  At a P. F. Chang's the other day I asked whether the beer I wanted to order was 22 oz.  The girl said it was a pint, "whatever that is." This was near Arizona State and it is a good bet that she was a student there.  How can such people not know that there are two pints in a quart, that a pint is 16 fluid ounces, that four quarts make a gallon , . . . , that a light-year is a measure of distance not of time, . . . .

Can we blame this one on libruls too?  You betcha!  A librul is one who has never met a standard he didn't want to undermine.

You many enjoy John Allen Paulos, Innumeracy.  In case it isn't obvious, innumeracy is the mathematical counterpart of illiteracy.

Doron Zeilberger’s Ultrafinitism

This is wild stuff; I cannot say whether it is mathematically respectable but the man does teach at Rutgers.  It is certainly not mainstream.  Excerpt:

It is utter nonsense to say that sqrt 2

 is irrational, because this presupposes that it exists, as a number or distance. The truth is that there is no such number or distance. What does exist is the symbol, which is just shorthand for an ideal object x that satisfies x2 = 2.

Now what the hell does that mean? A rational number is one that can be expressed as a fraction a/b where both a and b are integers and b is not 0. An irrational number is one that cannot be expressed in this way.  By the celebrated theorem of Pythagoras, a right triangle with sides of 1 unit in length will have an hypotenuse with length = the square root of 2.  This is an irrational number.  But this irrational number measures a quite definite length both in the physical world and in the ideal world.  How can this number not exist?  It is inept to speak of a symbol as shorthand for an ideal object since, if x is shorthand for y, then both are linguistic items.  For example 'POTUS' is shorthand for 'president of the United States.'  But 'POTUS' is not shorthand for Obama.  'POTUS' refers to Obama.  Zeilberger appears to be falling into use/mention confusion.  If the symbol for the sqrt of 2 refers to an ideal object, then said object is a number that does exist.  And in that case Zeilberger is contradicting himself.

What's more, it seems that from Zeilberger's own example one can squeeze out an argument for actual infinity.  We note first that the decimal expansion of the the sqrt of 2 is nonterminating:  1.4142136 . . . .  We note second that the length of the hypotenuse is quite definite and determinate.  This seems to suggest that the decimal expansion must be actually infinite.  Otherwise, how could the length of the hypotenuse be definite?

As an ultrafinitist, however, Zeilberger denies both actual and potential infinity:

. . . the philosophy that I am advocating here is called

ultrafinitism. If I understand it correctly, the ultrafinitists deny the existence of any infinite, not [sic] even the potential infinity, but their motivation is `naturalistic', i.e. they believe in a `fade-out' phenomenon when you keep counting. [. . .]

So I deny even the existence of the Peano axiom that every integer has a successor.

As I said, this is wild stuff.  He may be competent as a mathematician; I am not competent to pronounce upon that question.  But he appears to be an inept philosopher of mathematics.  But this is not surprising.  It is not unusual for competent scientists and mathematicians to be incapable of talking coherently about what they are doing when they pursue their subjects.  Poking around his website, I find more ranting and raving than serious argument.

The ComBox is open if someone can clue us into the mysteries of ultrafinitism.  There is also some finitist Russian cat, a Soviet dissident to boot, name of Esenin-Volpin, who Michael Dummett refers to in his essay on Wang's Paradox, but Dummett provides no reference.  Is ultrafinitism the same as strict finitism?

Bear Canyon Trail in the San Gabriel Mountains

The Bear Canyon Trail (Old Mt. Baldly Trail) is one way to the top of Mt. Baldy (Mount San Antonio) in the San Gabriel Mountains.  My childhood friend John Ingvar Odegaard (the heftier of the two guys depicted below) and I got nowhere near the peak, but we did saunter up to Bear Flat in a manner most leisurely.  We had the trail to ourselves except for a young mother with baby in papoose and an angry rattlesnake who was not glad to see us.  The trail to Bear Flat is a mere 1. 75 miles one way, but fairly steep, gaining 1260' from the trailhead at 4260'.  The trail was delightfully soft, unlike the rocky, ankle-busting tracks I am used to in the Superstitions, and proceeded mostly under an arboreal canopy of oak and other trees.   But the trail opened out here and there onto some nice vistas.  From one, we could see all the way down to the ancestral Odegaard cabin in Baldy Village.

IMG_1802

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Odegaard

Illegal Immigration and Liberal Irresponsibility

Peggy Noonan, America Is at Risk of Boiling Over:

To take just one example from the past 10 days, the federal government continues its standoff with the state of Arizona over how to handle illegal immigration. The point of view of our thought leaders is, in general, that borders that are essentially open are good, or not so bad. The point of view of those on the ground who are anxious about our nation's future, however, is different, more like: "We live in a welfare state and we've just expanded health care. Unemployment's up. Could we sort of calm down, stop illegal immigration, and absorb what we've got?" No is, in essence, the answer.

Exactly right.  One cannot have both an ever-expanding welfare state and a tolerant attitude toward illegal immigration. 

An irony here is that if we stopped the illegal flow and removed the sense of emergency it generates, comprehensive reform would, in time, follow. Because we're not going to send the estimated 10 million to 15 million illegals already here back. We're not going to put sobbing children on a million buses. That would not be in our nature. (Do our leaders even know what's in our nature?) As years passed, those here would be absorbed, and everyone in the country would come to see the benefit of integrating them fully into the tax system. So it's ironic that our leaders don't do what in the end would get them what they say they want, which is comprehensive reform.

Unfortunately, we cannot take at face value what our so-called leaders say they want, especially when they employ gaseous phrases like 'comprehensive immigation reform' which  mean nothing definite.  Obviously, Job One is to stop the influx of illegal aliens.  But try to get someone like Janet 'The System Works'  Napolitano to admit that.  She won't, not in a million years.  It's not in her interest, since illegal aliens are most of them 'undocumented Democrats,' i.e., potential members of her party.  Recently she dodged the fence question with the asinine response, "You can't stop 'em all."  On her JackAss (Democrat) logic, if you can't stop 'em all –which is true — then there is no point in enforcing the border so as to stop more than are being stopped now.

Once Job One is done, then we can advance to the question of how to normalize and integrate the 10-15 million whom we have allowed to enter illegally.  Noonan is absolutely right: we are not going to deport them, nor — I would argue — should we.  Conservative bomb-throwers such as Ann Coulter who call for deportation are almost as irresponsible as Obama and Co.  (To set forth my reasons why we ought not deport  millions of otherwise law-abiding illegals who contribute to our economy and have children who are U S citizens requires a separate post.)

Lest my conservative friends fear that I am turning into a squishy bien-pensant latte-sipping liberal, let me throw this into the mix: the law that allows the U.S. -born offspring of illegal aliens to gain immediate citizenship needs to be changed. 

 

Yet More on the Mosque and Matters Muslim

Malcolm Pollack e-mails from Gotham:

That was an excellent post  about that damned mosque. [. . .]

I have meanwhile been arguing, back at my place, with Bob Koepp over burqa-banning  –  an excellent discussion of which was written at NRO yesterday by Claire Berlinsky. I think you would find it interesting; it's here.

Very interesting indeed, and I agree with you that Berlinsky 'nails it' when she writes:

Because this is our culture, and in our culture, we do not veil. We do not veil because we do not believe that God demands this of women or even desires it; nor do we believe that unveiled women are whores, nor do we believe they deserve social censure, harassment, or rape. Our culture’s position on these questions is morally superior. We have every right, indeed an obligation, to ensure that our more enlightened conception of women and their proper role in society prevails in any cultural conflict, particularly one on Western soil.

I also noted in particular this paragraph of yours:

In the six years I have been running this weblog, I have distinguished between moderate and militant Muslims.  Some of my more conservative friends have criticized me for this distinction, and I am currently re-evaluating it.  This is an open question for me.  Perhaps 'moderate Muslim' is as oxymoronic as 'moderate Communist.'  Communists used our institutions and freedoms to undermine us, and that's a fact.  It is at least an open question whether Muslims are doing the same, with so-called 'moderate Muslims' being like 'fellow travelers' who are not actively engaged in subversion but provide support from the sidelines.

I've done some re-evaluating too; my own views have evolved considerably since 9/11. Prior to that awful day, I had only a general familiarity with Islam, and made a very clear distinction between "radical" or "fundamentalist" Islam and what I imagined to be "mainstream" or "modernized" Islam. After all, like you, I had Muslim friends and acquaintances, and my exploration of the teachings of G.I. Gurdjieff (whom my father actually knew, by the way) had led me some distance into esoteric teachings that derived in part from Sufism.

After 9/11, however, I made it my business to learn more, and I read a great deal about Islamic history and theology  –  with the effect that I came to understand, as Recep Erdogan has put it, that there is no such thing as "moderate" Islam; there is just Islam, and "moderates"  –  meaning, in particular, those who see Islam as fully compatible with life under a secular, pluralistic government  –  are, on any coherent interpretation, heretics and apostates.

See here for what Erdogan said and analysis by Daniel Pipes.

This realization has made it increasingly clear to me that Islam is not, as fuzzy-minded liberals (and even most conservatives) would have it, just another religion, and a peaceful one at that, that has been "hijacked" by "extremists", but an expansionist, totalizing ideology, a highly infectious mind-virus  –  and one that is not only utterly incompatible, in anything resembling its pure form, with Western norms and Western culture, but is also its sworn and implacable enemy.

I don't know whether you are right about this, Malcolm, but it is clear to me that this question must be honestly addressed, and political correctness be damned.

This is, of course, far beyond the pale as far as polite society is concerned, but the threat is, I think, so serious and so clamant that it must be said, and people here need to get used to hearing it. Very few people are saying it yet; Lawrence Auster is perhaps foremost among them, but his audience is small.

The lesson of 1,400 years is very clear: Islam always expands, unless it is made to contract or withdraw by force of arms. It is doing so in Europe, and in Britain, and it will do so here, if we let it. Terrorism is the least of it.

Anyway, sorry to ramble on so. Living here in the bulls-eye, this stuff is on my mind a lot lately.

Good luck with your battle against the D.O.J.!