Author: Bill Vallicella

Advice for the Oversensitive

Baltasar Gracian (1601-1658), The Art of Worldly Wisdom (Doubleday, 1992, tr. C. Maurer, # 173):

Don't be made of glass in your dealings with others. Even less so in friendship. Some people break very easily revealing how fragile they are. They fill up with resentment and fill others with annoyance. They are more sensitive than the pupils of the eyes, which cannot be touched, either in jest or in earnest. They take offense at motes: beams aren't even necessary. Those who deal with them must use great caution, and never forget their delicacy. The slightest slight annoys them. They are full of themselves, slaves to their own taste (for the sake of which they trample on everything else), and idolaters of their own silly sense of honor.

Schall on Belloc: Islam as a Christian Heresy

This is a thought-provoking essay. Excerpts with a bit of commentary:

Belloc’s thesis is that Islam began as a Christian heresy which retained the Jewish side of the faith, the Oneness and Omnipotence of God, but denied all the Christian aspects – the Incarnation, the divinity of Christ, who, as a result, became just a prophet. The denial of the church, the priesthood, and the sacraments followed. Islam succeeded because, in its own terms, it was a simple religion. It was easy to understand and follow its few doctrinal and devotional points.

Question: Given that Islam is much closer to Judaism than is Christianity, what explains the murderous ferocity of the Muslim hatred for Jews? One part of the explanation must be in terms of envy. Muslims feel profoundly diminished in their sense of worth by Jewish success and well-being. The Jews have made outstanding contributions to culture out of all proportion to their sparse numbers, whereas the hordes of Muslims have languished for the last four hundred years in backwardness and negativity. What else but envy could motivate the wild cries for the extermination of Jews and the destruction of Israel? Ahmadinejad, you will have noticed, is not a Palestinian, but an Iranian. When non-Palestinian Muslims call for the elimination of Israel, and prepare for decades of suicidal jihad, their 'beef' cannot be a relatively minor land dispute between Israelis and Palestinian Arabs.

Unlike Stanley Jaki, Belloc did not think that there was something in Islamic theology that militated against Islam’s ever becoming a major industrial or military-technological power by itself. (133). The fact that it never accomplished this transformation was for Belloc merely an accident, whereas for Jaki it was rooted in the relation of an absolute notion of divine will to its consequent denial of stable secondary causes. Jaki sees much of the rage in modern Islam to be due to its failure or inability to modernize itself by its own powers.6 Most of the weapons and equipment found in Muslim states are still foreign made, usually inferior, and paid for with oil money.

Islam apparently takes an occasionalist view of divine omnipotence. God is all-powerful not just in the sense that he has the power to do all, but in the sense that he exercises all the power that gets exercised. Thus secondary causes — so-called to distinguish them from the causa prima — are not causes at all, strictly speaking, but mere occasions for the exercise of divine causality, the only causality there is. If so, then everything is up to God, and nothing is up to secondary 'causes' including ourselves. When I lived in Turkey, I was struck by the prevalence of the belief in kismet, or fate. It is reflected in driving habits. Turks are arguably the worst drivers in the world. It is as if they don't believe that what happens on the road is largely up to them: kismet rules. When your number's up, it's up, and it doesn't matter what you do.

The very existence of Christianity is a blasphemy in Muslim terms if we insist on the truth of the Incarnation, that God became man.

In the eyes of Islam, Christianity is a form of idolatry: a mere man is identified with God. Schall quotes Belloc:

Mohammedanism was a heresy: that is the essential point to grasp before going any further. It began as a heresy, not as a new religion. It was not a pagan contrast with the Church: it was not an alien enemy. It was a perversion of Christian doctrine. Its vitality and endurance soon gave it the appearance of a new religion, but those who were contemporary with its rise saw it for what it was — not a denial, but an adaptation and misuse, of the Christian thing (76-77). Though it is not often attended to, saying Mass itself is forbidden in Saudi Arabia, even in private, and, even when permitted in other lands, it is restricted and constantly hemmed in by various formal and informal practices. Freedom of religion is not a concept that rises naturally in Muslim theory but it is a Western idea, even largely a modern Western idea. In Islam, the very practice of freedom of religion is thought to be a species of not giving submission to Allah, even where some non-Muslim churches are permitted.  Belloc thought that the Mohammedan temper was not tolerant. It was, on the contrary, fanatical and bloodthirsty. It felt no respect for, nor even curiosity about, those from whom it differed. It was absurdly vain of itself, regarding with contempt the high Christian culture about it. It still so regards it even today (90). The practical compromise in this situation was to allow the Christians to remain but within very confined areas and occupations. They had to pay a tribute. Many were gradually absorbed into Islam (91).

More on Whether Atheism is a Religion

Peter Lupu e-mails:

Your post provoked these thoughts:

I agree with you that most religions include as indispensable certain core metaphysical tenets about some kind of transcendental existence that is vital for the understanding of the nature and identity of our own self and that these core tenets distinguish religious ideologies from secular ideologies such as atheism and Marxism. However, it is worth noting that secular ideologies also include certain indispensable core metaphysical tenets: e.g., atheism denies the existence of a transcendental being such as God or denies that the existence of such a God is relevant to understand our nature and identity and Marxism is committed to the existence of deterministic historical laws which will inevitably lead to a certain socio-economic-political arrangement (i.e., communism).

In fact, both religious as well as secular ideologies can be identified in terms of their respective metaphysical core tenets in the sense that giving them up is giving up on the ideology itself. Hence, those who adhere to each ideology must hold on to their defining tenets come what may, for giving up these tenets is giving up the ideology itself. So we can define a religious attitude (in contradistinction to a religion) as a certain epistemic attitude whereby someone holds on to the metaphysical tenets that define their ideology come what may and regardless of the cogency of counterarguments or counter-evidence. Of course, we already have a word for this sort of attitude and it is "dogmatism." So it is not clear to me that we need another word for it, although I think that this is what people mean when they say that secular ideologies such as atheism or Marxism are or can be for some people a "religion."

Peter,  I take your point to be that when we say that militant atheism or Marxism are religions, we are speaking loosely: all we mean is that the commitment of their staunchest adherents is dogmatic and unshakeable.  Thus I take you to be agreeing with me me that militant atheism and Marxism are not, strictly speaking, religions.

Joseph Antolick e-mails:　

I think there's a problem when you worry – not without merit, since it's common in these discussions – that considering militant atheism a religion itself is a debating trick. You go on to say that there's a problem of defining religion (you even entertain the possibility that there's no way to "specify necessary and sufficient conditions") and also that these atheists are anti-religionist. Well, if it's not clear what a religion is, then how is it clear that atheists are anti-religion? I'll grant you that Richard Dawkins hates Catholicism. But so do a number of Muslims.

But I did suggest a criterion for distinguishing religious from non-religious ideologies:  "all and only religions make reference to a transcendent reality, whether of a personal or impersonal nature, contact or community or identification with which is the summum bonum and the ultimate purpose of human existence.  For the Abrahamic faiths, Yahweh, God, Allah  is the transcendent reality.  For Taoism, the Tao.  For Hinduism, Brahman.  For Buddhism, the transcendent state of nirvana."  This criterion makes it tolerably clear what counts as a religion and also what it is to be anti-religion.  I can't see what good purpose is served by lumping militant atheism in with the religions, unless one is talking loosely — see Lupu's comment above.  In a serious discussion one should avoid loose talk.

My claim here is that A) There is reason . . .  to at least suspect that the New Atheists are themselves religious and B) That if this is in fact the case, then the New Atheists are no more "anti-religion" than fanatical muslims for whom there is no room in the world for any religion but Islam.

And what reason would that be?  The fact that one's commitment to one's ideology is is total, dogmatic, and unshakeable by counter-argument is not a good reason to think that the object of one's commitment is a religion.  Countless Communists were committed heart, soul, and mind to their ideology. Some, like Trotsky, sacrificed everything for the cause.  But that didn't make Communism a religion.  An ersatz religion perhaps, something that substitutes for religion in the lives of its staunch adherents, but not a religion strictly speaking.  Faith and hope were major players in Trotsky's life, but they weren't religious faith and hope, though I will grant you that they were quasi-religious.  See my post, Trotsky's Faith.

Obviously, Muslims are not anti-religion because their ideology is a religion by my criterion, albeit a political religion if you will, one that denies church/mosque-state separation.    (Whether Islam is a religion that deserves First Amendment protection is a further question, and a pressing one given the bit after 'albeit.') 

To give an analogous example, Stephen Hawking in his new book claims that "philosophy is dead" – but then, as reviewers have noted, goes on to engage in metaphysics and take explicitly philosophical positions. If that's a fair description of his views, is it right to say Hawking is "anti-philosophy"? Or is it just that he's anti- any philosophy that differs from his? I think the difference between those two descriptions is important.

I'm glad you brought that up.  There is a big difference between being anti-religion and being anti-philosophy.  To oppose philosophy is to do philosophy.  Any attack on philosophy is a philosophical attack.  Anti-philosophy is just more philosophy.  And so I agree with you about Hawking.  He is anti-any philosophy other than his own.  But anti-religion is not just more religion, but precisely the rejection of all religion.  To oppose philosophy is to do philosophy; but to oppose religion is not to do religion, but to do philosophy.

The right way to combat militant atheists is not by arguing that they are serving up religion, but by exposing what they do as bad philosophy, as based on the dubious philosophical doctrine of scientism, for example.  Atheism is a philosophical position with all the rights, privileges, and debilities pertaining thereunto.  Dawkins, Grayling  and the boys may be dogmatic pricks but that does not make them religionists.  It makes them — dogmatic pricks.  Once you have exposed atheism as just another philosophical position you have already done quite a bit to undermine it: it is just another contender in the arena of Big Ideas;  just another contender that cannot establish hegemony — except in the minds of its dogmatic adherents.

That said, I don't claim to have the ultimate answer on this. But I do worry that there's a recognition that defining "religion" is difficult, and then a move is made to try and define religion in such a way that purposefully excludes militant atheists from the outset. I'm reminded of when Paul Davies wrote an op-ed, pointing out that even scientists have faith – and there was a fierce reaction from a number of scientists.

But why would you want to lump militant atheists in with religionists?  That makes little sense unless you are engaged in some sort of rhetorical sleight-of-hand.    Surely the burden is on you to show that they are religionists when it is plain to most of us that they are not.

And you also have to be careful not to equivocate on 'faith' as between religious and non-religious faith. Above I mentioned the faith of Trotsky.  Surely he was a man of faith in a secular, non-religious sense: as a professional revolutionary he believed with all his heart in the coming world-wide proletarian revolution that would usher in a classless society, a worker's paradise, etc. etc.  One could even in his case speak of a secular soteriology and eschatology, of the final salvation from alienation at the eschaton.  But again, a substitute for religion, something that merely resembles religion in certain ways, something the commitment to which is like a religious commitment, is not a religion strictly speaking.  

Are men of science men of faith?  Of course.  They have faith in the intelligibility of nature and in the uniformity of nature, and they hold this faith beyond what they have actually verified.  They have faith that the future will be like the past.  But no good purpose is served by conflating this sort of faith with specifically religious faith.  You cannot effectively defend religion against the attacks of scientistic scientists and their literary (Hitchens) and philosophical (Dennett) fellow travelers by saying that the attackers themselves have various faith commitments.

 

 

On ‘Spirituality’

Is Atheism a Religion?

From the mail:

Just read your On Religious Pluralism and Religious Tolerance entry, and I have one concern. Is it really right to view the New Atheists, and atheists in general, as "not religious"? I imagine this really depends on how you yourself define religion, and I admit to not knowing that. [. . .]

I don't know it either [grin].

The question as to what religion is is not at all easy to answer.  It is not even clear that the question makes sense.  For when you ask What is religion? you presuppose that it has an essence which can be captured in a definition that specifies necessary and sufficient conditions.  But it might be that the concept religion is a family resemblance concept like the concept game (to invoke Wittgenstein's famous example).  Think of all the different sorts of games there are. Is there any property or set of properties that all games have and that only games have?  Presumably not.  The concept game is a family resemblance concept to which no essence corresponds.  Noted philosophers of religion such as John Hick maintain the same with respect to the concept religion.

If you take this tack, then you can plausibly argue that Marxism and secular humanism and militant atheism are religions.

But it strikes me as decidedly odd to characterize  a militant anti-religionist as having a religion.  Indeed, it smacks of a cheap debating trick:  "How can you criticize religion when you yourself have a religion?" I prefer to think along the following lines. Start with belief-system as your genus and then distinguish two species: belief-systems that are theoretical, though they may have practical applications,  and belief-systems that are by their very nature oriented toward action.  Call the latter ideologies. Then distinguish between religious and non-religious ideologies.  Marxism and militant atheism are non-religious ideologies while the Abrahamic religions and some of the Eastern religions are religious ideologies.

But this leaves me with the problem of specifying what it is that distinguishes religious from non-religious ideologies.  Perhaps this: all and only religions make reference to a transcendent reality, whether of a personal or impersonal nature, contact or community or identification with which is the summum bonum and the ultimate purpose of human existence.  For the Abrahamic faiths, Yahweh, God, Allah  is the transcendent reality.  For Taoism, the Tao.  For Hinduism, Brahman.  For Buddhism, the transcendent state of nirvana.  But I expect the Theravadins to object that nibbana is nothing positive and transcendent, only the extinguishing or dissolution of the (ultimately illusory) self.  I could of course simply deny that Theravada Buddhism is a religion, strictly speaking.  I could lump it together with Stoicism as a sort of psychotherapy, a set of techniques for achieiving equanimity.

There are a number of tricky and unresolved issues here, but I see little point in calling militant atheism a religion, though I concede it is like a religion in some ways.

 

Definitions and Axioms of Classical Mereology

Is a wall or a brick house a whole of its parts?  Obviously — that's a pre-analytic datum.  But is it a sum of its parts?  I have been arguing, with no particular originality, in the negative.  I have been arguing that it is a big mistake to assume  that, just because y is a whole of the xs, that y is a sum of the xs. But it depends on what exactly is meant by 'sum.'  My point is well-taken if 'sum' is elliptical for 'classical mereological sum.'  But what does that mean?  Since 'classical mereological sum' is a technical term, it has all and only the meaning conferred upon it by the definitions and axioms of classical mereology.  I will now present what I take to be the essentials of classical mereology.  I will use 'sum' as short for 'classical mereological sum.'  Later we will look at neoclassical variants that result from tampering with the classical definitions and axioms.

If anything in what follows is original, it is probably a mistake on my part.  Feel free to correct me — but only if you know the subject matter.

I will take proper parthood and identity as primitives.  To simplify the exposition I will drop universal quantifiers.  They are there in spirit if not in letter.

D1. x is a PART of y =df x is a proper part of y or x = y.

D2. x OVERLAPS y =df there is a z such that z is part of x and z is part of y.

D3. x is DISJOINT from y =df it is not the case that x overlaps y.

D4. y is a SUM of the xs =df z overlaps y iff z overlaps one of the xs.

A1. Asymmetry of Proper Parthood.  If x is a proper part of y, then y is not a proper part of x.

A2. Transitivity of Proper Parthood.  If x is a proper part of y, and y is a proper part of z, then x is a proper part of z.

A3. Supplementation of Proper Parthood.  If x is a proper part of y, then there is a z such that z is a proper part of y and z is disjoint from x.

A4. Uniqueness of Summation.  If u is a sum of the xs and v is a sum of the xs, then u = v.

A5. Unrestricted Summation.  For any xs, there is a y such that y is a sum of the xs.

When I used the word 'sum' in previous posts, I intended that its meaning be not merely the meaning assigned to it by (D4), but the meaning assigned to it by (D4) in conjunction with the rest of the definitions and the axioms (not to mention the theorems that follow as logical consequences of the definitions and axioms). 

Extensionality is a feature of classical mereology.  I leave it as an exercise for the reader to derive Extensionality of Parthood  — if x and y are sums with the same proper parts, then x = y — as a theorem from the above.

 

Religions: Problems, Solutions, Techniques

Simplifying a four-part  schema employed by Stephen Prothero in his God Is Not One (Harper, 2010, p. 14), I propose, in agreement with Prothero, that each religion can be usefully seen as addressing itself to a problem; offering a solution to the problem, a solution that also constitutes the religion's goal; and proposing a technique for solving the problem and achieving the goal.

This post will consider five religions and how the simplified Prothero schema applies to them. 

For Christianity, the problem is sin, the solution or goal is salvation, and the technique is some combination of faith and good works. (14)  For Buddhism, the problem is suffering, the solution or goal is nirvana, and the technique for achieving nirvana is the Noble Eightfold Path. (14)  Prothero's main purpose in his book is to stress the differences between religions.  That is the point of the silly title, "God is Not One."  Obviously, God is one by definition; it is the conceptions of God that are various.  It is also a bad title because Prothero's topic is religion, not theism.  Buddhism, after all, is not a theistic religion.  But let that pass.  I can't fault the man for wanting to attract buyers with a catchy title, one reminiscent of Hitchens' God Is Not Great.  The schema makes clear the differences between these two great religions:

Are Buddhists trying to achieve salvation?  Of course not, since they do not even believe in sin.  Are Christians trying to achieve nirvana?  No, since for them suffering isn't something that must be overcome. (15)

If salvation is salvation from sin, then of course Prothero is right.  Sin is an offence against God, and in a religion with no God there can be no sin.  Nevertheless, I am a bit uneasy with the starkness of Prothero's contrast.  The Buddhist too aims at a sort of salvation, salvation from all-pervasive suffering.  To use 'salvation' so narrowly that it applies only to the Christian's religious goal obscures the commonality between the two great religions.  I should think that some soteriology or other is essential to every religion.   A religion must show a way out of our unsatisfactory predicament, and one is not religious unless one perceives our life in this world as indeed a predicament, and one that is deeply and fundamentally unsatisfactory, whatever the exact nature of the satisfactoriness.

For Islam, the problem is neither sin nor suffering but self-sufficiency,"the hubris of acting as if you can get along without God, who alone is self-sufficient." (32)  The solution or goal is "a soul at peace" (Koran 89: 27) in submission to Allah.  The technique that takes the believer from self-sufficiency to Paradise is to 'perform the religion." (42: 13)  Orthopraxy counts for more than orthodoxy.  The profession of faith is relatively simple, to the effect that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is the messenger of God.  That is the First Pillar of Islam.  The other four concern practice: prayer (salat), charity (zakat), fasting (sawm), and pilgrimage (hajj).

For Hinduism, the problem is samsara, "the vicious cycle of life, death, and rebirth." (136)  The solution (goal) is moksha, liberation from samsara.  The aim is not to escape into an afterlife, but to escape once and for all from the wheel of becoming whether here or beyond.  Moksha is not salvation because the goal is to escape samsara, not sin.  The various yogas are the techniques, whether karma yoga, jnana yoga, or bhakti yoga, whether work yoga, wisdom yoga, or the yoga of devotion.

For Judaism, the problem is exile, "distance from God and where we ought to be."  The solution is return, "to go back to God and our true home." (253)  The techniques are to keep the narrative alive and to obey the law, to remember and obey.  

So much for a quick little sketch of Prothero's new book.  A popular treatment but well worth reading.    

 

The Muslim Cab Driver and the Fundamentalist Christian Pharmacist

Mark Whitten inquires by e-mail re: Alcohol, Dogs, and Muslim Cab Drivers:

What is the difference between a Muslim cab driver who does not wish to transport a person with a dog or [an unopened container of]  alcohol, and a fundamentalist Christian pharmacist who does not want to dispense birth control?

Is there not a similar issue of social (dis)harmony / ‘‘assimilation’’ here?

I will assume arguendo that the arguments  against the moral permissibility of birth control (i.e., techniques that prevent conception as opposed to terminating a conceptus) are no better than the arguments against the moral permissibility of imbibing alcoholic beverages in moderation and keeping (well-behaved) dogs as pets  and transporting them in public.  On this assumption what the Christian pharmacist and the Muslim cab driver are doing is very similar.

If I were the owner of the pharmacy, I would fire the fundamentalist and give him this little speech:  "We live in a tolerant pluralistic society in which people disagree about many things including the morality of contraception.  I grant you that, objectively, the practice is either morally acceptable or it is not.  But we don't know which it is. While I respect your deep conviction, it is cuts no ice.  So we tolerate those who differ.  If in good conscience you cannot dispense birth control pills and devices, then you should resign.  But if you refuse to do your job, then you are fired."

If I were the owner of the cab company, I would fire the Muslim and give him this little speech:  "We live in a tolerant pluralistic society in which people disagree about many things including the morality of drinking.  I grant you that, objectively, the practice is either morally acceptable or it is not.  But we don't know which it is. While I respect your deep conviction, it  cuts no ice.  So we tolerate those who differ.  If in good conscience you cannot pick up uninebriated and otherwise well-behaved fares who are transporting unopened containers of hooch, then you should resign.  But if you refuse to do your job, you are fired.

And similarly for the Muslim supermarket checkout girl who refuses to touch a package of bacon.  She ought to be fired.  Ditto for the Muslim Disneyland hostess who insisted on wearing a hijab.  She should be fired and told to look for a job at ShariaLand.

Suppose a flat-chested lass tries to get a waitress  job at Hooters.  Hooters  is an establishment wherein adolescent males of all ages assemble to gawk at the front-end endowments — the 'hooters' — of nubile young ladies. (Some eating and drinking takes place as well.)  Suppose the applicant  is refused on the ground of cup size.  I would say that that is a legitimate form of discrimination  given the puerile purposes of that private enterprise.  It is similar to the Disneyland case.  The average American goes to Disneyland for a dose of pure Americana.  That's what  Disneyland sells.  The rubes from fly-over country don't want to see no Muslims.  Disneyland, as a private enterprise, has the right to demand that its employees project the right image. 

And political correctness be damned.

 

Alcohol, Dogs, and Muslim Cab Drivers

Apparently, significant numbers of Muslim taxi drivers in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area are refusing to transport people carrying  dogs or unopened containers of alcoholic beverages. There is a lesson here, but I am quite sure that liberals won't learn it, until they learn it the hard way.  It is a simple lesson really: social harmony is difficult in any event and is made especially difficult when large numbers of people are let into a society who (i) have wildly different values than the rest of us, and (ii) have no intention of assimilating.

On Praying for Christopher Hitchens

There is something strange, and perhaps even incoherent, about praying for Christopher Hitchens if the prayers are not for his recovery or for his courageous acceptance of death, but for conversion or a change of heart.  Let's think about it.

I do not play the lottery; I have good reasons for not playing it; I have no desire to win it, and I believe that I would be worse off if I were to win it.  Suppose you know these facts about me, but say to me nonetheless, "I am praying that you win the lottery," or "I hope you win the lottery."  Surely there is something strange about praying or hoping that I get something that I don't want and that I believe would make me worse off were I to get it. But beyond strange, it may even be incoherent.  Given that I do not play the lottery, there is no way I can win it; so if you hope or pray that I win it, then you are hoping or praying for the impossible.  Of course, you could hope or pray that I start playing.

Hitch does not want salvation of his soul via divine agency, and he has reasons that seem good to him for denying that there is such a thing.  And he presumably believes (though I am speculating here) that survival of bodily death and entry into the divine milieu would not be desirable.    For one thing, his brilliance would be outshone by a greater Brilliance which would be unbearable for someone with the pride of Lucifer, the pride of the light bearer.  It may also be that he believes, as many atheists and mortalists do, that the meaning of life here below, far from requiring a protraction into an afterlife, is positively inconsistent with such an extension.  "How boring and meaningless eternity would be, especially without booze and cigarettes and (sexual intercourse with) women!"

Hitch has lived his life as if God and the soul are childish fictions.  As a result, he has done none of the things that might earn him him immortality and fellowship with God, even assuming he wanted them.  This suggests that it is not just strange, but incoherent to pray for Hitch's metanoia.  For that would be like praying that he win the lottery without playing, without doing the things necessary to win it.

If a merciful God exists, then he should do the merciful thing and simply give Hitch what he wants and expects, namely annihilation.  Either that, or assign him another go-round, or series of go-rounds, on the wheel of samsara until such time as he is ready to accept the divine offer of everlasting life.

As for the prayer day in his honor, Hitch won't be attending.

 

Word of the Day: ‘Nychthemeron’

You may have noticed that 'day' is ambiguous: it can refer to a 24  hour period or to the non-nocturnal portion of a 24 hour period. The ambiguity spreads to the Latin injunction, Carpe diem! Does it include Carpe noctem! or exclude it? Or perhaps neither: to seize the day is to make good use of the present, whatever its duration, whether it be an hour, a day, a week.

A nychthemeron, from the Greek nyktos (night) and hemera (day) is a  period of 24 hours, a night and a day. Sleep researchers distinguish the nychthemeral from the circadian. According to Michael Quinion, "Circadian refers to daily cycles that are driven by an internal body clock, while nychthemeral rhythms are imposed by the external environment."

The use of the word is illustrated in this magnificent sentence from  "The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" by the great American philosopher, C. S. Peirce:

The dawn and the gloaming most invite one to Musement; but I have
found no watch of the nychthemeron that has not its own advantages
for the pursuit.

'Gloaming' is another one of those beautiful old poetic words that we conservatives must not allow to fall into desuetude. Use it or lose   it. It means twilight.