Author: Bill Vallicella

Gray Flannel and the Matter of Money

Sloan Wilson's The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit  appeared in 1955 two years before Jack Kerouac's  On the Road. I never finished Gray Flannel, getting only 80 or so pages into it.  It's a book as staid as the '50s, a tad boring, conventional, and forgettable in comparison to the hyperromantic and heart-felt rush of the unforgettable On the Road. Since how 'beat' one is in part has to do with one's attitude towards money, which is not the same as one's possession or nonpossession of it, I'll for now just pull some quotations from Horace and Sloan Wilson.  The Horace quotations seem not to comport well with each other, but we can worry that bone on another occasion.

Quaerenda pecunia primum est; virtus post nummos. (Horace, Epistles I, 1, 53) Money is to be sought first of all; virtue after wealth. Or, loosely translated, cash before conscience.

Vilius argentum est auro virtutibus aurum. (Horace, Epistles I, 1, 52). Silver is less valuable than gold, gold less valuable than virtue.

The next morning, Tom put on his best suit, a freshly cleaned and pressed gray flannel. On his way to work he stopped in Grand Central Station to buy a clean white handkerchief and to have his shoes shined. During his luncheon hour he set out to visit the United Broadcasting Corporation. As he walked across Rockefeller Plaza, he thought wryly of the days when he and Betsy had assured each other that money didn't matter. They had told each other that when they were married, before the war, and during the war they had repeated it in long letters. "The important thing is to find a kind of work you really like, and something that is useful," Betsy had written him. "The money doesn't matter."

The hell with that, he thought. The real trouble is that up to now we've been kidding ourselves. We might as well admit that what we want is a big house and a new car and trips to Florida in the winter, and plenty of life insurance. When you come right down to it, a man with three children has no damn right to say that money doesn't matter. (The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit, Simon and Shuster, 1955, pp. 9-10)

Why Liberals Don’t Get the Tea Party

Good analysis by Peter Berkowitz. Excerpt:

Born in response to President Obama's self-declared desire to fundamentally change America, the tea party movement has made its central goals abundantly clear. Activists and the sizeable swath of voters who sympathize with them want to reduce the massively ballooning national debt, cut runaway federal spending, keep taxes in check, reinvigorate the economy, and block the expansion of the state into citizens' lives.

In other words, the tea party movement is inspired above all by a commitment to limited government. And that does distinguish it from the competition.

 

 

Kerouac October Quotation #14 and Quiz

Describing the famous Gallery Six poetry reading in The Dharma Bums, Kerouac writes,

The other poets were either hornrimmed intellectual hepcats with wild black hair like Alvah Goldbrook, or delicate pale handsome poets like Ike O'Shay (in a suit), or out-of-this-world genteel looking Renaissance Italians like Francis DaPavia (who looks like a young priest), or bow-tied wild-haired old anarchist fuds like Reinhold Cacoethes, or big fat bespectacled quiet booboos like Warren Coughlin.

Who are or were these five poets in real life?

Islam and the West

It is certainly time that the West considered systematically whether it has irreconcilable differences with Islam. The belligerence of many Islamic spokesmen and the unassimilable quality of many Muslim immigrants in the West, as well as the spectacular terrorist provocations of extreme Islamic groups, make this a very legitimate question.

Read the rest.

The Bundle Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles

I have been defending the bundle-of-universals theory of concrete particulars (BT) against various weak objections over a series of posts, here,  here, here, and here. Now I consider a very powerful objection, one that many will consider decisive.  The objection can be cast in the mold of modus tollendo tollens:  If BT is true, then the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessary truth.  But the Identity of Indiscernibles is not a necessary truth. Ergo, BT is not true.

1. The Identity of Indiscernibles (IdIn) is the converse of the Indiscernibility of Identicals (InId) and not to be confused with it.  InId is well-nigh self-evident, while IdInis not.  Roughly, the latter is the principle that if x and y share all properties, then x = y.  It is a strictly ontological principle despite the epistemological flavor of 'indiscernible.' As just stated, it is more of a principle-schema than a principle.  We will get different principles depending on what we count as a property.  To arrive at a plausible nontrivial principle we must first rule out haecceity properties.  If, for any x,there is a property of identity-with-x, then no two things could share all properties, and the principle would be trivially true due to the falsehood of the antecedent.  Haecceity properties are creatures of darkness in any case as I argue elsewhere.

A plausible, nontrivial, principle results if we allow as properties all and only relational and  nonrelational pure properties.  A pure property is one that makes no reference to any specific individual.   Being married would then be an example of a pure relational property: to be married is to be married to someone, but not to any specified individual.  Being married to Xanthippe, however, is an impure relational property.  Being obese would be an example of a nonrelational property.  Here then is a plausible version of the Identity of Indiscernibles:

Necessarily, for any x, for any y, and for any relational or nonrelational pure property P, if (x has P iff y has P) then x = y.

2.  It is obvious, I think, that BT entails IdIn in the above form.  Consider a concrete particular, an iron sphere say, at a time.  On BT it is nothing but a bundle of universals. This implies that it is not possible that there be a second iron sphere that shares with the first  all relational and nonrelational pure properties.  This is not possible on BT because on BT a concrete particular is nothing more than a bundle of universals.  Thus there is no ontological ingredient in a concrete particular that could serve to differentiate it from another particular having all the same relational and nonrelational pure properties.  And if it is not possible that there be two things that differ numerically without differing property-wise, then the Identity of Indiscernibles as above formulated is necessarily true.

I am assuming that BT, if true, is necessarily true.  This is a special case of the assumption that the propositions of metaphysics, if true, are necessarily true.  If this assumption is granted, then BT entails IdIn.

3.  But is IdIn true?  Since it is necessarily true if true, all it takes to refute it is a possible counterexample.  Imagine a world consisting of two iron spheres and nothing else.  (The thought experiment was proposed in a 1952 Mind article by Max Black.) They are the same size, shape, volume, chemical composition and so on.  They agree in every nonrelational respect.  But they also agree in every relational respect.  Thus, each has the property of being ten meters from an iron sphere.   What Black's example seems to show is that there can be numerical difference without property-difference.  But then IdIn is false, whence it follows that BT is false.

4.  This is a powerful objection, but is it fatal?  Here are three ways to resist the argument, fit topics for further posts.  He who has the will to blog will never be bereft of topics.

a. Maintain that BT is a contingent truth.  If so, then BT does not entail IdIn as formulated above.

b. Grant that BT entails IdIn, but deny that scenarios such as Black's are really possible.  Admit that they are conceivable, but deny that conceivability entails possibility.

c.  An immanent universal can be wholly present at different places at once.  So why can't a bundle of universals be wholly present in different places at once?  Argue that Black's world can be interpreted, not as two particulars sharing all universals, but as one particular existing in two places at the same time.  From that infer that Black's Gedankenexperiment does show that IdIn is false.

Any other paths of resistance?

Kerouac October Quotation #13: Buddhist Life Denial

From Some of the Dharma, Viking 1997, p. 175, emphasis added:

No hangup on nature is going to solve anything — nature is bestial — desire for Eternal Life of the individual is bestial, is the final creature-longing — I say, Let us cease bestiality & go into the bright room of the mind realizing emptiness, and sit with the truth. And let no man be guilty, after this, Dec. 9 1954, of causing birth. — Let there be an end to birth, an end to life, and therefore an end to death.  Let there be no more fairy tales and ghost stories around and about this.  I don't advocate that everybody die, I only say everybody finish your lives in purity and solitude and gentleness and realization of the truth and be not the cause of any further birth and turning of the black wheel of death.  Let then the animals take the hint, and then the insects, and all sentient beings in all one hundred directions of the One Hundred Thousand Chilicosms of Universes. Period.

Nature is the cause of all our suffering; joy is the reverse side of suffering.  Instead of seducing women, control yourself and treat them like sisters; instead of seducing men, control yourself and treat them like brothers.  For life is pitiful.

Stop.

The Philosopher as Rhinoceros

George Santayana, Character and Opinion in the United States (New York: Norton, 1967), p. 35:

So long as philosophy is the free pursuit of wisdom, it arises wherever men of character and penetration, each with his special experience or hobby, looks about them in this world. That philosophers should be professors is an accident, and almost an anomaly. Free reflection about everything is a habit to be imitated, but not a subject to expound; and an original system, if the philosopher has one, is something dark, perilous, untested, and not ripe to be taught, nor is there much danger that anyone will learn it. The genuine philosopher — as Royce liked to say, quoting the Upanishads — wanders alone like the rhinoceros.

Is it any wonder that Santayana quit his teaching job at Harvard and spent the rest of his life in retirement in Rome?

The difference between a philosopher and a professor of philosophy is the former lives for what the latter lives from.

Self-Censorship Among the Politically Correct

There is no chicken like a liberal chicken.  Here.  Prager's comment: "Secular + Liberal = Wimp."

UPDATE 10/14.  Reason magazine weighs in.  Just Admit it, Newspapers: You're Scared of Muslims.

Of course.  The self-censorship is motivated by fear.  And it is a rational fear, which is why 'Islamophobia' and cognates are idiotic constructions that ought to be shunned by the intelligent.  Must I point out once again that a phobia is an irrational fear? So why do our leftist pals sling this word?

Some leftists sincerely believe that the concern over radical Islam is alarmist.  But most leftists know that it is not alarmist.  It is just that they hate conservatives more than they hate the threat to their own values.  They hate conservatives so much that they cannot or will not admit that they have more in common with contemporary American conservatives than they do with radical Muslims.  Astonishing, but true.  Apparently, they think they can use the Islamists, as a species of 'useful idiot,' to help destroy capitalism and usher in the socialist worker's paradise, dismissing or converting the Islamists when their services are no longer needed.  It's a bad bet.  It is more likely that they will lose their heads before any dismissal or conversion or mollification or other normalization of Islamists occurs.

Kerouac October Quotation #12: Our Boy Gives the Hinayana the Nod

From Some of the Dharma, pp. 174-175:

Hit the makeless null. Whether or not individuality is destroyed now, it will be complelely destroyed in death.  For all things that are made fade back to the unmade.   What's all the return-vow hassle, but a final metaphysical clinging to eternal ego-life by Mahayana Thinkers.  An intellectualized ego-attachment to taskhood.  Hinayana, nay Ecclesiastes, is best.

Companion posts:  A Philosopher's Notes on Ecclesiastes, Chapters 1-2.  A Philosopher's Notes on Ecclesiastes, Chapter 3. 

Bundling is Symmetrical But not Transitive

Over the phone the other day, Peter L. suggested the following objection to the bundle-of-universals theory of ordinary particulars, 'BT' hereafter.  (I leave out of consideration for the nonce bundle-of-tropes bundle theories.)  I am not sure I understood what Peter was driving at.  But here is the gist of what I thought he was saying. 

1. Suppose x is a proper (spatial) part of y, y being a physical thing.  On BT, both y and x are bundles of universals.  Now it often happens that a whole has a property that is not had by all its parts.  Think of a rubber ball.  The ball is spherical (or spheroid, if you  insist).  But it has proper parts that are not spherical.  For example, its hemispheres are not spherical.  Nor are the cubes of rubber internal to it spherical.  (They too are proper parts of it on classical mereology. These cubes could be 'liberated' by appropriate cutting of the ball.) The ball is red, let us say, but beneath the surface it is black.  And so on.  in sum, wholes often have properties that their parts do not have.

2.  On BT, property-possession is understood, not in terms of the asymmetrical relation of exemplification, but in terms of the symmetrical relation of bundling.  Accordingly, for a property to be possessed by something is not for it to be exemplified by this thing, but for it to be bundled with other logically and nomologically compossible properties.  Exemplification, the asymmetrical relation that connects a substratum to a first-level property is replaced by bundling  which is a symmetrical relation that connects sufficiently many properties (which we are assuming to be universals) so as to form a particular.  When the universals are bundled, the result is a whole of which the universals are ontological constituents, with the bundling relation taking over the unifying job of the substratum.  While bundling is symmetrical — if U1 is bundled with U2, then U2 is bundled with U1– ontological constituency is asymmetrical:  if U is an ontological constituent of B, then B is not an ontological constituent of U.

3.  Given that the  ball is a bundle of universals, and that the ball is spherical, it follows that the ball has as one of its ontological 'parts' the universal, sphericality.  Now sphericality and cubicality are not broadly-logically compossible.  Hence they cannot be bundled together to form an individual.  But our ball has a proper part internal to it which is a cube.  That proper part has cubicality as a constituent universal.  So it seems a broadly-logical contradiction ensues:  the ball has as constituents both sphericality and cubicality, universals that are not compossible.

4. An interesting objection!  But note that it assumes Transitivity of Bundling:  it assumes that if sphericality is bundled  with sufficiently many other Us to form a complete individual, and cubicality is bundled with one of these Us — say being made of rubber — then sphericality is bundled with cubicality. But it is well-known that bundling is not transitive.  Suppose roundness and redness are bundled in our ball, and redness and stickiness are bundled in a numerically distinct disk, but there is nothing that is both round and sticky. That's a possible scenario which shows that Transitivity of Bundling fails. From the fact that U1 is bundled with U2, and U2 with U3, one cannot infer that U1 is bundled with U3.  So from the fact that sphericality is bundled with rubberness, and rubberness with cubicality, it does not follow that sphericality is bundled with cubicality.

The  bundle theory can accommodate the fact that a property of a whole needn't be a property of all its proper parts.  Or am I missing something?