Why Be Consistent? Three Types of Consistency

A reader inquires:

This idea of the necessity to be consistent seems to be the logician's "absolute," as though being inconsistent was the most painful accusation one could endure. [. . .] What rule of life says that one must be absolutely consistent in how one evaluates truth? It is good to argue from first principles but it can also lead one down a rat hole.

Before we can discuss whether one ought to be consistent, we need to know which type of consistency is at issue. There are at least three types of consistency that people often confuse and that need to be kept distinct. I'll call them 'logical,' 'pragmatic,' and 'diachronic.' But it doesn't matter how we label them as long as we keep them separate.

Continue reading “Why Be Consistent? Three Types of Consistency”

Word of the Day: Inconcinnity

My elite readers no doubt know this word, but I learned it just today. It means lack of suitability or congruity: INELEGANCE.  'Concinnity' is also a word.  From the Latin concinnitas, from concinnus, skillfully put together, it means: harmony and often elegance of design especially of literary style in adaptation of parts to a whole or to each other. (Webster's New Collegiate, 1977, p. 234.)

Never allow a word to escape your comprehension.  If you encounter a word you don't know, write it down and look it up.  Keep a list of words and definitions in a notebook  you regularly consult.  It might be an online notebook like this one.  Having written this post, 'inconcinnity' is a word I am not likely to forget.  For there is nothing I write on this weblog that I do not reread, with pleasure, many times.

Dave Gudeman on Modality and ‘Antifactuals’

Long-time contributor Dave Gudeman coins the term 'antifactual' and then asks:

So, what are the truth conditions of an antifactual such as

(A) While the tree in my yard boasts 17,243 leaves at time t, it could have boasted 17,244 leaves at time t.

Here are some candidates:

(1) if the history of the tree had been different then …
(2) if the laws of physics had been different then …
(3) there exists a set of propositions S that were true at times before t such that, had each member of S been false, then given the truth of the various laws of physics and biology, an omniscient being could infer [could have inferred] that the number of leaves would be 17,244 at time t.
(4) there exists a set of propositions S that were true at times before t such that, had each member of S been false, then given the truth of the various laws of physics and biology, I can infer [could have inferred] by my normal power of reasoning and prediction that the number of leaves would be 17,244 at time t.

The problem with all of these candidates is that I don't think you can really know that any of them is true, but Peter, Bill et al. seem to be committed to the proposition that humans can know the truth of antifactuals. I can't come up with anything that humans could know the truth of short of the fact that (A) is not ruled out by mathematics or logic. But I've already discussed the problems with that interpretation. [In the portion of Dave's comments that I haven't quoted.] So that's what I mean when I say that I suspect that antifactuals, when used in a philosophical sense as Peter, Bill, et al use them are incoherent. I cannot figure out what the truth conditions of such propositions are. I can come up with several candidates, but none of them seems to be consistent with the usage and with what Peter, Bill, et al have said about modal propositions.

Continue reading “Dave Gudeman on Modality and ‘Antifactuals’”

A Cantorian Argument Why Possible Worlds Cannot be Maximally Consistent Sets of Propositions

In a recent comment, Peter Lupu bids us construe possible worlds as maximally consistent sets of propositions.  If this is right, then the actual world, which is of course one of the possible worlds,  is the maximally consistent set of true propositions.  But Cantor's Theorem implies that there cannot be a set of all true propositions. Therefore, Cantor's theorem implies that possible worlds cannot be maximally consistent sets of propositions.

Continue reading “A Cantorian Argument Why Possible Worlds Cannot be Maximally Consistent Sets of Propositions”

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Is That All There Is?

This strange Peggy Lee number is a candidate for the office of philosophically deepest popular song. If memory serves, it made the charts Stateside in the late 1960's. But it is the sort of song one would have expected to hear in a cabaret in Berlin in the decadent 1920's. 'Ockham' tells me that it is a Leiber and Stoller composition, and indeed it is. Surprising, given the other songs they wrote. It smacks of Weill-Brecht more than of Leiber-Stoller.

Bette Midler's version.

Nihilism was never so pleasantly packaged.

Can Existence Be Ostensively Defined?

Here is a remarkable passage from Ayn Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, expanded 2nd ed., p. 41:

Ostensive definitions are usually regarded as applicable only to conceptualized sensations. But they are applicable to axioms as well.  Since axiomatic concepts are identifications of irreducible primaries, the only way to define one is by means of an ostensive definition — e.g., to define 'existence,' one would have to sweep one's arm around and say: 'I mean this.'

Now that's an interesting suggestion! Let's put it to the test.

Continue reading “Can Existence Be Ostensively Defined?”

On Forming Societies at Faint Provocation

Paul Brunton, Notebooks II, 154, #56:

I am not enamoured overmuch of this modern habit, which forms a society at faint provocation. A man's own problem stares him alone in the face, and it is not to be solved by any association of men. Every new society we join is a fresh temptation to waste time.

Well said. Would Thoreau have joined the Thoreau Society? Merton the Merton Society? Would Groucho Marx have joined a club that would have him as a member, let alone make him the cynosure of its interest?

Four Uses of ‘Of’ and Non-Intentional Conscious States

The thesis of intentionality can be stated roughly as follows: Every consciousness is a consciousness of something.  I claim that this Brentano thesis is false because of the existence of non-intentional states of consciousness. Peter Lupu understands and agrees but no one else hereabouts does.  So I need to take a few steps back and issue some clarifications.  I begin by distinguishing among four uses of 'of.'  I'll call them the subjective, the objective, the dual, and the appositive.  Once these are on the table one or two impediments to the understanding of my point — which of course is not original with me —  will have been removed.

Continue reading “Four Uses of ‘Of’ and Non-Intentional Conscious States”

On Replying in Kind

Suppose A launches a vicious verbal attack on B. B will be tempted to respond in kind, but ought to give some thought to the point of so doing. For even if B does not escalate the attack, but merely throws back what was thrown at him, the attacker may well feel justified in having made his initial assault. He will be tempted to rationalize his behavior as follows:

You see what a worthless fellow B is? How dare he call me names! I'm glad I attacked him; he deserved it. In fact, I attacked him just to expose him, just to show what nastiness he is capable of.

The No True Scotsman or No True Atheist Fallacy

In logic, a fallacy is not a false belief but a pattern of reasoning that is both typical and in some way specious. Specious reasoning, by the very etymology of the term, appears correct but is not. Thus a fallacy is not just any old mistake in reasoning, but a recurrent mistake that is seductive. A taxonomy of fallacies is useful insofar as it helps prevent one from seducing oneself and being seduced by others.

Continue reading “The No True Scotsman or No True Atheist Fallacy”

Is Religious Instruction Child Abuse? Is Religion the Greatest Social Evil?

That religious instruction constitutes child abuse is another theme of contemporary militant atheists such as Richard Dawkins and A. C. Grayling. Consider the competing 'truths' taught by different faith-based schools, e.g. that Jesus is the Son of God, that he is not, etc. Grayling complains that

. . . in schools all over the country these antipathetic 'truths' are being force-fed to different groups of pupils, none of whom is in a position to assess their credibility or worth. This is a serious form of child abuse. It sows the seeds of apartheids capable of resulting, in their logical conclusion, in murder and war, as history sickeningly and ceaselessly proves. There is no greater social evil than religion. It is the cancer in the body of humanity. Human credulity and superstition, and the need for comforting fables, will never be extirpated, so religion will always exist, at least among the uneducated. The only way to manage the dangers it presents is to confine it entirely to the private sphere, and for the public domain to be blind to it in all but one respect: that by law no one's private beliefs should be allowed to cause a nuisance or any injury to anyone else. For whenever and wherever religion manifests itself in the public arena as an organised phenomenon, it is the most Satanic of all things. (A. C. Grayling, Life, Sex, and Ideas: The Good Life Without God, Oxford 2003, 34-35, emphasis added.)

Continue reading “Is Religious Instruction Child Abuse? Is Religion the Greatest Social Evil?”