Predicates and Properties

We are warming up to an examination of deflationary theories of truth according to which truth is either not a property or not a metaphysically substantive property.  (I oppose deflationary theories of truth just as I oppose deflationary theories of existence.) But first some clarification of 'predicate' and 'property.'

1. I begin by resisting the traditional conflation of predicates and properties, a conflation in evidence when we hear a philosopher claim that "existence is not a predicate."  That claim makes no sense unless a predicate is a property.  After all, 'existence,' as an abstract substantive, is not grammattically tuited to occupy predicate position.  If, however, a predicate is a bit of language used to express a property, then the claim should be that " '. . . exists' is not a predicate."  That's in order, as is "Existence is not a property."  As expressing properties, predicates are distinct from properties.  Predicates are linguistic while properties are extralinguistic.

To be a bit more precise, predicates (whether types or tokens) are tied to particular languages whereas the properties they express are not so tied.  Thus schwarz is tied to German in the way black is tied to English, but the property of being black is tied to neither.  Equally, the property of being disyllabic is tied to no one language even though it is a property that only linguistic items can have.  Thus 'Boston' but not Boston is disyllabic.

2. Some of you will question whether there are properties distinct from predicates.  Question away.  But just realize that in order to raise this very question you must first have distinguished predicates and properties.  You must already have made the distinction 'at the level of intension' if not 'at the level of extension.'  For you cannot maintain that there are no properties distinct from predicates unless you understand the term 'property' just as you cannot maintain that there are no unicorns distinct from horses unless you understand the term 'unicorn.'

3. By my lights, you are a very foolish philosopher if you deny properties, but not if you deny universals.  If you deny universals you are merely mistaken.  So let's be clear that 'property' and 'universal' are not to be used interchangeably.  It is a substantive question whether properties are universals or particulars (as trope theorists maintain).  Universals I define as repeatable entities, particulars as unrepeatable entities.

4. The predicate/property distinction under our belts, we need to note three views on their relation.

5. One view is that  no predicate expresses a property.  I rejected this view in #3.  To put it bluntly, there is a real world out there, and the things in it have properties whether or not there are any languages and language-users. Some of our predicates succeed more or less in expressing some of these properties.

6. A second view is that every predicate expresses or denotes a property.  The idea is that for every predicate 'P' there is a property P corresponding to 'P.'  But then, given that 'exists' and 'true' are predicates, it would follow straightaway that existence and truth are properties.  And that seems too easy.  Deflationists, after all, deny for reasons that cannot simply be dismissed that truth is a property.  They cannot be refuted by pointing out that 'true' is a predicate of English.  The following equivalence is undeniable but also not formulable unless 'true'  is a predicate:

'Grass is green' is true iff grass is green.

The deflationist will take an equivalence like this to show that 'true' is a dispensable predicate and therefore one that does not pick out a property.  (On Quine's disquotationalism, for example, 'is true' is a device of disquotation: it merely undoes the semantic ascent displayed on the LHS of the biconditional.)  We should therefore be uneasy about the view that every predicate expresses or denotes a property.  The existence of a predicate does not show the existence of a corresponding property.  A predicate need not predicate a property.  It should not be a matter of terminological fallout that wherever there is a predicate there is a property.

7.  Determined to maintain  that every predicate expresses or denotes a property, a deflationist  could of course hold that existence and truth are properties, but not metaphysically substantive properties.  A deflationist could argue like this:

Every predicate expresses a property

'True' is a predicate

Ergo: Truth is a property, but not a substantive one.

But he could also argue like this:

Every genuine predicate expresses a substantive property

Truth is not a substantive property

Ergo: 'True' is not a genuine predicate.

8.  A third view about the predicate-property relation has it that some predicates pick out properties and some don't.  I suggest this is how we should use 'predicate.'  It then becomes a matter of investigation, not of terminology, whether or not there is a property for a given predicate.

On Writing for Money

From an NYT interview with Christopher Hitchens on the occasion of the publication of his memoir Hitch-22:

Did you write the book for money?
Of course, I do everything for money. Dr. Johnson is correct when he says that only a fool writes for anything but money. It would be useful to keep a diary, but I don’t like writing unpaid. I don’t like writing checks without getting paid.

The fool in excelsis, I suppose, would be he who not only writes what cannot sell, but uses his own blood for ink.  I am thinking of Nietzsche whose posthumous birth was due in no small measure to the  auto-vivisection which supplied the fluid which powered his pen.

Another Round on Assertoric Force

William Woking comments:

Logical argument is just like a chess game. We have a common understanding of the rules of inference. The game ends either in reaching disagreement about a principle that is demonstrably fundamental, i.e., it self-evidently admits of no proof or disproof (e.g., Bill hates carrots), in which case stalemate, or where both sides end in agreeing upon a set of fundamental principles from which the truth of the winner's thesis follows with logical certainty.

———————- The argument so far ————————-

(Woking Thesis) Expression types (e.g. declarative sentences) can have assertoric force.

[Vallicella objection]
(Major) If an expression-type has assertoric force, every token of it has assertoric force
(Minor) A token of any sentence may occur in a context where it has no assertoric force
(Conclusion) No expression-type has assertoric force.

(Proof of the minor) Take any declarative sentence-type such as 'Socrates runs'. But it has no assertoric force in the consequence 'If Socrates runs, Socrates moves'.

(Reply to objection)
I concede the argument of the objection is valid. I concede the major. I dispute the minor. Against the proof of the minor. 'Socrates runs' does have assertoric force in the 'If Socrates runs, Socrates moves'. However, its force is cancelled out by the 'if then' operator.

The minor is thus the bone of contention.  We agree that in 'If Socrates runs, then he moves' the protasis of the conditional lacks assertoric force.  (I note en passant that the apodosis also lacks assertoric force.) But we disagree as to why the protasis of the conditional lacks assertoric force.  I say it is because no sentence-type intrinsically and as such has assertoric force.  Woking say is it is because there are contexts in which semantic cancellation removes the assertoric force which all declarative sentence-types possess intrinsically and as such. 

One objection to semantic cancellation is that it is inconsistent with the thesis of the compositionality of meaning, a thesis which Woking accepts, together with the thesis that assertoric force is a semantic component.  According to compositionality of meaning, a sentence-type is a semantic whole composed of, and built up out of, semantic parts.  Now given that assertoric force is a semantic component, and that wholes have their parts essentially, then the meaning of a sentence-type has its assertoric meaning component essentially, which implies that no sentence-type can have its assertoric force removed by semantic cancellation.  So either no sentence-type has assertoric force, as I maintain, or every sentence-type has assertoric force, whence it follows, contrary to what Woking maintains, that it is not the case that some sentence-types do, and some do not, have their assertoric force removed by semantic cancellation.  The argument, then, is this:

1. Compositionality of Meaning: The meaning of a sentence-type is a whole of parts.

2. Assertoric force is a semantic component of the meaning of a sentence-type.

3. Mereological Essentialism: wholes have their parts essentially: if x is a part of W, then necessarily x is a part of W.

4. The assertoric force of the meaning of a sentence-type is essential to it. (from 1, 2, 3)

5. If x is essential to y, then y cannot exist without x.

6. The meaning of a sentence-type cannot exist without its assertoric component. (from 4, 5)

7. A sentence-type's assertoric component, if it has one, cannot be removed by semantic cancellation, or in any other way. (from 6)

8. Either no sentence-type or every sentence-type possesses assertoric force intrinsically and as such. (from 7)

9. Some sentence-types do not possess assertoric force.

10. No sentence-type possesses assertoric force intrinsically and as such. (from 8, 9)

It appears that only by rejecting Mereological Essentialism can Woking evade this argument.  For the inferences are valid and the other premises he accepts.  But I should think that ME is far more credible than his somewhat vague talk of semantic cancellation.

Famous Last Words: “Don’t Worry, It Isn’t Loaded”

Life in the fast lane often leads to a quick exit from life's freeway.  You may recall Terry Kath, guitarist for the band Chicago.  In 1978, while drunk, he shot himself in the head with a 'unloaded' gun.  At first he had been fooling with a .38 revolver.  Then he picked up a semi-automatic 9 mm pistol, removed the magazine, pointed it at his head, spoke his last words, and pulled the trigger.  Unfortunately for his head, there was a round in the chamber.  Or that is one way the story goes. 

Such inadvertent exits are easily avoided by exceptionless observation of three rules:  Never point a gun at something you do not want to destroy.  Treat every gun as if   loaded, whether loaded or not.  Never mix alcohol and gunpowder.

Helen Thomas Disgraces Herself

Good riddance to this superannuated leftist gasbag.  Former mayor of NYC, Ed Koch, delivers a just and fitting verdict:

Helen Thomas, 89, who is of Lebanese descent, claims to be a professional journalist. As such, she is subject to professional standards. Her statement that Jews should “get the hell out of Palestine” and go back to "Poland and Germany" is clear evidence that she is no longer in control of her emotions and cognitive powers and that she cannot carry out the impartial obligations of a journalist. She has disgraced herself.

Jews have lived in the area known in modern times as the British Mandate of Palestine, for thousands of years and up to the present time. Indeed, Israelite civilization goes back to the Patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, as well as to King David and King Solomon. We Jews spring from the loins of those patriarchs. The State of Israel sits where the Jewish Kingdoms of Judea and Israel reigned thousands of years ago.

Referring to the Israeli boarding of the Mavi Marmara, she spoke wildly of a “deliberate massacre, an international crime,” and said the U.S. response was “pitiful.” See here.  Thomas is  a fool of no consequence, but what is truly troubling is to observe leftist collaboration with Islamists.  An amazing phenomenon.  I take a stab at analysis in The Converse Callicles Principle: Weakness Does not Justify.

Addendum (8 June):  From Helen of Oy!:

Anti-Semitism: With the state of Israel facing an existential threat, journalism's grand dame advocates ethnic cleansing as a Mideast solution. Liberal intolerance has come out of the closet.

The "retirement" of Helen Thomas comes as no surprise. Neither did the remarks that prompted it. She's expressed such sentiments before, and her brethren in the White House press corps, which salivates over any politically incorrect utterance from the right, let her get away with it.

She got away with it for the same reason those on the left from Bill Maher to Keith Olbermann get away with similar over-the-top sentiments. It depends on whose political ox is being gored. Tea Partyers who oppose the policies of the first black president are racists. Genuine bigots on the left are celebrated. (emphasis added)

Once again the leftist double standard in action.

Soteriology in Nietzsche and the Question of the Value of Life

Nietzsche1 Giles Fraser in his provocative Redeeming Nietzsche: On the Piety of Unbelief (Routledge 2002) maintains that "Nietzsche is obsessed with the question of human salvation" and that his work is "primarily soteriology." (p. 2)  I don't disagree with this assessment, but there is a tension in Nietzsche that ought to be pointed out, one that Fraser, from what I have read of his book, does not address.

1. Talk of salvation presupposes, first,  that there is some general state or condition, one in which we all find ourselves, from which we need salvation, and second, that this general condition is profoundly unsatisfactory.  In The Birth of Tragedy, section 3, Nietzsche invokes "the wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus" who, when asked by King Midas about that which is most desirable for man, replied that the best of all is utterly beyond human reach: not to be born.  The second best, if one has had the misfortune of being born, is to die soon.  Now it is clear that some such negative assessment of life, or of human life, is a precondition of any quest for salvation, no matter what form it might take, whether Buddhist, Stoic, Christian, whatever.  The negative judgment on life as a whole need not be as harsh as the Silenian one, but without some negative judgment or other as to the value of life the question of salvation  makes no sense.  To take the question seriously one need not believe that salvation to some positive state is possible; but one has to believe that the general state of humanity (or of all sentient beings) is deeply unsatisfactory, to use a somewhat mild term. 

2. But here's the rub.  It is well known  that Nietzsche maintains that the value of life is inestimable.  As he puts it in Twilight of the Idols ("The Problem of Socrates," sec. 2) : der Wert des Lebens nicht abgeschaetzt werden kann.  His point is that objective judgments about the value of life are impossible.  Such judgments can never be true; they count only as symptoms.  Saying nothing about life itself, they merely betray the health or decadence of those who make the judgments.  Buddha, Socrates, and all those belonging to the consensus sapientium who purport to say something objective about this life when they pronounce a negative judgment upon it, as Buddha does in the First Noble Truth (sarvam dukkham: all is suffering) merely betray their own physiological decline.  There is no fact of the matter as to the value or disvalue of life.  There is only ascending and descending life with the value judgments being no more than symptoms either of life ascending or life descending.  Thus spoke Nietzsche.

3. The tension, then, is between the following two Nietzschean commitments: (1) Man needs salvation from his present predicament in this life; (2) The value of life cannot be objectively assessed or evaluated.  The claims cannot both be true.  The need for salvation implies that our predicament in this life is of negative value, when this cannot be the case if there is no fact of the matter concerning the value of life. 

4.  Finding contradictions in Nietzsche is not very difficult, and one could even argue that the conflicting trends of his thought show its richness and its nearness to the bloody bone of the predicament in which we find ourselves; my present point, however,  is that Fraser's essentially correct claim that Nietzsche's work is "primarily soteriology" needs to be qualified by his fundamental thesis  about the inestimability of life's value, which thesis  renders soteriology impossible.

5. Well, is the value of life objectively inestimable?  A most vexing question.  Life is always an individual life, mine for example.  Heidegger spoke of the Jemeinigkeit des Daseins; I will speak of the Jemeinigkeit des Lebens.  There is no living in general; it is always a particular affair.  What's more, every individual life is stretched on the rack of time:  one does not live one's individual life all at once but bit by bit.  If there is a problem about how any given individual life can judge the value of life in general, then there will also be a problem about how any phase of an individual's life can judge the value of that individual's life as a whole.

I am tempted to give the gastroenterologist's answer to the question whether life is worth living.  It depends on the liver.  Joking aside, the point would be that there is just no objective fact of the matter  as to whether or not life in general is worth living.  You either experience your particular life as worth living or you don't.  If you do then your particular life has value, at least for the moment.  There is no  standard apart from life, and indeed apart from the life of the individual, by which the value of life could be measured.  No standard apart from life does not imply no standard: individual life is the standard.  The value of life's being objectively inestimable therefore does not imply that its value is merely subjective.  The implication seems to be that the individual life is an absolute standard of value in which subjective and objective coalesce.

6. "But aren't there certain general considerations that show that no life is worth living or that no life is worth very much?"  And what would those be? 

a) Well, there is the fact of impermanence or transience.  In a letter to Franz Overbeck, Nietzsche himself complains, "I am grieved by the transitoriness of things."  I feel your pain, Fritz.  Doesn't universal impermanence show that nothing in this life is worth much?  How important can anything be if it is here today and gone tomorrow?  How can anyone find value in his doings and strivings if he faces up to the universality of impermanence?  Does not the certainty of death mock the seriousness of our passions and plans?  (Arguably, most do not honestly confront impermanence but vainly imagine that everything will remain hunky-dory indefinitely.  They live in illusion until driven out of it by some such calamity as the sudden death of a loved one.)  But on the other hand, how can impermanence be taken to be an argument against worth and importance if there is no possibility of permanence?  As Nietzsche says in Twilight, if there is no real world, if there is no world of Platonic stasis, then there is no merely apparent world either.  Is it an argument against this life that it fails to meet an impossible standard?  And is not the postulation of such a world a mere reflex of weakness and world-weariness?  Weltschmerz become creative conjures up spooks who preside over the denigration of the only world there is. 

b) And then there is the fact of misery and affliction.  (Simone Weil is one of the best writers on affliction, malheur.)  Don't we all suffer, and doesn't this universal fact show that Silenus was right after all:  better never to have been born, with second best being an early death?  But again, and taking the side of Nietzsche, is it not the miserable who find life miserable, the afflicted who find it afflicting?  The strong do not whine about pain and suffering; they take them as goads to richer and fuller living.  Or is this just Nietzschean romanticism, a failure to fully face the true horror of life?

These questions are not easy to answer!  Indeed, the very posing of them is a difficult and ticklish matter.

Fat Ass Runs

That's what they are called, don't blame me.  "FAT ASS is the name given to a series of low key runs that are frequented by experienced runners & walkers and characterised by the phrase 'No Fees, No Awards, No Aid, No Wimps.'"  More here. Want to join me for Gold Canyon Fat Ass #1?