Maverick Philosopher

This is a response to a post of the same name by London Ed.  I am much in his debt for his copious and relentless commentary.  My responses are in blue.

After reading some of Maverick’s other posts on the subject, and reading some material he sent me, it  is clear I have misrepresented his argument. Although I am still some way from understanding it, I think it is this.

Suppose there is only one American philosopher, and suppose that it is Vallicella. Then the sentence ‘an American philosopher exists’ is true because Vallicella (qua American philosopher) exists. Now we can translate ‘an American philosopher exists’ into ‘some philosopher is American’, which reduces the verb ‘exists’ to the copula ‘is’. But we can’t translate ‘Vallicella exists’ in the same way. Thus general existential statements presuppose the truth of singular existential statements (or a disjunction or conjunction of singular existential statements). But we cannot analyse away ‘exists’ from singular existential statements. Therefore there is circularity: the same word appears on the right and left hand side of the definition. An American philosopher exists if and only if Vallicella exists.

That is not quite what I say, but it is a fair approximation.

But there is an obvious route out of this problem. What actually makes ‘some philosopher is American’ true is ‘Vallicella is an American philosopher’, which does not use the word ‘exist’. Vallicella may object that ‘Vallicella exists’ has to be true for that to work. Certainly, but we can reply in two ways. We could suppose that empty proper names are meaningless, and that ‘Vallicella’ is only meaningful because it names something. I.e. if it names something, it must name an existing something. ‘Vallicella exists’ is therefore true in virtue of the meaning of the proper name ‘Vallicella’. Or we could allow that empty proper names are meaningful, and that they have a sense but not a reference. Then we can appeal to the idea of instantiation, as with general concepts. ‘Vallicella exists’ means that the sense of ‘Vallicella’ has a referent or instance. ‘An American philosopher exists’ means that the sense of ‘American philosopher’ has an instance.

That is, either common names and proper names fall into different logical categories, in which case we don’t need to use the word ‘exists’ in singular sentences at all. Or they fall into the same category, in which case we can analyse singular existential statements exactly as we analyse general existential statements. In neither case is the definition of ‘exists’ circular.

The second alternative is available only if there are haecceity properties to serve as the Fregean senses of proper names.  Now I have argued many times in these pages and in print against such properties.  It follows that we cannot analyze 'Vallicella exists' in the same as as 'American philosophers exist.'  This leaves the first alternative, according to which the meaning of 'Vallicella' is its referent, an existing individual.  Ed claims that on this alternative "‘Vallicella exists’ is therefore true in virtue of the meaning of the proper name ‘Vallicella’."

I would say that Ed has it precisely backwards.  What he should say is that 'Vallicella' has meaning in virtue of the truth of 'Vallicella exists.'  What Ed says illustrates the linguistic idealism that I have more than once criticized him for.  V.'s existence does not depend on his name or on its meaning.  The point is clearer in terms of a non-human example.  So consider Stromboli, the island volcano.  Presumably Stromboli existed long before the emergence of language.  So what we should say is that 'Strromboli' has meaning in virtue of the fact that Stromboli extralinguistically and extramentally exists, and not vice versa.

Ed and I agree that 'Island volcanos exist' is logically equivalent to 'Some volcano is an island.'  This equivalence, however, rests on the assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals.  (If the domain were populated by Meinongian nonexistent objects, then the equivalence would fail.)   The attempted reduction of existence to someness is therefore circular.  For when we think it through we come to realize that the general existence expressed by sentences like 'Some volcano is an island' presupposes the  singular existence of the individuals in the domain of quantification.  This singular existence, obviously enough, precisely because it is singular, cannot be understood in terms of the logical quantity, someness.  So we move in a circle: from existence to someness and then back to existence.

The same argument can be couched in terms of instantiation.  'Island volcanos exist' is logically equivalent to the second-level predication  'The concept island volcano is instantiated.'  But if a first-level concept is instantiated, it is instaniated by at least one individual.  Obviously, this individual must exist.  (If it were a nonexistent individual, the link between existence and instantiation would be broken.)  So again we move in an explanatory circle,from existence to instantiation and back to existence again.  It follows that existence cannot be reduced to instantiation.

Pace Quine, existence is NOT what 'existential' (i.e., particular) quantification expresses.  What the particular quantifier expresses is instantiation, and instantiation is not existence.