We sometimes speak of this life. For example, some assert that this life is all there is. The ability to thematize and question the whole of life may not prove, but it does suggest, that we are more than beings confined to this life. Even the average schlep, enmired in the mundane, his fledgling metaphysical organs numbed by the the onslaught of quotidiana, will at some point, when the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune" pay him a visit, exclaim, "What the hell is this life all about?"
To Flout and to Flaunt
Why do people have such trouble with this distinction? One flouts the law. One does not flaunt it. Correct: 'She flaunted her naked breats thereby flouting the law.' Incorrect: 'She flouted her naked breasts thereby flaunting the law.'
Free Will
You say it is a life-enhancing illusion?
Perhaps it is
From a point of view not ours.
From ours
It has all the reality it needs
For all it needs to do is enhance life.
And that it does.
Disagree?
Then see
If you can live your life
On automatic pilot.
Good luck with that.
(If you crave something more substantial, poke around in my Free Will category.)
John Gardner on Mickelsson’s Ghosts
John Gardner describes his novel, Mickelsson's Ghosts:
The novel is about a famous philosopher who, midway through his career, suddenly finds himself (as Dante did) lost. He feels he has failed his wife and family (the wife has left him), feels he has betrayed his earlier promise and the values of his Wisconsin Lutheran background, has lost interest in his students and has ceased to care about philosophical questions, has lost faith and hope in democracy (and owes a large sum of money to the IRS), scorns the university where he teaches and the unsophisticated town in which it is situated, and has good reason to believe he is losing his mind. He cuts himself off fom his university community by buying a huge rotting house in the country, which turns out to be haunted (if he can trust his wits), and he finds himself up to the neck in evils he never before dreamt of — middle-of-the-night dumpings of poisonous wastes, witchcraft, backwoods prostitution, a mysterious string of murders, and more. (John Gardner, On Becoming a Novelist, Harper and Row, 1983, p. 141.)
On Becoming a Novelist is an excellent book, just unbelievably good. And the above described novel ain't no slouch either. But Gardner, being a damned fool, got himself killed in a motorcycle accident at the tender age of 49. A serious loss to American letters.
Saturday Night at the Oldies: Woody Guthrie & Sons: Arlo, Adnopoz, Zimmerman
Tomorrow being Woody Guthrie's 100th birthday, tonight we revisit some of his tunes and some of those he influenced. First a wry number from the man himself: Philadelphia Lawyer. A tale of an East Coast lawyer, a Hollywood maid, and a gun-totin' Reno cowhand name of Wild Bill, with "ten notches carved on his gun." "Now tonight back in old Pennsylvania/Amongst her beautiful pines/There's one less Philadelphia lawyer/In old Philadelphia tonight."
Percy's Song, written by Bob Dylan, is well-performed by Guthrie's son, Arlo. It is in the Guthrie tradition of left-leaning social protest. A mean judge metes out an unjust sentence. Arlo's City of New Orleans is a classic slice of Americana, and a great song, right up there with Don McLean's American Pie and Woody's This Land is Your Land. There is a element of silly socialist utopianism in the latter, but also something genuine and worthwhile.
Lacking as it does the proper American cowboy resonance, 'Elliot Charles Adnopoz' was ditched by its bearer who came to call himself 'Ramblin' Jack Elliot.' Born in 1931 in Brooklyn to Jewish parents who wanted him to become a doctor, young Adnopoz rebelled, ran away, and became a protege of Woody Guthrie. If it weren't for Ramblin' Jack, Guthrie would be nowhere near as well-known as he is today.
Pretty Boy Floyd. "As through this life you ramble, as through this life you roam/You'll never see an outlaw drive a family from their home." No? An example of the knee-jerk tendency of lefties invariably to take the side of the underdog regardless of whether right or wrong. It's as if weakness justifies.
Ramblin' Jack does a haunting version of Dylan's Just Like Tom Thumb's Blues. It grows on you. Give it a chance. Cigarettes and Whisky and Wild Woman. Soul of a Man. Dylan's unforgettable, Don't Think Twice.
And now the bard himself,the most distinguished Jewish 'son' of Woody Guthrie, who absorbed a hundred influences and made something new, Robert Zimmerman of Hibbing, Minnesota. Song to Woody. It Take a Lot to Laugh. Video of Dylan's meeting with Guthrie as the latter lay dying of Huntington's Chorea in a New Jersey hospital. I Shall Be Released. Rollin' and Tumblin.' Not Dark Yet. "Sometimes my burden is more than I can bear/It's not dark yet, but it's gettin' there."
Finally, one more from Woody. Hard Travelin.
Van Inwagen on ‘Exists’ as a Polyadic Predicate
This post continues my examination of Peter van Inwagen's "Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment." The first post in this series is here. There you will find the bibliographical details.
We saw that van Inwagen gives something like the following argument for the univocity of 'exists':
1. Number-words are univocal
2*. 'Exist(s)' is a number-word
Therefore
3*. 'Exist(s)' is univocal.
The second premise is pure Frege. The question arises: is van Inwagen committed to the Fregean doctrine that 'exists(s)' is a second-level predicate? He says he isn't. (484)
How should we understand a general existential such as 'Horses exist'? Frege famously maintained that 'exist(s)' is a second-level predicate: it is never a predicate of objects, but always only a predicate of concepts. What the sample sentence says is that the concept horse has instances. Despite appearances, the sentence is not about horses, but about a non-horse, the concept horse. The concept horse is not a horse! (Frege also famously and perplexingly maintains that the concept horse is not a concept, but let's leave that for another occasion.) And what our general existential says about the concept horse is not that it exists (as we ordinarily understand 'exists') but that it is instantiated. Van Inwagen, though endorsing Frege's key notion that (as PvI puts it) "existence is closely allied to number" (482) does not follow Frege is in holding that 'exists' is a second-level predicate.
Van Inwagen thus appears to be staking out a middle position between the following extremes:
A. 'Horses exist' predicates existence of individual horses.
B. 'Horses exist' predicates instantiation of the concept horse.
Van Inwagen's view is that 'Horses exist' says that horses, taken plurally, number more than zero. So 'Horses exist,' contra Frege, is about horses, but not about individually specified horses such as Secretariat and Mr Ed. 'Horses exist' is not about the concept horse or any other abstract object such as a property or a set: it is about concrete horses, but taken plurally.
I am trying to understand this, but I find it obscure. One thing I do understand is that there are predicates that hold plurally (collectively) but not distributively, but are not, for all that, second-level. Van Inwagen gives the example:
1. Horses have an interesting evolutionary history.
Obviously, the predicate in (1) is not true of each individual horse. No individual horse evolves in the sense pertinent to evolutionary theory. But the predicate is also not true of the concept horse or the set of horses or the property of being a horse or any other abstract object. No concept, set, or property evolves in any sense. So what is the logical subject of (1)? Horses in the plural, or horses taken collectively. Or suppose the cops have a building surrounded. No individual cop has the building surrounded, and of course no abstract object has the building surrounded. Cops have the building surrounded. Suppose Manny is one of the cops. Then the following argument would commit the fallacy of division: (a) The cops have the building surrounded; (b) Manny is one of the cops; ergo (c) Manny has the building surrounded. What is true of cops in the plural is not true of any cop in the singular.
If I have understood PvI, he is saying that 'exists' functions like the predicate in (1), and like the predicate in 'The cops have the building surrounded.' But this strikes me as problematic. Consider these two arguments:
Horses have evolved
Secretariat is a horse
ergo
Secretariat has evolved.
Horses exist
Secretariat is a horse
ergo
Secretariat exists.
The first argument is invalid, committing as it does the fallacy of division. The second argument is perfectly in order.
So it seems, contra Van Iwagen, that 'Horses exist' is importantly disanalogous to 'Horses have evolved' and 'The cops have the building surrounded.' 'Exists' is predicable of specified individuals, individuals in the singular. 'Evolved' is not predicable of specified individuals, individuals in the singular, but only of individuals in the plural.
I take van Inwagen to be saying that the logical subject of 'Horses exist' is not the concept horse, but horses, horses in the plural, and what it says of them is that they number more than zero. What I am having trouble understanding is how 'more than zero' can attach to a plurality as a plurality, as opposed to a one-over-many such as a concept (which has an extension) or a set (which has a membership).
A plurality as a plurality is not one item, but a mere manifold of items: there is simply nothing there to serve as logical subject of the predicate 'more than zero.'
"But look, Bill, it is the horses that are more than zero; so there is a logical subject of the predicate."
Response: You can't say what you want to say grammatically. If there IS a logical subject of the predicate, then it is not a mere manyness. But if there ARE many subjects of predication, then 'more than zero' applies to each horse which is not what you want to say. There must be something that makes the particulars you are calling horses horses, and that would have to be something like the concept horse; otherwise you have an unintelligible plurality of bare particulars. But then when you say that the horses are more than zero you are saying that the concept horse has more than one instance, and number-words become second-level predicates.
My suspicion is that van Inwagen's middle path is unviable and that his position collapses into the full-throated Fregean position according to which (a) "existence is allied to number" and (b) number-words are second-level predicates.
Van Inwagen on the Univocity of ‘Exists’
In "Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment" (in Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, eds. Chalmers et al., Oxford 2009, pp. 472-506), Peter van Inwagen argues that 'exists' is univocal: it does not have "different meanings when applied to objects in different categories." (482) This post will examine one of his arguments, an argument found on p. 482. All quotations are from this page.
Van Inwagen begins by noting that number words such as 'six' or 'forty-three' do not "mean different things when they are used to count objects of different sorts." Surely he is correct: "If you have written thirteen epics and I own thirteen cats, the number of your epics is the number of my cats." So the first premise of the argument is the indisputable:
1. Number-words are univocal in sense: they mean the same regardless of the sorts of object they are used to count.
Van Inwagen takes his second premise straight from Frege:
2. "But existence is closely allied to number."
How so? Well, to say that unicorns do not exist is equivalent to saying that the number of unicorns is zero, and to say that horses exist is equivalent to saying that the number of horses is one or more. Surely that is true for both affirmative and negative general existentials. Whether it is true for singular existentials is a further question.
Van Inwagen proceeds: "The univocacy [univocity] of number and the the intimate connection between number and existence should convince us that existence is univocal." The conclusion of the argument, then, is:
3. Existence is univocal.
The first thing to notice about this argument is that it is not even valid. Trouble is caused by the fudge-phrase 'closely allied to' and van Inwagen's shift from 'exists' to existence. But repairs are easily made, and charity demands that we make them. Here is a valid argument that van Inwagen could have given:
1. Number-words are univocal
2*. 'Exist(s)' is a number-word
Therefore
3*. 'Exist(s)' is univocal.
The latter argument is plainly valid in point of logical form: the conclusion follows from the premises. It is the argument van Inwagen should have given. Unfortunately the argument is unsound. Although (1) is indisputably true, (2*) is false.
Consider my cat Max Black. I joyously exclaim, 'Max exists!' My exclamation expresses a truth. Compare 'Cats exist.' Now I agree with van Inwagen that the general 'Cats exist' is equivalent to 'The number of cats is one or more.' But it is perfectly plain that the singular 'Max exists' is not equivalent to 'The number of Max is one or more.' For the right-hand-side of the equivalence is nonsense, hence necessarily neither true nor false.
This question makes sense: 'How many cats are there in BV's house?' But this question makes no sense: 'How many Max are there in BV's house?' Why not? Well, 'Max' is a proper name (Eigenname in Frege's terminology) not a concept-word (Begriffswort in Frege's terminology). Of course, I could sensibly ask how many Maxes there are hereabouts, but then 'Max' is not a proper name, but a stand-in for 'person/cat named "Max" .' The latter phrase is obviously not a proper name.
Van Inwagen's argument strikes me as very bad, and I am puzzled why he is seduced by it. (Actually, I am not puzzled: van Inwagen is in lock-step with Quine; perhaps the great prestige of the latter has the former mesmerized.) Here is my counterargument:
4. 'Exists' sometimes functions as a first-level predicate, a predicate of specific (named) individuals.
5. Number-words never function as predicates of specific (named) individuals
Therefore
6. 'Exists' is not a number-word.
Therefore
7. The (obvious) univocity of number-words is not a good reason to think that 'exists' is univocal.
Of course, there is much more to say — in subsequent posts. For example if you deny (4), why is that denial more reasonable than the denial of (2*)?
All Along the Watchtower
The Book of Isaiah, Chapter 21, verses 5-9:
Prepare the table, watch in the watchtower, eat, drink: arise ye
princes, and prepare the shield. For thus hath the Lord said unto
me, Go set a watchman, let him declare what he seeth. And he saw a
chariot with a couple of horsemen, a chariot of asses, and a
chariot of camels; and he hearkened diligently with such heed. . .
. And, behold, here cometh a chariot of men, with a couple of
horsemen. And he answered and said, Babylon is fallen, is fallen,
and all the graven images of her gods he hath broken unto the
ground.
Bob Dylan, All Along the Watchtower:
"There must be some way out of here," said the joker to the thief,
"There's too much confusion, I can't get no relief.
Businessmen, they drink my wine, plowmen dig my earth,
None of them along the line know what any of it is worth."
"No reason to get excited," the thief, he kindly spoke,
"There are many here among us who feel that life is but a joke.
But you and I, we've been through that, and this is not our fate,
So let us not talk falsely now, the hour is getting late."
All along the watchtower, princes kept the view
While all the women came and went, barefoot servants, too.
Outside in the distance a wildcat did growl,
Two riders were approaching, the wind began to howl.
The absurdist sensibility of Bringing It All Back Home, Highway 61 Revisited, and Blonde on Blonde gave way, after the July 1966 motorcycle accident, to a renewed seriousness. Life is no joke. We've been through that. No more talking falsely now, the hour is getting late.
On Calling Obama a Socialist
It is a tactical mistake for libertarians and conservatives to label Obama a socialist. For what will happen, has happened: liberals will revert to a strict definition and point out that Obama is not a socialist by this strict definition. Robert Heilbroner defines socialism in terms of "a centrally planned economy in which the government controls all means of production." To my knowledge, Obama has never advocated such a thing. So when the libertarian or conservative accuses Obama of socialism he lets himself in for a fruitless and wholly unnecessary verbal dispute from which he will emerge the loser.
It is enough to point out that the policies of Obama and the Democrat Party lead us toward bigger government and away from self-reliance, individual responsibility, individual liberty, and sound fiscal policy. If you want to use the 'S' word, you can say that Obama & Co. are pushing us in the direction of socialism. But calling him a socialist is tactically inadvisable. Never forget that the whole point is to remove him and his gang from positions of power. To achieve that goal we need to persuade large numbers of fence-sitters that that he is leading us down the wrong path. That persuasion is less likely to happen if we come across as extremists who misuse language.
It is even worse to label Obama a 'communist.' Every communist is a socialist, but not every socialist is a communist. If our president is not a socialist, then a fortiori he is not a communist. It is intellectually irresponsible to take a word that has a definite meaning and turn it into a semantic bludgeon. That's the sort of thing we expect from leftists, as witness their favorite 'F' word, 'fascist,' a word they apply as indiscriminately and irresponsibly as 'racist.'
Liberals and leftists love to sling the SIXHRB (sexist, intolerant, xenophobic, homophobic, racist, bigoted) epithets to pre-empt thought and prevent debate. We should avoid similar behavior.
Milos Forman has an op-ed piece in the NYT entitled Obama the Socialist? Not Even Close. Forman takes umbrage at the loose way 'socialism' is used by some conservatives:
Now, years later, I hear the word “socialist” being tossed around by the likes of Rick Perry, Newt Gingrich, Rick Santorum, Sean Hannity, Rush Limbaugh and others. President Obama, they warn, is a socialist. The critics cry, “Obamacare is socialism!” They falsely equate Western European-style socialism, and its government provision of social insurance and health care, with Marxist-Leninist totalitarianism. It offends me, and cheapens the experience of millions who lived, and continue to live, under brutal forms of socialism.
Forman goes on to recount a couple of truly horrifying tales about what it was like living under the jackboot of communism in Czechoslovakia.
Although Forman is right to distinguish the brutal forms of socialism from the supposedly benign forms, he seems willy-nilly to concede that Obamacare is a socialist policy. He is also quite naive if he thinks that the seeds of jackboot socilaism are not already present, in undeveloped form, in 'benign' socialism. He seems not to understand that power corrupts people and that one can get to a truly awful destination by tiny steps each of which seems reasonable and benign.
The pious platitudes with which Forman ends his piece are risible.
Scriptural Inerrancy Again
The following is from a reader who wishes to remain anonymous but who wants me "to hear a different perspective on the matter than that of the Calvinists who comment on your blog: I don't want you thinking they are the ones rightly interpreting the Christian texts."
……………….
Jesus and Paul had a rather liberal interpretation of the Old Testament Law, by which I mean a non-literal, moralist interpretation. I shall explain this in further detail by offering a few exemplary statements from them both.
Barack Obama, the PoMo Prez
No one is more skillful than Victor Davis Hanson when it comes to exposing His Mendacity, the empty suit currently occupying the White House. Here is an excerpt from a recent column:
Illegal, Legal, Neither, or Both?
I think the current status of immigration law goes something like this. It is fine for a municipality or state to contravene immigration law by declaring a region a “sanctuary,” where federal law cannot be enforced. But it is illegal for a state to enforce immigration statutes when the federal government will not. Arizona was sued for trying to deport illegal aliens; so California is considering ways to grant them amnesty. If an illegal alien graduates from high school, serves in the military, or breaks no law, he can be exempt from deportation; but if he does not graduate, does not serve, or breaks a law, there is no expectation that he will now suddenly be deported at the time those eligible for amnesty will not be. The president told Latino activists he wanted to, but could not, issue exemptions by fiat, but then did exactly that a bit later as the campaign heated up. Eric Holder both claimed the Arizona law encouraged profiling and admitted he had never read it. Obama called for an end to vilification, and then begged Latinos to “punish our enemies,” in the manner he once asked supporters to “get in their face.”
Mandate/Tax/Penalty?
The new federal takeover of health care requires a mandate, a tax, or a penalty, but the architects of the plan cannot agree on which — not a surprising postmodern turn when Justice Roberts reportedly wrote much of both the majority-confirming and the minority-dissenting opinions. It is unpopular now, but supposedly won’t be when it is enacted (or read for the first time) — and that is why over 2,000 insiders obtained exemption from such popular legislation. The 2,400 pages of ObamaCare were to lower our premiums by $2,500 a family, but they have already risen by almost 10% on average. Barack Obama ran against Hillary Clinton for her advocacy of a mandate, a position he ridiculed as both unfair and unworkable — before asserting just the opposite when he adopted her position as his own. One cannot be rejected for insurance for a preexisting illness, and therefore need not purchase insurance (preferring instead to pay the mandate / tax /penalty) until he is actually in extremis and in need of costly care — sort of like buying car insurance the day after you were blindsided, or life insurance on the day you were diagnosed with leukemia.
Duck Duck Go
A search engine that claims not to track your searches.
Equality of Opportunity Thin and Thick
Will Knowland writes:
Equality of outcome or result is not to be confused with
equality of opportunity or formal equality in general, including equality under
the law. It is an egregious fallacy of liberals and leftists to infer a denial
of equality of opportunity — via 'racism' or 'sexism' or whatever — from the
premise that a certain group has failed to achieve equality of outcome. There
will never be equality of outcome due to the deep differences between
individuals and groups. Equality of outcome is not even a value. We must do
what we can to ensure equality of opportunity and then let the chips fall where
they may.
I agree that there will never be equality of outcome, but neither will there ever be equality of opportunity, because opportunities at any given moment won't be equal unless outcomes are. And must we do what we can to ensure equality of opportunity? Can does not imply may. Family circumstances, for example, are the biggest determinant of a child's educational success. The State could, as Plato wanted, remove children from their families at birth. That would produce a more level playing field.
As Don Colacho wisely warned, though, "levelling is the barbarian's substitute for order."
BV responds: You say, "neither will there ever be equality of opportunity, because opportunities at any given moment won't be equal unless outcomes are." Your argument appears to be this:
a. There will never be equality of outcome
b. There is equality of opportunity if and only if there is equality of outcome
Therefore
c. There will never be equality of opportunity.
We agree that (a) is true, but I would deny (b). In fact (b) strikes me as plainly false. I enter local road races, but I never win. I don't come close to winning: I am a back-of-the-pack plodder who if he is lucky wins in his age division. So there is no equality of outcome. But there is equality of opportunity: I have exactly the same opportunity to win as the world-class 25 year old who actually wins. In what sense? Well, no one barred me from entering the race; I wasn't forced to pay a higher entry fee; no one verbally abused me before or during the race; no one threw rocks at me; I was not forced to wear weights that would slow me down; obstacles were not thrown in my path; etc. The timing chip even compensated me time-wise for the fact that I could not stand right at the starting line with the top runners.
So I had an equal opportunity qua runner to win, an opportunity equal to that of every other participant. I was not discriminated against on the basis of race, sex, creed, length of hair, or the fact that I insist on wearing the skimpy, slit-up-the-side nylon shorts we wore in the '70s as opposed to those utterly ridiculous, baggy, gangsta-rappa semi-auto concealing, knee-length monstrosities popular now among sartorial know-nothings [grin].
Obviously much depends on the concept of equality of opportunity being employed, and I favor a very 'thin' conception. Clearly, one one can plump for 'thicker' conceptions. But the thicker the conception, the less the contrast with equality of outcome/result. I grant that there is no real chance of me winning any (well-attended) road race. But that is irrelevant. Relevant alone is whether I am being excluded on the basis of irrelevant criteria, such as my sex or the color or skimpiness of my running shorts.
As for ensuring equality of opportunity, I would say that we must do what we can to ensure equality of opportunity in my thin sense. But on your exceedingly thick conception, according to which equality of opportunity is equivalent to equality of outcome, then we, collectively, deploying the awesome coercive power of the State, should not do anything. That's what I meant above when I said: let the chips fall where they may.
As for the liberal-left phrase 'level playing field,' we conservatives should avoid it. If you are a conservative, don't talk like a liberal. It's a metaphor whose application is severely limited.
If we are playing soccer or basketball (and there is no handicapping going on), then there must be a level playing field if there is to be a fair competition. But suppose Tom was born with two good eyes and Sally with none. Should we intervene to right that cosmic unfairness, to 'level the playing field' as between Tom and Sally, by transplanting (if we could) one of his eyes into her head? No.
Tom does not deserve his two good eyes, his intelligence, his height, his being born in the USA, in a good, two-parent, loving family, not in a war zone, not with crack cocaine in his system, etc. But he has a right to his advantages despite not deserving them, and no one and no State has the right to violate his rights.
We are just scratching the surface of a whole cluster of thorny and bitterly controverted questions.
Addendum: Knowland sends use this quotation from John Kekes, The Illusions of Egalitarianism, (Cornell, 2006), p.84: ". . . equal opportunity tends to produce unequal outcome, and equal outcome
requires making opportunities unequal by increasing the protection of some at the expense of others."
Metaphysical Grounding I: True Of
(Note to Peter L: This begins our discussion of metaphysical grounding and metaphysical explanation, topics of common interest. We need, over a series of posts, to uncover and discuss as many examples as we can find. My aim, and perhaps yours as well, is to demonstrate that metaphysical grounding and metaphysical explanation are legitimate topics, and that metaphysics is not a going enterprise unless they are legitimate topics. This is connected with our presumably common opposition to scientism and our presumably common defense of the autonomy of philosophy.)
Let 'Tom' name a particular tomato. Let us agree that if a predicate applies to a particular, then the predicate is true of the particular. Predicates are linguistic items. If Tom is red, then 'red' is true of Tom, and if 'red' is true of Tom, then Tom is red. This yields the material biconditional
1. Tom is red iff 'red' is true of Tom.
Now it seems to me that the following question is intelligible: Is Tom red because 'red' is true of Tom, or is 'red' true of Tom because Tom is red? 'Because' here does not have a causal sense. So the question is not whether Tom's being red causes 'red' to be true of Tom, or vice versa. So I won't speak of causation in this context. I will speak of metaphysical/ontological grounding. The question then is what grounds what, not what causes what. Does Tom's being red ground the application (the being-applied) of 'red' to Tom, or does the appplication (the being-applied) of 'red' to Tom ground Tom's being red?
I am not primarily concerned with the correct answer to this question, but with meaningfulness of the question.
Grounding is asymmetrical: if x grounds y, then y does not ground x. (It is also irreflexive and transitive.) Now if there is such a relation as grounding, then there will be a distinctive form of explanation we can call metaphysical/ontological explanation. (Grounding, though not causation, is analogous to c ausation, and metaphysical explanation, though distinct from causal explanation, is analogous to causal explanation.)
Explaining is something we do: in worlds without minds there is no explaining and there are no explanations, including metaphysical explanations. But I assume that, if there are any metaphysical grounding relations, then in every world metaphysical grounding relations obtain. (Of course, there is no grounding of the application of predicates in a world without languages and predicates, but there are other grounding relations.)
Grounding is not causation. It is not a relation between event tokens such as Jack's touching a live wire and Jack's death by electrocution. Grounding is also not a relation between propositions. It is not the relation of material implication, nor is it entailment (the necessitation of material implication), nor any other semantic relation wholly situated at the level of propositions. Propositions, let us assume, are the primary truth-bearers.
In our example, grounding is not a relation between propositions — it is not a logical relation — since neither Tom nor 'red' are propositions.
I want to say the following. Tom's being red grounds the correctness of the application of 'red' to Tom. 'Red' is true of Tom because (metaphysically, not causally or logically) Tom is red, and not vice versa. 'Red' is true of Tom in virtue of Tom's being red. Tom's being red is metaphysically prior to the truth of 'Tom is red' where this metaphysical priority cannot be reduced to some ordinary type of priority, whether logical, causal, temporal, or what have you. Tom's being red metaphysically accounts for the truth of 'Tom is red.'
I conclude that there is at least one type of metaphysical grounding relation, and at least one form of irreducibly metaphysical explanation.
Thoughts on Blogging
A fellow blogger inquires, " How did you get your blog 'noticed' or 'visited'? And how long did it take? I have had a few spikes from your blog and American Catholic, but the visits seem to have slowed down. Of course, it may be that getting people interested involves actual writing, as opposed to simple link collection.
1. In the early days of the blogosphere, over ten years ago now, weblogs were mainly just 'filters' that sorted through the WWW's embarrassment of riches and provided links to sites the proprietor of the filter thought interesting and of reasonable quality. So in the early days one could garner traffic by being a linker as opposed to a thinker. Glenn Reynold's Instapundit, begun in August 2001, is a wildly successful blog that consists mainly of links. But there are plenty of linkage blogs now and no need for more, unless you carve out a special niche for yourself.
2. What I find interesting, and what I aim to provide, is a blend of original content and linkage delivered on a daily basis. As the old Latin saying has it, Nulla dies sine linea, "No day without a line." Adapted to this new-fangled medium: "No day without a post." Weblogs are by definition frequently updated. So if you are not posting, say, at least once a week, you are not blogging. Actually, I find I need to restrain myself by limiting myself to two or three posts per day: otherwise good content scrolls into archival oblivion too quickly.
Here is my definition of 'weblog': A weblog is a frequently updated website consisting of posts or entries, usually short and succinct, arranged in reverse-chronological order, containing internal and off-site hyperlinks, and a utility allowing readers to comment on some if not all posts.
'Blog' is a contraction of 'weblog.' Therefore, to refer to a blog post as a blog is a mindless misuse of the term on a par with referring to an inning of a baseball game as a game, a chapter of a book as a book, an entry in a ledger as a ledger, etc. And while I'm on my terminological high horse: a comment on a post is not a post but a comment, and one who makes a commenter is a commenter, not a commentator. A blogger is (typically) a commentator; his commenters are — commenters.
There are group blogs and individual blogs. Group blogs typically don't last long and for obvious reasons, an example being Left2Right. (Of interest: The Curious Demise of Left2Right.) Please don't refer to an individual blog as a 'personal' blog. Individual blogs can be as impersonal as you like.
3. I am surprised at how much traffic I get given the idiosyncratic blend I serve up. This, the Typepad version of MavPhil, commenced on Halloween 2008. Since then the site has garnered 1.4 million page views which averages to 1045 page views per day. In recent months, readership is around 1300-1700 p-views per diem with various spikes. 3 July saw a spike of 2421 p-views. Don't ask me why. Total posts: 3489. Total comments: 5644.
Now to answer the question. How did I get my site noticed? By being patient and providing fairly good content on a regular basis. I don't pander: I write what interests me whether or not it interests anyone else. Even so, patience pays off in the long run. But it will take time: I've been at it for over eight years using three different service providers. I don't solicit links or do much to promote the site. I bait my hook and cast it out into the vasty deeps of cyberspace. I have managed to snag many interesting, high-quality 'fish.' You could say I have become 'a fisher of men.' Comment moderation keeps the bottom-feeders and scum-suckers at bay. (That's a bit of a mixed metaphor wrapped in a bad pun.)
Blogging is like physical exercise. If you are serious about it, it becomes a daily commitment and after a while it becomes unthinkable that one should stop until one is stopped by some form of physical or mental debilitation.
Would allowing comments on all posts increase readership? Probably, but having tried every option, I have decided the best set-up is the present one: allow comments on only some posts, and don't allow comments to appear until they have been moderated.
