Another Specimen of Bad Continental Philosophy: Slavoj Zizek on Christian Universalism

Over lunch a while back, a young friend asked me what I thought of Zizek.  "Not much," was my reply.  Here is a bit of justification, an old post (20 September 2004) from my first weblog. 

……………..

Slavoj Zizek in On Belief (Routledge, 2001, pp. 143-144) has this to say:

What is perceived here as the problem is precisely the Christian universalism: what this all-inclusive attitude (recall St. Paul’s famous "There are no men or women, no Jews and Greeks") involves is a thorough exclusion of those who do not accept inclusion into the Christian community. In other "particularistic" religions (and even in Islam, in spite of its global expansionism), there is a place for others, they are tolerated, even if they are condescendingly looked upon. The Christian motto "All men are brothers," however, means ALSO that "Those who are not my brothers ARE NOT MEN." [Emphasis in the original.] Christians usually praise themselves for overcoming the Jewish exclusivist notion of the Chosen People and encompassing all of humanity – the catch here is that, in their very insistence that they are the Chosen People with the privileged direct link to God, Jews accept the humanity of the other people who celebrate their false gods, while Christian universalism tendentially [sic! tendentiously?] excludes non-believers from the very universality of humankind.

What a delightfully seductive passage!

What Zizek is saying here is that the Christian universalism expressed by "All men are brothers" excludes non-Christians from the class of human beings. Zizek supports this surprising assertion with an argument. Made explicit, the argument is that

1. All men are brothers
Therefore
2. All who are not my brothers are not men.
But
3. All who are not Christians are not my brothers.
Therefore
4. All who are not Christians are not men.

Having made Zizek’s argument explicit, we can easily see what is wrong with it. The problem is (3). Without (3), one cannot validly infer the conclusion (4). But (3) is false: no Christian holds that all who are not Christians are not his brothers; they are his brothers whether or not they accept Christianity. For whether or not they accept Christianity they are sons of a common Father, God. Or if you insist that (3) is true, I will say that there is an equivocation on ‘brother’ as between (2) and (3). In one sense, two people are brothers if they have a common father. In this sense, all men are brothers if they have a common father, i.e., God. In a second sense, two people are brothers if they are members of a common organization or religion. Two teamsters, for example, are union brothers even if they do not share a common earthly father. The same for two members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In sum, Zizek makes a highly dubious assertion and then tries to support it with a worthless argument.

It is important to see that he really is giving an argument in the above passage, but that, like many Continentals, he argues in a slip-shod, half-baked way. It’s as if he wants the advantange of an argument without having to do the hard analytic work. In this regard, the above passage is characteristic of a lot of Continental philosophy.

On Race, ‘Progressives’ Are Stuck in the Past

It is a bit of a paradox: so-called 'progressives,' i.e., leftists, who routinely accuse conservatives of wanting to 'turn back the clock,' are doing precisely that on the question of race relations.  They yearn for the bad old Jim Crow days of the 1950s and '60s when they had truth and right on their side and the conservatives of those days were either wrong or silent or simply uncaring.  Those great civil rights battles were fought and they were won, in no small measure due to the help of whites.   Necessary reforms were made.  But then things changed and the civil rights movement became a hustle to be exploited for fame and profit and power by the likes of the race-baiters Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton.

At this point I hand off to Shelby Steele.  Excerpt:

The purpose of today's civil-rights establishment is not to seek justice, but to seek power for blacks in American life based on the presumption that they are still, in a thousand subtle ways, victimized by white racism. This idea of victimization is an example of what I call a "poetic truth." Like poetic license, it bends the actual truth in order to put forward a larger and more essential truth—one that, of course, serves one's cause. Poetic truths succeed by casting themselves as perfectly obvious: "America is a racist nation"; "the immigration debate is driven by racism"; "Zimmerman racially
stereotyped Trayvon." And we say, "Yes, of course," lest we seem to be racist. Poetic truths work by moral intimidation, not reason.



In the Zimmerman/Martin case the civil-rights establishment is fighting for the poetic truth that white animus toward blacks is still such that a black teenager—Skittles and ice tea in hand—can be shot dead simply for walking home. But actually this establishment is fighting to maintain its authority to wield poetic truth—the authority to tell the larger society how it must think about blacks, how it must respond to them, what it owes them and, then, to brook no argument.

Two comments.  First, pace Steele, what he is calling a "larger and more essential truth" is better described as a brazen lie. Second, the iced tea and Skittles that the 'child' Trayvon was carrying were presumably to be added to Robitussin to concoct a drug variously known as Purple Drank, Lean, and Sizzurp.  See here:

 

Trayvon,  with his hoodie up, grabs two items from the shelves of 7-11.  One is the  Skittles.  The other is Arizona Watermelon Fruit Juice Cocktail.  The  media avoid the name of the real drink — possibly because of the racial  implications of the word "watermelon," but possibly to avoid probing the real  reason for Trayon's trip.

Trayvon,  in fact, had become a devotee of the druggy concoction known as "Lean," also  known in southern hip-hop culture as "Sizzurp" and "Purple Drank."  Lean  consists of three basic ingredients — codeine, a soft drink, and candy.   If his Facebook postings are to be believed, Trayvon had been using Lean since  at least June 2011.  

On  June 27, 2011, Trayvon asks a friend online, "unow a connect for codien?"   He tells the friend that "robitussin nd soda" could make "some fire ass  lean."  He says, "I had it before" and that he wants "to make some more."   On the night of February 26, if Brandy had some Robitussin at home,  Trayvon had just bought the mixings for one "fire ass lean"  cocktail.

 

Black ‘Bash Mobs’ on the Rampage in Southern California

Here is the story from The Los Angeles Times. 

Nowhere in the article or in the video is it mentioned that the rioters are black.  You can see that they  are from the video. 

The liberal media falsely portrayed the Hispanic, George Zimmerman, as white in order to fit him into their 'America is racist' script; but they refuse to report the truth when blacks rampage.

No surprise: the truth would not fit the liberal-left 'narrative.' 

'Narrative' is one of theose POMO words that a conservative should be careful about using.  As I have said more than once, only the foolish conservative talks like a liberal.

Language matters!

The Lunacy of the Left

Here is yet another example of leftist lunacy  from the editors of The Nation:

The real problem is not that jurors were willing to accord Zimmerman the  presumption of innocence—a bedrock of our justice system. It is that Trayvon  Martin, an unarmed teenager, was never accorded the same presumption—and that so  many defendants who look like him are denied this right every day.

This is just breathtakingly idiotic.  First of all, it is not up to the jurors to will or not to will to accord the accused the presumption of innocence.  It is required that they do so.  It is one of the constitutive rules of our legal system that in a criminal proceeding such as a murder trial the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Being  a constitutive rule, the presumption of innocence is not something jurors have any say about.

Second, it is the accused who is presumed innocent until proven guilty, not the victim. For it is  the accused who is on trial.  Zimmerman was on trial, and he was accorded the (defeasible) presumption of innocence, a presumption that was not defeated.  Hence he was exonerated.  Martin was not on trial, hence presumption of innocence did not come into play in his case.

Third, Martin was not the defendant in the case; Zimmerman was the defendant.

Fourth, Martin's being an unarmed teenager is irrelevant to the question whether Zimmerman acted lawfully in shooting Martin.  The aptronymically appellated Charles Blow opined in a similarly moronic manner when he mentioned the 'disproportionality' of armament as between Martin and Zimmerman.  Again, utterly irrelevant.

So there's the Left for you: willful stupidity, verbal obfuscation, lies, agitprop.

Addendum:  Chad McIntosh, upon reading the above Nation quotation, subsumed it under what he calls the Madman Fallacy.

If Obama Could Have Been Trayvon Martin . . .

. . . then most of us could be the next George Zimmerman.

It cuts both ways, Mr. President. 

Besides, if you could have been Trayvon 35 years ago, what does that say about you?  Did you go around thuggishly attacking people, breaking their noses, pinning them on the ground, pounding and grounding, slamming heads into pavements,  threatening 'crackers' with death?

Better Unwed Than Ill-Wed

The title is mine to the following observation of Paul Brunton (Notebooks, vol. 5, part I, p. 106, #240):

It is true that men who are lonely or young or romantic are likely to marry a young woman with whom propinquity has brought them in touch.  In such cases he puts an illusion around the woman to the pressure of desire.  When the illusion goes and the facts show themselves he is left alone with the hard lesson of discrimination.  The situation can repeat itself with the victim being the woman.

A bit of important wisdom that unfortunately comes too late for too many.

Spencer Case

I was relieved to hear today that Spencer Case, long-time friend of MavPhil, and Middle Eastern correspondent, is once again safely Stateside after a nine month stint in Cairo as a Fulbright fellow researching Islamic philosophy.  I say 'relieved' because of the Andrew Pochter case.   Spencer tells me that he writes a monthly column for a conservative collegiate publication, The College Fix.  His latest column is Bipartisan Efforts to Hasten Elections in Egypt Bad Policy.

Welcome home, Spencer!

Six Types of Death Fear

1. There is the fear of nonbeing, of annihilation.  The best expression of this fear that I am aware of is contained in Philip Larkin's great poem "Aubade" which I reproduce and comment upon in Philip Larkin on Death.  Susan Sontag is another who was gripped by a terrible fear of annihilation.

There is the fear of becoming nothing, but there is also, by my count, five types of fear predicated on not becoming nothing.

2. There is the fear of surviving one's bodily death as a ghost, unable to cut earthly attachments and enter nonbeing and oblivion.  This fear is expressed in the third stanza of D. H. Lawrence's poem "All Souls' Day" which I give together with the fourth and fifth (The Oxford Book of Death, ed. D. J. Enright, Oxford UP, 1987, pp. 48-49).

They linger in the shadow of the earth.
The earth's long conical shadow is full of souls
that cannot find the way across the sea of change.

Be kind, Oh be kind to your dead
and give them a little encouragement
and help them to build their little ship of death.

For the soul has a long, long journey after death
to the sweet home of  pure oblivion.
Each needs a little ship, a little ship
and the proper store of meal for the longest journey.

3. There is the fear of post-mortem horrors.  For this the Epicurean cure was concocted.  In a sentence: When death is, I am not; when I am, death is not. Here too the fear is not of extinction, but of surviving.

4. There is the fear of the unknown.  This is not a fear with a definite object, but an indefinite fear of one-knows-not-what.

5. There is the fear of the Lord and his judgment.  Timor domini initium sapientiae.   "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom."  (Proverbs 9:10, Psalms 111:10)  A certain fear is ingredient in religious faith.  Ludwig Wittgenstein was one who  believed and feared that he would be judged by God.  He took the notion of the Last Judgment with the utmost seriousness as both Paul Engelmann and Norman Malcolm relate in their respective memoirs.  In 1951, near the end of his life, Wittgenstein wrote,

God may say to me: I am judging you out of your own mouth.  Your own actions have
made you shudder with disgust when you have seen other people do them." (Culture and Value, p. 87)

Wittgenstein had trouble with the notion of God as cosmic cause, but had a lively sense of God as final Judge and source of an absolute moral demand.

6. Fear of one's own judgment or the judgment of posterity.