Ted Honderich is One Quirky Writer

HonderichI am reading Ted Honderich, On Consciousness (Edinburgh UP, 2004) and trying to get a handle on just what his theory of consciousness as existence amounts to.  An awkward and quirky writer, he doesn't make things easy on the reader, and doesn't seem to realize  that in this very fast brave new world of ours the writer must get to  the point without unnecessary circumlocution if he wants to keep his reader glued to the page.  Here is an example of Honderich's style, from p. 206:

The other option from spiritualism now deserves the name of being devout physicalism. You can say and write, in a career that keeps an eye on some of science, maybe two, and is forgetful of reflective experience, that being conscious or aware of something is only having certain physical properties in the head. Usually this cranialism is a matter of only neural properties as we know them — thought of computationally or with microtubules to the fore or in any other way you like.

[Note the awkward placement of "Maybe two." It belongs right after "eye."]

Nobody not on the philosophical job of trying to approximate more to some of science or horse sense believes this either. We all know, to make use of a pefectly proper and enlightening parody,  that consciousness, isn't just cells, however fancily or fancifully conceived. Everybody on the job tries to give a place to or register what they know when they're not on the job. But they can't do it if they have it that consciousness has only neural properties or conceivably silicon or otherwise physical properties, no matter how they are conceived additionally.

Honderich's thought is not so much expressed as buried in the above  mess of verbiage. Here is the thought which is correct as far as it goes expressed in three sentences.

Devout physicalism is the main alternative to spiritualism, or substance dualism.  But only someone who fails to reflect on his actual experience could suppose that being conscious of something is a matter of the instantiation of neural properties in the brain.  Both philosopher and layman know that consciousness is not brain cells, but the philosopher trying to be scientific is apt to forget it.

Here is Colin McGinn's savage review of Honderich's book.  Be aware that there is personal animus between the two men.

Homo Homini Lupus

A 28 year-old Gypsy girl from the Tene Bimbo crime family 'befriends' an 85 year-old single man, marries him, and then poisons him, causing his death, in an attempt to steal his assets.  The two were made for each other, the evil cunning of the woman finding its outlet in the utter foolishness of the man.  What lessons are to be learned from this?

The first is one that serves as a criterion to distinguish conservative from liberal.  The latter lives and dies in the pious belief that people are inherently good and that it is merely such contingent and remediable factors as environment, opportunity, upbringing and the like that prevent the good from manifesting itself.   The conservative knows better: human nature is deeply flawed, structurally flawed, flawed beyond the hope of merely human amelioration.  The conservative takes seriously the idea of original sin, if not the particulars of any particular doctrinal formulation.  Though capable of near- angelic goodness, man is capable of near-diabolical evil.  History records it, and only the foolish ignore it.  The fact of radical evil cannot be gainsaid, as even the Enlightenment philosopher Kant (1781-1804) deeply appreciated.  The timber of humanity is crooked, and of crooked timber no perfectly straight thing has ever been made.  (Be it noted en passant that conservatives need to be careful when they generalize about the Enlightenment and wax critical of it.  They might want to check their generalizations against the greatest of the Enlightenment philosophers, the Sage of Koenigsberg.)

My second point will elicit howls of rage from liberals, but their howling is music to my ears.  The victim must bear some moral responsibility for the crime, albeit a much lower degree of responsibility than the perpetrator.  For he allowed himself to be victimized by failing to make use of his faculties. (I assume the 85 year-old was not senile.)  He did not think:  "What could an attractive young woman see in a decrepit old specimen like me?  What is she after?"  He let his vanity and ego swamp and suborn his good judgment.  He had a long life to learn the lesson that romantic love is more illusion than reality, but he failed to apply his knowledge.  Blaming the victim is, up to a point, justified.

 So man is a wolf to man and man is a lamb to man.  Wolf and lamb 'need' each other.  Be neither.  You have a moral obligation to be neither.

 Story here.

Addiction is not a Disease

The liberal wussification initiative needs ever more victims, ever more government dependents, and ever more sick people.  Hence the trend in this therapeutic society to broaden  the definition of 'disease' to cover what are obviously not diseases.  Need more patients?  Define 'em into existence!  Theodore Dalrymple talks sense:

There are cheap lies and expensive lies, and the lie that addiction is a disease just like any other will prove to be costly. It is the lie upon which Washington has based its proposed directive that insurance policies should cover addiction and mental disorders in the same way as they cover physical disease. The government might as well decriminalize fraud while it is at it.

The evidence that addiction is not a disease like any other is compelling, overwhelming, and obvious. It has also been available for a long time. The National Institute on Drug Abuse’s definition of addiction as a “chronic, relapsing brain disease” is about as scientific as the advertising claims for Coca-Cola. In fact, it had its origin as a funding appeal to Congress.

To take only one point among many: most addicts who give up do so without any medical assistance—and most addicts do give up. Moreover, they do so at an early age. The proximate cause of their abstinence is their decision to be abstinent. No one can decide not to have rheumatoid arthritis, say, or colon cancer. Sufferers from those diseases can decide to cooperate or not with treatment, but that is another matter entirely. Therefore, there is a category difference between addiction and real disease.

Read it all.

 

‘Merry Xmas’

When I was eight years old or so and first took note of the phrase 'Merry Xmas,' my piety was offended by what I took to be the removal of 'Christ' from 'Christmas' only to be replaced by the universally recognized symbol for an unknown quantity, 'X.' But it wasn't long before I realized that the 'X' was merely a font-challenged typesetter's attempt at rendering the Greek Chi, an ancient abbreviation for 'Christ.' There is therefore nothing at all offensive in the expression 'Xmas.' Year after year, however, certain ignorant Christians who are old enough to know better make the mistake that I made when I was eight and corrected when I was ten.

And there are some dumb atheists who think 'Merry Xmas' is an insult.  These punks need to wise up on this point as on many others.

It just now occurs to me that 'Xmas' may be susceptible of a quasi-Tillichian reading. Paul Tillich is famous for his benighted definition of 'God' as 'whatever is one's ultimate concern.' Well, take the 'X' in 'Xmas' as a variable the values of which are whatever one wants to celebrate at this time of year. So for some, 'Xmas' will amount to Solsticemas, for burglars Swagmas, for materialists Lootmas, for gluttons Foodmas, for inebriates Hoochmas, and for ACLU extremists Antichristianitymas.

A reader suggests some further constructions:

For those who love the capitol of the Czech Republic: Pragmas. For Dutch Reformed theologians of Frisian extraction who think Christmas is silly: Hoekemas. For Dutch Reformed philosophy professors of Frisian extraction who like preserves on their toast: Jellemas. For fans of older British sci-fi flicks: Quatermas. For those who buy every special seasonal periodical they can get their hands on: Magmas. One could probably multiply such examples ad nauseum, so I won't.

How could an ACLU bonehead object to 'Xmas' so construed? No doubt he would find a way.

A while back I quipped that "Aporeticians qua aporeticians do not celebrate Christmas. They celebrate Enigmas."  My man Hodges shot back:  "But they do celebrate 'X-mas'! (Or maybe they 'cerebrate' it?)"

Merry Chimas to all, and to all a good night.

Obama, the Main Mama of the Nanny State

Obama is this dude's main mama:

Pajama boy

It is amazing how shamelessly blunt the Obaminators are in promoting ObamaYomamaCare.  They leave no doubt that pussification and wussification are high on their agenda.

There is also something incoherent  about a law that allows these pajama-clad mama's basement dwellers to remain on their parents' health care plans until age 26, when suddenly they are supposed to man up and sign up and pay high premiums for services they don't need (and in some cases cannot need, e.g., maternity care for men) so that old people, who have had an entire lifetime to pile up loot and make provision for old age, and are not saddled with outrageous college loan debt, can get free or subsidized health care.

It doesn't make any bloody sense.  On the one hand, young people are given yet another incentive  to prolong their adolescence and dependence on parents and not take responsibility for themselves, while on the other hand, they, who are healthy and relatively poor, are expected to bear the lion's share of the health care burden for the old and illness-prone.

My advice to the young: don't allow yourself to be screwed.  I know you think Obama is one cool dude, but so is Ron Paul, and he talks sense.

On Multiplying Modes of Existence

UnicornAm I committed to an uneconomical multiplication of modes of existence?  I said that the following set of propositions is logically consistent:

a. Tom is thinking of a unicorn
b. Unicorns do not exist in reality
c. Tom's mental state is object-directed; it is an intentional state.
d. The object of Tom's mental state does not exist in reality.
e. The merely intentional object is not nothing.
f. The merely intentional object enjoys intentional existence, a distinct mode of existence different from existence in reality.

David Brightly in a comment constructs a similar set:

By analogy with your (a)–(f) can we not also consistently assert the following?

a. This tapestry, rather beautifully, depicts a unicorn.
b. Unicorns do not exist in the (C1)-sense.
c. The tapestry is object-directed; it is a depictional entity.
d. The object of the tapestry does not (C1)-exist.
e. The merely depicted object is not nothing.
f. The merely depicted object enjoys depictional existence, a distinct mode of existence different from (C1)-existence.

Likewise,

Whereas my view is that when Tom thinks of a unicorn, he is thinking of something, an item that exists merely as the object of Tom's act of thinking, but does not exist mind-independently,

has the analogy,

When the tapestry depicts a unicorn, it is depicting something, an item that exists merely as the object of the tapestry's depicting, but does not exist tapestry-independently.

Three points.

First, the intentionality of Tom's thinking is original while the intentionality of the tapestry is derivative.  The tapestry is not intrinsically  intentional, but derives its intentionality from a mind's taking of the merely physical object as a picture or image of something else.  By itself, the tapestry depicts nothing.  It is just a piece of cloth.

Given the first point, my second is that there are not two kinds of intentionality or object-directedness, but only one, the intentionality of the viewer of the tapestry who takes it as representing something, a unicorn. 'Derivative' in 'derivative intentionality' is an alienans adjective.

Third, if there are not two kinds of intentionality, then there is no call to distinguish, in addition to (C1)-existence (real existence) and intentional existence, depictional existence.

In this way I think I can avoid multiplying modes of existence by the multiplicity of types of physical things (scribbles on paper, trail markers, grooves in vinyl, etc.) that can be taken to represent something.

Sexuality and Sex Organs

Can one learn all about human sexuality by studying the human organs of generation?  The very notion is risible.  Can one learn all about human affectivity by studying that most reliable and indefatigable of pumps, the human heart?  Risible again.  It is similarly risible  to think that one can learn all about the mind by studying that marvellously complex hunk of meat, the brain.

 

A Slip of the Tongue and a Bit about Me and Mary Jane

One morning recently I was talking with a thirtysomething woman about Obamacare.  "If you like your period, you can keep your period" came out of my mouth.  I was intending, "If you like your plan, you can keep your plan, period."

Thanks to Obama, the period is one punctuation mark that will never be the same.  From now on, no one will be able to say 'period' without conjuring up the great man, just as words like 'inhale' and 'is' conjure up the first black president, Bill Clinton, along with images of chubby star-struck interns.  "But I didn't inhale."  I suppose it all depends on the meaning of 'inhale.'

Presidents need to realize that there is such a thing as videotape and that lies are easily exposed.  In this clip, Bubba say that he tried marijuana a time or two, didn't like it, didn't inhale, and never tried it again.  But obviously, there is no way to tell if you like it without inhaling it, and quite a bit of it, over several sessions.  The man was obviously lying, and he must have known that we knew he was lying.

I tried it, and from '68-'72 smoked my fair share of it, inhaling deeply as one must to get any effect, but I did not like it.  I'm an intense guy whose life is already plenty intense.  My reaction was similar to Lenny Bruce's:  "I've got enough shit flying through my head without smoking weed."  (Quoted from memory from How to Talk Dirty and Influence People which I read around '66.  My copy is long gone, my mother having confiscated it and thrown it away.)

Having just checked the quotation, I was pretty close.  What Bruce actually said was this:

"I don't smoke pot, and I'm glad because then I can champion it without any special pleading.
The reason I don't smoke pot is because it facilitates ideas and heightens sensations.
And I got enough shit flying through my head without smoking pot."

A Formula for Happiness

Excerpt:

For many years, researchers found that women were happier than men, although recent studies contend that the gap has narrowed or may even have been reversed. Political junkies might be interested to learn that conservative women are particularly blissful: about 40 percent say they are very happy. That makes them slightly happier than conservative men and significantly happier than liberal women. The unhappiest of all are liberal men; only about a fifth consider themselves very happy. (emphasis added)

Well, it's tough being a liberal.  We conservatives have our bibles and guns to cling to, but what do you have except your grievances and your utopian dreams that reality has a way of quashing?  Conservatives have the capacity to appreciate what they have while you liberals are too busy being pissed off at this sexist, intolerant, xenophobic, homophobic, racist, and bigoted country to have time to enjoy and appreciate anything.   

Camille Paglia Defends Men . . .

. . . and in the process kicks the candy ass of Maureen Dowd for whom "men have played so recklessly with the globe 'they nearly broke it.' "   You can break your finger nail, sweetie, but not the globe.  Girly-girl talk!  While C. P. is a good antidote to P. C., she cannot be awarded a plenary MavPhil endorsement because of the silly things she has said  about philosophy and women in philosophy.

Paglia-debate-600x399
 

But Camille, the one on the right,  well deserves a partial endorsement.  Here is a delightful Pagliaism: ”Leaving sex to feminists is like letting your dog vacation at the taxidermist.”

The image above suggests that the the ideal woman might well be a trinity:  Maureen in bed; the mannish Camille in the parlor for serious dialectic of the non-physical sort; the Virgin Mary (not depicted)  on a pedestal.

Note the dialectic  (in the Continental sense this time) of revelation and concealment displayed by the coquettish Maureen: one eye invisible, the low-cut top inviting the eye downward, while the gals to her left are bundled up like Muslims.