Daniel Dennett on the 'evolution' of intentionality.
Substack latest.
Daniel Dennett on the 'evolution' of intentionality.
Substack latest.
. . . when we have none we are in danger. (English proverb)
A proverb whose pertinence is proven by recent developments. Gold hit 2400 USD/oz. a day or two ago, but has backed off some. Joe Biden and his shills lie their heads off about everything including the health of the economy, but, with respect to the latter, the surging price of gold suggests otherwise.
Remember Bernie Madoff?
A Substack retrospect.
Top o' the Stack
Correctly used, 'unique' is three-way polyvalent. It can mean that which is one of a kind, that which is necessarily one of a kind, and that which is uniquely unique in that it transcends the kind-instance distinction.
Substack latest.
Well, what did you expect?
Intifada refers specifically to two separate uprisings of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank over the past four decades, but more broadly, it pertains to the continued resistance of the Palestinians to the existence of Israel. When they shout “Death to Israel,” they mean it. It should be a top priority of Congress now to determine whether they mean it when they shout “Death to America.”
The rise of pro-Palestinian hatred in the United States should not be a surprising development to anyone. Even before President Biden opened the southern border to millions of unvetted “newcomers,” as the global elites like to call the invaders, there has been a reckless U.S. policy going back two decades to resettle Muslim refugees from Iraq, Libya, Somalia, and Afghanistan in the U.S. heartland. And because immigration policy no longer treats assimilation as a worthwhile goal, many of those refugees are loyal to their homeland and their religion much more than to the nation that offered them safety and security.
I suppose that is an inevitable result of the globalist agenda of border dissolution and the merging of disparate populations for the purpose of sharing wealth and assuaging billionaires’ guilt.
But it is only inevitable if the rest of us tolerate it.
A reader sends us to an article that begins like this:
The need for a return to God is clearly evident in today’s deranged and dysfunctional world. It is a need, exceeding all others, that must be fulfilled in order to keep enemies of God from interfering with human life.
And then a little later we get an unsourced quotation from C. S. Lewis replete with a non-functioning hyperlink:
C.S. Lewis: “I believe in Christianity as I believe that the sun has risen: not only because I see it, but because by it I see everything else.” This points directly to the essence of the faith in Christianity and to its need in life. A short explanation, found here, includes the observation: “At first glance, this quote may appear simple, but upon closer examination, its deep meaning and profound importance become evident. Essentially, Lewis suggests that his faith in Christianity is not solely based on tangible evidence but also on the transformative impact it has on his perception of the world.” [My emphasis.]
Since the quotation is unsourced, I cannot check whether Lewis said what he is quoted as saying. If he did, it is a silly thing to say. Let me explain.
This morning I observed a beautiful sunrise. And so I believe that the Sun rose this morning. I also believe that the Sun is the source of the natural light we enjoy on Earth. But it is false, and indeed silly, to say that one who believes in Christianity believes in the very same way. The difference is obvious. I cannot help but believe that the Sun rose this morning: I saw it with my own two eyes! Seeing is believing in a case like this.* That the Sun rose is given, if not indubitably, then for all practical purposes.** There is no need for a leap of faith beyond the given. The will does not come into it. In no way do I decide to believe that the Sun has risen. Examples like this one refute a universal doxastic voluntarism.
But if you believe that God became man in Jesus of Nazareth, if you believe that the God-Man is fully divine and fully human, that he is one person in two natures, then you believe beyond the sensorily given. (You also arguably believe beyond what is intelligible to the discursive intellect.) You cannot see God the way you see the Sun. To 'see' God in Jesus you need the 'eye' of faith which is quite obviously not a physical eye but a spiritual 'eye.' The last sentence in the quotation reads:
Essentially, Lewis suggests that his faith in Christianity is not solely based on tangible evidence but also on the transformative impact it has on his perception of the world.
Better, but still bad. Someone who comes to embrace Christianity comes to view the world in a way very different from the way he viewed it prior to his becoming a Christian. True! So, yes, his worldview has been transformed. But that transformation is no part of the evidence of the truth of Christianity; if it were, then the transformation that occurs in someone who goes from being a Christian to an atheist or a Christian to a Communist or a Christian to a Buddhist, etc. is a transformation that is evidence of the truth of atheism, Communism, Buddhism respectively, etc.
Article here.
______________
*There may be other cases in which seeing does not suffice for belief. I am thinking of G. E. Moore's putative counterexample: "I see it, but I don't believe it!"
** The hyperbolic skepticism of Descartes is not to the point here.
Top o' the Stack.
Daniel Dennett died yesterday at age 82. A philosophical provocateur of influence, his brilliance far outstripped his insight. But a day after his demise, de mortuis nil nisi bonum remains in force. So I will say something good about him. I agree entirely with what he says in the following passage:
Daniel Dennett died today. I heard the news from Malcolm Pollack whose obituary refers us to a very recent discussion between him and Jordan Peterson. I have been very critical of Dennett's work over the years, but I won't rehearse any of my critique so near the hour of his death. Let the watchword be: De mortuis nil nisi bonum.
In July of 2022 I published a post entitled Faith's Immanent Value. Here are the opening paragraphs slightly redacted:
Suppose you sincerely believe in God and the soul but that your faith is in vain. You die and become nothing. Your faith was that the curtain would lift, but it falls, irrevocably. My question is whether that possible upshot would matter. If it should turn out there is nothing on the other side of the Great Divide, would that retroactively remove your faith's immanent value?
My answer is that it won't matter because you won't know it. You will not learn that your faith was in vain. There will be no disappointment. You will not discover that your faith was a life-enhancing illusion. You will have had the benefit of a faith which will have sustained you until the moment of your annihilation as an individual person. You will not die alone for you will die with the Lord-believed-in, a Lord never to be known, but also never to be known not to be. If the Lord-believed-in is enough for this life, and this life turns out to be the only life, then the Lord-believed-in is enough, period.
Your faith will have had immanent value. If this life is the only life, then this immanent value is the only value your faith could have had.
The post received a strong response positive and negative. I return to the topic now, as I re-read for the third time Dietrich von Hildebrand's Jaws of Death: Gate of Heaven (Sophia Institute Press, 1991, tr. Alice von Hildebrand. The German original appeared in 1980 under the title Über den Tod (On Death)).
On pp. 109-110, von Hildebrand says things that seem to contradict what I am saying. My purpose in this entry is to re-think the question so as to test my view against his. Here is the paragraph that gives me pause and prompts me to re-examine my position:
Nothing would be more absurd than for us to regard the subjective happiness that results from the supernatural view of death as an end, and to see faith as a means for obtaining this end. To do so would mean detaching from truth both faith and the supernatural view of death. Such a pragmatic interpretation of faith comes close to a total misunderstanding of it. We must, therefore, condemn as blind nonsense the idea that, because it cheers and comforts us, supernatural view of death is worth nourishing even if it is an illusion. Faith gives comfort only if it is true. (110, emphasis added)
The pragmatic interpretation of faith as described by von Hildebrand is not mine. My first task, then, is to explain why. I turn then to an evaluation of von Hildebrand's positive view.
I
My claim is that religious faith has an immanent value, a value for this life in the here and now, whether or not the objects of this faith, God and the soul,* really exist. This is equivalent to saying that faith has immanent value whether or not the faith is objectively true. I am not saying that that faith has immanent value whether or not the believer really believes in God and the soul. I assume that he really does believe, and shows that he really does believe by living his faith, by 'walking the walk' and and not merely by 'taking the talk.' My claim is that a believer who really believes derives an important life-enhancing benefit from his sincere belief whether or not the objects of his belief really exist.
It is important to understand that one who really believes in God and the soul believes that they really exist whether or not he or anyone else believes that they do. His believing purports to target transcendent entities that exist independently of his believing. But note that this purport to target the transcendent is what is whether or not the targets exist. In other words, from the fact that one really believes that a transcendent God exists, it does not follow that a transcendent God really exists.
Am I saying that faith is a means to the end of subjective happiness? No. The sincere believer does not make himself believe in order to make himself feel good or to comfort himself. He is not fooling himself so as to comfort himself. To fool himself, he would have to know or strongly believe that God does not exist and then hide that fact from himself.
The believer believes because of various experiences he has had: he feels (what he describes as) the presence of the Lord on certain occasions; he senses the absoluteness of moral demands and the gap between what he is and what he ought to be; he feels the bite of conscience and cannot bring himself to believe any naturalistic explanation of conscience and its deliverances; he has religious and mystical experiences that seem to tell of an Unseen Order; he takes the beauty, order, and intelligibility of the world to point beyond it to a transcendent Source of this beauty, order, and intelligibility; he feels that life would be meaningless if there were no God, that there would be no ultimate justice; he senses the presence of purely spiritual demonic agents interfering with his attempts to pray and meditate and conform to the demands of morality.
Or it may be that a sincere religious believer never has any experiences that purport to reveal the reality of God and the soul, and has never considered any of the arguments for God and the soul; he believes because he was brought up to believe by people he admires and respects and trusts. Even in this case the believer is not making himself believe as a means to the end of feeling good or comfortable or subjectively happy; he believes simply because he has taken on board the beliefs of others he trusts and respects. I seem to recall Kierkegaard somewhere saying that he believes because his father told him so. Some imbibe belief with their mother's milk.
II
Despite these clarifications of my position, it still seems that if von Hildebrand is right, then I am wrong, and vice versa. He holds that "Faith gives comfort only if it is true." I will take that to mean that faith confers an important life-enhancing benefit only it is objectively true and not merely believed to be truth by a sincere believer. What I am saying, however, is that faith confers an important life-enhancing benefit to the sincere believer whether or not it is objectively true.
Who is right? In all intellectual honesty, it seems to me that I am right. Why should it be necessary that the faith be true for it be life-enhancing, for it to be good for me to believe it? An analogy may help me get my point across.
At age 60 I attempted a marathon. At the starting line I did not know whether I could cover the 26.2 miles within the allotted time (under seven hours). I did not know whether I could pull it off, but I strongly believed that I could, and surely this strong belief, whether true or false, was good for me to believe: it had race-immanent value in that with this belief I performed better than I would have performed without it. As things turned out, I completed the marathon in six hours. But suppose I hadn't. Suppose that my belief in my ability to complete the marathon in the allotted time was false. It would still have been the case that my belief in completion had race-immanent value. I would still have been better off with that belief than without it.
Now in the Great Race of Life we compete against our own hebetude, decrepitude, and sinfulness for the crown of Eternal Life, the Beatific Vision. But here below we cannot know whether we will attain the crown, or even whether it exists, so here below we need faith. Living by faith we live better than we would have lived without it. We run the Race better, with more enthusiasm, commitment, and resoluteness. Clearly, or so it seems to me, we reap the benefits of this faith in the here and now whether or not there is anything on the other side of the Great Divide.
So I say that von Hildebrand does not understand the pragmatics of faith. One problem is that he caricatures the pragmatic approach as I showed in the first section. The other problem is that he is a dogmatist: his doxastic security needs are so strong that he cannot psychologically tolerate the idea that he might be wrong. He wants objective certainty about ultimates, as all serious philosophers do, but he confuses his subjective certainty, which falls far short of knowledge, with objective certainty, which knowledge logically requires.
He claims to know things that he cannot possibly know. He writes,
We ought to have faith because by our belief in God we give the response to which He is entitled. We ought to believe in divine Revelation because it is absolute truth. (110)
What von Hildebrand is doing here is simply presupposing the existence of God and the absolute truth of divine revelation. If God exists, then of course we ought to have faith in him. And if divine revelation is absolute truth, then we ought to believe in it. But how does von Hildebrand know that God exists and that revelation is true? He doesn't t know these things, he merely believes them. He is claiming to know what he cannot know, but can only believe.
___________________________
*'Soul' in the Platonic sense, not the Aristotelian one according to which the soul is the mere life-principle of the body.
From Robert Bolt's "A Man for All Seasons."
But what if giving evildoers the benefit of law leads to the permanent ascendancy of evil and the destruction of all civilization? You say that can't happen? How do you know that? Because God wouldn't allow it? How do you know that God exists? You don't know that; you believe it. Belief is not knowledge even if supported by reasons. Can you prove that the Good must triumph in the end? No you can't. I myself believe that the Good must triumph is the end. But this is matter of faith, not knowledge.
Of course, you might just say: Fiat iustitia, pereat mundus! "Let there be justice though the world perish!" But what would be the good of abstract justice if we were all to perish? The administration of justice via the rule of law in general and laws in particular is for the sake of human flourishing, and not the other way around. The law exists for us; we don't exist for the law. The same goes for government without which there could be no equitable administration of justice. Government exists for the benefit of the people; the people don't exist for the benefit of government and those who control it.
Welcome to political aporetics!
To put the aporia as sharply as possible, the following are individually plausible but mutually inconsistent:
A. Moral reasons for action ought to be dominant: they trump every other reason for action such as 'reasons of state.'
B. Some actions are absolutely morally wrong, intrinsically wrong, morally impermissible always and everywhere, regardless of situation, context, circumstances, consequences.
C. Among absolutely morally wrong actions, there are some that are (non-morally) permissible, and indeed (non-morally) necessary: they must be done in a situation in which refusing to act would lead to worse consequences such as the destruction of one's nation or culture.
It is easy to see that this triad is inconsistent. The limbs cannot all be true. (B) and (C) could both be true if one allowed moral reasons to be trumped by non-moral reasons. But that is precisely what (A), quite plausibly, rules out.
The threesome, then, is logically inconsistent. And yet each limb makes a strong claim on our acceptance. To solve the problem one of the limbs must be rejected. Which one?
Christopher Rufo has her number.
The new CEO of NPR, then, is a left-wing ideologue who supports wide-scale censorship and considers the First Amendment an impediment to her campaign to sanitize the world of wrong opinions.
Maher is no aberration. She is part of a rising cohort of affluent, left-wing, female managers who dominate the departments of university administration, human resources, and DEI. They are the matriarchs of the American Longhouse: they value safety over liberty, censorship over debate, and relativism over truth.
Here, Rufo interviews Larry Sanger about NPR CEO Maher. Excerpt:
Sanger: The fact that she is not immediately hounded out of her job—and she won’t be, I’m sure—shows you how profoundly and how quickly the culture of not just the Internet, but of the United States and the West in general, has changed.
The fact that you had to do some research and surface these videos, that they weren’t immediately caught as smoking-gun evidence of how bad things have gotten, shows you that the attitudes that she expresses are what we expect these days.
Poor Maher! She suffers from both TDS and Truth Decay.
Amazing video. Historically significant.
Substack latest.
I am just getting warmed up. But I'm sure you've caught the drift by now. Each of these bullet points can be nailed down with numerous references which I have supplied elsewhere in many a post.
It is now your turn to do something in defense of civilization.