An important piece by Ayaan Hirsi Ali.
On the Scientism Front
We defenders of the humanities need to do battle on three fronts against three enemies: scientism, leftism, Islamism. Each is represented by a disturbing number of crapweasels, individuals who won't own up to who and what they are. Thus prominent scientisticists — to give an ugly name to an ugly bunch — will deny that there there is any such thing as scientism. (See my Scientism category for documentation.) And the same goes, mutatis mutandis, for the Pee Cee crowd and the Islamists.
Here are two links so that you may know your enemies.
Thomas Nagel and Stephen C. Myer's Signature in the Cell
Why Neil de Grasse Tyson is a Philistine (HTs: Dave Lull, J. Orsak, W. Chambers, et al.)
Dallas Willard Remembered
Dallas Willard died on this date one year ago. Here is what I wrote at the time.
The Eliminative Materialist
The eliminative materialist is a bit like a man who blows his brains out to be rid of a headache. No head, no headache, no problem!
Are Rednecks People of Color?
If not, why not?
How Reasonable is it to Rely on Reason Alone?
Edith Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, tr. Reinhardt, ICS Publications, 2002, p. 22:
Reason would turn into unreason if it would stubbornly content itself with what it is able to discover with its own light, barring out everything which is made visible to it by a brighter and more sublime light.
Is it unreasonable to rely on reason alone, or is this exactly what reason demands? If the latter, how could reason validate its demand? Reason cannot validate itself by appeal to itself: A circular validation is no validation at all. So it is by a sort of transrational faith that reason relies on itself and accepts only what it can validate by its own lights. But if reason allows transrational faith in justification of itself, then it ought to be open to other transrational or suprarational sources of insight.
Solubility Skepticism, Religion, and Reason
Ruffin Crozat writes,
There is much depth in your short post on religion and reason from 6 May. Here are two points I often ponder about this topic:
First, I appreciate the difficulty of solving philosophical problems, but I wonder about the claim that they are insoluble (I suppose “insoluble” means “insoluble by humans alone”). If the problems are beyond mere human knowledge, how could we know this? One may inductively suspect insolubility by reflecting upon his experience of practicing philosophy, but how could he know the unknowable? If we can’t solve philosophical problems by philosophizing, then it seems we can’t conclude insolubility by philosophizing because this very conclusion would be a philosophical conclusion.
BV: I hold that the central problems of philosophy are most of them genuine, some of them humanly important, but all of them insoluble. And you are right, by 'insoluble' I mean insoluble by us or by beings of a similar cognitive architecture, ectypal intellects in Kant's jargon. Furthermore, pace Nicholas Rescher, I don't count a 'solution' that is relative to some set of background assumptions and cognitive values as a solution. Of course there are solutions in this sense. Nominalists solve the problem of univerals in one way, realists in another, conceptualists in a third, etc. But those are merely intramural solutions. What is wanted are solutions acceptable to all, solutions that hold ouside the walls of self-reinforcing enclaves of the like-minded.
You ask a very important question: How could one know that the central philosophical problems are insoluble? You yourself supplied the clue: by induction from philosophical experience. The best and the brightest have been at this game for thousands of years but not one single problem has been solved during this period, solved to the satisfaction of all competent practitioners. Everything is up for grabs, even the most elementary and picayune topics. Take a look at what is going one as we speak in the thread on logical form. Philosophers can't even agree on the most basic concepts of deductive logic. There is controversy everywhere. This is a plain fact.
The strife of systems and the ubiquity and longevity of controversy need explaining and I offer the insolubility thesis as the best explanation. Why haven't the problems been solved? Because they are insoluble. I agree with Benson Mates on this point. Of course, the following is an invalid argument form: Such-and-such has hitherto not been accomplished; ergo, such-and-such will never be accomplished. But then every inductive argument is invalid. Some inductive arguments, however, do quite reasonably support their conclusions.
But you can and should press your objection. If I maintain that the problems of philosophy are insoluble, then, given that the metaphilosophical problem of whether or not philosophical problems are soluble is a philosophical problem, it follows that the metaphilosophical problem is insoluble. Is this a difficult for my position? Not obviously. I simply 'bite the bullet' as they say. I accept that the meta problem is also insoluble.
In fact, the insolubility of the meta problem is further evidence of my thesis.
In other words, I am not dogmatizing. I am not claiming to know with certainty that the problems of philosophy are insoluble. I am not claiming to have solved the meta problem. I am merely claiming that the insolubility thesis is very reasonably maintained. Not every truth is such that we can know it to be true. With some truths the most we can expect here below is reasonable belief.
Compare God and the soul. I do not claim to know with certainty whether either exists. I claim merely that it it is reasonable to affirm both.
Second, I agree that it’s wise to intelligently practice religion and mysticism — which, by the way, rules out superstition and group-think! Take religion: religious practice does not exclude reason, as Mates’ quote implies. It is a false dilemma to say “One can seek truth either by reason or religion, but not both.” Why not both? If I try to lift a stone and realize I can’t manage alone, this would not entail that I can or should stop lifting. If a stronger person assists me, and I trust his assistance, I can still lift. He may request my help. He may even require that I give it my all, and I may grow from the effort. Likewise, intelligent religion requires reason.
Consider Christianity: The biblical conception of faith is “trust based on good reasons”. This point is clear in passages such as Hebrews 11:1 and 1 Peter 3:15. In the Gospels, Jesus himself reasons and encourages others to do the same. Christian faith calls for the whole self: heart, mind, soul, and strength.
I’d be interested in your thoughts on reason and intelligent religion.
BV: I basically agree with you. Reason in the end must confess its own infirmity. It cannot deliver on its promises. The truth-seeker must explore other avenues. Religion is one, mysticism is another.
Logical Form and the Symmetry Thesis
"The most conspicuous purpose of logic, in its applications to science and everyday discourse, is the justification and criticism of inference." (Emphasis added, Willard Van Orman Quine, Methods of Logic, 2nd revised ed., Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1959, p. 33.
Perhaps the dispute in the earlier thread could be resolved if we all could agree on the following.
1. The most specific logical form of a deductive argument A is the form relevant for assessing whether the reasoning embodied in A is valid or invalid.
2. Every deductive argument has exactly one most specific form.
3. Symmetry Thesis: if the most specific form of A is valid, then A is valid; if the most specific form of A is invalid, then A is invalid.
In case 'most specific logical form' needs explanation, consider the difference between the following valid form from the predicate calculus and the following invalid form from the propositional calculus:
Fa
Ga
——-
(Ex)(Fx & Gx)
p
q
——-
r.
The former is the most specific logical form of 'Al is fat, Al is gay, ergo, something is both fat and gay.' The latter, if a form of the argument at all, is less specific: it abstracts from the internal subpropositional logical structure of the constituent propositions.
Now three examples in illustration of (1)-(3).
Example One. Call the following argument 'Charley':
Tom is tall
——-
Tom is tall.
Although the above display, which is a written expression of the argument and not the argument itself, shows two tokens of the sentence type 'Tom is tall,' the argument consists of exactly one proposition. Anyone who executes the reasoning displayed infers the proposition *Tom is tall* from itself. (I am using asterisks to mention propositions. So '*Tom is tall*' is an abbreviation of 'the proposition expressed by a tokening of the sentence type "Tom is tall".')
It is perfectly clear that the reasoning embodied by Charley is valid and that its form is 'P ergo P.' The reasoning is not from P to some proposition that may or may not be identical to P. Therefore the concrete episode of reasoning does not have the form 'P ergo Q.'
But let us irenically concede that if one wished, for whatever reason, to abstract not only from the content of the argument but also from the plain fact that the argument involves exactly one proposition, one could view the form 'P ergo P' as a special case of 'P ergo Q.' And I will also concede, to keep peace between Phoenix and London, that the argument instantiates the second invalid form, even though I don't believe that this is the case.
Either way, the Symmetry Thesis stands and the Asymmetry Thesis falls. For as G. Rodrigues in the earlier thread pointed out, 'P ergo P' is the most specific form of Charley.
Example Two. Call the following argument 'Kitty Kat.'
If cats like cream, then cats like cream
Cats like cream
——-
Cats like cream.
Please note that there is no equivocation in this example: 'Cats like cream' has the same sense in all four of its occurrences.
Kitty Kat's most specific form is 'P –> P, P, ergo P.' This form is valid. So Kitty Kat is valid, notwithstanding the fact, if it is a fact, that Kitty Kat also instantiates the formal fallacy, Affirming the Consequent: P –> Q, Q, ergo P. By (1) above, the fact, if it is a fact, that Kitty Kat instantiates Affirming the Consequent is irrelevant to the assessment of the validity/invalidty of the reasoning embodied in Kitty Kat.
Example Three. Call the following example 'Massey':
If God created something , then God created everything.
God created everything.
——-
God created something.
This argument fits the pattern of the formal fallacy, Affirming the Consequent:
If p then q
q
——-
p.
But the argument also has a valid form:
Every x is such that Cgx
——-
Some x is such that Cgx.
Please note that if an argument is valid, adding a premise can't make it invalid; this principle is what allows us to disregard the first line.
(Example adapted from Gerald J. Massey, "The Fallacy behind Fallacies," Midwest Studies in Philosophy VI (1981), pp. 489-500)
The most specific form of Massey is the predicate logic form above displayed. Since it is valid, Massey is valid.
Symmetry Thesis vindicatus est.
Is everybody happy now?
The Logic of Buddhist Philosophy
Beyond True and False, by Graham Priest. (HT: Allan Jackson)
A Question for Benson Mates
According to Benson Mates (1919-2009), all the major problems of philosophy are "insoluble though intelligible." (Skeptical Essays, U. of Chicago Press, 1981, p. 13) If true, this would explain why the problems of philosophy have not been solved. But "the rational minds among us are not inclined to give up the struggle, while the rest become religious mystics or philosophical obscurantists . . . ." (p. x)
But why continue to struggle with the problems of philosophy? To better appreciate the insolubility thesis? Apparently, Mates thinks that while the problems can't be solved or dissolved, one ought to keep trying to solve them anyway. But how rational is this? I should think that a "rational mind" should not attempt to do what he has already convinced himself cannot be done. Is it not more rational to seek a path to truth beyond philosophy?
How rational is it to place one's sole faith in reason when one has, by one's own lights, seen the infirmity of reason?
If a certain weight needs lifting, a weight beyond my ability to lift, and known to be such, does it make sense to struggle with it? Or is it more rational to seek assistance? By rejecting out of hand the assistance of religion and mysticism – which he foolishly conflates — Mates shows that his commitment to reason is irrational, as irrational as my pride-driven conceit that I am master of any difficulty that I should encounter.
The Liberal
A liberal is the kind of person who would extend the right to vote to felons but will not grant the right to life to the unborn. How 'liberal' is that? How 'inclusive'? How respectful of 'diversity'?
Should felons be allowed to vote? The conservative answers with alacrity. "Of course not. Why should those who cannot order their own lives prudently be allowed to have a say in the ordering of society?"
There is no wisdom on the left.
The Proctology of a Pessimist
Arthur Schopenhauer was a foe of noise in all its forms, as one can see from his delightful essay, On Noise. The “infernal cracking of whips” especially got on his nerves. (One wonders what he would say about the Beelzebubic booming of boom boxes.)
One day, a cleaning lady made what he considered to be an excessive racket outside his rooms. He asked her to quiet down, which led to an argument. Push came to shove, and the lady ended up at the foot of the stairs. The local court ruled in favor of the Putzfrau, and Schopenhauer was ordered to pay her a monthly sum of money for the rest of her long life. When at last she died, the philosopher opened his journal and penned what is arguably the greatest Latin pun of all time: Anus obit, onus abit.
What wit, what pith, what anagrammatical punsterism! All hail to Schopenhauer and his scowl of Minerva! Note first that the line is an anagram: there are two constructions, in this case two independent clauses, each of which represents a transposition of the letters of the other. A second example of an anagram: Democritus docet risum = Democritus teaches laughingly. The second thing to note is that ‘anus’ has two Latin meanings depending on whether the ‘a’ is short or long. Short, it means alte Frau, Greisin, old woman. (My Latin dictionary is Lateinisch-Deutsch.) Long, it means 1) Fussring, 2) (euphem.) After (= anus in the English sense).
Schopenhauer’s aphorism in English: The old woman/anus is dead; the burden is lifted. So Schopenhauer was not necessarily being crude, though of course he was punning.
Decadent Art, Buddhist Statuary, and the Taliban
Our Czech friend, Vlastimil Vohanka, writes:
A question: Do you remember the title of your blog post in which you argued, if I recall correctly, that the Taliban damage to the Buddha statues would be evil — or ought not to take place — even if nobody ever got to know about it? I also recall dimly that the post was a reply to Peter Lupu. Is the post still online, somewhere?
Vlasta, I believe you are referring to this post. It was a response, not to Peter Lupu, but to Mike Valle. (I had the pleasure of their company at Sunday breakfast yesterday.)
Here is how the post begins:
This by e-mail from a doctoral student in Canada:
I am writing to you because I have a couple of questions . . . about your recent (May 12) blog post, and I was curious to hear a bit more about your views. [. . .] My questions concern your assertion that "I also agree that if one is going to violate people's beliefs in the manner of that 'artist' Andres Serrano then one ought to do it on one's own time and with one's own dime, as the saying goes." I assume that you're referring to "Piss Christ" and the controversy that surrounded it.
That's right. Context is provided by Mike Valle's post to which I was responding.
1. Why do you feel that "Piss Christ" (or Serrano's other works–again, I assume you're referring here mostly to the religious icons and bodily fluids) is (are) a "[violation] of people's beliefs"? The claim that it "violates beliefs" is much stronger than simply saying that it is distasteful, since it ascribes an active quality to the work.
Of course, it is more than distasteful or disgusting, although it is that; it shows profound disrespect and contempt for Christianity. And it is not the work itself that violates the beliefs and sensibilities of Christians and plenty of non-Christians as well, but the work in the context of its production and public display. It should be offensive to any decent person, just as "Piss-Buddha," if there were such an 'art work,' would be offensive to me and other non-Buddhists. Buddha was a great teacher of humanity and should be honored as such. (That is why decent people were offended when the Taliban destroyed the ancient Buddhist statuary.) The same goes for Jesus and Socrates and so many others. Christians of course believe that Jesus was much more than a great teacher of humanity, but whether he was or not is immaterial to the point at issue. Or imagine "Piss-King" in which a figurine of Martin Luther King, Jr. is supended in urine. Everyone would take that, and rightly so, as expressive of contempt for the black American civil rights leader, as offensive as Southern racists' references to King back in the '60s as Martin Luther Coon.
The decadent art of the 20th century reflects not only the corruption of aesthetic sensibility but also a moral corruption. So my objection to Serrano is not merely aesthetic but moral. The purpose of art is not to debase but to elevate, refine, ennoble.
[. . .]
Tenth Anniversary Pledge
This weblog commenced operations on 4 May 2004. I thank you for reading.
My pledge: You will never see advertising on this site. You will never see anything that jumps around in your visual field. I will not beg for money with a 'tip jar.' This is a labor of love and I prize my independence.
I also pledge to continue the fight, day by day, month by month, year by year, against the hate-America, race-baiting, religion-bashing, liberty-destroying, gun-grabbing, lying fascists of the Left. As long as health and eyesight hold out.
I will not pander to anyone, least of all the politically correct.
And I won't back down. Are you with me?
Addenda:
Philosopher TB writes, "I’m with you, man! I’ve learned a good deal from your blog, and, what’s better, you inspire me to be a better person. I’ve only been following for about a year, but it was a great year of blogging."
JC writes, "Congratulations on ten years of fighting leftist nonsense! If you're interested in reading some history dealing with leftist delusions I recommend Simon Schama's Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution. I also recommend this excellent docudrama on the French Revolution: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-SP4iii_THQ
I also cannot recommend enough Martin Malia's The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-199.
The Johnny Cash version of "I Won't Back Down."
TC writes, "Congratulations on celebrating 10 years in the Blog world. It appears that you are attracting and interacting with some first rate minds and providing a great service to the public. I hope that some of your correspondents who are still in the academic world or in other positions in which they might be able to influence people are recommending your page. Congrats again and keep up the great work!"
Logical Form and the Supposed Asymmetry of Validity and Invalidity: A Defense of Symmetry
For the 'Londonistas,' Ed and David, partners in logical investigations. We are unlikely ever to agree, but clarification of differences is an attainable and worthwhile goal, here, and in every arena of controversy. Have at it, boys.
………….
1. Suppose someone reasons as follows. 'Some Englishmen are Londoners; therefore, some Londoners are Englishmen.' To reason is one thing, to reason correctly another. So one can ask: Is this specimen of reasoning correct or incorrect? This is the sort of question with which logic deals. Logic is the study of inference and argument from a normative point of view. It seeks to articulate the criteria of correct and incorrect reasoning. It is analogous to ethics which seeks to articulate the criteria of correct and incorrect action.
2. We all take for granted that some reasoning is correct and some incorrect, and we are all more or less naturally good at reasoning correctly. Almost everyone grasps immediately that if Tom is an Englishman and some Englishmen are Londoners, it does not follow that Tom is a Londoner. What distinguishes the logician is his reflective stance. He reflects upon reasoning in general and tries to extract and systematize the principles of correct reasoning. 'Extract' is an apt metaphor. The logician develops a theory from his pre-theoretical understanding of argumentative correctness. As every teacher of logic comes to learn, one must already be logical to profit from the study of logic just as one must already be ethical to profit from the study of ethics. It is a matter of making explicit and raising to the full light of awareness what must already be implicitly present if the e-duc-ation, the drawing out into the explicit is to occur. This is why courses in logic and ethics are useless for many and positively harmful for some. But they do make some of us more logical and more ethical.
3. Correctness in deductive logic is called validity, and incorrectness invalidity. Since one can argue correctly from false premises and incorrectly from true premises, we distinguish validity from truth. Consider the following argument:
Some Englishmen are Londoners
——-
Some Londoners are Englishmen.
We say of neither the premise nor the conclusion that it is either valid or invalid: we say that it is either true or false. And we do not say of the argument that it is true or false, but that it is either valid or invalid. We also speak of inferences as either valid or invalid.
4. What makes a valid argument valid? It can't be that it has true premises and a true conclusion. For there are invalid arguments that satisfy this condition. Some say that what makes a valid argument valid is the impossibility of the premises' being true and the conclusion false. Theirs is a modal explanation of validity. Equivalently,
D1. Argument A is valid =df necessarily, if A's premises are all true, then A's conclusion is true.
This necessity is plainly the necessity of the consequence (necessitas consequentiae), not the necessity of the consequent (necessitas consequentiis): in the majority of cases the premises and conclusion are all contingent propositions.
The modal explanation of validity in (D1) is fine as far as it goes, but it leads to the question: what is the ground of the necessity? If validity is explained by the RHS of (D1), what explains the necessity? What explains the necessitas consequentiae of the conditional on the RHS of (D1)?
Enter logical form.
The validity of a given valid argument evidently resides in something distinct from the given argument. What is this distinct something? It is the logical form of the argument, the argument form. The form F of an argument A is distinct from A because F is a universal (a repeatable) while A is a particular (an unrepeatable). Thus the form
All S are M
All M are P
——-
All S are P
is a one-in-many, a repeatable. It is repeated in every argument of that form. It is the form of indefinitely many syllogisms, although it is not itself a syllogism, any more than 'All S are M' is a proposition. A proposition is either true or false, but 'All S are M' is neither true nor false. To appreciate this, bear in mind that 'S' and 'M' are not abbreviations but placeholders. If the letters above were abbreviations, then the array above would be an (abbreviated) argument, not an argument form. An argument form is not an argument but a form of indefinitely many arguments.
Now validity is a property of argument forms primarily, and secondarily of arguments having valid forms. What makes a valid argument valid is the validity of its form:
D2. Argument A is valid =df A is an instance of a valid argument form.
D3. Argument form F is valid =df no instance of F has true premises and a false conclusion.
Validity is truth-preserving: a valid argument form will never take you from true premises to a false conclusion. (Exercise for the reader: show that invalidity is not falsehood preserving.) In sum, an argument is valid in virtue of having a valid form, and a form is valid if no argument of that form has true premises and a false concusion. The logical form of a valid argument is what makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false.
5. If a valid argument is one with a valid form, one will be tempted to to say that an invalid argument is one with an invalid form. Call this the Symmetry Thesis:
ST. If an argument is an instance of a valid form, then it is valid, and if it is an instance of an invalid form, then it is invalid.
But there are examples that appear to break the symmetry, e.g.:
If God created something , then God created everything.
God created everything.
——-
God created something.
This argument fits the pattern of the formal fallacy, Affirming the Consequent:
If p then q
q
——-
p.
But the argument also has a valid form:
Every x is such that Cgx
——-
Some x is such that Cgx.
(Example adapted from Gerald J. Massey, "The Fallacy behind Fallacies," Midwest Studies in Philosophy VI (1981), pp. 489-500)
So which is it? Is the argument valid or invalid? It can't be both and it can't be neither. One option is to abandon the Symmetry Thesis and maintain that having a valid form is sufficient for an argument to be valid, but that having an invalid form is not sufficient for it to be invalid. One would then be adopting the following Asymmetry Thesis:
AT. Having a valid form suffices for an argument to be valid, but having an invalid form does not suffice for an argument to be invalid.
Another option is to hold to the Symmetry Thesis and maintain that the Massey argument is really two arguments, not one. But before exploring this option, let us consider the unintuitive consequences of holding that one and the same argument can have two different forms, one valid, the other invalid.
6. Consider any valid syllogism. A syllogism, by definition, consists of exactly three different propositions: a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. So every valid syllogism has the invalid form: p, q, ergo r. Generalizing, we can say that any argument whose validity hinges upon the internal subpropositional logical structure of its constituent propositions will instantiate an invalid form from the propositional calculus (PC). For example, any argument of the valid form, Some S are P; ergo, Some P are S, is an instance of the invalid PC form, p, ergo q.
To think of a valid syllogism as having the invalid form p, q, ergo r is to abstract away from the internal subpropositional logical structure that the syllogism's validity pivots on. But if this abstraction is permitted, one may permit oneself to abstract away from the requirement that the same terms in an argument be replaced by the same placeholders. One might then maintain that
All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
——-
Socrates is mortal
has the invalid logical form
All Fs are Gs
a is an H
——-
a is a G
But why stop there? By the same 'reasoning,' the Socrates syllogism has the invalid form:
All Fs are Gs
a is an H
——-
b is an I.
But if one abstracts away from the requirement that the same term or sentence be replaced by the same placeholder, then we get the result that the obviously valid
Tom is tall
——-
Tom is tall
has the valid form p ergo p and the invalid form p ergo q. Here we are abstracting away from the fact that a proposition entails itself and ascending to the higher level of abstraction at which a proposition entails a proposition. After all, it is surely true that in our example a proposition entails a proposition.
I submit, however, that our example's having an invalid form is an intolerable result. Something has gone wrong. Surely the last argument has no invalid form. Surely one cannot lay bare the form of an argument, in an serious sense of 'argument,' if one abandons the requirement that the same term or sentence be replaced by the same placeholder. To do that is to engage in vicious abstraction. It is vicious because an argument in any serious sense of the term is not just a sequence of isolated propositions, but a sequence of propositions together with the idea that one of them is supposed to follow from the others. An argument in any serious sense of the term is a sequence of propositions that has the property of being putatively such that one of them, the conclusion, follows from the others, the premises. But no sequence of propositions can have this property if the argument's form allows for different terms/propositions to have different placeholders.
7. So I suggest that we abandon the Asymmetry Thesis and adopt the Symmetry Thesis according to which no valid argument has any invalid forms. Let me now try to motivate this proposal.
An argument form is an abstraction from an argument. But it is also true that an argument is an abstraction from a concrete episode of reasoning by a definite person at a definite time. Clearly, the same argument can be enacted by the same person at different times, and by the same or different persons at different times. I can 'run through' the argument that the null set is unique any number of times, and so can you. An argument in this sense is not a concrete episode of arguing (reasoning) but a sequence of propositions. A proposition, of course, is not the same as a sentence used to express it.
Now I grant that an argument taken in abstraction from an episode of reasoning (and as the content of that reasoning) can instantiate two or more argument forms. But I deny that a concrete episode of reasoning by a definite person at a definite time can instantiate two or more argument forms. So my claim is that while an argument in abstracto can have two or more forms, an argument in concreto, i.e. a concrete episode of reasoning cannot have more than one form. If this form is valid the argument in concreto is valid. If invalid, the argument in concreto is invalid. To illustrate:
Suppose I know that no Democrat supports capital punishment. Then I learn that Jones is a Democrat. Putting together these two pieces of information, I infer that Jones does not support capital punishment. By 'the concrete episode of reasoning,' I mean the reasoning process together with its content. One first thinks of the first proposition, then the second, then one infers the third, and all of this in the unity of one consciousness. The content is the argument considered in abstraction from any particular diachronic mental enactment by a particular person at a particular time. The reasoning process as a datable temporally extended mental process is also an abstraction from the concrete episode of reasoning which must include both, the reasoning and its content.
Now the concrete episode of reasoning embodies a pattern. In the example, I reason in accordance with this pattern:
(x) (Fx –> ~Gx)
Fa
——-
~Ga
Which is also representable as follows:
No Fs are Gs
a is an F
——-
a is not a G.
The pattern or logical form of my concrete episode of reasoning is assuredly not: p, q, ergo r. This is consistent with saying that the argument in abstracto instantiates the invalid form p, q, ergo r in addition to the valid form above.
The point I am making is this. If we take an argument in abstraction from the concrete episode of reasoning in which it is embodied, then we may find that it instantiates more than one form. There is no denying that every valid syllogism, considered by itself and apart from the mental life of an agent who thinks it through, instantiates the invalid form p, q, ergo r. But no one who reasons syllogistically reasons in accordance with that invalid form. Syllogistic reasoning, whether correct or incorrect, is reasoning that is sensitive to the internal subpropositional logical structure of the syllogism's constituent propositions. The invalid form is not a form of the argument in concreto.
One must distinguish among the following:
- The temporally extended event of Jones' reasoning. This is a particular mental process.
- The content of this reasoning process, the argument in abstracto as sequence of propositions.
- The concrete episode of reasoning (i.e. the argument in concreto) which involves both the reasoning and its content.
- The verbal expression in written or spoken sentences of the argument.
- The form or forms of the argument in abstracto.
- The verbal expression of a form or forms in a form diagram(s).
- The form of the argument in concreto.
My point, again, is that we can uphold the Symmetry Thesis if we make a distinction between arguments in the concrete and arguments in the abstract. But this is a distinction we need in any case. The Symmetry Thesis holds for arguments in the concrete. But these are the arguments that matter because these are the ones people actually give.
Applying this to the Massey example above, we can say that while the abstract argument expressed by the following display has two forms, one invalid, the other valid:
If God created something , then God created everything.
God created everything.
——-
God created something
there is no one concrete argument, no one concrete episode of reasoning, that the display expresses. One who reasons in a way that is attentive to the internal subpropositional structure of the constituent propositions reasons correctly. But one who ignores this internal structure reasons incorrectly.
In this way we can uphold the Symmetry Thesis and avoid the absurdities to which the Asymmetry Thesis leads.
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