Ferguson

I have been asked my opinion.  But before opining it would be better to wait until we know or at least have a clearer idea of what exactly transpired between Michael Brown, the 18-year-old black male, and the white police officer Darren Wilson. We know that Brown is dead and that the officer hit him with five or so rounds. (And we know that it was the shooting that caused the death.)

And we know that prior to the shooting, Brown stole some tobacco products (cigarillos in one account, Swisher Sweet cigars in another) from a convenience store, roughing up the proprietor on the way out.

The theft is not something that Wilson could have known about prior to the shooting, and even if he did know about it, that would not justify his use of deadly force against the shoplifter.  Obviously.

So those are the main facts as I understand the case.  I need to know more to say more, except for two comments:

1.  Al Sharpton's claim that the release of the store video was a 'smear' of Brown is absurd on the face of it.  One cannot smear someone with facts. To smear is to slander.  It is to damage, or attempt to damage, a person's reputation by making false accusations. Sharpton is employing the often effective leftist tactic of linguistic hijacking.  A semantic vehicle with a clear meaning is 'hijacked' and piloted to some leftist destination.   The truth about a person can be damaging to his reputation.  But if you cannot distinguish between damaging truths and damaging falsehoods, then you are as willfully stupid as the race hustler Sharpton.

2. The governor of Missouri, Jay Nixon, called for "a vigorous prosecution"  in the case and to "do everything we can to achieve justice for [Brown's] family." These statements sink to a Sharptonian level of (willful?) stupidity.  For one thing, Wilson cannot be prosecuted for the killing of Brown until it has been determined that Wilson should be charged in the killing of Brown.  

That Wilson killed Brown is a fact.  But that he should be charged with a crime in the killing is a separate question.  Only after a charge has been lodged can the judicial process begin with prosecution and defense.

Second, talk of achieving justice for Brown's family  not only presupposes that Wilson has been indicted, it begs the question of his guilt: it assumes he is guilty of a crime.  More fundamentally, talk of achieving justice for one party alone makes no sense.  The aim of criminal proceeding is to arrive at a just outcome for both parties.

Suppose Wilson is indicted and tried.  Either he is found guilty or found not guilty of the charge or charges brought against him.  If he is found guilty, and is in fact guilty, then there is justice for both the perpetrator and the victim and his family  If he is found not guilty, and he is in fact not guilty, then the same: there is justice for both the perpetrator and the victim and his family.  Therefore, to speak of achieving justice for one of the parties alone makes no  sense.

People don't understand this because they think that the victim or his family must be somehow compensated for his or their loss.  But that is not the purpose of a criminal trial.  It is too bad that the young black man died, but the purpose of a criminal trial is not to assuage the pain of such a loss.  The purpose is simply to determine whether a person charged with a crime is guilty of it.

Inheritance and Appropriation

The high school I attended required each student to take two years of Latin.  Years later the requirement was dropped. When a fundraiser contacted me for a donation, I said, "You eliminated Latin, why should I give you a donation?"  He replied that the removal of Latin made room for Chinese.
 
What I should have said at that point was something like the following.  "While the study of Asian languages and cultures and worldviews is wonderfully enriching, it must not come at the expense of the appropriation and transmission of our own culture which is Judeo-Christian and Graeco-Roman."
 
And then I could have clinched my point by quoting a couple of famous lines from Goethe's Faust, Part I, Night, lines 684-685:
 
Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern hast,
erwirb es, um es zu besitzen!
 
What from your fathers you  received as heir,
Acquire if  you would possess it. (tr. W. Kaufmann)
 
 
The idea is that what one has been lucky enough to inherit, one must actively appropriate, i.e., make one's own by hard work,  if one is really to possess it.  The German infinitive erwerben has not merely the meaning of 'earn' or 'acquire' but also the meaning of aneignen, appropriate, make one's own.
 
Unfortunately the schools and universities of today have become leftist seminaries more devoted to the eradication of the high culture of the West than its transmission and dissemination.  These leftist seed beds have become hot houses of political correctness.
 
What can you do?  You might think of pulling your children out of the public schools and home-schooling them or else sending them to places like Great Hearts Academies.

The Ten Commandments as Survival Manual

A recent Richard Fernandez column ends brilliantly:

We often forget that the sacred texts of mankind began as practical documents.  They were checklists. And we may well rediscover this fact before the end. One can imagine the last two postmoderns crawling towards each other in the ruins of a once great city to die, and while waiting to expire engage in conversation to pass the time.

“Waldo,” the first said, “do you remember that tablet displayed in front of the Texas Statehouse. You know, back when there was a Texas?”

“Yeah, didn’t it have a whole bunch of stuff scrawled on it? Tell me again what it said,” replied the other.

“Waldo, it said, ‘thou shalt not kill.’ And ‘thou shalt not lie’.”

“Anything else?”

“Yes it also said, ‘thou shalt not steal’. Plus somewhere in the middle said, ‘thou shalt not have sex with people you weren’t married to.’”

“Yeah, I remember it now,” the second post-modern said. “What a bunch of hooey. It’s a right wing, nutjob, racist document called the Ten Commandments.  It’s a religious document.”

“No Waldo,” the first replied. “That’s where you’re wrong. It ain’t no religious document. I just figured out it was a survival manual.”

 

More Proof that the Left Sees Politics as War

Andrew McCarthy comments on the Rick Perry indictment.  Alan Dershowitz:  Perry indictment is "What Happens in Totalitarian Societies."

The scumbags of the Left will dismiss the folks over at NRO as right-wing nutjobs, but that won't work with Dershowitz.  Or how about Jonathan Turley, who has spoken out against the lawlessness of the Obama administration? Is he a right-wing crazy?

Haven't I told you time and again that the Left is totalitarian from the bottom up, the top down, and side to side?  Some say that Communism is dead.  Well no, it has simply transmogrified into Obaminism.

Related:  Politics is War and Conservatives Need to Learn How to Fight

Victor Davis Hanson on Obama the Mendacious

Here (HT: Bill Keezer):

[. . .]

Barack Obama is once again lamenting the charge that he is responsible for pulling all U.S. peacekeepers out of Iraq, claiming that the prior administration is culpable. But Obama negotiated the withdrawal himself. We know that not because of right-wing talking points, but because of the proud serial claims of reelection candidate Obama in 2011 and 2012 that he deserved credit for leaving Iraq [6]. That complete pullout prompted Joe Biden to claim the Iraq policy was the administration’s likely “greatest achievement” and buoyed Obama to brag that he was leaving a stable and secure Iraq. Think of the logic: pulling all soldiers out of Iraq was such a great thing that I now can brag that I am not responsible for it [7].

In regards to Syria, does Obama remember that he issued red lines should the Assad regime use chemical or biological weapons? Why then would he assert that the international community had done so, not Barack Obama? Think of the logic: I issued tough threats, and when my bluff was called, someone else issued them.

If Obama were to readdress Benghazi, would anyone believe him? What would he say? That he was in the Situation Room that evening? That he was correct in telling the UN that a (suddenly jailed) video maker prompted the violence? That the consulate and annex were secure and known to be so? That Susan Rice was merely parroting CIA talking points? Think of the logic: a video maker was so clearly responsible for the Benghazi killings that we will never have to mention his culpability again.

Does anyone believe the president that ISIS are “jayvees,” [8] or that al Qaeda is on the run, or that there is no connection between the ascendance of ISIS and the loud but empty boasting of red lines in Syria and complete withdrawal from Iraq? (If we had taken all troops out of South Korea in 1953 — claiming that we had spent too much blood and treasure and that the Seoul government was too inept — would there be a Kia or Hyundai today, or a North Korea in control of the entire Korean peninsula?) Think of the logic: the ISIS threat is so minimal that we need not be alarmed and therefore Obama is sending planes and advisors back into Iraq to contain it. If Obama truly believes that pulling all troops out made Iraq more secure, what will putting some back in do?

Was there any Obama boast about his Affordable Care Act that proved true: Keep your doctor? Keep your health plan? Save $2,500 in annual premiums? Lower the deficit? Lower the annual costs of health care? Win the support of doctors? Simplify sign-ups with a one-stop website? Enjoy lower deductibles? Think of the logic: you will all benefit from a new take-over of health care by a government whose assertions of what it was going to accomplish were proved false in the first days of its implementation.

There are many possible explanations about why the president of the United States simply says things that are not true or contradicts his earlier assertions or both. Is Obama just inattentive, inured to simply saying things in sloppy fashion without much worry whether they conform to the truth? Or is he a classical sophist who believes how one speaks rather than what he actually says alone matters: if he soars with teleprompted rhetoric, what does it matter whether it is true? If Obama can sonorously assert that he got America completely out of Iraq, what does it matter whether that policy proved disastrous or that he now denies that he was responsible for such a mistake?

Is Obama so ill-informed [9] that he embraces the first idea that he encounters, without much worry whether these notions are antithetical to his own prior views or will prove impossible to sustain?

On a deeper level, Obama habitually says untrue things because he has never been called on them before. He has been able throughout his career to appear iconic to his auditors. In the crudity of liberals like Harry Reid and Joe Biden, Obama ancestry and diction gave reassurance that he was not representative of the black lower classes and thus was the receptacle of all sorts of liberal dreams and investments. According to certain liberals, he was like a god, our smartest president, and of such exquisite sartorial taste that he must become a successful president. In other words, on the superficial basis of looks, dress, and patois, Obama was reassuring to a particular class of white guilt-ridden grandees and to such a degree that what he actually had done in the past or promised to do in the future was of no particular importance.

[. . .]

Arguing with Brightly over Ficta

Earlier I wrote that the central problem in the philosophy of fiction is to find a solution to the following aporetic dyad:

1. There are no purely fictional items.

2. There are some purely fictional items.

The problem is that while the limbs of the dyad cannot both be true, there is reason to think that each is true.

David Brightly comments:

May I offer the following resolution of the paradox? I say that 'purely fictional' does not function as a concept term. Instead, it is ambiguous between two interpretations. On the one hand, it behaves like the pseudo-concept 'inexistent'. To say that Bone is a purely fictional alcoholic is to deny that Bone exists. [BV: Biconditionality seems  too strong.  If N is a purely fictional F, then N doesn't exist; but if N doesn't exist, it does not follow that N is purely fictional.] The same goes whatever name and concept term we substitute for 'Bone' and 'alcoholic'. This leads us to assert

1. There are no purely fictional items.

On the other hand, I say that 'fictional and 'purely fictional' appear to be concept terms because sentences like

Bone is a purely fictional alcoholic

arise via a surface transformation of

Purely fictionally, Bone is an alcoholic

and inherit their meaning and truth value. We can understand the latter as asserting that

Some work of fiction says that Bone is an alcoholic.

We take this as true, as evidenced by the work of Hamilton, and running the transformation in reverse gets us to

Bone is a purely fictional alcoholic.

Taking 'purely fictional alcoholic' as a predicate, which it superficially resembles, by Existential Generalisation we arrive at

There is some purely fictional alcoholic,

and hence to

2. There are some purely fictional items.

and apparent contradiction with (1).

The idea of a surface transformation may well appear controversial and ad hoc. But the phenomenon occurs with other pseudo-concept terms, notably 'possible'. We have

Bone is a possible alcoholic <—> Possibly, Bone is an alcoholic
Bone is a fictional alcoholic <—> Fictionally, Bone is an alcoholic.

On the left we have 'possible' and 'fictional' which look like concept terms but cannot be consistently interpreted as such. On the right we have sentential operators which introduce an element of semantic ascent which is not apparent on the left. It's precisely because 'possible' and 'fictional' involve hidden semantic ascent that they do not work as concept terms.

Response

I am afraid I don't quite understand what David is saying here despite having read it many times.  This could be stupidity on my part. But I think we do need to explore his suggestion that there is an equivocation on 'purely fictional items.'  Let me begin by listing what we know, or at least reasonably believe, about purely fictional characters.

First of all, we know that George Bone never existed: that follows from his being purely fictional.

Second, we know or at least reasonably believe that Bone is a character created by its author Patrick Hamilton, a character who figures in Hamilton's 1941 novel, Hangover Square. Just as the novel was created by Hamilton, so were the characters in it.  Admittedly, this is not self-evident.  One might maintain that there are all the fictional characters (and novels, stories, plays, legends, myths, etc.) there might have been and that the novelist or story teller or playwright just picks some of them out of  Plato's topos ouranos or Meinong's realm of Aussersein.  I find this 'telescope' conception rather less reasonable than the artifact conception according to which Bone and Co. are cultural artifacts of the creative activities of Hamilton and Co.  Purely fictional characters are made up, not found or discovered.  It is interesting to note that fingere in Latin means to mold, shape, form, while in Italian it means to feign, pretend, dissemble.  That comports well with what fiction appears to be.  Of course I am not arguing from the etymology of 'fiction.'  But if you have etymology on your side, then so much the better.

Now there is a certain tension between the two points I have just made.  On the one hand, Bone does not exist.  On the other hand, Bone is not nothing.  He is an artifact of Hamilton's creativity just as much as the novel itself is in which he figures.  How can he not exist but also not be nothing? If he is not nothing, then he exists.

If Bone were to exist, he would be a human person, a concrete item.  But there is no such concretum. On the other hand, Bone is not nothing: he is an artifact created by Hamilton over a period of time in the late '30s to early '40s.  Since Bone cannot be a concrete artifact — else Hamilton would be God –  Bone is an abstract artifact.  Thus we avoid contradiction.  Bone the concretum does not exist while Bone the abstract artifact does.  This is one theory one might propose. (Cf. Kripke, van Inwagen, Thomasson, Reicher, et al.)

Note that this solution does not require the postulation of different modes of existence/being.  But it does require that one 'countenance' (as Quine would say) abstract objects (in Quine's sense of 'abstract') in addition to concrete objects.  It also requires the admission that some abstract objects are contingent and have a beginning in time.  The theory avoids Meinongianism  but is quasi-Platonic.  London Ed needs a stiff drink long about now.

Now let's bring in a third datum.   We know that there is a sense in which it is true that Bone is an alcoholic and false that he is a teetotaler.  How do we reconcile the truth of 'Bone is an alcoholic'  with the truth of 'Bone does not exist'?  There is a problem here if we assume the plausible anti-Meinongian principle that, for any x, if x is F, then x exists.  (Existence is a necessary condition of property-possession.)  To solve the problem we might reach for a story operator.  The following dyad is consistent:

3. According to the novel, Bone is an alcoholic

4. Bone does not exist.

From (3) one cannot validily move via the anti-Meinongian principle to 'Bone exists.'  But if 'Bone is an alcoholic' is elliptical for (3), then 'Bone is a purely fictional character' is elliptical for

5. According to the novel, Bone is a purely fictional character.

But (5) is false.  For according to the novel, Bone is a real man.

The point I am making is that 'Bone is a purely fictional character' is an external sentence, a sentence true in reality outside of any fictional context.  By contrast, 'Bone is an alcoholic' is an internal sentence: it is true in the novel but not true in reality outside the novel.  If it were true outside the novel, then given the anti-Meinongian principle that nothing can have properties without existing, Bone would exist — which is false.

I think Brightly and I can agree that a purely fictional man is not a man, and that a purely fictional alcoholic is not an alcoholic.  And yet Bone is at least as real as the novel of which he is the main character.  After all, there is the character Bone but no character, Son of Bone.  In keeping with Brightly's notion that there is an equivocation on 'purely fictional item,' we could say the following.  'Bone' in the internal sentence 'Bone is an alcoholic' doesn't refer to anything, while 'Bone' in the external sentence 'Bone is a purely fictional character' refers to an abstract object.

We can then reconcile (1) and (2) by replacing the original dyad with

1* There are no purely fictional concreta

2*  There are some purely fictional abstracta.

The abstract artifact theory allows us to accommodate our three datanic or near-datanic points.  The first was that Bone does not exist.  We accommodate it by saying that there is no concretum, Bone.  The second was that Bone is a creature of a novelist's creativity.  We accommodate that by saying that what Hamilton created was the abstract artifact, Bone*, which exists.  Bone does not exist, but the abstract surrogate Bone* does.  The third point was that there are truths about Bone that nevertheless do not entail his existence.  We can accommodate this by saying that while Bone does not exemplify such properties as being human and being an alcoholic, he encodes them. (To employ terminology from Ed Zalta.)  This requires a distinction between two different ways for an item to have a property.

I do not endorse the above solution.  But I would like to hear why Brightly rejects it, if he does.

More on the Rationality of Political Ignorance

Alex L. writes, "I was interested in the post where you mentioned voting rationality.  I've heard this argument as well — that the chance your vote will influence elections is minuscule, so it's not rational to vote."

But that is not the argument.  The argument is not to the conclusion that it is not rational to vote, but that it is rational for many people to remain ignorant of past and present political events and other relevant facts and principles that they would have to be well-apprised of if they were to vote in a thoughtful and responsible manner.

What is at issue is not the rationality of voting but the rationality of political ignorance. 

The reason it is rational for many people to remain politically ignorant is that one's vote will have little or no effect on the outcome.  To become and remain politically knowledgeable as one must be if one is to make wise decisions in the voting booth takes a considerable amount of initial and ongoing work.  I think Ilya Somin has it right:

. . . political ignorance is actually rational for most of the public, including most smart people. If your only reason to follow politics is to be a better voter, that turns out not be much of a reason at all. That is because there is very little chance that your vote will actually make a difference to the outcome of an election (about 1 in 60 million in a presidential race, for example). For most of us, it is rational to devote very little time to learning about politics, and instead focus on other activities that are more interesting or more likely to be useful.

And please note that if it is rational for many to remain politically ignorant, that is consistent with the rationality of others to become and remain politically knowledgeable.  I gave three reasons for someone like me to be politically savvy.

First.  My goal is to understand the world as best I can.  The world contains political actors, political institutions, and the like.  Therefore, in pursuit of my goal it is rational to study politics.

Second. Politics is interesting  the way spectator sports are.  Now I don't give a flying enchilada about the latter.  Politics are my sports.  In brief, staying apprised of political crapola is amusing and diverting and also has the salutary effect of reminding me  that man is a fallen being incapable of dragging his sorry ass out of the dreck by his own power,  or, in Kantian terms, that he is a piece of crooked timber out of which no straight thing ever has been or ever will be made.

Third.  Knowledge of current events in the political sphere can prove useful when it comes to protecting oneself and one's family.  Knowledge of the Obaminations of the current administration, for example, allows one to to plan and prepare.

It is also worth pointing out that while political ignorance is for many if not most citizens rational, that it not to say that it is good. 

Note finally that if it is not rational for most of us to acquire and maintain the political knowledge necessary to vote wisely, election after election, that is not to say that it is not rational for most of us to vote.  For one can vote the way most people do, foolishly.  Consider those voters who vote a straight Democrat ticket, election after election.  That takes little time and no thought and may well be more rational than not voting at all.  Let's say you are a welfare recipient or a member of a teacher's union or an ambulance chaser.  And let's assume you are voting in a local election.  Then it might be in your interest, though it would not be for the common good, to vote a straight Dem ticket.  It might well be rational given that no effort is involved.

The Lonesome Death of an Old Australian Woman

Here (HT: Karl White)

A ninety year old woman died in her home in Auburn. She had decomposed through the floor before she was found six months later. The diaries found in her belongings shed light on this lonely and brilliant mind. Watch the documentary above, and read further excerpts from her diaries below.

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Beatle Song Titles in Latin

Try to guess the English title before clicking on the link.

Te perspicio

Dies in vita

Hic, illic, ubique

Pecuniam numquam me afferas

Manus tuam continere volo

Arcanum cognoscere vis

Puella

Aliquid.  Probably George Harrison's best composition.  One of the great love songs.

Ab me ad te

Hic venit sol.  YouTuber comment: "The Beatles are an antidepressant.  This song is a great example!"

Intus te sine te.  Another great Harrison song. 

I have borrowed from here and here.  There may be errors in the Latin.  I am not enough of a Latinist to be sure.

‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ and Gerundives

I just now noticed that the following two sentences are interchangeable salva significatione:

Gluttony is to be avoided

Gluttony ought to be avoided.

A curious linguistic tidbit, possibly of philosophical use later, possibly of no such use at all.  But interesting either way.  So I note it en passant.

Addendum (literally, something to be added or that ought to be added)

Seldom Seen Slim e-mails:

I see that you've just discovered the obsolescent gerundive or future passive construction in English.
 
"Gluttony is to be avoided" = "Gluttony is a thing to be avoided" = Gluttony is something we should/ought to avoid" (pretty much equivalent statements).
 
But now are any of these statements at all? How do they differ from the directive "Avoid gluttony!", which is plainly no statement at all.
Well, I was careful to call them sentences, not statements.
 
There look to be two puzzles here.  The one that struck me was:  how can a future passive construction be used to make a normative point?  Compare the gluttony example with this one:  'The execution is to occur tomorrow at sunrise.'  This does not mean that the execution ought to occur tomorrow at sunrise, if 'ought' has a normative sense.  Or perhaps a clearer example would be this: 'The sunrise is to occur tomorrow at 5:30 A.M.'  The latter cannot be replaced salva significatione by 'The sunrise ought to occur tomorrow at 5:30 A.M.' if 'ought' has normative bite.  It is just a prediction.  It means that the sunrise will occur tomorrow at 5:30 A. M.  It is strictly speaking a future passive construction with no modal component.
 
Slim's concern is different.  His question, I take it, is this.  When I utter 'Guttony is to be avoided' am I making a statement or issuing a command?  I am making a statement.  I am stating that the action-type inordinate eating has a certain deontic property, the property of being such that it ought not be tokened. I am using a sentence in the indicative mood to make that statement.  If I utter 'Avoid inordinate eating' I utter a sentence in the imperative mood and issue a command.
 
The Roman senate or the emperor could say to the army, Cartago delenda est, meaning that Carthage is to be/ought to be/should be/must be destroyed.  But the senate or the emperor could say this without issuing a command.

 Related articles

God Doesn’t Philosophize

He doesn't need to.  We need to. But our neediness goes together with our inability to make any progress at it.  A double defect: need and inability.  The truth we need we cannot acquire by our own efforts.  It is this fact that motivates some philosophers to consider the possibility of divine revelation.  They can raise the question of revelation without quitting Athens.  See Blondel.

The Wise Live by Probabilities, not by Possibilities

The worldly wise live by the probable and not by the possible.  It is possible that you will reform the person you want to marry.  But it is not probable. 

Don't imagine that you can change a person in any significant way.  What you see now in your partner is what you will get from here on out.  People don't change.  They are what they are.  The few exceptions prove the rule.  The wise live by rules, not exceptions, by probabilities, not possibilities.  "Probability is the very guide to life." (Bishop Butler quoting Cicero, De Natura, 5, 12) It is foolish to gamble with your happiness.  We gamble with what is inconsequential, what we can afford to lose.  So if there is anything about your potential spouse that is unacceptable, don't foolishly suppose that  you will change her.  You won't. You must take her as she is, warts and all, as she must take you.

The principle applies not only to marriage but across the board.

The Rationality of Political Ignorance

There are those who love to expose and mock the astonishing political ignorance of Americans.  According to a 2006 survey, only 42% of Americans could name the three branches of government.  But here is an interesting question worth exploring: 

Is it not entirely rational to ignore events over which one has no control and withdraw into one's private life where one does exercise control and can do some good?

I can vote, but my thoughtful vote counts for next-to-nothing in most elections, especially when it is cancelled out by the vote of some thoughtless and uninformed idiot.  I can blog, but on a good day I will reach only a couple thousand readers worldwide and none of them are policy makers.  (I did have some influence once on a Delta airline pilot who made a run for a seat in the House of Representatives.)  I can attend meetings, make monetary contributions, write letters to senators and representatives, but is this a good use of precious time and resources?  I think Ilya Somin has it right:

. . . political ignorance is actually rational for most of the public, including most smart people. If your only reason to follow politics is to be a better voter, that turns out not be much of a reason at all. That is because there is very little chance that your vote will actually make a difference to the outcome of an election (about 1 in 60 million in a presidential race, for example). For most of us, it is rational to devote very little time to learning about politics, and instead focus on other activities that are more interesting or more likely to be useful.

Is it rational for me to stay informed?  Yes, because of my intellectual eros, my strong desire to understand the world and what goes on in it. The philosopher is out to understand the world; if he is smart he will have no illusions about changing it, pace Marx's 11th Thesis on Feuerbach.

Another reason for people like me to stay informed is to be able to anticipate what is coming down the pike and prepare so as to protect myself and my stoa, my citadel, and the tools of my trade.  For example, my awareness of Obama's fiscal irresponsibility is necessary if I am to make wise decisions as to how much of my money I should invest in precious metals and other hard assets.  Being able to anticipate Obaminations re: 'gun control' will allow me to buy what I need while it is still to be had.   'Lead' can prove to be useful for the protection of gold.  And so on.

In brief, a reason to stay apprised of current events is not so that I can influence or change them, but to be in a position so that they don't influence of change me.

A third reason to keep an eye on the passing scene, and one mentioned by Somin, is that one might follow politics the way some follow sports. Getting hot and bothered over the minutiae of baseball and the performance of your favorite team won't affect the outcome of any games, but it is a source of great pleasure to the sports enthusiast.  I myself don't give a damn about spectator sports.  Politics are my sports.  So that is a third reason for me to stay on top of what's happening.

All this having been said and properly appreciated, one must nevertheless keep things in perspective by bearing  in mind  Henry David Thoreau's beautiful admonition:

Read not The Times; read the eternities!

For this world is a vanishing quantity whose pomps, inanities, Obaminations and what-not will soon pass into the bosom of nonbeing. And you with it.

Buried Alive

Islamic State kills 500 Yazidis, burying some alive.

Who will stand up to these rampaging Islamists who threaten civilization itself?  The cheese-sucking French?  The dolce vita Italians?

Paleocon, libertarian, and hard left noninterventionists need to ask themselves this question.

For a paleocon response, see Patrick J. Buchanan, Is ISIS an 'Existential Threat'?