Maverick Philosopher – Page 368 – Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Trump Against the Pussycons

'Pussycon' is a crude moniker for those I have variously described as milquetoast conservatives, yap-and-scribble do-nothings, and bow-tie boys. Esther Goldberg:

The hanky-clutching, cluck-clucking, tsk-tsking faction of the Conservative movement is in for a rough and bumpy ride over the next four to eight years.

They’re the ones who wanted a Republican president who looked like the male manikin on top of the wedding cake. You know, like Mitt Romney. And who were shocked when they got one who wore a baseball cap and spoke with a Queens accent. Like Al Capp’s S.W.I.N.E. (Students Wildly Indignant about Nearly Everything), they are perpetually offended by everything Donald Trump says and does. By the fact that he simply exists.

I call them the Pussycons. They’re demanding a prissiness from Republican politicians, a refined politesse that distinguishes them from the swinish multitude. For George Will, you had to be able to imagine him “in an Iowa living room, with a macaroon in one hand and cup of hot chocolate balanced on a knee.” A George H.W. Bush, dangling a tea cup. Or a Mitt Romney, so much more elevated than his 47 percent of “takers.”

Continue reading “Trump Against the Pussycons”

Reading Now: When Reason Goes on Holiday (Encounter, 2016)

Neven Sesardić is a Croatian philosopher, born in 1949. He has taught philosophy at universities in Croatia, the United States, Japan, England, and Hong Kong. An earlier book of his is Making Sense of Heritability (Cambridge U. P., 2005).

“Gripping, thoroughly researched and documented, judiciously argued, and alternately depressing and infuriating, Sesardić’s courageous book offers the astounding spectacle of some of the greatest minds of the past century―including Carnap, Einstein, Gödel, and Wittgenstein―adopting odious political views, supporting Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, for simplistic and plainly fallacious reasons. More shocking still is the story of how prominent journals, encyclopedias, and the American Philosophical Association itself have sacrificed academic integrity on the altar of political activism. Great philosophers repeatedly reveal themselves as terrible thinkers when it comes to morality and politics, plunging headlong into complex controversies without drawing elementary distinctions or differentiating degrees of good or evil.” ―Daniel Bonevac, professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin

The book arrived yesterday. Flipping though it, I was surprised and pleased to find a quotation from one William Vallicella on p. 168. This is from a letter that protests a proposed group resolution on the death penalty:

What then could justify the APA in taking sides on the sort of broadly philosophical issues that tend to become bones of contention in the political arena? . . . Furthermore, by what principle was the death penalty chosen as the topic of an APA resolution rather than, say, partial-birth abortions? Should the APA endorse a package of positions, issuing pronunciamentos on the Balanced Budget Amendment, handgun control and ebonics? If not, why not? (William Vallicella).

Here is a second, later letter of protest (November 2003) that I sent to the A. P. A. before cancelling my membership:

An Identity Theory of Predication

I will sketch a two-name, quasi-Scholastic, nominalistic/reistic theory of predication that I believe is quite hopeless. But it may serve as a foil against which and in comparison to which a more plausible theory may be developed.

Suppose it is true that Sam is poor. What are the truth-conditions of 'Sam is poor'? Rewrite the sentence as 'Sam is a poor individual.' Think of 'Sam' ('S') and ''poor individual' ('P') as names where the first name is proper and the second common. We assume that there are no universals. Accordingly, 'poor' in our original sentence cannot be construed as an abstract substantive, as a proper name for the universal poorness. It must be construed as a common name for poor individuals.

And because we are assuming that there are no universals, we cannot parse 'Sam is poor' as 'Sam instantiates poorness.' Nor can we take the truth-maker of 'Sam is poor' to be the state of affairs, Sam's being poor.

First idea. 'Sam is a poor individual' is true just in case:

A. For some x, 'S' denotes x and for some x, 'P' denotes x.

This is obviously insufficient since it doesn't guarantee that the item denoted by 'S' is numerically the same as one of the items denoted by 'P.' While the second two occurrences of 'x' are bound variables, they are not bound by the same quantifier. So we try

B. For some x, 'S' denotes x and 'P' denotes x.

This is much better. The second and third occurrences of 'x' are bound by the same quantifier. This ensures that the item denoted by 'S' is identical to one of the items denoted by 'P.' The first item is called 'Sam' and the second we can call 'Poboy.' Obviously these names denote one and the same item given that our sentence is true.

This yields an identity theory of predication. A simple predicative sentence such as 'Sam is poor' is true just in case the denotatum of the subject term is identical to one of the denotata of the predicate term. The truth-maker of the sentence is the identity of Sam with Poboy, i.e., the identity of Sam with himself.

Objection 1. Sam might not have been poor. But it is not the case that Sam might not have been Sam. So the manifestly contingent truth of 'Sam is poor' cannot be explained in terms of identity.

Objection 2. That was a modal objection; now for a temporal one. The poor have been known to become rich. Suppose Sam goes from poor to rich. The identity theory implies that Sam, who was identical to Poboy, ceases to be identical to Poboy and become identical to Richboy. But surely this is absurd inasmuch as it is equivalent to saying that Sam, who was numerically the same as himself, is now no longer numerically the same as himself.

This is absurd because, if Sam changes in respect of wealth, going from poor to rich, there has to be a self-same substrate of this change. Sam must remain numerically the same through the change. After all, the change is accidental, not substantial. The identity theory of predication, however, cannot accommodate these truisms. For if Sam is poor in virtue of being identical to one of the poor individuals, then he cannot become rich without ceasing to be himself.

Notice how these problems disappear if properties are admitted. Sam instantiates the property of being poor, but he might not have. Sam instantiates the property of being poor at one time but not at others.

I now invite the Noble Opponent to show how his version of the identity theory circumvents these objections, if it does.

Carnap and Clarity

Potentiality and the Substance View of Persons

Objective Truth as a Condition of Intelligibility

Divine Simplicity and God's Contingent Knowledge: An Aporetic Tetrad

The Rage of Sally Haslanger

Here.

I discuss, not her rage, but some of her ideas in Is Beef Food? and in the ComBox to 'Women are Better at Looking After Children.'

The Continuing Meltdown of Bill Kristol

An excellent piece by Chris Buskirk

Can Friendship Survive Deep Disagreement?

Clearly friendship can survive deep disagreement if it is over some abstruse topic in the philosophy of language, say. The question I intend, however, is whether friendship can continue among those who find themselves in profound disagreement over matters that touch us 'existentially.' Politics and religion supply plenty of examples. Here too friendship can survive and even thrive. It may be worth reminding ourselves of this in these dark times.

In an optimistic piece entitled "The Value of Unexpected Friends," K. E. Colombini cites examples of prominent ideological opponents who were on friendly terms. The case that surprised me was the friendship of Ruth Baader Ginsburg with the late Antonin Scalia.

When Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia passed away unexpectedly in February 2016, perhaps the colleague who mourned the most was Ruth Bader Ginsburg. While they differed greatly in their day jobs, they formed a surprisingly deep friendship based on mutual respect and interests. [. . .]

“From our years together at the D.C. Circuit, we were best buddies,” Justice Ginsburg’s statement reads, in part. “We disagreed now and then, but when I wrote for the Court and received a Scalia dissent, the opinion ultimately released was notably better than my initial circulation. He was a jurist of captivating brilliance and wit, with a rare talent to make even the most sober judge laugh. It was my great good fortune to have known him as working colleague and treasured friend.”

[. . .]

One of Scalia’s more famous quotes, shared often in social media these days, was given in a 2008 interview on 60 Minutes: “I attack ideas, I don’t attack people—and some very good people have some very bad ideas.”

[. . .]

Separating ideas from people, like hating the sin but not the sinner, is a challenging act, but it is one that is ultimately valuable. Taking the time to get to know someone—even the person we battle with—opens doors that help us understand not only the debated issue, but also ourselves, better.

While there are cases of ideological opponents who remain on good terms, there are even more cases in which they don't.

Colombini article here.

Past, Present, and Future Walked into a Bar . . .

. . . and things began to get tense.

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Cats

Loving Spoonful, Nashville Cats, 1966. They's playin' since they's babies.

Harry Chapin, Cat's in the Cradle. For you fathers out there. Bond with your son when he's five. Wait till he's 50 and he won't give you the time of day.

Tokens, The Lion Sleeps Tonight, 1961

Bent Fabric, Alley Cat, 1962. Bent fabric can be said to have a kink in it. Therefore,

Kinks, Phenomenal Cat

Tom Jones, What's New Pussycat? 1965. This reminds me to get my wife a pussyhat for her birthday to wear while I watch O'Reilly and the boys.

Norma Tanega, Walkin' My Cat Named 'Dog.' The queen of the one-hit wonders?

Mongo Santamaria, El Pussycat. If you remember this one, I'll buy you a pussyhat and a watermelon. While we have Mongo Santamaria cued up, here is his rather better-known Watermelon Man, muchachos.

Buck Owens, Tiger by the Tail. This one goes out to Kathy P.

Stray Cats, Stray Cat Strut

Ted Nugent, Cat Scratch Fever

Sue Thompson, Paper Tiger, 1965. This one's for Barack "Red Line" Obama.

Elton John, Honky Cat, 1972

Robert Petway, Catfish Blues, 1941. An influential song in the history of the blues.

Note to Correspondents

Please don't take it amiss if I fail to respond to your missives or do so in a cursory manner. I must be selective. Philosophia longa, vita brevis. The clock is running, and I have a lot to finish before the flag falls.

Diversity Can Be Our Weakness

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada responding to the fatal shooting at the Centre culturel islamique de Québec located in the Ste-Foy neighbourhood of the city of Québec:

Diversity is our strength, and religious tolerance is a value that we, as Canadians, hold dear.

I should think that strength derives from unity, not diversity. "United we stand; divided we fall." See Mark 3:25: "And if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand"; Matthew 12:25: "And Jesus knew their thoughts, and said unto them, Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand," and Luke 11:17: "But he, knowing their thoughts, said unto them, Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and a house divided against a house falleth."

Diversity is of course good within limits. But a diversity worth having must submit to the control and discipline of the competing value, unity. Otherwise, diversity divides and destroys.

Given that we are united in our commitment to religious liberty, we can tolerate a diversity of religious and anti-religious views. Unfortunately, Islam is not known for its toleration of competing faiths and non-faiths. In its core doctrine Islam is radically totalitarian and suppressive of dissent. So radical Islam cannot be tolerated since it opposes toleration and religious liberty.

A diversity so diverse that it tolerates the enemies of toleration and diversity is destructive.

Much of the yammering about diversity by liberals is nothing but empty virtue-signalling. Liberals need to show appreciation for the competing value of unity. Until they do so we should denounce them as destructive fools.

I of course condemn the attack on the Québec mosque.

The Dilemma of Sebastian Rodrigues in Endo’s Silence: Ethical or Merely Psychological?

This entry assumes familiarity with the story recounted by Shusaku Endo in his novel, Silence. Philip L. Quinn's "Tragic Dilemmas, Suffering Love, and Christian Life" (The Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 17, no. 1, Spring 1989, 151-183) is the best discussion of the central themes of the novel I have read. I thank Vlastimil Vohanka for bringing Quinn's article to my attention.

Quinn argues powerfully and plausibly that Rodrigues is "trapped in an ethical dilemma." (171) I will suggest, however, that while the dilemma is genuine, it cannot be ethical. Let us first hear what Quinn has to say:

When Rodrigues tramples on the fumie [image of Christ] what he does, I think, is both to violate a demand of his religious vocation binding on him no matter what the consequences and to satisfy an equally pressing demand for an expression of love of neighbor. The case resists subsumption under one but not the other of these descriptions. Both demands are characteristic of distinctively Christian ethic. They spring from a single source: the commandment that we both love God with total devotion and love our neighbor as ourselves. The misfortune is that Rodrigues cannot, given that he is the kind of person his life has made him, satisfy one of these demands without violating the other. He is, I suggest, trapped in an ethical dilemma. (170-171)

Quinn then proceeds to explain what an ethical dilemma is:

There is an ethical dilemma when a person is subject to two ethical demands such that he cannot satisfy both and neither demand is overridden or nullified. [. . .] Demands that are neither overridden nor nullified are in force. When one confronts two conflicting ethical demands both of which are in force, one is caught in an ethical dilemma. It seems to be that this is the situation of Sebastian Rodrigues.

I will now attempt to set forth the problem as clearly as I can.

A. The two great commandments that contain the whole law of God are:

Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind, and with thy whole strength;
Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

And one of them, a doctor of the Law, putting him to the test, asked him, "Master, which is the great commandment in the Law?" Jesus said to him, "'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind.' This is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like it, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.' On these two commandments depend the whole Law and the Prophets." (Matthew 22:35-40)

B. Both demands are morally obligatory because they are divinely commanded.

C. Both are equally obligatory: neither takes precedence over the other.

D. Neither demand can be overridden and neither can be nullified.

E. An exterior act of apostasy such as trampling on the fumie even without a corresponding interior act of apostasy counts as a violation of the first commandment.

F. Failing to engage in a simple exterior act such as trampling on the fumie that will save many from prolonged torture and death is a violation of the second commandment. Therefore:

G. Rodrigues faces a dilemma: he must satisfy both demands, but he cannot satisfy both demands.

But is this dilemma an ethical dilemma? Arguably not.

H. Ought implies Can: If one ought to do x, i.e., if one is morally obliged to do x, then it must be possible that one do x. Contrapositively, if it is not possible that one do x, then one is not morally obliged to do x.

I. It is not possible that Rodrigues satisfy both demands in the terrible situation in which he finds himself. Therefore:

J. Rodrigues is not morally obliged to satisfy both demands in the situation in which he finds himself. This is not to say that, in general, a Christian is not morally obliged to satisfy both demands; it is is to say that a person in the situation in which Rodrigues find himself is under no moral obligation to satisfy both.

At best he is in an awful psychological bind. The dilemma is psychological, not ethical. Quinn may be committing a non sequitur when we writes (emphasis added),

The misfortune is that Rodrigues cannot, given that he is the kind of person his life has made him, satisfy one of these demands without violating the other. He is, I suggest, trapped in an ethical dilemma.

From the fact that R. is deeply psychologically conflicted due to the circumstances he is in and the kind of person his life has made him, it does not follow that he is in an ethical dilemma. He cannot be morally obliged to do what it is impossible for him to do. So:

K. Rodriguez is not "trapped in an ethical dilemma."

L. We should also note that if Rodrigues does face an ethical dilemma, then this would seem to show that there is something deeply incoherent about Christian ethics. This would not follow if the dilemma is merely psychological.

M. So what should Rodrigues do? Exactly what he is depicted as doing in the novel. I can think of two reasons that justify trampling upon the fumie and saving the prisoners from torture.

The first is that his apostasy is merely external, not in his heart, and therefore arguably not apostasy at all in the precise circumstances in which he finds himself. So (E) above, even if true in general cannot be true for R. in the circumstances.

The second is that, given the silence of God, it is much better known (or far more reasonably believed) that the prisoners should be spared from unspeakable torture by a mere foot movement than that God exists and that Rodrigues' exterior act of apostasy would be an offence God as opposed to a mere betrayal by Rodrigues of who he is and has become by his life choices.

Proof that I am a Native American

A while back a front page story in the local rag of record, The Arizona Republic, implied that one is either a native American, a black, or an Anglo. Now with my kind of surname, I am certainly no Anglo. And even though I am a 'person of color,' my color inclining toward a sort of tanned ruddiness, I am undoubtedly not black either.

It follows that I am a native American. This conclusion is independently supported by the following argument:

1. I am a native Californian.
2. California is in America.
3. If x is native to locality L, and L is within the boundaries of M, then x is a native M-er.
Therefore
I am a native American.

This argument is impeccable in point of logical form, and sports manifestly true premises. What more do you want?

Note that (2) is true whether 'America' is taken to refer to the USA or to the continent of North America.

Let us also observe that since I am a native American, it cannot be the case that "we are all immigrants" as far too many liberal knuckleheads like to claim.

We need more mockery of liberals. There is little point in attempts to engage them on the plane of reason, for that is not the plane they inhabit.

Two Good Articles on Predication Theory

Ignacio Angelelli, Predication Theory: Classical versus Modern

Gyula Klima, The Essentialist Nominalism of John Buridan

The SCOTUS Argument for Trump Vindicated

Had he lost the election, Trump would be remembered mainly for his ugly words. But having won, he is redeemed by his already long string of ameliorative actions, the latest and best of which has been his nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court. Gorsuch is the recipient of high praise from many quarters, including the precincts of NeverTrumpers like Robert P. George.

One has to wonder what these NeverTrumpers were thinking and drinking when they fancied that the Republic could survive 4-8 years of Hillary and her destructive SCOTUS appointments, then to be miraculously saved — by whom? Mitt Romney? Jeb! Bush? But perhaps it is now time to show charity and cease rubbing the noses of the NeverTrumpers in their bad judgment.

I doubt whether any of these prominent NeverTrumpers will publicly confess their errors, but from the columns they are now writing one can see that many of them are coming around.

"Power is the ultimate aphrodisiac." (Henry Kissinger)