This entry continues the discussion with my Right-identitarian interlocutor. My current position is one of rejection of both Left- and Right-identitarianism. I am open, however, to a change of position. That is part of what makes me a philosopher as opposed to an ideologue. I wrote in my critique of Dennis Prager:
"The correct view is that racial differences are real and significant just as sexual and age differences are real and significant, but for purposes of social harmony and political cooperation we had better not identify ourselves racially but in terms of attributes more conducive to comity." My correspondent responds:
I agree with your criticisms of Prager. In a normal society men don't pretend that they're just human beings rather than men (who are also human beings) and women don't pretend that they're just human beings rather than women. Rather, in a normal society the distinctive male and female abilities and interests and ways of being are accepted, and society adapts itself to these differences–these male and female 'identities' in other words. But then, if race is similar to sex and age in this respect, why would it be bad for people to 'identify' in terms of race along with attributes like sex and age? Shouldn't we say instead that this is also reasonable and healthy?
In discussions like these it is always a good idea to seek (and rejoice over) points of agreement. Points of disagreement will emerge soon enough.
One thing we can agree on is that no human being can be just a human being if that implies having no sex or no race or no age or no height, etc. And so if I pretended to be a human being indeterminate with respect to one or more of the above-listed attributes, then my pretense would empty and absurd. My talk of treating people as individuals rather than as tokens of ethnic or racial types does not imply that they are bare individuals bereft of all attributes.
But there is nothing empty or absurd about prescinding from this or that characteristic in certain contexts. Characteristics prescinded from don't matter for the purpose at hand, but they are still there. For example, age and citizenship matter when it comes to voting, but race and sex by current law do not and ought not. But if we don't take into consideration a person's sex when it comes to the right to vote, it does not follow that the person is sexless. In general, if attribute A is instantiated by the members of a given population of individuals, and abstraction is made from A, it does not follow that the members of the population are indeterminate with respect to A.
So far, near-platitudes, unless my opponent questions my voting example which I fear he might. (If he does, then that discussion belongs in a separate thread.) We have yet to locate the bone of contention.
Are there "distinctive male and female abilities and interests"? I would say so, and I would add that they are not merely socially constituted. The biology of the female plays a role in the explanation of why women are more nurturing than men, more cooperative and conciliatory, make better real estate agents, but also why they are more emotional than men and why their political judgment is not as good. (I would argue, however, that the last two points are not reasons to withhold from women full voting rights.) So far, then, no disagreement. No disagreement with my conservative interlocutor, that is. I have already said enough to elicit howls of rage from the lunatic Left. Their howling, however, is music to my ears. Their destructive extremism only galvanizes the resoluteness of my opposition to them.
Does it follow that there are male and female 'identities'? Here is where it gets tricky and sticky. 'Identity' can be used in different ways. What is meant by 'identity 'here ? A stereotype? That is apparently what my sparring partner has in mind. I will assume that he agrees with me that stereotypes, most of them, or at least many of them, have a fundamentum in re and are true in the way that generic statements can be true. (It is surely true, for example, that Germans are more rule-bound and respectful of authority than Italians. See this list of generic statements.) Stereotypes are not, most of them, expressions of mindless bigotry or irrational hatred of the Other. What are truly mindless and irrational are liberal denials of this plain truth.
My opponent is going to agree with me that women as a group are more nurturing, caring, cooperative, conciliatory, averse to heated disagreement, better with children, etc., than men as a group. But that is a positive, accurate stereotype which not all women fit. Women are nurturing and Sally is a woman; it does not follow, however, that Sally is nurturing. 'Women are nurturing' is a generic statement: it cannot be replaced by a universal generalization such as 'Every woman is nurturing.' Sally is a chess-playing, nerdy engineer who works for Google, worships Ayn Rand, enjoys heated debate, and has no interest in children or in taking care of anybody. And all of this without prejudice to her being, and being essentially (as opposed to accidentally), a full-fledged biological female with the 'plumbing' and chromosomal make-up to prove it.
It may be that my opponent is conflating stereotype with identity. In one sense of 'identity,' the identity of a thing is what it is by nature, what it is essentially. Since Sally does not fit the gender stereotype, and yet is essentially biologically female, we ought not conflate identity with stereotype. (I am assuming a distinction between sex, which is a biological reality, and gender which, while it reflects sex, is in part socially determined. Anyone who elides the distinction I would have to consider very foolish indeed.)
My claim is that there are no "male and female 'identities'." There are male and female stereotypes and gender roles but no male and female identities. If there were a female identity or nature that included such stereotypical features as being nurturing, being conciliatory, shying away from heated argument, then every female would fit that identity; Sally does not fit the female identity; ergo, there is no female identity.
And because there is no female identity, if Sally so self-identifies, then her self-identification is a false self-identification. She falsely self-identifies if she so apperceives herself as to be nothing but an instance of that identity. And if we deny Sally her right to be a nerdy, chess-playing, Rand-reading, non-nurturing engineer, then we reduce her to a gender stereotype in violation of her true identity as a free, self-determining person. As an animal, Sally's biological identity or nature is essential to her; as a person, however, she is free to pursue engineering in defiance of the stereotype.
And the same goes for race. There are different races as a matter of biological-anthropological fact. (Race is not a mere social construct.) And there are different racial and ethnic stereotypes, accurate stereotypes, i.e., stereotypes with a basis in reality, some negative, some positive. But there is no white identity or black identity or Italian identity or Polish identity. Granted, I am essentially Caucasian and essentially of Italian ancestry; no change is possible in these respects. But there is no white identity that includes stereotypical features since there is no such identity had essentially by every biological white. Bear in mind that 'white' in this context does not refer to skin color but to race. It is a mistake to confuse race with skin color.
So I continue to maintain my thesis that, "for purposes of social harmony and political cooperation we had better not identify ourselves racially but in terms of attributes more conducive to comity." The opponent hasn't given me any good reason to abandon this thesis.
Is a reversion to tribalism, even if inevitable, something to be regretted, or is it healthy?
But then, in my critique of Prager, after listing some candidate attributes, I waxed pessimistic. For example, can we Americans identify for political purposes as Americans, as people committed to the values and principles enshrined in our founding documents? Obviously not. Too many of our fellow 'citizens' have no respect for these documents. The universities of the land are lousy with such people. There are leftist knuckleheads who speak of a 'living constitution,' which, of course, is no constitution at all. And in what sense are these fellow 'citizens' fellow citizens if they don't accept our great Constitution? Think of the liberal-left liberty-haters who call for the elimination of the Second Amendment.
"So I end with a dark thought: in the end tribalism wins."
Again I wonder why this is a dark thought. You seem to be considering the possibility that identities like 'citizen' or 'American' are too weak to form the basis for a healthy society. But suppose that's true. Then it's _good_ that people will eventually reject these identities in favor of some 'tribal' identity which could serve as a better basis for society–something that is more "conducive to comity". Suppose it's not true, and identities like 'citizen' are enough. Then it seems to me that people should be able to get along and share a society simply on the basis of being 'citizens' or 'Americans' while at the same time having distinct racial or tribal identities, just as they can share a society and get along despite having distinct identities based on sex and age.
Amazingly, my opponent thinks that tribalism is good and that tribal identification can unify us. I can't see that this makes any sense at all. So here we find a bone of serious contention! If we can no longer identify as citizens or Americans, it does not follow that tribal self-identification with the resultant Balkanization would be good.
I am saying that we conservatives, through inattention and inaction, have allowed things to get to the point where identities like 'citizen' and 'American' can no longer form the basis of a healthy society and polity. We are now in a very bad state of affairs. But tribalism makes things worse. The reversion to tribalism may be inevitable, but as I see it, it can't be good. Tribalism can't be the basis of comity or social harmony precisely because different tribes with different values and interests oppose one another. Furthermore, when we think and act tribally we fail to see important individual differences. Clearly, there are important differences between Clarence Thomas and Trayvon Martin, Jason Riley and Ta-Nehisi Coates, Walter E. Williams and Michael Brown. Coates is a despicable racist fool and an enemy, but I would love to have Riley and Williams and Thomas as next-door neighbors. No social harmony is likely to ensue if we lump all these blacks together as members of the opposing tribe. It is of course different in war. But we want to avoid war. Don't we?
I am saying that, as a matter of contingent fact, we are no longer united under an umbrella of shared values and principles, and that tribal identification will only make it worse. If, on the other hand, we were united under that 'umbrella,' then of course there would be no problem. We would be united publicly, and privately people could do their tribal thing.
Of course, there is a crucial disanalogy: Human nature is such that differences of sex and age occur naturally and inevitably within a given human community, since these are part of the basic structure of the extended family. By contrast, differences of race and ethnicity do not occur within the natural human community. On the contrary, since the natural community is based on the family and extended family, that kind of community eliminates racial or ethnic differences–any natural community ends up being a single racial-ethnic community.
So it's doubtful that racial difference and racial identity can be accepted as part of the normal structure of society in the way that these others already are. To the extent that racial and ethnic differences exist within a society, that society must be somewhat artificial; it must be made up of sub-cultures that have a stronger claim on the natural loyalties and identities of its members. Racial-ethnic differences are a primordial sign of Otherness, of Not Belonging–of potential danger and competition rather than safety and co-operation. We can try to pretend otherwise, but this is contrary to our own instincts, and it probably won't work in the long run. But, again, is this dark?
Well, intermarriage among different European ethnicities has worked hasn't it?
My opponent seems to be suggesting that racial/ethnic uniformity is essential for a well-functioning society. I don't buy it. Suppose blacks had never been brought as slaves to North America. The other racial and ethnic groups get along tolerably well. But the key is assimilation and commitment to a set of values and principles that transcend blood. Unfortunately, the Melting Pot is a thing of the past never to return. Leftists have destroyed it by exploiting racial tensions to forward their agenda. And of course we no longer agree on values and principles.
Horribile dictu, leftist filth are now attacking free speech!
Is invocation of Blut und Boden dark? I would say so. For one thing, blood ties and racial purity do not insure comity. I have more in common with Korean and Turkish philosophers than with anyone in my family. Consanguinity is no guarantee of spiritual affinity, and spiritual affinity can exist without consanguinity. We are told that "To the extent that racial and ethnic differences exist within a society, that society must be somewhat artificial; it must be made up of sub-cultures that have a stronger claim on the natural loyalties and identities of its members."
This begs the question by assuming what I argued against, namely, that there are ethnic and racial identities. Beside, the emphasis on narrow natural loyalties works against social harmony. That's the mentality of mafiosi. Social harmony requires a commitment to higher loyalties. John Gotti's children should have 'ratted out' their father. The Unabomber's brother was right to turn him in. He was acting under the inspiration of a higher loyalty.
Multi-culturalists and Leftists would say it's 'dark' to imagine shutting down mass immigration of Muslims into Europe–because for them, the attempt to force incompatible cultures together into some kind of incoherent mess seems good! But a conservative doesn't want to force people to live in weird new ways that (we think) go against human nature, so a conservative doesn't think it's 'dark' to imagine Muslims in Muslim lands, Christians in Christian lands, etc. Feminists think it's 'dark' to imagine a world where most women are focused on having kids and staying home to care for them, because they think the ideal is to have women be just like men in all respects; but a conservative thinks it's better to let the sexes live in ways they find natural, and so doesn't think this scenario is 'dark'. Of course, excessive tribalism is possible (and 'dark') but why not allow for some degree of tribalism? A sound conservative position, I think, is that society must provide people with healthy ways of expressing their instincts rather than forcing us to suppress them. Telling people they have to think of themselves as just 'citizens' or 'humans' is telling them to suppress some very powerful instincts. So (I think) conservatives should regard this as an oppressive and unhealthy policy.
We agree that allowing mass immigration of Muslims into Western lands is suicidal. This is because they don't, as a group, share our superior Western values and because they want to replace them with unenlightened Sharia-type values. It is not because of their being Turks or Arabs or whatever. (The few that do share our values can be allowed to immigrate.) And of course there is nothing 'dark' about traditional Muslims staying in their lands.
Nor is there anything 'dark' about women devoting themselves to the noble and difficult task of being good mothers and homemakers. The feminists who attack motherhood have a lot to answer for.
What I see as 'dark' is the racial self-identification on the identitarian Right. It amounts the deliberate erasure of one's unique personhood in favor of being an interchangeable token of an ethnic or racial type. (This has some connection to the Marxist notion of man as Gattungswesen, but I am not in a position to explain it clearly.) How can my identity reside in an attribute shared with billions of others?
My identity is what make me be me and no one else. It is therefore impossible to locate one's identity in being an interchangeable token of a racial type. For every token of a type, qua token of a type, is the same as every other one.
There is also a slippery slope consideration. If you identify as white, then why not as Southern white, and if Southern white, why not rural Southern white, and so on until you identify as a Hatfield or a McCoy?
Furthermore, race is part of my animality. So if I identity racially, then I identify myself as a particular instance of a particular race of animals. But I am more than an animal, and my true self cannot be located in my animality.
But now we move into metaphysics. This is unavoidable in a thorough discussion. But this entry is already too long. Tomorrow's another day.
