No Day Without Cultural Appropriation

Andrew Klavan:

Cultural appropriation is not a glitch of American life. It's a feature. It's part of what makes the country great. We take your culture, we get rid of the oppression, the mass murder, the slavery, the intransigent poverty and the endless internecine wars. We keep the pasta and the funny hats, and occasionally we dress up as you on Halloween. It's a good deal for everyone.

I think I'll make me a curry tonight, thereby paying tribute to Indian cuisine. I love Indian food. Americans who find it too hot are culinary pussies. They need to get out of their gastronomical ghettos and celebrate diversity. My curry might not turn out as good as a gen-u-ine Indian curry, but then again it might turn out better.

Klavan is being combative above, but it is well-justified punch-back against willful and vicious stupidity of the sort that leftist lunkheads specialize in dishing out.   Cultural appropriation is good: blacks on the bottom could improve their lot by 'acting white,' by appropriating those bourgeois values that Amy Wax was recently waxing enthusiastic over, and rightly so.  

I engage in cultural appropriation every day. Why just this morning I read a bit from the Old Testament. Am I a Jew?  And then I  prayed the Ave Maria in Latin with special emphasis on the beautiful Ora pro nobis peccatoribus, nunc et in hora mortis nostrae.

Am I a Roman?

Is English your native tongue? No? Then by what right do you speak OUR language?  You are engaging in cultural theft!

An Italian told me that there is no dish in Italy called pollo alla marsala. But there ought to be as you will readily agree after you've tasted mine. 

Klavan is right: it's a feature, not a bug. 

‘White Supremacist’ Values

The following are now widely viewed as 'white supremacist' values: merit, individual achievement, objectivity.

Leftists used to argue, fallaciously, that since outcomes are unequal for blacks and whites, 'racism' had to have been at work. As bad as that argument is, it was at least correctly assumed that people ought to be judged on their merits and by their achievements as individuals, and not discriminated against on the basis of race or sex.

But it turns out that the war against 'racism' has done little to improve the lot of blacks as a group.

So now the lunatic Left takes a different tack, that of rejecting the very values mentioned as 'white supremacist.' 

Hillary uses the slanderous phrase. One more reason to rejoice over her defeat.

The Wipeout of Obama’s Legacy

He who lives by the Executive Order shall die by the Executive Order.

The witticism is mine. Fred Barnes provides the documentation.

And a friendly tip of the hat to old blogger buddy Bill Keezer for keeping me well-supplied with cartoons and memes. I met old Bill back in the early days of the blogosphere, 'long about aught-four, when a lot of us first found each other and began enriching one another's lives.

Therein resides the beauty of blog: one draws to oneself the like-minded.

Obama shitcan

Does Obama have a legacy? A legacy is something good. 'Legacy' is not a pejorative.

On Keeping a Journal

Thomas Merton, Journals, Volume Two, p. 333, entry of 10 July 1949:

Keeping a journal has taught me that there is not so much new in the interior life as one sometimes thinks. When you re-read your journal you find out that your newest discovery is something you already found out five years ago. Still, it is true that one penetrates deeper and deeper into the same ideas and the same experiences.

Bolzano on Obligation and Supererogation

Here is a curious passage from Bernard Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre, sec. 147 (HT: V.V.):

. . . I take the concept of obligation in such a wide sense that it holds of every resolution which can be termed morally good, whether it is a definite duty or  or merely meritorious, so that we can say of both kinds that they ought to be performed. Thus I say, for example, that one ought not lie, which is a duty; and I also say that we ought to be charitable, which is not a duty, but merely meritorious . . . (Rolf George tr., p. 192)

I see it differently. The obligatory does not include the meritorious or supererogatory.  Both pertain to the actions and resolutions of rational beings.  The difference is that supererogatory actions are not required, whether morally or legally, whereas obligatory actions are.  

The obligatory is what one MUST do. The obligatory is the sphere of moral necessity.

The impermissible is what one MUST NOT do. The impermissible is the sphere of moral impossibility.

The permissible is what one MAY do. The permissible is the sphere of moral contingency.

The supererogatory is a proper subset of the permissible. Its intersection with the obligatory is null, and its intersection with the impermissible is also null.  

David Boaz on F. A. Hayek

Excerpts worth pondering:

Hayek’s last book, The Fatal Conceit, published in 1988 when he was approaching ninety, returned to the topic of the spontaneous order, which is “of human action but not of human design.” The fatal conceit of intellectuals, he said, is to think that smart people can design an economy or a society better than the apparently chaotic interactions of millions of people. Such intellectuals fail to realize how much they don’t know or how a market makes use of all the localized knowledge each of us possesses.

[. . .]

Reagan and Thatcher admired Hayek, but he always insisted that he was a liberal in the classical sense, not a conservative. The last chapter of “The Constitution of Liberty” was titled “Why I Am Not a Conservative.” He pointed out that the conservative “has no political principles which enable him to work with people whose moral values differ from his own for a political order in which both can obey their convictions. It is the recognition of such principles that permits the coexistence of different sets of values that makes it possible to build a peaceful society with a minimum of force. The acceptance of such principles means that we agree to tolerate much that we dislike.”

You won't hear about Hayek and his ideas in the the leftist seminaries, which is what most of our universities have become. Yet another reason to bring down the Left.  

Although I am experiencing some salutary pressure from the neo-reactionary direction, I continue to hold that a sound conservatism must incorporate the insights of the classical liberals. How to pull this off in concreto is of course a difficult question given the  limitations of libertarianism.

Libertarians seem to think that we are all rational actors who know, and are willing and able to act upon, our own long-term best self-interest.  This is manifestly not the case.  That is why drug legalization and open borders are disastrous. They are particularly disastrous for a welfare state, which is what we have, and which is not going to "wither away."  Sure, if libertarians were in charge there wouldn't be a welfare state; but the Libertarian Party of the USA — founded by USC philosopher John Hospers in 1970 by the way — will never gain power. They are the "Losertarian Party" to cop a moniker from Michael Medved.  Remember the clown they ran for president in 2016, the former governor of New Mexico?  I've already forgotten his name.  Something Johnson?

The libertarians think of man one-sidedly as homo oeconomicus. Accordingly, humans are "consistently rational and narrowly self-interested agents who usually pursue their subjectively-defined ends optimally."

That's a text-book case of false abstraction.

Libertarians have something  to learn from conservatives.  But go too far in the particularistic conservative direction and you end up with the tribalism of the Alt-Right . . . .

Perhaps we need to resurrect some version of fusionism. It might help with the current political 'fission' and 'centrifugality.' No doubt you catch my drift.

David Rubin: Why I Left the Left

David Rubin, who describes himself as gay, pro-choice, and classically liberal, explains why 'progressives' are in fact regressive. (A point I have made many times.) A Prager U video under five minutes in length.  

Trigger Warning! The video contains vicious, racist, incendiary content sure to melt snowflakes. Richly deserving of being 'demonetized' by Google if it hasn't been already. [Irony off]

Rubin, like so many others including Tucker Carlson, makes the standard mistake of conflating race with skin color. 

The Fantasy of Addiction

As long as this blog has been online, 14 years now, I have railed against the misuse of the the word 'addiction.' Thanks to Dave Lull, I am pleased to see that Peter Hitchens takes a similar line  in a First Things article. Excerpt:

The chief difficulty with the word “addiction” is the idea that it describes a power greater than the will. If it exists in the way we use it and in the way our legal and medical systems assume it exists, then free will has been abolished. I know there are people who think and argue this is so. But this is not one of those things that can be demonstrated by falsifiable experiment. In the end, the idea that humans do not really have free will is a contentious opinion, not an objective fact.

So to use the word “addiction” is to embrace one side in one of those ancient unresolved debates that cannot be settled this side of the grave. To decline to use it, by contrast, is to accept that all kinds of influences, inheritances, and misfortunes may well operate on us, and propel us towards mistaken, foolish, wrong, and dangerous actions or habits. It is to leave open the question whether we can resist these forces. I am convinced that declining the word “addiction” is both the only honest thing to do, and the only kind and wise thing to do, when we are faced with fellow creatures struggling with harmful habits and desires. It is all very well to relieve someone of the responsibility for such actions, by telling him his body is to blame. But what is that solace worth if he takes it as permission to carry on as before? Once or twice I have managed to explain to a few of my critics that this is what I am saying. But generally they are too furious, or astonished by my sheer nerve, to listen.

Read it all.

Related: The Case for Nicotine

Peter-and-Christopher-Hit-010

A Most Remarkable Prophecy

The Question

Suppose there had been a prophet among the ancient Athenians who prophesied the birth among them of a most remarkable man, a man having the properties we associate with Socrates, including the property of being named 'Socrates.'  Suppose this prophet, now exceedingly old, is asked after having followed Socrates' career and having witnessed his execution: Was that the man you prophesied?

Does this question make sense?  Suppose the prophet had answered, "Yes, that very man, the one who just now drank the hemlock, is the very man whose birth I prophesied long ago before he was born!"  Does this answer make sense?  

An Assumption

To focus the question, let us assume that there is no pre-existence of the souls of creatures.  Let us assume that Socrates, body and soul, comes into existence at or near the time of his conception.  For our problem is not whether we can name something that already exists, but whether we can name something that does not yet exist.

Thesis 

I say that neither the question nor the answer make sense.  (Of course they both make semantic sense; my claim is that they make no metaphysical or broadly logical sense.)  What the prophet prophesied was the coming of some man with the properties that Socrates subsequently came to possess.  What he could not have prophesied was the very man that subsequently came to possess the properties in question.  

What the prophet prophesied was general, not singular:  he prophesied that a certain definite description would come to be satisfied by some man or other. Equivalently, what the prophet prophesied was that a certain conjunctive property would come in the fullness of time to be instantiated, a property among whose conjuncts are such properties as being snubnosed, being married to a shrewish woman, being a master dialectician, being  accused of being a corrupter of youth, etc.  Even if the prophet had been omniscient and had been operating with a complete description, a description such that only one person in the actual world satisfies it if anything satisfies it, the prophecy would still be general. 

Why would the complete description, satisfied uniquely if satisfied at all, still be general?  Because of the possibility that some other individual, call him 'Schmocrates,' satisfy the description.  For such a complete description, uniquely satisfied if satisfied at all, could not capture the very haecceity and ipseity and identity of a concrete individual.

We can call this view I am espousing anti-haecceitist:  the non-qualitative thisness of a concrete individual cannot antedate the individual's existence.  Opposing this view is that of the haecceitist who holds that temporally prior to the coming into existence of a concrete individual such as Socrates, the non-qualitative thisness of the individual is already part of the furniture of the universe.

My terminology is perhaps not felicitous.  I am not denying that concrete individuals possess haecceity.  I grant that haecceity is a factor in an individual's  ontological 'assay' or analysis.  What I am denying is that the haecceity of an individual can exist apart from the individual whose haecceity it is.  From this it follows that the haecceity of an individual cannot exist before the individual exists.

But how could the non-qualitative thisness of a concrete individual be thought to antedate the individual whose thisness it is?  We might try transforming the non-qualitative thisness of a concrete individual into an abstract object, a property that exists in every possible world, and thus at every time in those worlds having time.

Consider the putative property, identity-with-Socrates.  Call it Socrateity.   Suppose our Athenian prophet has the power to 'grasp' (conceive, understand) this non-qualitative property long before it is instantiated. Suppose he can grasp it just as well as he can grasp the conjunctive property mentioned above.    Then, in prophesying the coming of Socrates, the prophet would be prophesying the coming of Socrates himself.  His prophecy would be singular, or, if you prefer, de re: it would involve Socrates himself.  

What do I mean by "involve Socrates himself"?  Before Socrates comes to be there is no Socrates.  But there is, on the haecceitist view I reject, Socrateity.  This property 'deputizes' for Socrates at times and in possible worlds at which our man does not exist.  It cannot be instantiated without being instantiated by Socrates.  And it cannot be instantiated by anything other than Socrates in the actual world or in any possible world.  By conceiving of Socrateity before Socrates comes to be, the Athenian prophet is conceiving of Socrates before he comes to be, Socrates himself, not a mere instance of a conjunctive property or a mere satisfier of a description.  Our Athenian prophet is mentally grabbing onto the very haecceity or thisness of Socrates which is unique to him and 'incommunicable' (as a Medieval philosopher might say) to any other in the actual world or in any possible world.

But what do I mean by "a mere instance" or a "mere satisfier"?

Let us say that the conjunctive property of Socrates mentioned above is a qualitative essence of Socrates if it entails every qualitative or pure property of Socrates whether essential, accidental, monadic, or relational.  If Socrates has an indiscernible twin, Schmocrates, then both individuals instantiate the same qualitative essence.  It follows that, qua instances of this qualitative essence, they are indistinguishable.  This implies that, if the prophet thinks of Socrates in terms of his qualitative essence, then his prophetic thought does not reach Socrates himself, but only a mere instance of his qualitative essence.  

My claim, then, is that one cannot conceive of an individual that has not yet come into existence.  Not even God can do it.  For until an individual comes into existence it is not a genuine individual.  Before Socrates came into existence, there was no possibility that he, that very man, come into existence.  (In general, there are no de re possibilities involving future, not-yet-existent, individuals.)  At best there was the possibility that some man or other come into existence possessing the properties that Socrates subsequently came to possess.  To conceive of some man or other is to think a general thought: it is not to think a singular thought that somehow reaches an individual in its individuality.

To conceive of a complete description's being satisfied uniquely by some individual or other it not to conceive of a particular individual that satisfies it.  If this is right, then one cannot name an individual before it exists.

Gimme Shelter

Sang the Stones. We conservatives need shelter and sanctuary. Leftists create sanctuary jurisdictions to shelter criminals and express their contempt for the Constitution and the rule of law. Push-back is now here in the form of gun sanctuaries.  We need liberty sanctuaries for free speech and open inquiry and religion as well. 

The Stones' lyrics are creepily relevant. They are displayed in the video to which I linked. "War, children, it's just a shot away, just a shot away. . . ."

The intro-buildup is one of the finest in the history of rock.

Of Patella and POTUS: The Mueller Squeeze

Having some trouble with my right knee, I purchased a Mueller compression sleeve which is putting the squeeze on my patella in a manner much to be preferred to the in terrorem manner Robert Mueller is putting the squeeze on POTUS.  And then there's Heinrich Mueller of Gestapo fame, no blood relation of Robert. I'll leave it to the better informed to assess the similarity of their tactics.

One thing is for sure: the criminalization of political differences is a serious threat to our republic.  Hats off to Alan Dershowitz for speaking out forcefully on this danger. 

The Generalized Ought-Implies-Can Principle and Novák’s Objection

This entry is an addendum to my Prague paper (see link below) in which I deploy a principle I call GOC, a principle that comes under withering fire in the ComBox from Dr. Lukáš Novák.  Here is my reformulation of his objection.  You will have to consult my Prague paper to see what I mean by 'really possible.' Neither of us are metaphysical naturalists, but we are assuming naturalism to be true for the sake of this discussion. The burden of my Prague paper is to show that metaphysical naturalism is not logically consistent with David Benatar's claim that "while some lives are better than others, none are (noncomparatively or objectively) good." (The Human Predicament  67)

1) Necessarily, if a state of affairs S ought to be, then S is really possible. (GOC)

2) That no child starves is a state of affairs that ought to be. (Novak's plausible premise. It is supposed to hold whether or not naturalism is true.)

Therefore:

3) That no child starves is really possible. (1, 2)

But:

4) That no child starves is not really possible on naturalism. (Premise I share with Novak:  e.g., a child who is the sole survivor of a shipwreck washes ashore  on a deserted island where there is no food.)

5) (3) and (4) are mutually contradictory.

Therefore, by reductio ad absurdum,

6) Either (1) is false or (2) is false or (4) is false.

7) (2) and (4) are both true. (Novak assumes)

Therefore

8) (1) is false.

How might I respond? Well, I agree that (4) is true.  And I have a separate argument for (1). So I argue that, on naturalism, (2) is false.  Thus I argue:

1) Necessarily, if a state of affairs S ought to be, then S is really possible. (GOC)

4) That no child starves is not really possible on naturalism.

Therefore

~2) It is not the case that on naturalism no child's starving ought to be.

This is the analog of the cases of the ought-to-do in which an agent cannot do X. If an agent cannot do X, then it is not the case that he ought to do X. 

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Is the Quality of Life Objectively Evaluable on Naturalism?